

June 1972

**A. Ross Johnson and Arnold L. Horelick, 'Communist
Political Succession'**

Citation:

"A. Ross Johnson and Arnold L. Horelick, 'Communist Political Succession'", June 1972, Wilson Center Digital Archive, RAND Report R-1958-DOS, June 1972, Secret. Abridged version publicly released in January 2003 with redaction only of classified source citations. Obtained and contributed by A. Ross Johnson.
<https://wilson-center.drivingcreative.com/document/208715>

Summary:

This 1972 RAND Report, prepared for the Department of State, describes possible alternative domestic and international "futures" and presents a framework for formation of U.S. policy toward post-Tito Yugoslavia. It includes appendices assessing Yugoslav developments and reviewing the history of U.S.-Yugoslav relations.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from MacArthur Foundation

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

R-1058-DOS (ABRIDGED)

Public Release
January 2003

June 1972

Communist Political Succession (U)

A. Ross Johnson and Arnold L. Horelick

A Report prepared for
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



COPY NO. _____

This research is supported by the Office of External Research Department of State under Contract 1722-220004-SCC-10499. Views or Conclusions contained in this study should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of Rand or of the Department of State.

Note

This study is one of a number done by academic and other institutions for the Department of State as part of the Department's program of external research. The program is designed to supplement the Department's in-house research capabilities and provide independent expert views to analysts and policy officers on problems with significant foreign policy implications.

The original request for this study came from Mr. Richard T. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR). The specific terms of reference were developed by Donald C. Tice, Country Officer for Yugoslavia in EUR; Ivan V. Matusek, Chief of the East European Division, Office of Research and Analysis for the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); and Pio D. Uliassi, Senior Program Officer in INR's Office of External Research, who also served as project monitor.

The external research program is planned and coordinated by the Department of State Research Council and managed by the Office of External Research.

E. Raymond Platig
Director, Office of External Research
Department of State

-v-

PREFACE

This report presents a framework for the formulation of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period and recommends that the U.S. Government take certain immediate preparatory steps. The policy recommendations are derived from analysis of the interaction of a range of alternative internal developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia with alternative Soviet policies in the context of the broad political-military environment that may prevail in Europe at the time.

This report was prepared under the sponsorship of the Office of External Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Its point of departure was a pilot Rand study by the same authors ("The Soviet Threat to Post-Tito Yugoslavia," December 1970), which was limited to an outline scenario of Soviet military intervention in Yugoslavia. It draws on data and analysis contained in Rand studies of the national question and political system in Yugoslavia (*The Removal of Rankovic: An Early Interpretation of the July Yugoslav Party Plenum*, RM-5132-PR, August 1966; *The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia*, P-4761, October 1971, both by R. V. Burks), and in interim publications of a Rand study of Yugoslav military affairs ("The Yugoslav Doctrine of Total National Defense," April 1971; *Total National Defense in Yugoslavia*, P-4746, December 1971, both by A. Ross Johnson).

(U) A note on terminology: Throughout this report, "national" applies to the ethnic characteristics of the constituent peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Albanians, etc.). Common Yugoslav issues and institutions centered in Belgrade are referred to as "all-Yugoslav."

SUMMARY

Tito's passing from the Yugoslav political scene will create a new situation for U.S. foreign policy. This report addresses implications for U.S. policy of alternative courses of internal developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia--some of which could be very troublesome for the United States--in the light of likely future Soviet policy toward the country.

Tito's 80th birthday in May 1972 is a reminder that Yugoslavia is moving inexorably closer to the Tito succession. Indeed, in important respects the "post-Tito" period has already begun. The personal revolutionary dictatorship that Tito exercised after 1945 has long been diluted. The transformed Yugoslav political system exhibits many pluralistic features and has, as described in Appendix A, functioned with Tito's only limited and sporadic personal intervention in recent years. As now constituted, the system virtually excludes personal succession of the orthodox Communist type. Preparations for an institutional succession have included the establishment of the collective League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Executive Bureau in 1969 and the collective state Presidency, with a head rotating yearly, in 1971.

Post-Tito Yugoslavia will be shaped by four primary variables:

1. *Economic Performance.* Yugoslavia will have to achieve substantially the goals of the middle-term plan adopted in early 1972 if social and national tensions resulting from modernization and exacerbated by the regional disparity of development are to be manageable.

2. *Domestic Unity.* Cohesion will require the containment and resolution of regional-national conflict--which will continue under even optimistic assumptions--and the implementation of a necessary minimum of all-Yugoslav policies satisfying all of the republics most of the time. Cohesion will also require the process of national affirmation to postulate the continued indispensability of a common Yugoslav community of nations. This will depend in part on the functioning of the "successionist" institutional structure, especially the state Presidency and the Party Executive Bureau. Cohesion will require some

-viii-

mutually accepted recentralization. And it will require the emergence of a group of respected all-Yugoslav leaders and a strengthened sense of mutual community on the part of the republics and provinces. In the absence of these preconditions, post-Tito Yugoslavia will be internally divided. Such a discohesive Yugoslavia might stumble along in a state of permanent semi-crisis, the "sick man" of Europe in the 1970s. Or a catalyzing nationalist incident involving bloodshed could degenerate into chaos, even civil war and revived national genocide. The Yugoslav state might then disintegrate.

3. *Character of the Political System.* This variable, while analytically distinct, is likely to be closely related to the degree of domestic cohesion. While formal rule by the LCY under the rubric of "socialist self-management" will almost certainly continue, this rule may assume different forms. The Titoist system, with its much diluted Leninist core, may be perpetuated. More conservative nuances may develop--although a neo-Stalinist restoration is inconceivable without the shock of civil war or Soviet intervention. The system may be transformed by progressive "Social Democratization." On the other hand, domestic discohesion would favor a challenge to LCY rule by multiple Yugoslav nationalist movements.

4. *Foreign Policy Orientation.* Nonalignment will almost certainly be perpetuated. It may emphasize even-handed balancing between East and West. Or it may emphasize a leaning toward the West.

Plausible combinations of these variables are explored in the report by utilizing a matrix of twelve Alternative Future Yugoslavias. The degree of domestic cohesion is the major, but unpredictable, variable in each of the twelve "models." Centripetal forces favoring cohesion include remaining all-Yugoslav institutions (the army, the residual unity of the LCY), popular satisfaction with personal betterment, increasing opportunity for national affirmation, the country's international prestige, the multiple character of regional and national tensions, the Soviet threat, and the bleakness of alternatives to membership in Yugoslavia. Yet they do not permit a high confidence judgment that post-Tito Yugoslavia will be internally cohesive. From the perspective of

-ix-

Yugoslavia in mid-1972, the probability of a cohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia seems to the authors not much greater than the likelihood of discohesion (which is not, however, to be equated with disintegration of the Yugoslav state; prospects for the latter, while not negligible, are small).^{*} If the transformed Communist totalitarianism and the undermined vision of South Slav national unity are not replaced by a new positive rationale for the Yugoslav community, centrifugal forces could undermine domestic cohesion.

Internal disunity in post-Tito Yugoslavia would also have a high potential for catalyzing the external Soviet threat while sapping the country's capacity for effective resistance. Moscow has never abandoned a proprietary claim on Yugoslavia. It has alternated since 1948 between a hostile policy, intended to isolate Yugoslavia from Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, and a policy of conciliation, intended to woo the country back toward the Soviet fold. The USSR evidently views Tito's future passing from the Yugoslav scene as enhancing considerably the prospects for the latter. The report weighs presumed Soviet preferences regarding Yugoslavia against constraints hindering translation of these preferences into operative policy, employing the matrix of Alternative Future Yugoslavias.

Confronted by a cohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia, constraints on aggressive Soviet policies would remain high, for only direct employment of military force would promise Moscow a substantial capability to influence Yugoslav developments. But systemic internal change or a more Western-leaning foreign policy orientation would strengthen Soviet motivation to intervene. While a discohesive Yugoslavia would be more vulnerable to Soviet intervention, Moscow would probably attempt to encourage disintegrative tendencies and increase its influence with dissident domestic forces rather than take violent preemptive action. The efficacy of Soviet economic manipulation, political leverage, subversion, and military threats would be substantially enhanced. The Soviets might enjoy a constituency in Yugoslavia which they now lack.

^{*}Quantification of these probabilities implies specious precision about their predictability. However, a rough distribution of probabilities consistent with the main thrust of the analysis in this report might be: cohesion, 0.5; discohesion, 0.4; disintegration, 0.1.

-x-

Confronted by a disintegrating Yugoslavia, Moscow would have an alluring opportunity to restore the integrity of the Soviet bloc. The Soviet risk/opportunity calculus would change sharply and dramatically in favor of the latter. Soviet willingness to act in accordance with these propensities would be influenced by extra-Yugoslav considerations, including the likelihood of Western involvement, the impact on broader Soviet European policy, and the consequences in Eastern Europe.

The final section of the report argues that the United States has a strong interest in the survival of Yugoslavia as an independent state free of Soviet control in the post-Tito period. Soviet subordination of Yugoslavia would constitute the first significant shift in the postwar European power balance. This could galvanize NATO into a more cohesive military alliance, but there is a danger that it might lead some West European states to seek their own security accommodations with the USSR. Soviet military capacities for use in a conflict on NATO's Southern Flank and the Mediterranean region would be enhanced. This might induce a strong sense of insecurity in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Romania's autonomy and Albania's independence would almost certainly be terminated, while forces of national affirmation and political liberalization elsewhere in Eastern Europe would receive a severe setback. If the Soviets intervened militarily in Yugoslavia, both a protracted resistance effort and internal disintegration would have some potential for spreading outside Yugoslavia's borders.

United States efforts to contribute to the preservation of Yugoslav independence after Tito should recognize, and reinforce where practicable, three essential aspects of Yugoslav political life:

1. *Internal cohesion, a new all-Yugoslav consensus based on the healthy and self-disciplined expression of regional and national diversity.* Such a Yugoslavia will have the best chance to prosper and resist Soviet encroachments. The United States Government (USG) must be sensitive to the "confederal" elements in what, under the most optimistic assumptions, would be a much diluted Yugoslav federalism. But Washington should lend whatever support it can to all-Yugoslav federal institutions. It should take care to avoid even the appearance that sensitivity to regional and national diversity involves de facto support

-xi-

of some parts of the country, particularly Croatia and Slovenia, at the expense of other parts, for this would fuel centrifugal tendencies. The USG should not confuse its continued interest in Yugoslav modernization--much of the impetus for which has come from Croatia and Slovenia--with a belief that a more "pro-Western" outlook in the "Northern" republics serves the U.S. interest. Moreover, modernizing forces in Yugoslavia are increasingly less polarized along strictly national lines, while the Croatian national affirmation may be peculiarly susceptible to degeneration into exclusivist nationalism and separatism.

If post-Tito Yugoslavia appears to be evolving along discohesive lines, U.S. interests would still best be served by promoting a new all-Yugoslav unity in diversity. Any retreat from backing the cause of Yugoslav integrity in order to seek special influence in individual republics could easily rebound to the advantage of the USSR. In the extreme contingency of internal disintegration, support for Yugoslav integrity would probably remain the best among poor alternatives for the United States. Clean secession leading to the establishment of viable national mini-states over which the United States might wish to extend a security umbrella is exceedingly unlikely. In this contingency, the USG should prefer to risk backing the Yugoslav state after it has ceased to be viable over prematurely abandoning support for Yugoslav integrity.

2. *Rule by the League of Communists which, continuing an evolutionary process of economic and political reform, remains in control of events and limits exclusivist nationalism.* Demise of Communist rule in Yugoslavia could trigger Soviet intervention. Continued LCY rule is, moreover, a probable condition of domestic cohesion, for no alternative all-Yugoslav political force is visible on the horizon. In the future, extensive further democratization may promote nationalism and thus considerable internal dis cohesion. Hence it must be anticipated that future reversals of democratization that are directed at containing nationalism and other centrifugal forces may be essential to continued LCY control and hence to Yugoslav cohesion.

3. *Nonalignment in foreign policy, while gradually and in a controlled manner proliferating and strengthening ties with Western Europe and the United States.* A conspicuous shift in Yugoslavia's international

-xii-

posture from nonalignment to a pro-Western orientation could provoke Soviet intervention and would be incompatible with the LCY's internal cohesion. U.S. preference for the kind of nonalignment practiced by post-Tito Yugoslavia is clear only with respect to the undesirability of an Eastward-leaning variant. The USG's preference for a Westward-leaning versus a balanced variant should depend on its judgment of the impact of each on the Soviet provocation/deterrence calculus. The primary reason for preferring the former, in the absence of high-level Soviet-Yugoslav tension, is that it would lay the groundwork for rapid implementation of less provocative deterrence-strengthening U.S.-Yugoslav measures should they later be required by the Soviet threat.

An examination of the opportunities for and the constraints operating on U.S. policy toward the twelve Alternative Future Yugoslavias postulated in this study, in the light of the foregoing considerations, suggests the following long-term and immediate policy recommendations.

SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA

Support for Yugoslav Unity

a. United States support for Yugoslav integrity should be no less than our support for the independence of the Yugoslav state, because the former is a prerequisite for the latter. U.S. interests would not be served, even with regard to "worst cases," by anticipating the breakup of Yugoslavia into secessionist mini-states, for a neat breakup of the country seems demographically impossible. In particular, the USG should not anticipate a "Northern strategy," involving backing of supposedly "reformist" or "pro-Western" Croatia and Slovenia, with this contingency in mind. U.S. support for Yugoslav integrity should be communicated to all the interested parties--all-Yugoslav forces, separatists, and the Soviets.

b. Maximum Yugoslav political cohesion cannot be achieved by unitary or centralist rule, but, optimally, by a new Yugoslav unity that rests on explicit respect and affirmation of regional and national diversity. U.S. policy should aim to reinforce domestic cohesion of this type. The USG should prepare to work with and support looser but

-xiii-

more unified federal organs that emerge and avoid favoring the army as a supposedly supranational centralist force. The USG should state explicitly, elaborating on its earlier declarations, that it understands that Yugoslav unity postulates a different relationship between Belgrade and the republican capitals than has obtained in the past. The American presence in Yugoslavia should reflect this declaratory posture.

c. If post-Tito Yugoslavia is militarily threatened by the USSR, any U.S. military assistance should postulate a high degree of internal cohesion. This should be made clear to the Yugoslavs.

d. Internal cohesion cannot be counted upon in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Continuing reassessments of the internal situation will be required. These assessments should focus on the key variables, and the interrelationships among them, identified and analyzed in this study. In the event of internal dis cohesion, the USG should mount a holding operation, attempting to prevent Soviet political inroads and to deter Soviet military intervention while giving the country an opportunity to achieve greater internal unity. Expanded U.S. representation in the Yugoslav southeast would be essential. Responding to competing requests for economic assistance from republican authorities, the USG should still channel assistance through Belgrade. It should expect to expand military relations to include republican territorial forces. It could play a role in restraining centrifugal and secessionist forces by making it clear that domestic cohesion would be a prerequisite for American assistance to meet a Soviet threat.

e. In the event that post-Tito Yugoslavia disintegrated and the federal authorities or the army itself succeeded in halting the disintegration, the USG should prefer to err on the side of backing excessive centralism, which is a specific exception to the policy outlined in paragraph b above. It should welcome and support any force--whether supranational, nationally hegemonic, or military-dominated--attempting to preserve an integral Yugoslav state from domestic chaos and Soviet intervention. Any faltering by the United States in maintaining pre-existing relations with such a regime--because of uncertainty in Washington or the outcry of vocal Yugoslav emigres--would give the Soviets a freer hand to establish predominant influence with the new regime.

-xiv-

f. If, in the event of disintegration, a reconsolidation were unsuccessful or not attempted, the USG would be unable to exert substantial influence on the internal situation. It should encourage containment of civil conflict and discourage secessionist efforts while attempting to deter the Soviets from intervention.

g. In the initial weeks after Tito passes from the Yugoslav scene, judgments about the emerging degree of domestic political cohesion cannot be relied upon. Unless the internal situation shows a sharp early deterioration, the United States should act as though internal consolidation were being maintained. It should demonstratively reassert its interest in Yugoslav integrity and independence by exchanging high-level visits and by adopting a strong declaratory stance (while avoiding pointed references to the Soviet threat and such terms as the "grey area"). It should continue the political, diplomatic, economic, informational, intelligence, and military policies followed at present or projected (in the interagency response to NSSM-129) for the immediate future.

Attitude Toward Communist Rule

Since the United States will prefer maximum political cohesion in post-Tito Yugoslavia, it has a strong interest in the continuation, rather than the replacement, of rule by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The LCY is the only available state-preserving institution for the foreseeable future. Further modernization of Yugoslav society and democratization of LCY rule may be desirable, but not at the price of endangering Communist control at the republican, no less than at the all-Yugoslav, level. For the odds are that such loss of control would favor nationalist and separatist centrifugal forces. In contrast to the past, some future reversals of liberalization in Yugoslavia are more likely to promote than to damage fundamental U.S. interests if they serve to restrain nationalism and limit centrifugal tendencies. Temporary policies ostensibly repressive of personal liberties should not be allowed to provoke the USG into weakening its support for an independent Yugoslavia. At such time, Congress and segments of public opinion may require detailed explanation of the grounds for U.S. policy.

-xv-

Intimacy of Bilateral Relations

a. Given sufficient cohesion in post-Tito Yugoslavia, the United States should cautiously encourage a Westward-leaning orientation compatible with nonalignment; that is, incremental proliferation of political, economic, military, and other forms of relations with the West, but not formal alliance ties. Belgrade's judgment about the appropriate pace and scope of developing ties with the United States and other Western countries should govern. Closer military relations could enhance Yugoslavia's defensive capabilities, deter Soviet encroachments, and prepare the ground for prudent U.S. military assistance should deterrence fail. It might be in the U.S. interest to facilitate Yugoslav purchases of sophisticated weaponry--such as Redeye--useful for total national defense. As closer ties developed, the USG should publicly emphasize (but not elaborate on) the theme of "support for Yugoslav integrity, independence, and prosperity." It might parry private Yugoslav feelers on U.S. reaction to Soviet intervention with a "What would be helpful?" response. It would probably be protected against overcommitment by Yugoslav self-restraint.

