January 17, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation between General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency George Bunn and Soviet Counselor Yuli M. Vorontsov, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty and Other Arms Control Matters'

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Summary:

Information about the recent U.S.-West German discussions had leaked to the press and in this conversation, Vorontsov “wanted to know what we had told the Germans with respect to participation in a European nuclear force.” Bunn told him that the “Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of Europe.”

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 17, 1967

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty and Other Arms Control Matters (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Y. M. Vorontsov, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
George Bunn, General Counsel, ACDA

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Vorontsov invited me to lunch today. The following points were covered:

1. NPT - European Force. His reason for asking me to lunch was obviously his concern about stories which had appeared in the Washington Post and in Pravda concerning West German desires to participate in a European nuclear force. The Post story (Jan. 15, 1967) says West Germany "seeks firm assurance that the intended treaty will not foreclose the possible development of a European nuclear force, in which she might share.

* * * *

"The United States, it was said, has assured Bonn that any ambiguities in the treaty text will be fully clarified by United States officials when the treaty goes through the Senate. That is, that the United States will specify that the treaty would leave open the prospect for a European nuclear force which would not spread nuclear weapons to any individual nation.

"In theory, at least, the present British or French nuclear forces, or both, might some day be converted into a Western European force."

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The Pravda article reports Secretary McNamara as having promised to look after German interests in getting around clauses of the NPT. McNamara is reported to have told a German parliamentarian that the treaty would in no way infringe German rights to participate in a joint nuclear delivery system within NATO.

Vorontsov was concerned as to what the Post article might mean with respect to U.S. views on NPT interpretation, and as to what the Pravda article might mean with respect to his government's present views on the NPT negotiations. I said the Post story was not accurate, and did not come from sources within ACDA so far as we had been able to determine. The Pravda account about McNamara just didn't sound to me like anything that McNamara would say.

Vorontsov pressed to find out what the basis for these stories could possibly be. He wanted to know what we had told the Germans with respect to participation in a European nuclear force. I replied that the Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of Europe. The United States of America acquired the assets of Texas automatically when it came into the Union, and the U.S.S.R. acquired the assets of the individual Soviet Socialist Republics. An NPT could not be expected to prevent a United States of Europe from succeeding to the nuclear assets of France or the U.K. if they were consolidated into the new state, particularly in view of the changed political situation which would have to have come about. Succession to assets, of course, could not happen short of the creation of a new federated state. It could not happen with just an alliance or a group of states of that kind. In our view, a United States of Europe would be a "recipient" under the treaty, and the United States could not transfer its nuclear weapons to it. However, if France were one day consolidated with Germany into a new state, that new state would automatically have nuclear weapons. Statements reflecting this point of view would seem to me a small price for the Soviets to pay to gain FRG acquisition to the treaty.

Vorontsov did not disagree, but neither did he agree. He said he did not know what Moscow's view would be on this point.

2. NPT - FRG views. Vorontsov probed for the FRG's reaction to the treaty drafts. I said a spokesman for the Federal Government had reported that the Cabinet had given the enterprise approval in principle. This seemed to me to represent quite a step forward.

Vorontsov said that while, as a general rule, they did not like Democratic Socialists, they had been impressed with Brandt's party in the past. They were watching carefully whether Brandt and those who agreed with him, or the more conservative Christian Democrats, would win out in the government. He felt that FRG agreement to a non-proliferation treaty would be a concrete action the new government could take to evidence its desire to improve relations with its Eastern neighbors.

3. NPT - Safeguards. I said I was particularly concerned about the safeguards (Article III) problem. While Article I and II seemed more important now, in the years ahead, whether we got safeguards or not in places like the Near East and India and Pakistan would probably be at least as important as the provisions of Articles I and II. I did not personally see a way out of the dilemma at the moment, for meeting the Soviets' views on this would be nigh impossible for us. I asked him to report this to Roshchin (who he said was much concerned for a status report), and to ask whether Roshchin had any new ideas on how this problem might be resolved. He agreed that achieving safeguards throughout the world was of interest to both governments but said not to wait on them for new ideas. Roshchin had said the Soviets could not accept control of NATO members by other NATO members as he was leaving for Moscow. Vorontsov didn't expect any change in this view.

4. NPT - Timing of next meetings. Vorontsov wanted to know when they could expect to receive U.S. "official views" on Article I. He felt that, except for Article III, if we

agreed on Article I, there should be no other problems in the treaty draft. I asked whether we had a Soviet official agreement to Article I. He avoided a response at first but finally said that we did not. What we had was an indication that Article I would probably be acceptable to them. I told him our hope was to have an agreed co-chairmen's (U.S.-U.S.S.R.) recommendation to the ENDC when it resumed on February 21. I said I did not know when they would hear from us as to our views with respect to Article I, but it might not be before Mr. Foster and Amb. Roshchin were to meet on February 16. Vorontsov felt this was not soon enough to meet the February 21 deadline unless there was agreement to their view on Article III as well as to the Working Group text of Article I. If further negotiations were required with respect to Article III, the five days between the 16th and the 21st did not seem to him as sufficient. He asked whether there had not been some talk about a trip to Moscow for further discussions. I said, so far as I knew, there was no understanding concerning any such trip on our side although Washington, Moscow and New York had all been discussed earlier.

5. Comprehensive Test Ban. Vorontsov said that after the news on the "big hole" in Mississippi (Project STERLING), he assumed we would not be interested in moving forward on the comprehensive test ban. I said we had, of course, known for a long time that there was theoretical possibility of decoupling by using a big hole. We discussed this problem for a minute further but it seemed reasonably evident that he did not think this a fruitful topic for negotiation at this time.

6. Strategic offensive and defensive carriers. I asked whether they had any views on the statement on this subject in the State of the Union message. He said they had seen that and something else (unspecified). They would wait to see what Amb. Thompson had to say. He felt out of touch with his Government on this problem. As Amb. Dobrynin had told Mr. Foster on March 17, 1966, any discussion of ABM's should also include offensive missiles. However, Vorontsov did not know whether the Soviet government would wish to have a discussion of these matters now. It might be that they would simply say they saw

nothing fruitful to discuss at this time. He commented that our military people seemed to be against the discussions we had in mind and implied that their military people would have the same view. He said that while Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry might look upon a subject as a fruitful one for discussion, they would not be the ones to decide how the Soviet government would respond on a matter of this kind.

7. Chicoms. Vorontsov opined that Liu Shao-ch'i and his allies would win out in the end, but that they were really no more friendly to the Soviet Union than Mao was. He felt that Mao must have been in desperate straits to have called the teenage Red Guards to his support, and that this must be his last attempt to achieve supremacy. In his view, Lin Piao was not strong enough to rule the country when Mao was gone.

8. NPT - French views. Vorontsov said that the French had listened to Soviet views on NPT; that the French had said they would not put any obstacles in the way of the treaty; but that he did not think the French would sign. I asked whether the French would put obstacles in the way of IAEA safeguards in Euratom territory if the treaty required IAEA safeguards everywhere. He replied that the discussions had not gotten into that detail.