In some circumstances, however, a more balanced mode of nonalignment might be preferable, so that the sensitive deterrence/provocation calculus vis-à-vis the USSR did not become unbalanced toward provocation. On the other hand, should Yugoslavia feel itself imminently threatened by Soviet military intervention, Yugoslav leaders might attempt to abandon nonalignment in favor of a pro-Western orientation as strong as that of the early 1950s. In this eventuality, visible faltering by the USG in backing Yugoslav independence could lead the USSR to intervene preemptively. The USG and the Government of Yugoslavia would have to coordinate declaratory policy on bilateral relations, in order to avoid giving mixed signals to Moscow.

b. If post-Tito Yugoslavia is internally dis cohesive, prudence would argue for the United States to rely on its own rather than Belgrade's judgment of the appropriate intimacy of bilateral relations. The USG should probably encourage balanced as opposed to Westward-leaning nonalignment. New Yugoslav leaders should be informed that the USG would be unable to bolster Yugoslav independence if the Yugoslavs themselves are unable to offer united resistance to Soviet political

encroachments or military intervention. Some policies serving well to deter the USSR for a cohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia could result in overcommitment for a discohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia. Were the USG to invest prestige and pump resources into a "sick man," it could prove to be excessively entangling.

Deterrence of Soviet Intervention

a. Given a cohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia, in the event of an apparent Soviet military threat--such as sudden maneuvers in Hungary--the USG should make a strong effort to deter Soviet intervention. NATO should be urged to undertake preventive political and collateral measures that would communicate to the USSR that it could not intervene in Yugoslavia at the relatively minor political cost it incurred in occupying Czechoslovakia in 1968. Direct U.S. initiatives would probably be required as well. Parallel or even joint Sino-American remonstrances could warn Moscow that an invasion would harden the Peking-Washington relationship and lead the United States to give it an anti-Soviet edge. A direct early approach to Moscow might be made, warning it that the United States would not accept as legitimate any "invitation" to intervene in Yugoslavia, that such an act would endanger the fabric of East-West relations in Europe and U.S.-Soviet relations on the global scale, and that the USSR would have to accept the serious consequences of initiating armed conflict in Europe.

b. If the USSR nevertheless invaded a cohesive Yugoslavia, and the country succeeded in bogging down Warsaw Pact forces by a unified and effective resistance effort, the USG, together with interested West European allies, should be prepared to render limited military support with low escalatory potential. U.S. interest in preserving Yugoslavia's independence or, barring this, raising the cost Moscow would have to pay to subordinate the country, would justify a positive response to the probable Yugoslav request for assistance. NATO should not be relied upon for organizing military assistance to an invaded Yugoslavia; the USG would have to act with interested West European allies outside formal NATO channels. The United States should not consider bearing

-xvii-

the brunt of the defensive effort nor contemplate major military involvement, including commitment of ground forces. Limited military assistance to raise the cost to Moscow of occupying the country need not and, indeed, should not be rendered in the initial hours following a Soviet invasion. The USG would need time both to satisfy itself that the Yugoslav resistance was reasonably unified and effective and to patch together an assistance program in the probable absence of bilateral contingency planning.

c. A Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia would inevitably endanger Romania, Austria, and Albania. The threat to Austria would probably be limited, as the Soviets would have a continuing interest in maintaining Austrian neutrality. The Romanian "deviation" would almost certainly be ended. Although the United States should attempt to exact some political price for this, a futile commitment of U.S. prestige to bolster Romania would detract from the deterrent force of U.S. support for Yugoslav independence.

d. Provided that the USSR were willing to pay high costs, it might nevertheless subdue Yugoslavia, effective Yugoslav resistance and limited Western assistance notwithstanding. By attempting to increase these costs, the United States might discourage an all-out Soviet effort to pacify the country. But, if the Soviets proceeded with a successful occupation effort, the U.S. stake in Yugoslav independence, although considerable, would not justify the high risks of a qualitative U.S. military escalation. Having accomplished the objective of increasing the cost of a Soviet takeover, U.S. assistance would have to be terminated.

e. In the event of Soviet intervention in a disintegrating Yugoslavia, there would be no Yugoslav actor for the United States to support. The USG would have to resign itself to limiting the political damage in Western Europe while magnifying political costs for the Soviet Union in the Third World. Interesting opportunities could be presented for Sino-American cooperation. While the loss of Yugoslavia's independence would be unwelcome under any circumstances, it would be less costly for the West if it resulted directly from the country's self-disintegration.

-xviii-

SUGGESTED IMMEDIATE PRIORITY MEASURES

This report is concerned with post-Tito Yugoslavia; it does not duplicate the comprehensive review of near-term policy toward Yugoslavia conducted in the Government in response to NSSM-129. This analysis nevertheless suggests several immediate measures that could better prepare the United States for the post-Tito period.

Augmentation of the U.S. Presence in Yugoslavia

a. The projected extension of U.S. representation by establishing United States Information Agency reading rooms in additional regional capitals should encompass Priština as well. Centers should be run by de facto American political officers. The Zagreb consulate should be balanced by a "Southern" consulate in Skopje. Alternatively, reading rooms could be supplemented by "traveling consulates" and regularized embassy visits to all the republican and provincial capitals. For increased reporting from these capitals and greater interaction with regional personalities are likely to be prerequisites for effective policy toward post-Tito Yugoslavia.

b. Voice of America should devote a greater percentage of its broadcast time to non-Serbian languages and dialects.

c. Activities of individual NATO countries in Yugoslavia should be better coordinated: reporting of local representations might be routinely exchanged; foreign broadcasts in the various Yugoslav languages and dialects might better complement each other.

Contingency Planning

a. The USG should formulate, unilaterally, a contingency plan for rendering appropriate limited military assistance to Yugoslavia in the event of Soviet intervention. Yugoslavia is unlikely to be interested until it is too late, while such planning in NATO is likely to prove not only futile but counterproductive. No detailed attention has been devoted to this contingency, and the Yugoslavs would very likely request U.S. assistance should they be attacked. The intelligence community should estimate materiel bottlenecks the Yugoslavs are likely to encounter in implementing total national defense. With due attention

-xix-

to the political realities of possible military assistance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should formulate plans, inter alia, to supply suitable weapons to the Yugoslavs, to provide them with reconnaissance and communications facilities, and to mount a show of force in the Adriatic.

b. Voice of America should formulate a contingency plan for strengthened, round-the-clock-service to Yugoslavia in at least the major Yugoslav languages. Should post-Tito Yugoslavia disintegrate, the USG would require a massive informational input capacity to have any influence on the internal situation.

Deterrent Measures

a. In preparation for the post-Tito period, the United States and other NATO members should continue to develop regularized, low-profile military relations with Yugoslavia. This could strengthen uncertainty in Moscow about the possibility and nature of Western involvement should Warsaw Pact forces invade Yugoslavia. In order to maximize Soviet perceptions of the military cost of invading Yugoslavia, the USG should also attempt to facilitate Yugoslav purchases in the United States of defensive weaponry suited to total national defense.

b. In Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe discussions or preparations, greater emphasis should be placed on indicating to Moscow that threats to Yugoslavia are incompatible with the normalization of East-West relations. Deterrence would be strengthened with respect to the "European security" process if Moscow had to treat Yugoslavia as a full member of the European neutral grouping. In this regard, support for Yugoslavia by the Federal Republic of Germany and France would be particularly useful. Mutual Balanced Force Reduction proposals encompassing southeastern Europe should aim to make it physically more difficult for the Soviets to intervene in Yugoslavia without violating a force reduction agreement at the same time.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to acknowledge their debt to numerous officials of the Department of State, especially the Bureau of European Affairs, the Office of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Embassy in Belgrade, and the Mission to NATO, as well as of other Government agencies for helpful conversations on the substance of this study and for useful comments on the preliminary draft of this report. The authors are also indebted to their colleagues, Fritz W. Ermarth, Fred C. Iklé, Nathan Leites, William A. Stewart, and Thomas W. Wolfe for useful critiques of the manuscript.

None of these colleagues or officials, nor members of the Office of External Research of the Department of State, bears any responsibility for the views expressed in this report, which are solely those of the authors.

-xxiii-

CONTENTS

NOTE ON CLASSIFICATION	iii
PREFACE	v
SUMMARY	vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	xxi
GLOSSARY	xxv
Section	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE YUGOSLAVIAS	3
The Post-Tito Non-Succession	3
Domestic Variables	5
Foreign Policy	11
A Typology of Alternative Future Yugoslavias	11
Cohesive Yugoslavias	12
Discohesive Yugoslavias	14
Disintegrating Yugoslavias	16
III. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA	20
The Role of Yugoslavia in Soviet Foreign Policy	21
Soviet Policy Choices in Post-Tito Yugoslavia	26
Instruments of Soviet Policy	27
Propensities of Soviet Policy	28
Extra-Yugoslav Considerations	39
IV. U.S. POLICY TOWARD POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA	44
The Political-Military Significance of Yugoslavia	44
Future U.S. Policy	49
General Objectives	49
Specific Cases	54
Threatened Yugoslavia	65
Implications for Present Policy	74
Presence	74
Contingency Planning	75
Priority Deterrent Measures	76
Appendix	
A. YUGOSLAVIA TODAY	79
B. THE HISTORICAL U.S. STAKE IN YUGOSLAVIA	109
BIBLIOGRAPHY	127

UNCLASSIFIED

-xxv-

GLOSSARY

AFYs	Alternative Future Yugoslavias
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPY	Communist Party of Yugoslavia
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
EEC	European Economic Community
FEC	Federal Executive Council
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
LCY	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MBFR	Mutual Balanced Force Reduction
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
TDF	Territorial Defense Forces
YPA	Yugoslav Peoples Army
GOY	Government of Yugoslavia

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-xxvii-

TITO ON POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA

Much has been written abroad about Yugoslavia disintegrating when I go. In Yugoslavia, there have been too many various conjectures about who will take my place . . . there must be cohesion at the top to have cohesion below, in the republics . . . we would only have to feel anxiety if we were not internally united. If we are united, if we are firmly determined to defend our country . . . then no one will move to threaten our freedom and independence.

(September 21, 1970)

. . . devils abroad try . . . to destroy us from within; to destroy our [Yugoslav] community . . . these people are predominantly those . . . who should be our best friends . . . abroad there are all those ravens who have their long necks and their beaks aimed at Yugoslavia wondering whether they might obtain some easy pickings and whether [the time] is perhaps already ripe for this.

(November 25, 1970)

The attitude of the Bulgarian leadership toward Yugoslavia is symptomatic. It does not recognize the Macedonian nation. . . . The underlying motivation of such an attitude is clear. In a tense situation a demand would be made for the annexation of the "Bulgarians" in Macedonia to Bulgaria. This would follow the well-known Yalta principle. In that spirit Yugoslavia is divided into its Orthodox and its Catholic parts. There is talk that the Orthodox population of Yugoslavia loves the Soviet Union. Such theories suit the West, too, for it follows that the so-called Catholic part of Yugoslavia would belong, one way or another, to the West. . . . We dare not permit any open internal questions or dissension to weaken our internal unity . . . I am a pessimist with regard to the international situation. . . . We must be aware that Yugoslavia is located on a crossroads. We must be vigilant . . . and constantly aware of the forces acting against Yugoslavia's interests.

(December 19, 1970)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-xxviii-

Do we not hear nearly every day talk about how Yugoslavia will break up. Yugoslavia will break up when these hills break up. . . .

(September 5, 1971)

It has almost become a crime to admit that one is a Yugoslav.

(October 10, 1971)

Although [the army's] primary task is to defend our country against foreign enemies, our army is also called upon to defend the achievements of our revolution within the country, should that be necessary . . . if it comes to shooting, if there is a need to defend the achievements [of our revolution], the army, too, is here. This should be made clear to all.

(December 22, 1971)

* * *

What would have happened in this country were it not for Tito and his timely and resolute political intervention?—R. Mandić

(Vjesnik, December 26, 1971)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-xxx-



Map 1 — The republics and provinces of Yugoslavia

UNCLASSIFIED

-1-

I. INTRODUCTION

This report addresses the implications for future U.S. policy of alternative developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia, with particular reference to future Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia.

Section II formulates a number of alternative, internally derived Future Yugoslavias--both "good" and "bad" outcomes from the U.S. point of view--which may evolve from the dynamic present-day Yugoslav political system (analyzed in Appendix A) after Tito passes from the scene. Following a discussion of the key variables upon which Yugoslavia's future would seem to depend, a typology of Alternative Future Yugoslavias is presented. The "models" of this typology do not presume to offer a comprehensive description of any particular future course of events. Rather, the "models" are used to highlight the major alternative directions of future developments in Yugoslavia and to limit to manageable proportions subsequent discussion of Soviet and U.S. policies toward post-Tito Yugoslavia.

(U) Section III is concerned with Soviet policy. It examines the frame of reference within which Moscow will formulate policy toward post-Tito Yugoslavia and specific policy instruments it may employ in response to alternative developments in Yugoslavia.

Section IV addresses, in turn, the U.S. stake in the preservation of Yugoslavia's independence from Soviet encroachments in the post-Tito period. U.S. policy toward post-Tito Yugoslavia is then examined with reference to the alternative domestic futures and Soviet policies previously discussed. The final part of Sec. IV identifies several major implications of this discussion for current U.S. policy. The treatment of U.S. policy in Sec. IV is influenced by the comprehensive review of near-term U.S. policy to bolster Yugoslavia's independence and welfare, while Tito remains at its helm, which was conducted in the U.S. Government (USG) in response to NSSM-129. This review took place after the authors' pilot study was circulated. In the interest of maximizing the original contribution of this report, the discussion of U.S. policy issues is therefore limited, somewhat artificially, to "post-Tito" Yugoslavia.

-2-

The post-Tito succession period in Yugoslavia has in many respects already begun. Any clear distinction between present-day and post-Tito Yugoslavia is hence somewhat arbitrary. It is assumed, for the purposes of this analysis, that the latter period may begin at any time in the next five years.

UNCLASSIFIED

-3-

II. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE YUGOSLAVIASTHE POST-TITO NON-SUCCESSION

(U) Josip Broz Tito was 80 in May 1972. He appears to be in reasonably good health, continues to demonstrate his capacity for decisive leadership, and retains his charismatic political qualities. His advanced age and the establishment in 1971 of a collective Yugoslav state Presidency are, however, vivid reminders that Yugoslavia is moving inexorably closer to the succession that has been under active discussion for more than a decade.

(U) Tito has played a seminal role in the establishment, consolidation, and liberalization of the Communist system in Yugoslavia. The familiar landmarks of Tito's political biography are "Bolshevization" of the faction-torn Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in the late 1930s at Stalin's behest; organization of the Communist-led Partisan resistance and revolution in Yugoslavia during World War II; preservation of Yugoslavia's independence, as well as of the political power and the very lives of his close colleagues and himself after 1948 in the face of Stalin's anathema; radical transformation of the ideology and the economic and political systems of Yugoslavia after 1949; establishment of an international posture of nonalignment for Yugoslavia, allowing it to balance between East and West while gaining stature as a leader in the Third World; acceptance and implementation of far-reaching new economic and political liberalization after 1965. These accomplishments place Tito in that close circle of political leaders who shape history.

(U) Events of the past two decades have markedly changed Tito's personal role in the Yugoslav system, eroding the revolutionary personal dictatorship he exercised in the initial postwar years. In the 1960s, he involved himself less in day-to-day domestic politics, concentrating for long periods almost exclusively on foreign policy. Functioning with limited, sporadic personal intervention by Tito, the transformed Yugoslav political system has for several years exhibited many of the pluralistic features likely to dominate it after his passing.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-4-

(U) The transformed political system virtually excludes personal succession of the orthodox Communist type. Already in 1969, Tito began to prepare for an institutional succession by establishing at the apex of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) a new body, the Executive Bureau, whose chairmanship rotated monthly. Explicitly seeking to avert a potential crisis over "who will take my place," he advanced these preparations in September 1970 and proposed a collective state Presidency, with a head rotating yearly in the Swiss manner. (Tito will head the Presidency as long as he is politically active.) In 1971 the personal political power of Edward Kardelj, the last of the senior "old comrades" who once might have personally succeeded Tito, further declined. Tito's September 1970 initiative precipitated a major, indeed, historic restructuring of the Yugoslav state along far looser federal--to some extent, quasi-confederal--lines. In these important respects, the "post-Tito" period has already begun.

(U) Tito will not be personally succeeded, but the institutional preparations do not diminish the momentous significance of his future passing from the political scene. Although no longer able to manipulate the formal system of centralized cadre controls over which Aleksandar Ranković once presided in his behalf, Tito's continued political authority at lower leadership levels of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has probably been indispensable in bringing about the two events of strategic importance for the development of the Yugoslav political system since he purged Ranković. These were (1) the ousting of the "old guard" ex-Partisans from middle- and lower-level positions in the LCY at its Ninth Congress in early 1969 and (2) the confrontation with Croatian nationalism (and the ouster of the top Croatian Party leaders who had sought to utilize it) in December 1971.

(U) The latter event, in particular, has demonstrated that Tito will pass from the Yugoslav political scene in a period of increasing socioeconomic, national, and political tension. Hence it is especially important, in contemplating Yugoslavia without Tito, to examine possible directions of development of the political system as a whole, particularly those that would result in severe internal instability and might create conditions favoring the reincorporation of Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-5-

DOMESTIC VARIABLES

(U) The political shape of post-Tito Yugoslavia will be influenced considerably by the performance of the economy. At the beginning of 1972, Yugoslavia set goals for its middle-term economic plan: a 7.5 percent growth rate; continued, albeit rationalized and reduced, subsidization of the most backward sections of the country; and further inclusion in the international division of labor. If the economy meets these goals, social and national tensions of modernization exacerbated by the regional disparity of development may be confined to manageable proportions.* Even so, it will be difficult for Yugoslavia to reduce the developmental gap between its advanced and backward regions; this is likely to require higher internal labor mobility and greater orientation of the economies of the backward regions toward world markets.

(U) If, on the other hand, the economic goals of the plan are not met, if rampant inflation continues, if the balance of payments worsens, and if the economy falters, social and national tensions are certain to increase. Nationalist pork-barrel squabbles would multiply. If, in addition, Western Europe were to have a major economic recession, which could add several hundred thousand Yugoslavs to the ranks of the domestic unemployed, Yugoslavia would face economic disaster.

(U) A second key domestic variable, related to the first, is the degree of internal political cohesion that is to be achieved "after Tito." Even under optimistic assumptions, regional economic-political conflicts with explicit national ramifications will continue; the national genie in Yugoslavia will not be squeezed back into the bottle. What will be decisive is whether regional-national conflicts can be contained and resolved, whether the necessary minimum of all-Yugoslav policies, satisfying all of the republics[†] most of the time, can be formulated and implemented. The process of cultural and linguistic national affirmation by Yugoslavia's peoples and nationalities will also continue in the post-Tito period. Given the vanishing prospect

* (U) Judgments about the present-day Yugoslav system expressed or implied in this section are based on the analysis in Appendix A.

† (U) "Republic" is utilized, here and subsequently, for "republic and province," since the latter have nearly achieved republican status.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-6-

of the merging of the national identities of these groups into one Yugoslav national consciousness, this process of national affirmation will be a healthy phenomenon if necessary self-discipline is maintained. The expensive and cumbersome trappings of multiple linguistic and cultural expression will continue to be the price that Yugoslavia must pay to assure equality to its national groups. Whether the process of national affirmation continues to postulate a Yugoslav community of nations or whether it degenerates into exclusivist nationalism promoting national hatred of other Yugoslav peoples and nationalities will determine the outcome. Dominance of the latter tendency in any republic could lead to the disintegration of the Yugoslav state.

(U) Resolution of these issues in favor of cohesion will depend in part on how well the new Yugoslav institutional structure functions; it cannot be properly tested until after Tito passes from the scene. ~~Prerequisites for its efficacy will include a state Presidency able to~~ serve as an ultimate locus of all-Yugoslav decisionmaking, a Federal Executive Council and Assembly able to coordinate policy, a security service responsive to republican control but retaining all-Yugoslav capabilities, and an army accepted as an all-Yugoslav military force by all the republics.

(U) The chances that post-Tito Yugoslavia will achieve such cohesion will be maximized if the country quickly completes, under Tito's leadership, the unfinished business of reconstituting the federation on a new, looser basis and, then, by mutual consent of its constituent republican Party organizations, curtails further centrifugal tendencies. A new unity must emerge from the affirmation of diversity that involves a degree of voluntary, mutually accepted recentralization.* This will require a reconstituted "political center." A group of respected all-Yugoslav leaders will be needed, not supranational or integral Yugoslavs,

* (U) This is not a "conservative" Communist platform but was--well before December 1971--the nearly unanimous conclusion of reformist Party intellectuals in all regions of the country who had not succumbed to the nationalist bacillus. See the discussions "The Moment of Yugoslav Socialism," *Praxis*, Nos. 3-4, and 5, 1971, and "The Present Moment and Perspectives of International Relations in Yugoslavia," *Gledista*, Nos. 5-6, 1971.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

-7-

but (in Tito's apt terminology) "men from the republics who are not republicans" and who are not bound by an imperative mandate of their parent republican Party organizations. The new all-Yugoslav organs must function as more than a technical service for the republics; they must have powers of their own. Perhaps most important, cohesion will require a strengthened sense of community on the part of the republics and provinces, a commitment to an all-Yugoslav interest not subject to the veto power of the components.

(U) It needs to be reemphasized that such cohesion can come only from unity *in diversity*. Any other approach to unity is foredoomed. Revival of supranational, integral Yugoslavism is not an option; the LCY has undergone an irreversible transformation; the clock cannot--in foreseeable domestic or international circumstances--be turned back to 1945. Any political grouping posing as integral Yugoslavs, such as the pensioned "old guard" coming forward in a crisis, would in fact stand on a platform of Serb-Montenegrin hegemony.* Given that the founding rationale of Communist Yugoslavia was ending Serbian hegemony and given the quasi-confederal powers of the republics today, this is a formula for civil war. The one exception might be a situation of imminent threat of Soviet attack, say, in the wake of a Soviet invasion of Romania, which might induce the republics voluntarily to accept sharp limitation of their powers and more personalized federal government in the interest of centralized national defense.

(U) Failure to resolve these interrelated economic and national problems will mean an internally divided post-Tito Yugoslavia. Such a Yugoslavia might stumble along in a state of permanent semi-crisis as the "sick man" of Europe in the 1970s with many traits in common with its Imperial predecessors. Reconstituted as a de facto confederation, Yugoslavia might continue in this condition indefinitely, but precariously.

(U) In such an environment, however, a catalyzing nationalist incident involving bloodshed could readily degenerate into chaos, perhaps into civil war and even into revived national genocide. A Bangladesh

* (U) This is explicitly acknowledged by Yugoslav leaders, for example, by Kiro Hadzi-Vasilev, in *Klasno i nacionalno u savremenom socijalizmu*, 2 Vols., Zagreb, 1970 (Vol. 2, p. 665).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-8-

in Europe strains the imagination, but if it can occur anywhere, Yugoslavia is the place, for in that country national hatreds of an intensity unsurpassed in modern Europe have been submerged, not uprooted. Should any of Yugoslavia's national groups again fear that its very existence is threatened by other Yugoslavs, and should the constraints of Communist control be weakened or removed, these national hatreds might surface again. Reports from Zagreb in December 1971 about the eruption of popular national hatred between Serbs and Croats, while perhaps exaggerated, should not be dismissed.

(U) The character of the internal political system--how "Communist" it is--may be viewed as an independent variable in post-Tito Yugoslavia but is likely to be directly related to the degree of political cohesion. Barring disintegration of the Yugoslav state or Soviet invasion, formal rule by the LCY under the rubric of "socialist self-management" will almost certainly continue at the all-Yugoslav level and in all the republics. The political system may, nevertheless, assume any one of a number of different shapes. The present "Titoist" system, with its much-diluted Leninist core, and aggregation of societal interests through the LCY, may be perpetuated. More "conservative" nuances may even develop--some were implicit in the "administrative measures" taken against "counterrevolutionary" tendencies in Croatia after December 1971. The internal neo-Stalinist restoration (as distinct from Soviet-imposed rule) against which both reformist and nationalist republican Party leaders have warned in promoting their own regional causes is, however, a straw man; regional/national differences in Yugoslavia are already so great, and the command economy so thoroughly dismantled, that orthodox Communist restoration, in any literal sense, is inconceivable without the shock of civil war or foreign intervention. Even a Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA) "takeover" to halt or preempt disintegration of the Yugoslav state would be carried out in the name of LCY rule and with respect for many of its existing forms.

(U) On the other hand, assuming a continuation "after Tito" of Yugoslavia's "return to Europe" and closer contacts with the United States and other Western countries, forces of socioeconomic modernization and political pluralism will continue to challenge the Leninist

UNCLASSIFIED

remnants of LCY rule. These forces would have the greatest healthy potential impact in a cohesive Yugoslavia. Discohesion would favor a similar challenge by multiple Yugoslav nationalisms and perhaps even call into question LCY control in one republic or another. This challenge might take the form of an open confrontation between new nationalist parties and the LCY. A more likely situation would involve--as some Croatian indicators showed in the second half of 1971--the penetration of the LCY leadership by nationalist Communists. Possible details both of the progressive "Social Democratization" and "nationalization" of the LCY will be discussed later.

(U) How much cohesion will be achieved in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period cannot be predicted with any confidence. Cohesion will be favored by the continuation of a number of centripetal forces. These include several strong all-Yugoslav institutions--the YPA, and the residual unity of the LCY itself. The successionist institutions established by Tito, and the habits of reconciling regional disputes encouraged by these institutions, may have considerable potential for the future. The widespread sense of personal betterment and increasing opportunity for national expression in Yugoslavia is a significant centripetal force. Another is the country's international prestige, out of all proportion to its size. That regional and national conflicts are multiple--not polarized between "North" and "South" and between Serbs and Croats to the same extent as in pre-war Yugoslavia--and thus not a zero-sum game, limits discohesion.* Perhaps most important, however, most Yugoslavs apparently believe they face a serious Soviet threat and view bleakly any alternative to membership in the Yugoslav federation.

(U) The latter point is of particular relevance to this study. The Yugoslav republics are too small to be economically viable as separate entities. Incorporation in any other extant state would probably worsen, not improve, their position in almost every respect. Most important, the Yugoslav national groups are, in most cases, too intermingled

* (U) For example, in 1971 Macedonia aligned itself with Croatia in seeking federal subsidies for agricultural products, while joining with Serbia to urge greater use of the Cyrillic alphabet.

UNCLASSIFIED

-10-

for clean separation to be a practical option. Any frontier between Croatia and Serbia would leave a large minority on one side or the other, or both. Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be split up on national lines; merging it either with Croatia or Serbia would mean rule by a national minority. Were the Albanians of Kosovo to opt for union with Albania, they would have to deal with a large Serbian minority population. Vojvodina would find the national rights of its non-Serbs questioned and its economic interests sacrificed were it to remain in an independent Serbia, while separation from Serbia would raise the issue of the status of its majority national group. Any effort to join Montenegro to Serbia would disrupt the former. A secessionist Macedonia would have to deal with its minority Albanian population and might easily find its Serb neighbors joining Bulgaria and Greece in questioning the legitimacy of the Macedonian nation itself. The best candidate for secession is nationally homogeneous Slovenia. While the republic is sometimes regarded as a potential Denmark of the Adriatic, this perspective ignores its unfulfilled, if presently quiescent, national ambitions (a third of the Slovene people live in Italy, Austria, and Hungary) and the bleak economic prospects it would face on its own.

(U) These largely negative incentives for cohesion do not provide grounds for strong optimism that post-Tito Yugoslavia will overcome centrifugal forces. From the perspective of Yugoslavia in mid-1972, the probability of a cohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia seems to the authors not much greater than the likelihood of dis cohesion (which is not, however, to be equated with disintegration of the Yugoslav state; prospects for the latter, while not negligible, are small).^{*} The transformed Communist totalitarianism and the undermined vision of South Slav national unity may not be replaced by a new, positive rationale for the Yugoslav community, and this may prove fatal to domestic cohesion. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, whether under Communist rule or prior to it, resolution of the "national question" has been temporarily

^{*} Quantification of these probabilities implies specious precision about their predictability. However, a rough distribution of probabilities consistent with the main thrust of the analysis in this report might be: cohesion, 0.5; dis cohesion, 0.4; disintegration, 0.1.

UNCLASSIFIED

-11-

postponed in multi-ethnic regions by effective repression carried out by self-confident supranational elites or hegemonic nations, but it has been truly "solved" only by mass forced emigration and resettlement in compact national groups.

FOREIGN POLICY

(U) Yugoslavia's foreign political orientation, too, will play a pivotal role in determining the overall political characteristics of post-Tito Yugoslavia. Nonalignment is deeply anchored in ideological predispositions and in the political system itself and (with the possible exception of a situation of imminent Soviet invasion) will be maintained after Tito. Yugoslavia's voluntary reincorporation in the Soviet bloc is to be excluded. Moreover, while Yugoslavia might again establish better relations with the USSR in selected areas than prevailed in mid-1972, an Eastern-leaning emphasis on nonalignment, as in 1962-1968, would necessitate a sharply altered Yugoslav perception of the Soviet threat. This would probably require fundamental systemic and leadership changes in the USSR itself. On the other hand, formal abandonment of nonalignment in favor of a pro-Western posture--even to the extent of the early 1950s--is to be discounted except in a situation of imminent Soviet invasion. Even if a post-Communist regime were inclined to reorient Yugoslav foreign policy Westward, this would be a foolhardy undertaking in the absence of a strong Western commitment to take Yugoslavia under NATO protection, which seems highly unlikely. Consequently, Yugoslavia after Tito can be expected to follow a policy of nonalignment with one of two alternative emphases: (1) an attempt to balance between East and West or (2) a leaning toward the West. Possible manifestations of these two varieties of nonalignment are developed in the following typology.

A TYPOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURE YUGOSLAVIAS (AFYs)*

UNCLASSIFIED

(This page is Unclassified)

-12-

Cohesive Yugoslavias

(U) AFY No. 1. Cohesive, Communist, Balancing Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia maintains a healthy growth rate throughout the country; inflation is limited while internal labor migration expands. Inter-republican economic-political disputes result in much hard bargaining, but shifting alliances coalesce on various issues, the looser federal institutions function, and compromises are reached without undue delay. Some political power now concentrated at the republican level devolves upon the communal authorities. National affirmation is predominantly "healthy," with abrasive incidents marginal and isolated. The particularist interests of some republics are occasionally outvoted by others, but this does not always involve the same actors and is accepted as legitimate by the republics affected. The LCY reestablishes, in a manner mutually satisfactory to its constituent republican organizations, a "political center." New leaders with some all-Yugoslav stature emerge.

(U) The LCY retains its "Titoist" forms. It prohibits organized political challenges to its rule at local, as well as republican and all-Yugoslav, levels. It adheres to forms of democratic centralism precluding organized factional activities. Republican Party organizations continue successfully to represent themselves as the "best defenders" of the particular interests of "their" national group(s), while channeling them in an all-Yugoslav direction and containing local chauvinism.

(U) Trade with Western Europe increases and significant amounts of Western venture capital flow into the country, but trade with Comecon continues to account for nearly a quarter of total foreign trade turnover. The post-Tito leadership makes a studied effort to promote outwardly good relations with the USSR, including exchange of Party-level delegations, while cultivating political relations with the West. A scrupulous attempt is made to afford "equal treatment" to East and West, particularly in military diplomacy and arms purchases. The Yugoslavs carefully abstain from indicating explicitly that their preparations for total national defense are in response to the Soviet threat.

(U) AFY No. 2. Cohesive, Communist, Westward-leaning Yugoslavia. Similar to AFY No. 1, but with a more Westward-oriented variant of non-alignment. Trade with Comecon declines to less than ten percent of the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-13-

total, while Yugoslavia becomes a de facto associate of the European Communities. Anchoring itself in the West takes precedence for Yugoslavia over atmospheric defusing of the Soviet threat. Normal state relations are maintained with the USSR, but Party exchanges are neglected. Intensive political and cultural ties develop with many Western countries.

(U) AFY No. 3. Cohesive, Post-Communist, Balancing Yugoslavia.

An evolution beyond AFY No. 1. The "market" character of "market socialism" becomes more pronounced. A "people's" capital market develops and private savings account for a large percentage of investment. LCY ideologues explain that this is the apotheosis of worker self-management. While the LCY successfully contains nationalism and retains overall political control, Djilas' vision of the transformation of Titoist Communism into Social Democracy appears to be proceeding apace. Non-Communist political forces come to play an independent role in the Socialist Alliance in some republics, e.g., a Clerical group in Slovenia. Republican Parties take the lead in abandoning democratic centralism; eventually the all-Yugoslav LCY statute is modified along the lines of the August 1968 draft statute of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

(U) AFY No. 4. Cohesive, Post-Communist, Westward-leaning Yugoslavia. This Yugoslavia represents a further evolution beyond and a combining of tendencies in AFYs Nos. 2 and 3. The more Westward emphasis of nonalignment and systemic domestic political change prove to be mutually reinforcing.

(U) AFY No. 5. Cohesive, Communist, Pro-Western, Garrison Yugoslavia. A special case. Perception of an imminent threat of Soviet invasion leads members of the Yugoslav political elite to submerge their internal differences dramatically in the interest of preserving Yugoslavia's separate existence. The republics voluntarily accept some recentralization; the Presidency, acting unanimously, invokes its emergency powers. Civic rights and some forms of national expression are limited for the sake of vigilance and efficiency in mobilizing to meet the external threat. Nonalignment is abandoned, in deed if not in word. Washington is asked to affirm strong U.S. interest in the inviolability of Yugoslav sovereignty and to increase deliveries of some military hardware, including sophisticated classified systems. The YPA General

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-14-

Staff indicates its interest in contingency discussions with military planners of the United States, Italy, and other key NATO countries. Closer intelligence collaboration on Warsaw Pact developments is proposed.

Discohesive Yugoslavias

(U) AFY No. 6. Discohesive, Communist, Balancing Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav economy fails to grow at the projected rate of 7.5 percent, with ensuing economic stagnation, particularly in the less-developed regions of the country. Economic and social problems are magnified by a jump in the unemployed labor force--a consequence of a reversal of the labor emigration to Western Europe, and/or a closing down of the remaining "political factories" in less-developed regions. National affirmation increasingly degenerates into exclusivist nationalism. Further dilution of the federation leads "minority" national groups in multinational republics--e.g., the Croatian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats, and the Macedonian Albanians--to demand federalization of their respective republics. These demands provoke efforts by the republican authorities, representing the "majority" national group or a national coalition, to repress the "minority." This further poisons relations with other republics where co-nationals of the repressed groups are in the "majority." Kosovo demands formal republican status, provoking a bitter political conflict with Serbia. Inter-republican economic-political disputes are exacerbated. The all-Yugoslav institutions of succession function entirely as creatures of the republics and are consequently immobilized. Essential all-Yugoslav decisions are reached only after long and bitter infighting or are simply postponed.

(U) Discohesion notwithstanding, the republican LCY organizations perpetuate "Titoist" forms of Communist rule and, while increasingly identifying themselves with the narrow interests of their respective "majority" national groups, they successfully continue to utilize nationalist forces for their own purposes, rather than vice versa. In foreign policy, nonalignment is balanced between East and West, in part because this is the path of least resistance in the absence of independent federal organs. The republics expand their prerogatives in foreign policy. Some promote special relationships with their neighbors

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-15-

or with other countries (e.g., Slovenia with Austria or Italy, Kosovo with Albania, Montenegro with the USSR).

(U) AFY No. 7. Discohesive, Communist, Westward-leaning Yugoslavia. AFY No. 6, modified by a Western emphasis of nonalignment. The characteristics of the Westward-leaning version of nonalignment of cohesive AFYs Nos. 2 and 4 pertain. Yugoslav republics promote direct ties with foreign countries, but, recognizing the dangers of any approach to the Soviet bloc, restrict their approaches to countries on the North, West, and South.

(U) AFY No. 8. Discohesive, Post-Communist, Balancing Yugoslavia. AFY No. 6, modified by further evolution of the LCY in an increasingly nationalist direction. Republican Party organizations are successfully confronted or infiltrated by nationalists. Republican leaders formerly ousted for their toleration of nationalism return to power in triumph. The Church (say, the Serbian Orthodox and the Slovene Catholic) assumes considerable importance as spokesman for the nationalist cause. Cultural associations turn into National Radical-like parties with autonomous representation in the Socialist Alliance; they seek to elect assembly delegates. To perpetuate their control, some republican Party organizations downplay further "worker self-management" and "class" interests and attempt to compete with the nationalists on the latter's own terms. They become comic-opera Communists, reminiscent of the comic-opera parliamentary nationalists of interwar Eastern Europe.

(U) AFY No. 9. Discohesive, Post-Communist, Westward-leaning Yugoslavia. An evolution from AFY Nos. 7 and 8. Special ties with Western countries are promoted by the increasingly nationalist republican LCY organizations, but all of them nevertheless remain wary of entering into any special connections with the East.

(U) AFY No. 10. Confederal Yugoslavia. This Yugoslavia represents an evolution beyond the above discohesive Yugoslavias--all of which might prove transitional. Paralysis of the federal policymaking organs leads the republics and provinces to act increasingly like sovereign mini-states. Yugoslavia resembles a revived German Bund, but with sharp national conflicts. Some broad policy decisions are reached by several or most of the republics, acting together on the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-16-

principle of mutual self-interest; other decisions are, by default, reached in each republican capital separately. Party organizations in these capitals promote nationalist causes, including creation of national mini-states and repression of national "minorities." Territorial defense forces under republican control assume greater importance. The YPA is further reduced in size, and its internal use is subjected to a veto of the respective republican political authorities.

(U) Members of the Yugoslav confederation promote their separate foreign political and economic interests. The remaining all-Yugoslav subsidy of the least-developed areas is terminated. The respective "Southern" political authorities look abroad for economic assistance of some kind. In the presumptive absence of adequate aid from the West, some look to the USSR. In the interest of beefing up their territorial armies, the republics seek to purchase military supplies directly abroad; some make approaches to the USSR.

Disintegrating Yugoslavias^{*}

(U) AFY No. 11. Localized Conflict. Given a dis cohesive Yugoslavia, nationalist violence occurs in some region, e.g., a clash between Serbs and Croats in Croatia or between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, or a violent protest by Kosovo Albanians against mistreatment of their co-nationals in Macedonia. The republican authorities, unable to contain the violence easily, turn to Belgrade and appeal for assistance from the YPA and federal security organs in putting down the unrest. This is done at the cost of some loss of life. The recurrence of fratricide thirty years after World War II has a sobering effect on all Yugoslavs. Common interests are reemphasized and internal cohesion is achieved. Alternatively (and more likely), if ending the unrest involves the blatant suppression of one national group, the resulting stability proves to be temporary. Other incidents occur but are similarly contained.

(U) AFY No. 12. Contagious Conflict. Nationalist unrest spreads, but the republican authorities are unwilling or unable to suppress it.

^{*}(U) This part of the typology is compressed into two cases, each of which subsumes several discrete scenarios.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-17-

Fearing that federal intervention will result in suppression of the republic, a preemptive secessionist attempt is made, e.g., by Croatia or Kosovo. YPA units of the affected military district go into action, either at the command of representatives of the rump Presidency, or by direct order of the General Staff, which presents itself, in the name of the LCY, as the institution of state preservation. If the YPA restores order quickly and with limited loss of life, the Presidency or the army itself installs new leaders in the dissident republic and attempts to reconstitute Yugoslavia on a more centralized basis.

(U) Alternatively, federal intervention initiates a messy and prolonged civil war. Territorial defense forces of the dissident republic clash with YPA units, and the latter suffer widespread desertion. The YPA moves units from other military districts into the area. Atrocities are reported. The dissident republic attempts to secede from Yugoslavia. Other republics prepare to disassociate themselves from the crumbling federation. The secessionist regions appeal for a security guarantee, perhaps first to the West and then--if none is forthcoming--to the East. Retired senior YPA and security officials, mobilized by Cominformists, call for the USSR to put an end to the bloodletting. Alternatively, if the civil war persists, the rump Presidency or the YPA itself appeals for such "assistance" from Moscow.

(U) The typology is presented graphically on the following pages.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-18-




Fig. 1 — Cohesive Alternative Future Yugoslavias




Fig. 2 — Discohesive Alternative Future Yugoslavias

UNCLASSIFIED

-19-




Fig.3 — Disintegrating Alternative Future Yugoslavias

-20-

III. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA

Two clouds hang over Yugoslavia's future: First, the potential for self-paralysis and self-destruction inherent in the Yugoslav state and society and, second, the threat of external intervention. Although LCY ideologies may on occasion ritualistically invoke the "imperialist threat," Yugoslavs really perceive only one menacing external power, the Soviet Union, as Yugoslav leaders freely acknowledge in private.

(U) The two threats to Yugoslavia's future have a complex inter-relationship. Viewed independently from today's perspective, the external threat would appear to be manageable. Yugoslavia has endured the heavy hand of Stalin and both the blandishments and scolding of his successors without succumbing; Yugoslav sovereignty remains intact. Indeed, the perception of the Soviet threat shared among the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia has contributed importantly to binding them together in a federal union. But the looming presence of the Soviet Union no longer seems to overshadow the particularist and antagonistic forces within. Modernization, industrialization, liberalization, and national affirmation that have transformed Yugoslavia in the Communist era have given rise to a new set of divisive internal preoccupations. Today, these vie with the commonly perceived external threat for a commanding place in the Yugoslav political consciousness.

(U) If, in the past, the dominant mode of interaction between the two factors was for perceptions of the external threat to mitigate the effects of the internal one, in the future the decisive interaction seems likely to be reversed; internal conflicts in Yugoslavia threaten to catalyze the external threat and to sap the country's will and capabilities to resist it effectively.

(U) The Soviet threat is a reality. Unlike the major non-Communist states, which long ago concluded that the status quo in Yugoslavia was the best alternative for the country, the Soviet Union's attitude, even when it ceased after Stalin's death to be unremittingly hostile, has remained ambivalent at best. In 1955, the Soviet leaders, not without reluctance and misgivings, formally accepted the Yugoslav

UNCLASSIFIED

-21-

status quo; but this acceptance has always been provisional and has been so perceived by the Yugoslavs. Through the ups-and-downs in Soviet-Yugoslav relations since 1955, Moscow has never abandoned a proprietary claim on Yugoslavia. Its preference for an alternative internal order and foreign policy alignment that would restore Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc has been unmistakable. However, the balance between Soviet preferences with respect to Yugoslavia and the constraints operating to inhibit Soviet freedom of action to realize those preferences has been such as to compel the USSR to live with the status quo.

(U) In this section, presumed Soviet preferences regarding Yugoslavia will be weighed against constraints hindering the translation of preferences into operative policy in the circumstances of the Alternative Future Yugoslavias that have been delineated in Sec. II. Particular attention will be devoted to those AFYs that significantly increase Yugoslavia's vulnerability to Soviet interference or intervention and to their likely impact on Soviet propensities to interfere or intervene. Finally, in assessing the probability of change in future Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia, the likely impact upon Soviet policy of Yugoslav-specific factors, on the one hand, and the weight of broader extra-Yugoslav considerations, on the other, will be distinguished. Among the latter, the USSR's European policy and its relations with the United States have particular relevance.

THE ROLE OF YUGOSLAVIA IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

(U) Yugoslavia has played a unique role in postwar Soviet foreign policy, absorbing the attention and energies of high-level Soviet decisionmakers on a scale out of all proportion to the size of the country and its resources. Even during the brief period when Yugoslavia was firmly attached to the "socialist camp," Belgrade was a source of special concern in Moscow. A largely self-liberated Communist-ruled country, Yugoslavia, unlike other East European satellites, was not abjectly dependent on the Soviet Union. Tito stood out among East European Communist leaders, for he could count on the personal loyalty of his associates; the CPY was not an "imported Party" and its leader was a genuine hero to large segments of the population. Tito, moreover, had

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-22-

"imperialist" pretensions of his own, and sought to carve out for Yugoslavia a sphere of influence in southeastern Europe. In fact, the militance of the self-confident and aggressive CPY leadership was a source of continuing embarrassment to Stalin, whose principal objective in Eastern Europe in the early postwar years was to digest his huge gains quietly, without provoking a Western reaction.

(U) But precisely because Tito and his associates commanded a strong Communist Party with indigenous roots and enjoyed a measure of popular support without parallel elsewhere in Eastern Europe, their loyalty and devotion to the Soviet Union and to Stalin personally were unique assets that a more balanced Soviet leader might have cultivated rather than squandered. Stalin's excommunication of Tito and his colleagues on trumped-up charges of deviationism must be regarded as one of the largest and most consequential overreactions in the history of Soviet foreign policy.

(U) When Stalin's anathema and a concerted bloc-wide campaign of anti-Titoist vilification and intimidation failed to produce the intended results, Yugoslavia was transformed into a new, irritating, and intractable problem for Moscow, one no longer susceptible to management "inside the family." Stalin's fierce campaign against the Yugoslav heresy had far-reaching consequences throughout the Communist world. It fueled the forced draft prophylactic "Bolshevization" of Eastern Europe and triggered the purge of precisely those Communist leaders who had some potential for developing indigenous roots for the Communist system in their own countries. Yugoslavia became the "negative example" for the entire Communist world, a clear warning of the dangers inherent in the slightest deviation from "socialist internationalism."

(U) In the post-Stalin period, Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia became the focus of a fierce debate inside the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), symbolizing as no other foreign policy issue the struggle between the Stalinist wing of the Party and the exponents of change. For Khrushchev, who headed the latter group, the Stalin-Molotov policy of excommunication, intimidation, and incessant hostility toward Yugoslavia--if not a mistake from the outset--had long

UNCLASSIFIED

-23-

since outlived its usefulness. The prospects for toppling Tito and coercing Yugoslavia back into the fold had clearly exhausted themselves, and the old policy promised only to drive Yugoslavia further and further away from both the Leninist model and the Soviet bloc. Enmity toward Tito, emerging as a leader of the nonaligned forces, also constrained new Soviet approaches to the Third World. Molotov, on the other hand, warned of the disciplinary problems elsewhere in Eastern Europe that rapprochement with Yugoslavia would create. The issue came to a head at the July 1955 CPSU Central Committee plenum, at which Molotov was decisively defeated.

(U) In the months that followed Khrushchev's pilgrimage to Belgrade (May 1955), Molotov's gloomy prophecy appeared to be borne out. His socialist bona fides reestablished by the fountainhead of world Communism, Tito promptly began to throw his weight around in Communist Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia became a complicating irritant endangering Soviet efforts to place its domination of Eastern Europe on a new basis that relied less on coercion and more on the presumed community of interests of the Communist leaders of the region. In greater or lesser degree Yugoslavia has played a role in all of the major upheavals and deviations in Eastern Europe since "normalization" of Soviet-Yugoslav relations in 1955: Poland and Hungary in 1956, Romania in the 1960s, Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yugoslavia has also been an issue in the conflict between the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), serving in the late 1950s as a convenient proxy for Peking's attacks on Soviet "revisionism" and then, as Sino-Yugoslav relations warmed in the late sixties, a source of Soviet concern that the Chinese Communists were attempting to build a "Peking-Balkan axis" against the USSR.

(U) The expanded global role of the Soviet Union in the 1960s has brought home to contemporary Soviet leaders additional geopolitical costs of the "loss" of Yugoslavia that were not anticipated in 1948. For Stalin in the early postwar years, Yugoslavia was not so much a Soviet bridgehead on the Southern Flank of non-Communist Europe as it was an exposed salient commanded by reckless and poorly disciplined leaders unable or unwilling to maintain the low international profile

-24-

that circumstances required. The ouster of Tito did deprive the Communist insurgents in Greece of their main source of external support and contributed, perhaps decisively, to their defeat, but there is strong evidence that Stalin was less than enthusiastic about the Greek Civil War. Similarly, while the Soviet Union lent political support to Belgrade in its dispute with Italy over Trieste, this too was not a major objective of Soviet policy at the time, and Soviet support was extended begrudgingly. The Soviet leaders were appalled at the audacity of the Yugoslavs in shooting down American aircraft that overflew Yugoslavia in 1946.

Given the essentially regional and continental parameters within which Soviet foreign policy was conducted during the first post-war decade, Yugoslavia's strategic geographical position did not figure prominently in Soviet foreign and military policy calculations. But during the last fifteen years, the Soviet Union has emerged as a Middle Eastern power of the first magnitude, with a sizeable permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean. Having "lost" Albania in 1961, however, the USSR found itself without direct access to a theater in which its power and prestige had become heavily invested. Deeply committed to keeping their tottering Egyptian client afloat after the Six-Day War in June 1967, the Soviet leaders were obliged to negotiate with Belgrade for overflight rights so that an aerial arms bridge could be built from Moscow to Cairo. The temporary interruption of Soviet overflights of Yugoslavia during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 demonstrated the limitations on Soviet freedom to pursue ambitious goals in the Mediterranean and the Middle East imposed by Stalin's caprice in 1948.

(U) Albania's success in escaping from the embrace of the Warsaw Pact after 1961 can in large measure be attributed to Yugoslavia's blocking position, which denies the Soviet Union direct access to Albania through a Soviet-dominated state; to a lesser extent, Romania's freedom of action within the bloc has been enhanced by the existence of an independent Communist-ruled state on its western frontier.

(U) Finally, the vulnerability of NATO's weak Southern Flank to Soviet military and political pressure has been substantially mitigated by the denial of Yugoslav territory to Soviet bloc forces. Had Yugoslavia

UNCLASSIFIED

-25-

remained in the bloc, politically unstable Italy would have become a "front-line" state along the line of demarcation between East and West in Europe, and Greece would have found itself confronted along almost its entire northern border by Soviet-controlled states.*

Two-Track Soviet Policy

(U) Short of forcibly dragging Yugoslavia back into the Soviet fold--a course of action that has always implied large-scale military operations--the Soviet leaders have had two basic alternative policies open to them for coping with the persisting harmful effects of Yugoslavia's extra-bloc status: (1) a hostile policy of isolating Yugoslavia from the rest of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe so as to minimize the risks of infection with the virus of Yugoslav independence and revisionism; and (2) a conciliatory policy designed to wean Yugoslavia away from a Western orientation, undermine its nonaligned status, promote its dependence on the Soviet Union, and keep alive "socialist ties" until some future set of circumstances might make possible re-incorporation in the bloc without armed force.

(U) Soviet policy since 1948 has fluctuated between these two polar courses. Neither policy has been entirely satisfactory from Moscow's point of view; hence the oscillations. The first course, while safer with respect to Moscow's position elsewhere in Eastern Europe, has had the undesirable consequence of stimulating a Westward shift in Yugoslav foreign policy and has provided grist for the mill of Yugoslav political and economic revisionism--thus simultaneously moving Belgrade further away both from the Soviet bloc and from Soviet-style "socialism." It has been a sticking point, in varying degrees, inhibiting broader Soviet foreign policy moves vis-à-vis the West and toward the nonaligned Third World. With regard to Yugoslavia itself, this policy has been tantamount to writing the country off politically, leaving overt military intervention as the sole means for returning it to the Soviet fold.

* (U) Additional advantages that control of Yugoslavia would give the USSR at present are discussed in Sec. IV.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-26-

(U) The conciliatory policy alternative, adopted with special fervor by Khrushchev in the interval between his Canossa-like pilgrimage to Belgrade in 1955 and his suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in the fall of 1956, and then again in the early 1960s, has had the drawbacks that Molotov had foreseen. Conciliatory phases of Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia have repeatedly been punctuated by upheavals or deviations in Eastern Europe; rebels in Hungary, deviators in Romania, and reformers in Czechoslovakia have all, often without full consciousness, been emboldened by Belgrade. For all revisionist and autonomous movements in Eastern Europe, Soviet-Yugoslav relations have served as a barometer indicating permissible limits of divergence from Soviet-preferred policies: good Soviet-Yugoslav relations have implied greater Soviet tolerance; tense relations have implied its lowering.

(U) Today, as discussed in Appendix A, the USSR is attempting to combine the promotion of inter-state and inter-Party ties with Yugoslavia and limited encouragement of internal dissension keyed to the future. But the Soviet Union is no more able to afford a long-term conciliatory policy toward Yugoslavia at present than it was in the past, for its domination of Eastern Europe is inherently unstable. When the next upheaval occurs in Eastern Europe, Moscow will be no more ready than in the past to adopt a long-term hostile policy toward Yugoslavia, for it is inherently unable to write off the country. Continued oscillation between the two policies is likely--unless the passing of Tito provides the Soviets with their long-desired opportunity to return Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc.

SOVIET POLICY CHOICES IN POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA

(U) The passing of Tito will represent a branch point for Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia, regardless of what comes after. While Tito rules, the prospects for a Soviet policy of pressure to bring Yugoslavia around are poor, the probability that Yugoslavia will remain viable is fairly high, and the danger that Yugoslavia might drift too far into the Western camp is low. On all counts, living with the status quo in Yugoslavia will probably continue to recommend itself to Moscow as preferable to any alternative policy as long as Tito retains power.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-27-

(U) His passing will raise new perils to Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union. Without Tito, a Yugoslavia that neither disintegrates nor moves back toward the Soviet Union may in Moscow's view seem more likely to gravitate toward the West. The future of even Tito's revisionist version of "socialism" will seem bleaker without him. A post-Tito Yugoslavia that evolves out of "socialism" could be lost indefinitely, and, even worse, might eventually become a Western bridgehead in Eastern Europe. Without Tito, disintegrative tendencies will not come up against the obstacle of the charismatic "only Yugoslav" leader whom Soviet observers, like Westerners, must regard as the principal cementing force in the society. Exploitation of disintegrative tendencies will appear to promise higher payoffs to Moscow in the post-Tito environment. Moreover, Tito's passing will remove the principal focus, both real and symbolic, of Western and Third World support for an independent Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the external costs of Soviet meddling or intervention will probably seem lower to Moscow.

(U) Thus Tito's passing is likely to be perceived by the Soviets as increasing the attractiveness of more interventionist policies, posing the danger that Yugoslavia might slip into the Western orbit if it successfully negotiates the succession, and reducing the external political costs to the Soviet Union of meddling or intervening in Yugoslav affairs.

Instruments of Soviet Policy

(U) The instruments at the disposal of the Soviet leadership for influencing the future course of developments in Yugoslavia range all the way from an overwhelming military capability to threaten or invade the country to instruments of subversion to disorganize it, political leverage to isolate or woo it, and a grip on part of Yugoslavia's economy still large enough to make economic manipulation a significant policy option for the USSR. The efficacy of these instruments will depend on the circumstances in which they are employed, particularly the vulnerability of the target against which they are directed and the will of the Soviet leadership to employ them decisively.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-28-

(U) Against a stable and cohesive Yugoslavia, the instruments available to Moscow, short of the direct employment of large military forces, will provide the USSR with only a marginal capability for influencing the course of events. Indeed, aggressive employment of these instruments is likely, as in the past, to prove counter-productive, offering the Yugoslavs fresh confirmation of Soviet hostility without constituting sufficient coercive force to impose Soviet will. Against an unstable, discohesive Yugoslavia, however, the efficacy of all instruments of Soviet policy will be enhanced. Operating against an internally divided Yugoslavia, selective employment of economic, political and subversive instruments by the Soviet Union could make a large difference; and the weakening of Yugoslavia's capacity and will to resist Soviet military intervention could enhance the political value of military threats. Since the potential of the various policy instruments available to the Soviet leadership is so sensitive to the environment in which they might be employed, the prospects for their utilization will be examined further against the range of Alternative Future Yugoslavias delineated in Sec. II.

Propensities of Soviet Policy

(U) Cohesive Yugoslavias. Cohesiveness will be the most sensitive domestic variable in Yugoslavia's future relations with the Soviet Union. While the strength of the USSR's *motivation* to interfere energetically in Yugoslavia's internal affairs or to intervene militarily in that country will be primarily a function of Soviet perceptions of changes in the character of Yugoslavia's sociopolitical system and its foreign policy orientation, *opportunities* for intervening at acceptable *cost* and *risk* will depend above all on Soviet perceptions of Yugoslavia's vulnerability, measured primarily by the ability of Tito's successors to hold the country together and to offer effective military resistance if attacked. Given a cohesive Yugoslavia, further liberalization of the Yugoslav political and social system and a more Westward-looking emphasis of the country's foreign policy orientation may be manageable; that is, while they might antagonize Moscow, they would not necessarily provoke intervention.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-29-

(U) *AFY No. 1. Cohesive, Communist, Balancing Yugoslavia.*

(U) Soviet Propensity: Against forcible intervention. Yugoslavia's capacity to offer strong resistance would continue to be respected by Moscow, and the maintenance of Communist rule in the country as well as a balanced nonaligned foreign policy would probably stabilize the magnitude of provocation more or less at its present level. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union's broader European and East-West policy interests would be decisive in shaping Moscow's policy toward Yugoslavia. This AFY is compatible with non-antagonistic Soviet efforts to build influence in the country, to keep options open for more assertive policies in the future, and to attempt the gradual weaning away of Yugoslavia, or of selected constituent parts or groups, from Western associations. The Soviet Union could be expected to maintain its capacity to stir up dis cohesive forces and to exercise its political, economic, and military leverage to contain any Westward drift.

(U) Discontinuous Impulse: If, however, Yugoslavia's immediate post-Tito transition were a troubled one (say, a prominent leader were assassinated), Moscow could be faced with a choice between attempting to undermine consolidation by offering support to and making alliances with dissident, separatist or unitarian elements, at the risk of earning the enmity of the Yugoslav regime if it survived the transition, or foregoing serious efforts to influence the course of the succession along pro-Soviet lines in order not to antagonize the likely successor regime. A compromise would be low-profile Soviet involvement with dissidents within the broad framework of an ostensibly disinterested posture. But in a severely troubled immediate transition, where a more activist Soviet policy of interference might be seen as capable of tipping the balance, the case might be made in Moscow for intervening before cohesive forces in Yugoslavia could harden and assume effective control.

(U) *AFY No. 2. Cohesive, Communist, Westward-leaning Yugoslavia.*

(U) Soviet Propensity: Mixed, with higher estimates of the risks and costs both of intervention and of failure to deflect Yugoslavia from

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-30-

a Westward-leaning course. Yugoslavia's closer ties to the West would probably add to the deterrent effect of its cohesiveness, raising Soviet estimates of the probability that prolonged Yugoslav resistance would be supported in some measure by friendly Western powers. But there would also be a heightened sense of threat stemming from concern that a decisive political shift might be occurring that could prove irreversible if permitted to reach fruition. There would be a stronger propensity to intervene provided that Yugoslav-exogenous conditions did not threaten to exact too high a political price or pose serious danger of a wider military confrontation. Deterring signals to the Soviet Union from the United States and the Western allies might be decisive, along with the skill of Yugoslav leaders in negotiating the perilous course toward a more Western-oriented nonalignment posture. Under these circumstances, Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia might be particularly sensitive to the political climate elsewhere in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. Evidence that Romania was attempting to reorient its foreign policy in a similar manner might trigger a once-and-for-all Soviet response.

(U) Discontinuous Impulse: Preemptive invocation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, even in the absence of a credible appeal from "healthy forces."

(U) *AFY No. 3. Cohesive, Post-Communist, Balancing Yugoslavia.*

(U) Soviet Propensity: Similar to AFY No. 1. The degree of provocation offered by Yugoslavia's evolution toward Social Democracy would depend largely on the character of the evolutionary process (dramatic, or by barely perceptible stages; under the cover of ostensible single-party LCY rule, or without it) and the extent to which it threatened to influence political developments in the Soviet bloc. Moscow's posture toward such a Yugoslavia would also be conditioned by the expectations of the Soviet leaders regarding the viability of non-alignment for Yugoslavia in the absence of a single-party leadership core able to enforce the necessary foreign policy discipline. A balancing foreign policy posture might require a higher degree of national homogeneity and self-discipline than a post-Communist Yugoslavia would be capable of mustering, and this might be evident to the Soviet leaders.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-31-

(U) Discontinuous Impulse: As long as Yugoslavia remained both cohesive and genuinely nonaligned, Moscow's motivation for preemptive intervention might be lower than in AFY No. 2. The threat of intervention might, however, be employed, directly or by implication, to inhibit pro-Western movement in Yugoslavia's international relations. The Soviet Union would inject itself into the likely internal controversy on Yugoslavia's foreign policy orientation, offering rewards and threatening punishment to the competing forces.

(U) *AFY No. 4. Cohesive, Post-Communist, Westward-leaning Yugoslavia.*

(U) Soviet Propensity: More favorable to forcible action than in AFYs Nos. 1, 2, or 3. If the Westward foreign policy drift came on the heels of systemic political change, Moscow might regard it as "the last straw," confirming what is probably a fundamental Soviet belief that popular government in Eastern Europe entails an anti-Soviet foreign policy.

(U) Discontinuous Impulse: The Soviet leaders might feel hard pressed to undertake decisive intervention quickly, before Yugoslavia's movement toward the West crystalized into ties that raised the risk of Western involvement in any future Soviet attack on Yugoslavia.

(U) *AFY No. 5. Cohesive, Communist, Pro-Western, Garrison Yugoslavia.*

(U) Soviet Propensity: This is a special case that presupposes a strong Soviet propensity to intervene militarily against Yugoslavia; indeed, it is presumed that perception of an imminent threat of Soviet invasion is the catalyzing force that leads Yugoslavs to submerge their internal differences in order to preserve the independence and integrity of the state. The climate of Soviet-Yugoslav relations under this alternative would resemble that of the most intense phase of the post-1948 confrontation. Economic, cultural, and political relations between Yugoslavia and the entire Soviet bloc would revert to the antagonisms of that earlier period. It is extremely doubtful that Moscow would tolerate an independent Romanian position on Yugoslavia in these circumstances; a crisis in Soviet-Romanian relations would be highly

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-32-

probable if Bucharest did not capitulate and participate in the anti-Yugoslav campaign. Yugoslavia would be treated by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states as a NATO spearhead in Eastern Europe. Soviet motivation to intervene militarily would be higher in this case than in any of the other Alternative Future Yugoslavias, but the probability of prolonged Yugoslav resistance and the risk of Western intervention would maximize Soviet restraint. Whether the latter would offset the former cannot be predicted with any confidence. The balance would probably be determined by larger, extra-Yugoslav considerations, primarily by the Soviet Union's perception of its stake in preserving détente in Europe--which might, in turn, depend largely on the state of Sino-Soviet relations and on the USSR's assessment of the strength of the U.S. and allied response to Yugoslavia's request for assistance and protection.

(U) The moment of greatest danger for such a Yugoslavia might come if the United States and its NATO allies faltered or responded weakly and equivocally to Belgrade's request for support and assistance. Such a response might embolden the Soviet leaders to strike quickly, relying on Western disarray to preclude effective outside help for Yugoslavia.

(U) Discohesive Yugoslavias: From the perspective of Soviet propensities to intervene forcibly, discohesive Yugoslavias all share one important common characteristic: they would appear to Moscow to be unstable situations. Under these circumstances, watchful waiting, together with fishing in troubled waters, would probably appeal to Soviet leaders more than drastic measures of interference or military intervention. While in the cohesive Yugoslavia alternatives, Soviet leaders might fear that time was working against their long-term aspiration to reabsorb Yugoslavia, thus stimulating Soviet interest in forceful preemptive action, discohesive Yugoslavias are likely to appear to Moscow as transitional phenomena on the road to disintegration. Violent preemptive action would seem less called for than encouragement of disintegrative tendencies and alliance-building with dissident domestic forces.

(U) The key political problem for the Soviet Union in dealing with discohesive Yugoslavias would be whether to throw its weight behind

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-33-

separatist forces, hence accelerating disintegrative processes, or to cultivate greater influence in Yugoslavia by supporting centralist forces, either in the Party, the federal government, or the YPA. The choice would depend on the political complexion of the all-Yugoslav champions and their foreign policy orientation, particularly their receptivity to offers of assistance from the USSR. In any case, the Soviet Union could to some extent play all sides against each other, using differentiated approaches to cultivate all parties except those that might seek to enhance their internal position by putting forward an anti-Soviet platform.

(U) *AFY No. 6. Discohesive, Communist, Balancing Yugoslavia.*

(U) Soviet Propensity: Discohesion in Yugoslavia would greatly expand the Soviet Union's room for maneuver among competing national and economic forces in the country and enlarge Soviet leverage for dealing with them on a selective, differentiated basis. Rewards in the form of credit extensions, favorable terms of trade, and perhaps even indirect political support for republics expanding their prerogatives in foreign policy would be among the favored Soviet instruments. The carrot might be publicly extended toward politically more conservative forces and elements favoring strict nonalignment over a more Westward orientation; but covertly, Moscow would probably also instigate and provide assistance to separatists of strongly anti-Communist political persuasions. The stick might be applied in the form of withholding credits, trade, and other forms of economic assistance and political favor. But threats of intervention would probably be regarded as counterproductive by the Soviet leadership, since they could provide cement for the otherwise weakened or crumbling all-Yugoslav structure.

(U) *AFY No. 7. Discohesive, Communist, Westward-leaning Yugoslavia.*

(U) Soviet Propensity: Similar to AFY No. 6, except that greater attention would be devoted to arresting or reversing the Westward orientation of the "foreign policies" of the constituent parts of the country. A special effort would probably be made to cultivate adherents of balanced nonalignment.

(U) Discontinuous Impulse: If closer ties between individual republics and non-Soviet bloc neighbors and other foreign countries

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-34-

threatened to provide such a Yugoslavia with the kinds of economic inputs and political support likely to stabilize the politics of the country on a Western-oriented foreign policy basis, a more activist policy of interference might recommend itself to Soviet leaders as a means of preemption.

(U) *AFY No. 8. Discohesive, Post-Communist, Balancing Yugoslavia.*

(U) Soviet Propensity: Similar to AFY No. 6, but with greater emphasis on selective assistance to the more politically conservative forces in the country, particularly "old comrades" in economically disadvantaged republics. At the same time, lines of communication might be extended to radical nationalists, who might be regarded as the latter-day Yugoslav version of the "revolutionary democrats" of the underdeveloped countries; the brunt of the Soviet effort would be to steer such radical nationalists in an anti-Western direction.

(U) *AFY No. 9. Discohesive, Post-Communist, Westward-leaning Yugoslavia.*

(U) Soviet Propensity: For the Soviet Union, this would be the least desirable of the discohesive Yugoslavias, since it combines abandonment of what in Soviet eyes are the country's residual "socialist" attributes with a foreign policy orientation that looks to the West. In its cohesive variant, this is the Yugoslav path of development most provocative to the Soviet Union. In a setting of general discohesion, Soviet fears of irreversible movement of Yugoslavia out of its tenuous connection with the "socialist community" and toward economic and cultural, if not formal political and military, ties with Western Europe would presumably be less urgent. Lacking central direction and control, the internal political and foreign policy drift of the republics and provinces would be highly uneven, uncoordinated, and probably chaotic. Politically, the salient characteristic for Moscow of such a Yugoslavia would be the abrasive relationship of its constituent parts, rather than the non-Leninist internal organizational forms or efforts to promote special political ties with non-Communist foreign powers.

(U) The Soviet propensity in this case would be similar to AFYs Nos. 7 and 8. A favored clientele would be sought from among those

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-35-

local leaders leaning more toward conservative authoritarian (in the Yugoslav context, "orthodox" Communist) systems of political rule and wary of close ties with Western states (champions of balanced non-alignment, although not necessarily of close relations with the USSR and the Soviet bloc). It is not to be excluded that, in these circumstances, the Soviet Union would present itself as the ally of those elements in Yugoslavia faithful to the heritage of President Tito. Indeed, a "pro-Tito" posture would serve Soviet purposes well under such circumstances, particularly since a Titoist restoration without Tito would be a remote prospect. Such a posture would be nonprovocative in the West, where Titoism has long been regarded as the legitimate expression of Yugoslavia's interests, and it could hardly be denounced inside Yugoslavia as an attempt to impose an "alien" system on the country. If this course of internal Yugoslav development were to culminate in a Soviet intervention, the Soviets might well march into Belgrade under the banner of Marshal Tito.

(U) *AFY No. 10. Confederal Yugoslavia.*

(U) Soviet Propensity: A confederal Yugoslavia would offer the Soviet Union broad avenues for subversion, alliance-building, and tactics of *divide et impera*. In the absence of an effective federal authority in Belgrade to oversee the conduct of the country's foreign political, economic, and military relationships, the Soviet Union would enjoy direct access to the republics and provinces, and probably to individual enterprises and political and economic interest groups in each of the confederated parts of Yugoslavia as well. With the termination of the all-Yugoslav subsidy to the least-developed "Southern" parts of the country, a "Southern strategy" might commend itself to the Soviet leaders. Credits, favorable trade agreements, and perhaps even subsidies might be offered by the USSR for purposes of client-building in the "South," accompanied by a revival of the Russian "Big Brother" theme in dealing with the Serbs and Montenegrins. Simultaneously, however, the Bulgarians, with Soviet backing, might press their claims on Macedonia.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-36-

(U) A Southern strategy would not preclude covert Soviet activities in other parts of the country, particularly activities aimed at preventing Croatia and Slovenia from building patron-client relationships with neighboring Western states. In Croatia, subversive Soviet activities might be directed simultaneously at supporting the hard-pressed Serbian minority while stirring the pot of Croatian nationalism. The object would be to make Croatia appear to its Western neighbors as an unattractive object of support. Should the YPA be overshadowed by territorial defense forces under republican control, selective offers of military assistance might also be proffered, particularly if inter-republican tensions were exacerbated by repression of national "minorities."

(U) A confederal Yugoslavia would probably look to Moscow like a way-station on the road to disintegration. The dominant Soviet propensity is more likely to be to push Yugoslavia further down that road, thus helping the fruit to ripen, than to intervene prematurely with military force.

(U) Disintegrating Yugoslavias: Confronted by a post-Tito Yugoslavia that maintained basic political and social cohesion, constraints on aggressive Soviet policies would probably remain high, but Soviet motivation to interfere actively or to intervene militarily might also be strengthened, depending on the evolution of Yugoslavia's internal political system and its foreign policy posture. Against dis cohesive Yugoslavias the balance of constraints and motivations would change somewhat; Yugoslavia would be more vulnerable to Soviet interference or intervention, but sharp departures in policy would probably not seem urgently required since the course of events would be seen in Moscow as running in a favorable direction. Nudging rather than forcing history would appear to be the preferred Soviet strategy in such circumstances.

(U) The Soviet risk/opportunity calculus would change sharply and dangerously, however, in the face of a disintegrating Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's vulnerability would be very high, the availability of external assistance and Yugoslavia's capacity to absorb it would be low, and hence the opportunities for realizing Soviet aspirations to restore the integrity of the post-World War II Soviet bloc would probably seem more

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-37-

alluring to Moscow than at any time since the Great Schism of 1948.
(See Fig. 4.)

Alternative Future Yugoslavia	Aggressive Motivations	Constraints on Aggressive Behavior
Cohesive	Moderate to High	High
Discohesive	Moderate to Low	Moderate to Low
Disintegrating	Moderate to High	Low

(U) Fig. 4--Soviet propensities for intervention in
Post-Tito Yugoslavia

(U) AFYs No. 11. *Localized Conflict* and No. 12. *Contagious Conflict*.

(U) Soviet Propensity: The Soviet Union would probably find irresistible an appeal for fraternal assistance, whether issued in the name of Slav brotherhood or socialist solidarity, by Yugoslav federal authorities who were generally recognized as legitimate (as opposed to a fictitious or obscure "healthy nucleus"). Responding to such an appeal by beleaguered Yugoslav leaders, the Soviets would expect to encounter in Yugoslavia willing allies, instead of total resistance, among a significant part of the population. They would expect it highly probable that the Western World would accept their intervention, sadly, but with resignation, and--if it occurred in the wake of widespread domestic violence--perhaps even with relief.

(U) But if an appeal for assistance from legitimate federal authorities would be the easiest one for Moscow to respond to, it is also the least likely of the "appeals-to-the-Soviet Union" contingencies. Both the legitimacy of the authorities making such an appeal and their locus of power are likely to be less ideal. An "all-Yugoslav" appeal might come, not from legally constituted authorities, but from their challengers, or from some "credentialed" rump group that had split off from the rest of the government; it might conceivably come from the leaders, or from a leadership faction, of an all-Yugoslav institution, such as the YPA. Or, if the authorities requesting Soviet

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-38-

assistance were "legitimate" leaders, their jurisdiction might be less than all-Yugoslav, perhaps limited to a single republic, even a "Northern" one.

(U) The Soviet response to an invitation to intervene that came from these more ambiguous Yugoslav sources cannot be predicted with any confidence. But a chaotic, strife-ridden, disintegrating Yugoslavia would in any case produce a wide range of pretexts for Soviet intervention, if the Soviet leaders chose to exercise that option. The actual Soviet choice would depend on a wide range of interrelated calculations:

1. The likely outcome if the Soviet Union did not intervene, including particularly the possibility of Western or international intervention on behalf either of the Belgrade authorities or of secessionist republics, or the prospects of restabilization by purely internal efforts;

2. The effect of internal conflict in Yugoslavia on U.S. and Western predispositions to commit prestige and resources on behalf of Yugoslavia;

3. The impact of national strife in Yugoslavia on the Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe.

(U) Under certain circumstances, actions short of large-scale direct intervention might be deemed more suitable by the Soviet leadership. In a localized conflict, Moscow might seek to woo back into the Soviet fold the more repressive regime that would probably ensue. In a contagious conflict that found all-Yugoslav authorities ranged against a secessionist republic, the Soviets might try to buy dominant influence with Belgrade, whether a rump Presidency or a YPA-dominated regime, by means of political backing for the cause of Yugoslav integrity and substantial infusions of arms and logistic support. In the event of failure, or of continued internal disintegration, the option of direct intervention would still be open. In this eventuality, regardless of any secessionist attempts in the meantime, the Soviets would seek to extend their domination over all the constituent parts of Yugoslavia.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-39-

Extra-Yugoslav Considerations

(U) Soviet hopes for restoring Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc are likely to be strengthened by Tito's passing. Moscow is likely to find new opportunities for exploiting internal conflicts and more credible pretexts for intervening in the country. But Soviet willingness to act in accordance with these propensities will be influenced, in some cases decisively, by Soviet calculations about the following extra-Yugoslav considerations.

(U) 1. The likelihood of direct Western involvement. Moscow's employment of Soviet military forces in Europe for the first time in violent conflict beyond the confines of the Warsaw Pact would represent a leap into the uncertain. Post-Tito Yugoslavia will not be a prize sufficiently big to tempt Soviet intervention in the face of an assessment that the United States and its allies possessed the capability and resolve to enter the conflict on Yugoslavia's side. But the Soviet assessment of the likely Western response would hardly be so clear-cut. Under most foreseeable circumstances, the Soviets would probably discount active Western intervention against a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia that quickly overpowered the country. If, on the other hand, Yugoslavia promised to be capable of mounting a united and effective resistance effort, which could turn the Soviet invasion into a protracted conflict, the matter would probably be viewed differently in Moscow. Prolonged fighting against elusive regular and irregular Yugoslav forces operating in difficult terrain and supported by the Yugoslav population at large not only would be an unwelcome prospect per se to the Soviet leaders, but also it would make more likely Western support for the Yugoslav resistance effort and increase the risk of an eventual East-West military confrontation over the country.

(U) 2. The impact on broad Soviet European policy. Intervention in post-Tito Yugoslavia or a strong threat to its independence would be perceived by Soviet leaders as dysfunctional to the broad détente policy pursued by Moscow with respect to the Western allies since the early 1960s. Such a policy, assuming it is perpetuated after Tito passes from the Yugoslav scene, may be regarded as a constraint on Soviet interventionist propensities toward Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union's

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-40-

investment in promoting an environment of détente in Western Europe is substantial, has already generated payoffs that Moscow evidently values highly, and holds out promise of even greater rewards in the future. The Soviets will not lightly embark on a course of action toward Yugoslavia that would risk jeopardizing that investment, reversing diplomatic gains already achieved, or foreclosing their further enlargement.

(U) Yugoslav spokesmen have frequently cited these considerations, along with confidence that their country's will and capacity to offer effective resistance to intervention is understood by Moscow, as powerful deterrent factors. However, reliance on these considerations for deterrence of Soviet intervention must be conditional. It presupposes that the Soviets will calculate that the costs of intervening in Yugoslavia, expressed in terms of a setback to broader Soviet policy interests, outweigh the benefits, expressed in terms either of gains that might be foregone or of losses that might be incurred from failure to intervene. This Soviet calculation may not always be an easy one. The Soviets might conclude that the likely political costs of intervention, while tangible, would be limited and reversible and therefore acceptable. Although aware of the difference between intervention against Yugoslavia as opposed to a Warsaw Pact member, they might be encouraged by their success in limiting political damage incurred as a result of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The policies and postures of the Western allies toward Yugoslavia, both before and during any post-Tito Yugoslav crisis, would be the key external variables affecting this Soviet calculation.

(U) In time, however, the Soviet stake in preserving or extending the atmosphere of détente in Europe might be reduced, either because the Soviet leaders concluded that their détente policy had exhausted its usefulness or had failed to produce the expected results or because it had succeeded so well that reliable alternatives to accommodation to the Soviet Union no longer seemed available to most West European governments. In both cases, the U.S.-West Europe relationship would be crucial in the Soviet calculation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-41-

(U) Failure of present Soviet efforts to dissolve NATO ties and to accelerate the decoupling of Western Europe from the United States might well lead the USSR to abandon or downgrade the priority it now appears to attach to a posture of détente, but this would not necessarily reduce Soviet estimates of the risk of aggressive courses of action in Europe. How Soviet abandonment of détente diplomacy would affect the position of Yugoslavia, assuming it had become more vulnerable for internal reasons, would depend on whether the Soviet leaders regarded forbearance with respect to Belgrade as a condition imposed upon them primarily by balance of power considerations, or whether they regarded it chiefly as a price that had to be paid for demonstrating Soviet restraint and goodwill while experimenting with détente diplomacy in Europe. In the latter case, deterrence of Soviet intervention against Yugoslavia might be gravely weakened by the deemphasis of détente politics in Europe. Particularly to a new Soviet leadership, once the diplomatic inhibitions of détente had been removed, the time might seem ripe for a testing of the altered balance of power achieved by the Soviet military buildup since the mid-sixties. Yugoslavia, if it had become vulnerable domestically, and assuming it was not explicitly covered by NATO security guarantees, might seem a suitable and promising target for such probing and testing.

(U) Success for Soviet détente diplomacy is far more likely to generate more of the same than to cause Moscow to revert to a more aggressive policy. The long-term consequences of such Soviet success could well be calamitous for NATO Western Europe, as well as for Yugoslavia and other neutral states. In the short- and middle-run, however, such Soviet success would probably induce in most of non-Soviet-dominated Europe a sense of relaxation rather than of imminent peril, and Soviet interests would probably best be served by catering to such a mood. A deliberate Soviet decision to test its irreversibility very early would not be likely, even in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the Soviets might be more willing in these circumstances to act decisively in Yugoslavia if an opportunity such as internal disintegration presented itself.

(U) Persisting Soviet interest in cultivating an atmosphere of détente in Europe will, then, provide post-Tito Yugoslavia with a

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-42-

significant measure of assurance against Soviet aggression, but the reliability of that assurance will depend critically on whether Soviet restraint is reinforced by fear of consequences apart from endangering détente: primarily, likelihood of Western involvement in a united and effective Yugoslav resistance effort.

(U) 3. The impact on Eastern Europe. The impact of intervention in Yugoslavia on East European politics would be a difficult calculation for the Soviets. A major objective of Soviet intervention would be to remove, once and for all, a persistent irritant and obstacle to stable Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. A serious Romanian crisis would increase this motivation; as discussed in Sec. IV, such a crisis could even "spill over" into Yugoslavia. Other future upheavals or deviations in Eastern Europe--such "discontinuities" are almost inevitable in one country or another--would further strengthen the Soviet desire to be rid of an independent Yugoslavia. On the other hand, with reference to Eastern Europe, the prospect of prolonged Yugoslav resistance to military intervention may be considered a constraint on Soviet interventionist proclivities, for Moscow would fear it might stimulate dissidence elsewhere in the region rather than cowing and pacifying it. Moscow would be particularly concerned about negative repercussions in Eastern Europe if national armed forces were involved in a protracted conflict in Yugoslavia.

(U) 4. The impact on other issues. Perpetuation of present Soviet policy toward the Third World might constitute a slight constraint on Soviet interventionist propensities in Yugoslavia. Particularly in the event intervention led to prolonged, bloody conflict, the Soviets could not be confident that the precedent of Czechoslovakia would apply with respect to the Third World. Although Tito's passing would have reduced the stature of Yugoslavia as a leader of the nonaligned states, the spectacle of a fiercely opposed Soviet intervention against an avowedly nonaligned state could only deepen the misgivings about the scope of the Brezhnev Doctrine of Third World states that have accepted Soviet assistance and presence and strengthen the disinclination of others to turn toward the USSR for assistance in solving their regional military-political problems.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-43-

(U) Similarly, Moscow could expect a serious deterioration of relations with West European Communist Parties--the Italian Party, especially. This would constitute an additional minor constraint on intervention, especially if Moscow were still following détente policies in Europe.

(U) The Chinese Communists could be counted upon to help rally the Afro-Asian World against the Soviet Union and would undoubtedly use the United Nations as a forum. Assuming a continuation of strong Sino-Soviet enmity, this itself is unlikely to influence Soviet behavior very much. But further assuming a Soviet fear of Western support for a Yugoslav resistance effort, Moscow would be concerned that U.S.-Chinese political cooperation against the USSR would be hardened and the evolution of a working partnership between the USSR's two strongest opponents be given a strong boost.

(U) An extended high-level crisis or the renewed outbreak of fighting in the Middle East would, on the other hand, enhance rather than constrain Soviet propensities to intervene in Yugoslavia. In these circumstances, secure overflight rights and aircraft and naval bases would be far more important to Moscow than at present. If the post-Tito regime continued to refuse Soviet requests for such rights, Moscow might judge the payoff of intervention to be worth even substantial probable costs.

(U) This discussion indicates that Yugoslav-specific and extra-Yugoslav motivations for and constraints on Soviet intervention are closely interrelated. The development of the Yugoslav political system after Tito will not only affect Soviet perceptions of opportunities for interfering in Yugoslavia and propensities to do so, but will also strongly influence Moscow's calculation of the weight to be given to external factors in any decision on intervention. The critical domestic Yugoslav variables in this regard are (1) the cohesiveness and political stability of post-Tito Yugoslavia, and (2) its capacity to offer prolonged and effective resistance to Soviet intervention. If post-Tito Yugoslavia is dis cohesive and unstable, and if its capacity to resist Soviet invasion is low, the *external*, no less than the internal constraints on Soviet intervention will be considerably weakened.

UNCLASSIFIED

-44-

IV. U.S. POLICY TOWARD POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIATHE POLITICAL-MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF YUGOSLAVIA

The U.S. interest in Yugoslavia's survival as an independent state free of Soviet control derives primarily from the U.S. concern to maintain the stability of the post-World War II power balance in Europe and to encourage forces of national affirmation and political and economic liberalization in Eastern Europe.

The U.S. has a clear-cut military stake in Yugoslav independence. Effective Soviet military control of Yugoslav territory would increase Warsaw Pact ground, air, and naval capabilities for use in a conflict on NATO's Southern Flank. Soviet control of naval and airbase facilities in Yugoslavia would significantly improve the overall Soviet military posture in the Mediterranean region.

The Soviets would be guaranteed against revocation by Yugoslavia of existing overflight rights, and they would enjoy greater flexibility in timing, refueling, and use of relief crews in the event of a crisis or renewed outbreak of fighting in the Middle East. Control of airfields in Yugoslavia would somewhat extend the range of Soviet tactical air support for the Soviet fleet in the Western Mediterranean, although still not to its Western exit. Naval bases on the Adriatic, supplementing the Black Sea ports, would relieve the Soviets of exclusive dependence on access and egress through Turkish waters in a crisis and increase on-station time under normal conditions. On the other hand, the Soviets are not likely to concentrate too much of their naval capability in the Adriatic, where it would be highly vulnerable and easily bottled up. To further improve their position in the Western Mediterranean, they would probably still desire expanded facilities, for example, in Algeria.

On the Central Front, Soviet control of Yugoslavia would not enhance Soviet military capabilities, and in some circumstances might involve at least their temporary weakening. Given European topography, northern Yugoslavia is not a useful staging area for a land invasion of the FRG. Nor would control of Yugoslav territory enhance Soviet

-45-

tactical air capabilities on the Central Front. Moreover, assuming present or increased Soviet force deployments on the Chinese border and no prior overall buildup of Soviet General Purpose Forces, commitment of a sizeable Soviet force (say, over one-half million men) in Yugoslavia might reduce the strength of Soviet forces available for use on the Central Front during the time Soviet forces were tied down in Yugoslavia.

The European balance of power would, nevertheless, be fundamentally affected, since Yugoslavia has assumed a neurological position in postwar Europe. Yugoslavia is the only truly "grey" area on the continent. In Austria, Finland, and the other neutral European countries, the interests of East and West are in relatively stable equilibrium. In Yugoslavia, this equilibrium is far more unstable. Since 1949, the United States and other NATO members have accepted as fully legitimate an independent, nonaligned Yugoslavia and have (as described in Appendix B) expended considerable resources in assisting Yugoslavia to preserve that position. Since 1968, the United States has intensified its efforts to bolster Yugoslav independence while Tito continues to lead the country. But the USSR, successfully defied by Tito in 1948, has never abandoned a residual desire, in appropriate circumstances, to reincorporate Yugoslavia into the Soviet bloc. It regards the bloc as Yugoslavia's "natural hinterland"* and evidently interprets Yugoslavia's mounting internal conflicts, and the prospect of their worsening after Tito, as raising real prospects for realizing this objective.[†]

Soviet domination of Yugoslavia would constitute the first significant shift in the postwar European power balance, the first clear-cut Soviet success in pursuing the policy of "status quo plus" in Europe since the division of the continent was consolidated at the end of the 1940s. Assuming the Soviets would have to use force to achieve this

* Raabe commentary, Deutschlandsender, September 24, 1971.

[†] This sentiment has been expressed bluntly in public agit-prop lectures in Moscow. For example, on January 25, 1972, a CPSU speaker praised the post-December crackdown in Yugoslavia, singling out Tito and the army for praise while expressing the hope that the country would return to a planned economy and the Soviet bloc. (U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Airgram-130, February 11, 1972, Secret.)

-46-

aim, they might, even if they did so reluctantly, expect to impress on Western Europe their military power and their willingness to use it for offensive political purposes in Europe. They might also hope to demonstrate to West Europeans the emptiness of the U.S. security interest in Yugoslav independence and thus reinforce doubts about the validity of the U.S. strategic guarantee for Western Europe.

Whether subjugation of Yugoslavia would have the consequences in Western Europe desired by Moscow would depend primarily on the general state of the Atlantic relationship at the time. If NATO remained a viable alliance, Soviet occupation of Yugoslavia by military force would, at the least, cause West European states to interrupt détenteist policies and probably induce Bonn to scuttle its Ostpolitik. If the Atlantic alliance were characterized by real confidence and especially if a Soviet invasion were bloody and prolonged, Western Europe might significantly increase its own defense expenditures, show heightened interest in European defense cooperation, and galvanize NATO into a more cohesive military alliance.

If, however, the current Soviet "peace offensive" had resulted in increasing net Soviet political influence in Western Europe, if strains in NATO had been seriously exacerbated, and particularly, if a large reduction of U.S. forces stationed in Europe had occurred not as part of a restructuring of NATO acceptable to both Western Europe and the United States but had created a great deal of intra-alliance acrimony, Soviet military subordination of Yugoslavia might serve as the proverbial last straw fatally disrupting NATO and leading some West European states to conclude that they had better make their own security accommodations with the USSR on the best terms available.

Extension of Soviet control over Yugoslavia would, given the military issues previously discussed, induce a strong sense of insecurity in Yugoslavia's NATO neighbors--Italy, Greece, and perhaps Turkey as well. (Even were the Italian Communists in power, they would feel threatened by this development.) Italy, Greece, and Austria would be faced with a potentially massive influx of refugees.

Achievement of Soviet control over Yugoslavia would have important ramifications within the Soviet bloc. It would almost certainly spell

-47-

the end of Romanian autonomy. A prior Soviet attempt to end by force the Romanian deviation is one scenario by which a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia might come about. The tacit Yugoslav-Romanian alliance would probably dissolve in such a crunch, for the Yugoslavs would be most unlikely to extend even marginal military assistance for fear of provoking a Soviet attack on themselves. They might well prefer even Romanian capitulation to the uncertainties of Romanian resistance, especially the danger of "spill-over."^{*} If the Soviets mounted an invasion of Yugoslavia for other reasons, there is a high probability that they would simultaneously settle accounts with the maverick Romanian leadership. Transit of Romanian territory, if not direct participation of Romanian forces, would almost certainly arise as a crisis issue. Romanian capitulation would signal an end to Romanian autonomy, while Romanian refusal might well trigger immediate Soviet occupation.

If the Soviets had resolved to seize control of Yugoslavia, they would incur little additional cost in subduing Albania as well. This would eliminate the last remaining independent or autonomous Communist state in Europe, thus restoring the integrity of the "socialist commonwealth" on the continent and demonstrating the inability of the PRC to render meaningful assistance to Communist deviants. The Soviets would also regain their former naval base at Dürres, with some resulting naval advantages in the Mediterranean in addition to those gained from utilizing Yugoslav ports further north on the Adriatic Coast.

Soviet suppression of the Yugoslav, Romanian, and Albanian deviations would constitute a setback to the forces of national affirmation and political and economic liberalization elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The extent of this setback would depend on whether Yugoslavia had retained some lustre in Eastern Europe at the time of invasion and was subdued against its united and determined resistance, or whether dis cohesion and internal turmoil had already dispelled illusions about the "Yugoslav model" and made the Soviet takeover a relatively easy

^{*}Two detailed scenarios resulted from the 1969 Epsilon political-military games conducted by the Joint War Games Agency.

-48-

one. In the latter case, the Soviet Gleichschaltung might only deepen popular feelings of resignation to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. In the former case, greater Soviet control and internal repression throughout the bloc would be likely in the wake of heightened discontent and possibly new upheavals as a reaction to the Soviet attempt to occupy Yugoslavia. Popular revulsion against participation of national armed forces in the invasion would probably be strong everywhere except in Bulgaria. Suppression of this unrest by Moscow would, at least in the short run, constitute a severe setback to evolutionary forces in Eastern Europe. But this might only increase the longer-run instability of the area, making new mass upheavals more rather than less likely in the future. This would be more likely if the Warsaw Pact occupation of Yugoslavia were prolonged and partisan warfare persisted.

As this last point suggests, the political-military consequences of Soviet subordination of Yugoslavia would be highly sensitive to the *process* by which Soviet control were achieved. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets could suppress Yugoslavia as easily as they "consolidated" Czechoslovakia after the road-march of August 21, 1968. Invasion of a cohesive Yugoslavia, whatever the circumstances, is likely to trigger total national defense. The Soviet invasion force might well get bogged down in a protracted, bloody conflict. In this eventuality, Yugoslavia would probably appeal to Western governments and public opinion for military assistance, while the prolonged fighting itself would create some danger of spill-over into neighboring NATO and neutral countries, if not of retreating military forces, then of refugees.

Some of these dangers would arise even if a Soviet invasion were launched against a disintegrating Yugoslavia, although the degree of provocation to the West of an invasion under such circumstances would be significantly less. Soviet military intervention in a disintegrating Yugoslavia is likely to have been preceded by the outbreak of violent internal conflict in the country, perhaps even by a bloody civil war. Europe would have been witnessing the dissolution of a state entity astride the line of demarcation between East and West,

-49-

accompanied perhaps by a scramble among some of Yugoslavia's constituent parts to find external security guarantors. The explosive potentialities of such a scenario would be compounded by the impossibility of any clean break-up of Yugoslavia into discrete mini-states.

FUTURE U.S. POLICY

General Objectives

The USG has a strong interest in helping Yugoslavia to preserve its independence from the USSR in the post-Tito period. Chances for this will be maximized if, in the post-Tito period, Yugoslavia is (1) internally cohesive, able to achieve a new all-Yugoslav consensus based on the healthy, self-disciplined expression of regional and national diversity; (2) ruled by a Communist Party which, while continuing the evolutionary process of economic and political reform, remains in control of events (and, most importantly, limits exclusivist nationalism); (3) politically and militarily nonaligned, while gradually and in a carefully controlled manner proliferating and strengthening its ties with Western Europe and the United States. These desiderata have important implications for U.S. policy.

1. A cohesive, internally united Yugoslavia will have the best chance to prosper and resist Soviet encroachments of all kinds. There is practically no chance of Yugoslavia's achieving such cohesion on the basis of centralized unitary federalism; unity can only result from more legitimized and regularized expression of regional and national diversity and autonomy than in the past. The United States and its NATO allies will be quite limited in their ability to influence positively the emergence of a new all-Yugoslav synthesis, but inept policies could hamper it considerably. On one hand, the USG must be sensitive to the "confederal" elements in what, under the most optimistic assumptions, will be a much diluted Yugoslav federalism. On the other hand, the USG should continue to lend whatever support it can to all-Yugoslav federal institutions. Extreme care should be taken to avoid even the appearance that American sensitivity to regional and national diversity involves de facto support of some parts of Yugoslavia at the expense

-50-

of others. This could only promote chauvinist and separatist centrifugal tendencies.

Specifically, the United States should resist any temptation to extend special support to Croatia and Slovenia at the expense of "Southern" parts of Yugoslavia. The United States will have a continuing interest in socioeconomic modernization and evolutionary political reform in Yugoslavia, and just as in the 1960s, much of the impetus for this process is likely to come from Croatia and Slovenia. The issue of modernization should not, however, be confused with a belief that more "pro-Western" political and societal attitudes in Croatia and Slovenia serve the U.S. interest and deserve special support. The United States should recognize that forces promoting modernization, while concentrated in the "North," have never been polarized along national lines and that this is even less likely to occur in the future, for Vojvodina and metropolitan Belgrade are now in the forefront of the process. The United States should also recognize, as the events of December 1971 in Croatia demonstrated, that the Croatian national affirmation may be particularly susceptible to degeneration into exclusivist nationalism. Harnessed to the further modernization of Yugoslavia on the basis of a new all-Yugoslav synthesis, the Croatian and Slovene national affirmations may remain the Yugoslav political forces most congenial to the United States. If, however, these national affirmations are dominated by separatist tendencies, they may be transformed into the domestic political forces most harmful to U.S. interests in Yugoslavia.

Even should post-Tito Yugoslavia evolve along internally dis cohesive rather than cohesive lines, U.S. interests would still be promoted best by a posture encouraging a new all-Yugoslav unity-in-diversity. In such circumstances, nothing would be better calculated to provide the USSR with an opening for effective intervention in Yugoslav internal affairs than competition among external powers for special influence in particular Yugoslav republics. The United States should not try to compete with the USSR in playing both ends against the middle; the chips would be stacked in Moscow's favor. A de facto confederal Yugoslavia might justify a situation in which individual Western states sought to establish discreet "special relationships"

-51-

with individual republics within a broad framework of overall NATO support for Yugoslavia's integrity. Any such "special relationships" should, however, include the "Southern" republics no less than the "Northern" ones, and the United States itself should remain forcefully and visibly behind all-Yugoslav institutions as long as they are able to assert themselves.

Support for Yugoslav integrity would probably be the best among poor alternatives for the U.S. even in the contingency of Yugoslav disintegration. As noted earlier, clean secession leading to the establishment of viable national mini-states over which the United States might wish to extend a security umbrella is exceedingly unlikely. Thus even in the extreme case of disintegration, if Washington must choose between the risk of backing the integrity of the Yugoslav state after it has ceased to be viable, or abandoning support for Yugoslavia prematurely, it should prefer to err on the side of the former and be prepared to accept the consequences of failure. The alternative would be to invite the mischief of the latter and to bet, against very high odds, that some residual U.S. interests could be salvaged from the breakup of the Yugoslav state.

2. If the disintegration of Yugoslavia promises to entice the Soviet Union toward intervention, the demise or supersession of Communist rule in the country is, along with Westward reorientation of Yugoslav foreign policy, the internal development best calculated to provoke it. Continuity of rule by the LCY will not in itself insure post-Tito Yugoslavia against Soviet intervention, but its loss of leadership could trigger intervention. Moreover, continued LCY rule is probably a necessary condition for internal, especially national cohesion. It is true that the revolutionary supranationalism of the Yugoslav Communists is by now a largely spent force and that the reopening of the national question in Yugoslavia is in some measure the consequence of LCY policies in the early post-war years. While the LCY may therefore appear to be a weak reed on which to rely for national cohesion, there is no alternative all-Yugoslav political force even faintly visible on the horizon. Any post-Communist political forces that emerge in Yugoslavia are likely to have more, rather than less, nationalist

-52-

coloration than the existing republican LCY organizations. Even if an alternative all-Yugoslav political force should arise to challenge the LCY, it is unlikely that Yugoslavia could survive the transfer of power intact.

The United States should face squarely the fact that continued Communist rule in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period is in the U.S. interest. In 1949, the USG judged correctly that there were only two options for Yugoslavia: Yugoslav Communist rule or Soviet Communist rule, and that the former was by far preferable. Although the issue was less acute in the past, the USG also recognized that the LCY was the only all-Yugoslav political force capable of ensuring internal cohesion. The United States did welcome and encourage self-modernizing and self-reforming LCY rule, so that the country might become a modern, economically self-supporting industrial state, so that it might continue to reinforce evolutionary and autonomous tendencies in the Soviet bloc, and so that fundamental human rights might be more widely respected in Yugoslavia.

The United States will have an interest in continued modernization and liberalization in post-Tito Yugoslavia, for essentially the same reasons as in the past. However, these forces have spawned nationalism, which could, for the first time, seriously call into question continued LCY political control in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Unless nationalist passions are guided into healthy channels, and other centrifugal forces restrained, further extensive democratization may promote internal dis-cohesion and thus be counterproductive for U.S. interests. Since the primary U.S. interest lies in greater political cohesion, the USG should prefer a republican Party organization able to channel national affirmation in an all-Yugoslav direction while suppressing exclusivist nationalism and separatism, even at the price of some greater degree of societal repression, over a Party that begins to reflect or espouse popular attitudes of this kind. Assuming the Croatian Party was indeed losing control to nationalist forces in late 1971, then the U.S. preference should be for a Nikezić-like Serbian Party over a Tripalo-like Croatian Party, with perhaps a Popit-like Slovene Party as the best possible alternative.

-53-

The USG will have little direct influence on the resolution of this issue. It should, however, resist any temptation to modify otherwise sound U.S. policies intended to bolster Yugoslav independence in the wake of an LCY crackdown on nationalism. In the past, temporary reversals of the process of internal liberalization in Yugoslavia have given rise to public doubts and some reappraisal within the USG of the validity of ongoing U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia. In the future, it must be anticipated that such "reversals" directed at containing nationalism and other centrifugal forces may be a prerequisite for continued LCY control and thus for Yugoslav cohesion. While doubtless offending emigre groups and other segments of Western public opinion, such measures, if they achieve their intended objective, will serve the primary U.S. interest in Yugoslavia.

3. A conspicuous shift in Yugoslavia's international posture from nonalignment to a pro-Western orientation would heighten Soviet suspicions and could even provoke Soviet intervention. In the absence of an immediate Soviet threat, such a shift would be incompatible with the LCY's ideological foundations and very internal cohesion. The United States thus has an interest in the perpetuation of Yugoslavia's nonaligned status "after Tito." This premise is today much more in line with the general U.S. appraisal of nonaligned states than was the case a decade ago.

As described in Sec. II, however, nonalignment may assume several alternative emphases. The U.S. preference for the post-Tito period is clear only with respect to the undesirability of the Eastward-leaning variant of nonalignment which Yugoslavia followed in the late Khrushchev and early Brezhnev years. As between nonalignment of the balancing as opposed to the Westward-leaning variant, the U.S. preference will depend on Washington's assessment, informed by Yugoslav views, of the likely impact of these alternatives on the Soviet deterrence/provocation calculus. All other things being equal, the U.S. should prefer a non-aligned, cohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia that is tilted somewhat toward the West. But all other things will not be equal, and the relationship among the relevant variables is likely to be fluid rather than static. The deterrence/provocation balance will require continuous reassessment and appropriate policy readjustment.

-54-

Specific Cases

These general considerations will now be applied to the three broad categories of Alternative Future Yugoslavias (cohesive, dis-cohesive, and disintegrating) formulated in Sec. II, in light of likely Soviet policies discussed in Sec. III.

Cohesive Yugoslavias. The USG should continue the set of political, diplomatic, economic, informational, intelligence, and military policies currently being implemented or projected for the immediate "Titoist" future.* U.S. economic policies should aim both at helping the Yugoslavs deal with temporary economic problems and at fostering greater long-run integration of the Yugoslav with the Western economies. Backing the looser but more unified federal organs, the U.S. presence in Yugoslavia should be attuned more finely to the regional and national diversity on which the new all-Yugoslav cohesion will have to be based. But the USG should avoid--in high-level visits, in the International Visitors Program, in establishing local representations of any kind--favoring the "North." This should serve to counter expected Soviet efforts at selective "influence-building."

In cultivating contacts with the YPA, the United States should endeavor to help the Yugoslavs enhance their defensive capabilities by facilitating the purchase of weapons useful for total national defense but not easily manufactured in Yugoslavia. Bilateral (and West European-Yugoslav) military ties could also play a special deterrent role vis-à-vis the USSR. If deterrence failed, such contacts would prepare the ground for extending prudent U.S. military assistance to Yugoslavia. Continued contacts with and greater insights into the senior personalities and institutions of the military would also serve to prepare the United States better for the contingency of a disintegrating Yugoslavia in which the military in effect assumed power from the federal government. Short of this extreme eventuality, however, the U.S. should deal with the Yugoslav military in the context of its support for all-Yugoslav unity-in-diversity. Any prior sign that the U.S. supported the military as a

* These policies were formulated in the interagency paper "U.S. Policy and Post-Tito Yugoslavia," September 13, 1971, Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissemination, prepared in response to NSSM-129. Details are not repeated here.

-55-

centripetal unitary Yugoslav political institution would be internally divisive and counterproductive.

Following Tito's disappearance from the scene, the USG should, in general, continue to encourage the Yugoslavs to set the pace in developing closer bilateral relations. Dealing with a cohesive Yugoslavia whose will and capacity to resist Soviet encroachments were strong and evident to Moscow, the USG could expect Belgrade's judgments about the appropriate pace and scope of developing ties with the United States and other Western states to be reliable and judicious. If Yugoslavia tended toward balanced nonalignment, the United States should treat this approach as quite satisfactory, while remaining receptive to any overtures to impart to it a more Westward-looking emphasis. If the new Yugoslav leadership should conclude that Yugoslavia's interests would be served by a continuation of high-level exchanges of political and military visits between Belgrade and Warsaw Pact capitals, the USG should take such developments in stride.

If, on the other hand, post-Tito Yugoslavia should tend toward a Westward-leaning variant of nonalignment, the USG should cautiously encourage this and reciprocate Yugoslav feelers and overtures. In the absence of very tense Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the primary rationale for preferring a cohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia to follow this variant of nonalignment is that such an orientation would lay the groundwork for rapid implementation of more highly visible deterrence-strengthening measures in a less provocative fashion should they later be required by an increased Soviet threat. The USG might have a strong interest in facilitating Yugoslav purchases of sophisticated weaponry, such as individual anti-aircraft weapons, which could enhance total national defense. It might strive for routinized intelligence exchange. As closer ties developed, it should be prepared to deal with "embarrassing questions" about the security implications of the bilateral relationship. Publicly, it should emphasize (but not elaborate on) the theme of "support for Yugoslav integrity, independence, and prosperity"; privately, it might parry Yugoslav feelers on U.S. reaction to Soviet intervention with a "What would be helpful?" response. It would probably be protected against overcommitment by Yugoslav self-restraint. The

-56-

U.S. would not be asked, nor should it propose, to engage in explicit bilateral contingency planning. If, however, the Westward orientation of nonalignment continued to gain momentum, the U.S. should begin to question whether the Yugoslavs were proposing excessively provocative ties with the West. If a cohesive Yugoslavia felt itself directly threatened by the USSR, it might be driven to seek military ties with the West which appeared to the USG as unduly provocative vis-à-vis Moscow. The same concern would arise if the Yugoslavs were shifting their foreign policy from a balanced to a Westward-leaning mode of nonalignment at a time of sharp challenge to the USSR from within the Soviet bloc.

If post-Tito Yugoslavia should tend toward a post-Communist internal order, there would be a greater possibility for Western technical-scientific, cultural, and political inputs to have a positive influence on the process of modernization. While some of these inputs would be nongovernmental, the USG should do what it could to facilitate them. At the same time, it should assure itself by careful monitoring of the internal scene that Titoist Communism was indeed transforming itself into Social Democratism without a potentially explosive loss of control. (Should this loom on the horizon, the challenge to LCY rule would likely come from nationalist forces; this post-Tito Yugoslavia would be replaced by a dis cohesive Yugoslavia, and the policy implications of such a Yugoslavia to be discussed later would apply.)

Like the Soviets, the United States should expect a post-Communist evolution to favor a more Westward emphasis of Yugoslav foreign policy. U.S. policy should be particularly sensitive to increased domestic pluralization fostering an elemental turning to the West that would exceed the formal limits of nonalignment. Given the greater Soviet propensity to intervene in Yugoslavia in this eventuality, the USG should combine very strong reaffirmation of its interest in Yugoslav independence with discouragement of any elements within Yugoslavia that might publicly advocate formal political or military links with the West.

The Cohesive, Communist, Pro-Western, Garrison Yugoslavia (Alternative Future Yugoslavia No. 5) described in Sec. II would constitute a special case for U.S. policy. This course of development assumes

-57-

(at least in Yugoslav eyes) a serious danger of imminent Soviet attack as the factor causing the country to abandon nonalignment in favor of a pro-Western stance at least as strong as that of the early 1950s. Without a positive Western response, such a Yugoslavia would be transitional; the country would either be invaded or come to terms with the USSR on whatever basis it could. If the U.S. stake in Yugoslav independence discussed earlier is valid, the USG should respond positively to Yugoslav overtures in such circumstances. Any visible faltering at this point to reassess U.S. interests could prove extremely destabilizing and perhaps cause the Soviets to intervene preemptively. Hence the USG should satisfy the probable Yugoslav request for a reaffirmation of its interest in Yugoslav independence which has clear security overtones. It should be prepared to act quickly on a Yugoslav request for bilateral military contingency discussions. It should encourage NATO to implement deterrent political and collateral military measures (to be discussed later) appropriate to the situation, but it should not make U.S. assistance conditional on a concerted NATO military assistance policy.

In the initial months after Tito's passing from the scene, the USG will probably not be able to make a high confidence judgment about the degree of domestic political cohesion that is emerging. But so long as no sharp early deterioration occurs, the USG should act as if Yugoslavia were proceeding toward greater internal consolidation and attempt to maintain the bilateral relationship established under Tito. This could dissuade the Soviets from any temptation to intervene before cohesive forces predominate.

The USG should demonstratively reassert its interest in Yugoslav integrity and independence immediately upon Tito's death or incapacitation. It should send high-level representation to the funeral, and members of the Yugoslav Presidency should be invited for an early visit to the United States. Washington should restate its continued interest in Yugoslavia's integrity, independence, and prosperity. Yugoslavia is unlikely to request explicitly, but will nevertheless almost certainly welcome, such a U.S. statement. Parallel statements by the NATO allies

-58-

would also be useful, as well as expressions by nonaligned and neutral countries of their desire to continue friendly relations. Declaratory statements and eulogies of President Tito should express confidence that Yugoslavia will remain strongly united in diversity^{*} and urge full respect for its nonaligned position by all states. However, pointed references to the Soviet threat should be avoided, as well as such terms as "grey area" and "Western security interests in Yugoslavia."[†] Such language would suggest to the Yugoslav Party elite a presumptive Western "sphere of influence" in Yugoslavia and the possibility of a Great Power "deal" over the country.

^{*}For example, an extension of President Nixon's remarks in Yugoslavia on September 30, 1970, about people of diverse backgrounds joined together in one strong country, and the related formulation in Secretary Rogers' reports, *United States Foreign Policy: 1969-1970*, p. 31 and *United States Foreign Policy: 1971*, p. 36.

[†]The history of these terms is instructive. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, NATO sought to discourage further Soviet interventions in non-NATO countries by asserting that such acts would affect its security interests. A Ministerial Communique declared that the allies could not remain indifferent to "any development which endangers their security" and warned that Soviet intervention "directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences." Yugoslav representatives then and subsequently unofficially expressed their satisfaction with this statement (and with the formulations in *United States Foreign Policy* on U.S. support for Yugoslavia's determination to maintain its independence). Secretary Rusk's remarks on the subject in Brussels were, however, widely reported in the Western press as including Yugoslavia in a "grey area" "clearly related" to NATO security interests. In the first public Yugoslav reaction to the NATO session, *Borba's* foreign affairs commentator welcomed the "grey area" formulation as well. ("If this is supposed to express how black is the color of the bloc division of this continent, then we have nothing against using grey to characterize the color of nonbloc sovereignty" [M. Milenković, *Borba*, November 18, 1968].) But the phrase was susceptible to interpretation in Yugoslavia as implying Great Power competition for spheres of influence. This applied especially to Tito and other leaders of the Partisan generation, with their Yalta "50-50" complex. Soviet "disinformation" activities apparently had an effect in persuading some Yugoslav leaders that this was a Western purpose. Tito then apparently concluded that the danger of imminent Soviet intervention had passed and the tense relations with Moscow should be defused somewhat. Hence he publicly disassociated Yugoslavia from the "grey zone," affirming that his country was a "bright zone" because "the spheres of influence stop at our border." (Press conference in Jajce, November 29, 1968.) Subsequently, Yugoslav spokesmen

-59-

Discohesive Yugoslavias. U.S. policies appropriate for cohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia will be applicable to discohesive Yugoslavia only with important modifications. The United States should mount a holding operation, attempting to prevent Soviet political inroads, including regional influence-building, and deter Soviet military intervention, while giving the country an opportunity to achieve greater internal unity. In the process, the USG might find itself dealing as nowhere else in the world with a quasi-confederal state and forced to devote as much attention to dealing with the parts as with the whole. This is likely to increase the budgetary costs of the U.S. presence and U.S. programs in circumstances in which the prospects of a return on the U.S. political investment in Yugoslav integrity and independence would be bleaker, and questioning within the United States of policy toward Yugoslavia is likely to increase.

Policies advancing the primary U.S. interest of encouraging the emergence of a new Yugoslav unity would be more difficult to design and implement than in the case of a cohesive Yugoslavia. All U.S. contacts with Yugoslavia, even those of a routine or technical character, would have to be reappraised to ensure that they did not inadvertently provide ammunition either to nationalist-separatist forces or to ostensibly supranational but in fact nationally hegemonic ones.

The USG should broaden the scope of its direct contacts with the various republics, particularly avoiding over-concentration on the "North." Some kind of U.S. representation in the "South" would be essential to balance the Zagreb consulate. It would also be highly desirable for the Voice of America (VOA) to devote more time to Yugoslav languages and dialects other than Serbian. The USG should

both unofficially and officially (inter alia, during Foreign Minister Tepavac's October 1971 talks in Washington) stressed their displeasure with the phrase. They still interpret it as "implying certain claims to our country, in keeping with the division of spheres of influence" (V. Teslić, *Borba*, November 28-30, 1971).

Yugoslav spokesmen also privately expressed their dissatisfaction with Secretary Rusk's implicit assertion of NATO "security interests" in Yugoslavia, which he differentiated from "extension of the NATO umbrella" to cover Yugoslavia (Face the Nation telecast, December 1, 1968).

-60-

anticipate diverse and competing requests for economic assistance, made directly by republican authorities, against the background of regionally differentiated Soviet economic policies. To the extent possible, Washington should still attempt to channel assistance through remaining all-Yugoslav institutions in Belgrade, while carefully monitoring final regional distribution. The USG should expect to include the republican territorial defense forces in its military relations with Yugoslavia, although this should take second place to dealing directly with the YPA.

If a discohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia assumed a de facto confederal form, any stabilizing U.S. influence would have to be applied directly through some kind of representation in the republican capitals. Direct "foreign policy" approaches to the United States from the republics would be likely, as would direct approaches by some republics to purchase military equipment for republican territorial forces. The United States would probably find itself competing willy-nilly with the USSR for influence in individual republics. It would probably find itself at a great relative disadvantage in the "South" in competing with the Soviets economically. On the other hand, it could offer effective support to the Macedonian national affirmation within Yugoslavia against likely Soviet-backed Bulgarian claims on Macedonia. It would still be preferable to respond through the appropriate all-Yugoslav institutions in countering Soviet *divide et impera* tactics, unless these institutions had ceased to function entirely. In this situation, as stated earlier, the USG might accept the establishment by its NATO allies of a series of low-profile "special relationships" between individual NATO members and the various Yugoslav republics. The United States itself should, however, continue to back the all-Yugoslav cause.

In the case of a discohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia, the danger of U.S. overcommitment would be much greater than in the case of a cohesive Yugoslavia. Greater domestic cohesion might not be achieved; discohesive Yugoslavia might not prove viable; potential disintegration might begin to loom larger on the horizon despite appropriate U.S. policies (which at best could only marginally influence a favorable outcome). Dealing with such a Yugoslavia, the USG would have to rely more heavily on its own judgments of what degree of intimacy with Belgrade is likely to be

-61-

useful under the circumstances. A Westward-leaning variant of non-alignment practiced by a discohesive Yugoslavia could still bolster Yugoslav independence without appearing unduly provocative vis-à-vis Moscow, for while the latter's opportunities to intervene in Yugoslavia would be greater, its propensities to do so would probably be lower. In these circumstances, however, the USG might find itself investing prestige and pumping resources into a "sick man" with highly uncertain prospects for recovery. More important, the USG might find itself investing so much prestige in bolstering the independence of a discohesive Yugoslavia that it would be difficult to limit the U.S. commitment should the internal situation deteriorate further. If Yugoslavia disintegrated for internal reasons, the USG would not have a client to help even should the USSR invade, and in most foreseeable situations the primary U.S. interest would be in limiting its previous commitments to the country in a manner minimizing the negative international collateral effects.

Prudence would therefore argue for U.S. encouragement of a balanced as opposed to a Westward-leaning variant of nonalignment if post-Tito Yugoslavia is discohesive. The USG should discourage exchanges of high-level Yugoslav military officials solely with the United States and other NATO countries, to the total neglect of the Warsaw Pact countries--not primarily because this would be provocative vis-à-vis the USSR, but because it would lead Yugoslavia to overestimate U.S. willingness to support it militarily and thus be too entangling for the United States. In dealing with a discohesive Yugoslavia, the USG should be especially careful to limit its investment of high-level prestige on Yugoslavia's behalf. Neither Yugoslavia's internal political health nor the likely larger European context would provide an auspicious environment for any effort to revive a 1949-like policy of "keeping Yugoslavia afloat." Indeed, the USG might wish to tell the Yugoslavs that, if its support for Yugoslav independence were to have significance, Yugoslavia would have to achieve greater internal unity.

Should a discohesive Yugoslavia tend toward a post-Communist order, the United States would be confronted by greater centrifugal nationalist-separatist forces. In this eventuality the USG might wish to state

-62-

publicly that it viewed the rising nationalist forces as working against Yugoslavia's long-term independence. It could attempt to coordinate measures with its NATO allies for dealing with the likely increase of terrorist activities on the part of nationalist emigres in Western Europe and the United States. If nationalist-separatist forces joined (or acted through) republican authorities in making uncoordinated, spontaneous overtures to the West, overcommitment and provocation of the USSR could become a real danger. In these circumstances, the USG might wish to curtail drastically some of its programs and forms of presence in the country.

Disintegrating Yugoslavias. Cohesive and discohesive post-Tito Yugoslavias, while requiring differentiated approaches, would not call for any sharp discontinuity in fundamental U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia. A disintegrating Yugoslavia, on the other hand, would call into question the major premises of past U.S. policy. Once disintegration began, Yugoslavia would transform itself from an asset into a liability in terms of U.S. interests in Europe. The limits of effective U.S. action would be narrowly drawn. In these circumstances, damage-limitation is likely to be the optimal U.S. policy, initially to help contain civil conflict while deterring Soviet inroads. But if the unraveling of the Yugoslav state proceeded, the consequences would be unpredictable and potentially explosive. The potential for chaos would be great, since a clean breakup of the country is demographically impossible. Confronted with extreme disintegration, U.S. interests would best be served by a restoration of order, even if it had to be carried out by a more conservative Communist (which need not be pro-Soviet) or nationally hegemonic regime.

If the conflict were localized, following a few days of anxious waiting, the United States would be dealing with a possibly more repressive and perhaps only temporarily more unified regime than in the case of the preceding discohesive Yugoslavia. During this period, the USG, together with its NATO allies might, depending on the seriousness of the situation, undertake a number of preventive political and collateral military measures (amplified later in the Threatened Yugoslavia case) to discourage Soviet intervention. The USG should initially

-63-

maintain the preexisting bilateral relationship in most spheres, for preservation of the integrity of the Yugoslav state and exclusion of Soviet influence should take precedence over any dismay of segments of American public opinion at manifestations of internal political and national repression. If, however, Yugoslavia did not move quickly toward greater cohesion, the United States might wish to cut back sharply some forms of bilateral relations so as to avoid entanglement in the not unlikely event that the unraveling of the Yugoslav state continued.

If domestic conflict spread, the outcome might be uncertain for an extended period. The United States should seek to deter Soviet intervention, on the one hand, and secessionist attempts and appeals from any Yugoslav quarter for outside assistance (even if directed explicitly to the West), on the other hand. Both aims would be served by a strong declaratory and diplomatic position backing "Yugoslav integrity" and warning "hands-off Yugoslavia" in the UN, in any future Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) forums, and from NATO. Greece and Italy might be encouraged to reassure Yugoslavia directly, as they did in 1968, that neither had any territorial designs on Yugoslavia. NATO members should be strongly discouraged from even tacit support of any secessionist attempts. The United States might propose within NATO an agreement on special measures to limit the operations of emigre nationalist terrorists. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) should be requested to discourage the sudden return of Yugoslav laborers to Yugoslavia on a large scale.

Publicly and privately, the United States should appeal to reason and the Soviet threat in urging Yugoslavs to terminate their civil strife. Whenever a choice were possible, it should initially continue rather than terminate ongoing programs, so as to minimize Soviet opportunities for greater inroads. If order were restored by federal authorities, the USG should deal with the presumably more repressive regime that ensued as discussed previously. If the YPA assumed direct responsibility for restoring order, the United States should accept the military-dominated LCY regime as the fully legitimate Government of Yugoslavia. No delay should occur in recognizing and continuing

-64-

preexisting relations--especially military relations--with the new regime; faltering at this point, whether because of uncertainty in Washington or because of an outcry by vocal emigre groups in the United States concerning repression of their conationals in Yugoslavia, could give the Soviets an opportunity to establish close relations with the new Yugoslav leadership (which might, in any case, be inclined to turn toward Moscow).

If disintegration took the form of a messy civil war, involving fighting within as well as across republican boundaries, the United States should anticipate considerable violence, attempts at secession, and appeals for outside assistance and security guarantees. Initially, the USG should maintain the policy of backing Yugoslav integrity and opposing Soviet intervention. It might propose that the UN or any future European security organs offer to mediate the conflict. It should not anticipate, however, that any Western or UN-backed force would take on the unwelcome task of restoring order. It would not be in the U.S. interest to undertake such a task unilaterally.

If all-Yugoslav forces evaporated, the United States should consider extending support for secessionist attempts only if two conditions were met: (1) secession appeared irreversible in the face of general disintegration; (2) the secessionist entity appeared to be reasonably cohesive, probably meaning that it was largely homogeneous nationally.

The potential "Northern" candidates for secession are Croatia and Slovenia. Croatia would be unlikely to satisfy the second condition, but Slovenia might. Its small size notwithstanding, Slovenia's geographical location might justify a limited effort to help it establish its independence, regardless of the outcome of the bloodletting in the other Yugoslav lands. In such an extreme eventuality, the United States should prefer an "Austrian" to an "Italian" status for such a mini-state.

In the "South," Macedonia and Kosovo are the most likely secessionist regions. The former is not likely to be an attractive candidate for U.S. efforts to help it establish its independence, even in the absence of strife between its Macedonians and its Albanians.

-65-

Kosovo, given its present national composition, is likely to be divided by conflict between its Albanians, on the one hand, and its Serbs and Montenegrins, on the other. If in the meantime, however, the high Albanian net population increase and emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from the province on a large scale resulted in a nationally more homogeneous population, a secessionist Kosovo might be internally united. If Kosovo did attempt to secede from Yugoslavia, however, its probable aim would not be independence but, the disparity in internal systems notwithstanding, union with Albania. Even though Tirana might have strong reservations about such union in a crisis period, fearing that it would both undermine its orthodox Communist system and make Albania more susceptible to Soviet attack, it would nevertheless be hard put to renounce the formation of a Greater Albania. Even if it still enjoyed the PRC's political backing, the expanded state might repeat the Yugoslav experience of 1949 and request Western support and assistance. In these circumstances, if the Albanians gave some promise of being prepared to resist Soviet intervention, the USG might consider extending political support and even limited military assistance to Greater Albania. It could, in any case, treat the Soviet threat to Greater Albania as a vehicle for coordinating with the PRC diplomatic and political measures directed against Moscow.

A secessionist effort by at least one of the above regions might succeed, while a messy civil war continued in rump Yugoslavia. If the bloodletting continued very long, and disintegration of the Yugoslav state appeared to be irreversible, the United States would have no recourse but to accept a Soviet decision to move in and restore order, either at the request of the legitimate federal authorities which survived, or on Soviet initiative. In such an unlikely but conceivable "worst case," the USG should expect the Soviets to back the cause of Yugoslav integrity and seek the reincorporation into Yugoslavia of any secessionist entities. Their survival would require a strong U.S. and NATO security guarantee.

Threatened Yugoslavia

The likelihood of Soviet military intervention is much higher in the case of a disintegrating than a discohesive or cohesive post-Tito

-66-

Yugoslavia. But the Soviets, whether for extra-Yugoslav or for domestic Yugoslav reasons, might nevertheless mount an imminent military threat to these categories of Alternative Future Yugoslavias as well. Such a threat would constitute a qualitative transformation of either (and of a disintegrating Yugoslavia as well, were the Soviet threat to reverse the unraveling and galvanize the Yugoslavs to defend themselves from external attack). This situation will thus be treated here as a special case.

NATO's Limited Role. Effective U.S. policy toward a Threatened Yugoslavia would be predicated on recognizing the limited role NATO is likely to play in countering Soviet military intervention in Yugoslavia. It is true that the U.S. stake in the independence of post-Tito Yugoslavia is defined in large measure by the likely impact of Soviet subjugation of Yugoslavia on NATO and Western Europe. Today there is broad agreement among the NATO allies about the strategic importance of Yugoslavia, widespread concern over the possibility of Soviet intervention in the post-Tito period, and a general belief that the ramifications of such an invasion would be qualitatively different from the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Mass tourism and labor emigration and the recent proliferation of economic and political ties between Yugoslavia and West European states have reinforced West European concern about Yugoslavia's future. Nevertheless, the capacity of the fifteen allies to concert a military policy in defense of a non-member must be assessed as low to non-existent.

As discussed earlier, NATO could play a useful, if limited, political role in coordinating an allied policy toward post-Tito Yugoslavia in the absence of an acute Soviet threat. NATO might serve as an instrument to coordinate measures among the relevant member-states against nationalist emigre terrorists. Assuming an overall policy backing Yugoslav integrity, NATO might provide a forum in which to coordinate low-profile "special relationships" between allies and individual Yugoslav republics in the event the country moved rapidly toward confederation.

In a crisis situation, preventive political and collateral military measures by NATO, not all of which would require unanimity by the fifteen

-67-

member-states, could communicate to the Soviet leaders some of the political costs that intervention against Yugoslavia would entail and thus strengthen deterrence. The Ministerial Council could follow up its November 1968 statement with a stronger declaratory stand; coordinated diplomatic demarches in Moscow and other Warsaw Pact capitals might be made; contacts with the Warsaw Pact countries could be suspended; economic sanctions could be taken.* Initial measures of the NATO alert system might be taken, such as more overt intelligence gathering and alerting or redeployment of dual-based American forces. NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean could be beefed up.†

In the event of hostile Soviet military acts threatening Yugoslavia (sudden maneuvers in Hungary analogous to the situation around Czechoslovakia in April-May 1968), the USG--reinforced if possible by key NATO allies--might as an alternative to diplomatic "escalation" raise the issue explicitly and straightforwardly with Moscow. Stressing the seriousness with which it would view intervention in "any European country" and dismissing in advance the legitimacy of any "invitation" for assistance, the USG could propose that the threatening maneuvers be cancelled. It could warn Moscow that intervention would endanger the fabric of East-West relations in Europe and U.S.-Soviet relations globally, and that the USSR would incur serious consequences if it initiated armed conflict in Europe. If the maneuvers continued, the USG could give full publicity to its evidence of the mounting military threat.

Should the USSR, nevertheless, invade post-Tito Yugoslavia, any Western military assistance would have to be rendered outside the NATO framework. The USG should not expect more of the alliance than some

*

† Contingency discussions on these matters within NATO are almost certain to leak. If "spheres of influence" language can be avoided, the Yugoslavs are likely to be more pleased that Yugoslavia has not been forgotten than embarrassed at its greater vulnerability to Soviet suspicion and accusations. Past soundings on the matter suggest that Yugoslavia will find discreet attention to its situation in NATO preferable to benign neglect.

-68-

escalation of the political-military measures mentioned earlier, emphasizing the political costs of the intervention for the USSR, and collateral military measures such as reinforcement of the Southern Flank. Any effort to concert a NATO policy for military assistance to Yugoslavia on a time-urgent basis is likely to fail. This failure would probably leak to the Soviets and hence be compounded. The readiness of individual West European allies to support military assistance to Yugoslavia would depend in large measure on the health of the Atlantic relationship at the time and, above all, on U.S. readiness to initiate such assistance and to offer special security reassurances to the West European states involved. The Italian military is likely to be interested, but the Italian domestic political situation would be uncertain; a Yugoslav crisis might trigger a major political crisis in Italy. Greece is also likely to participate. The FRG, France, and the United Kingdom would be the other key allies. While the USG would have to organize bilateral or multilateral assistance to Yugoslavia outside NATO, it might attempt to capitalize on such an effort to regalanize the alliance.

U.S. Assistance. If the Soviet Armed Forces, probably joined by other Warsaw Pact national forces, invaded Yugoslavia and the country united to defend itself, the United States could anticipate requests for military assistance. United States interest in preserving Yugoslav independence or, barring this, raising the cost Moscow would have to pay to occupy the country, would be sufficient to justify limited military support with low escalatory potential in order to maximize the effectiveness of the Yugoslav resistance effort. As just noted, the USG should not count on NATO itself mounting a support operation. However, the interest and participation of some of the NATO allies (particularly the Southern Flank countries) outside the NATO framework would be essential.

The USG would not, in any circumstances, have an interest in bearing the brunt of the resistance effort; only the Yugoslavs themselves could do that. Nor would it be in the U.S. interest, in view of the previous instability of Soviet and U.S. interests in Yugoslavia and the resulting high potential for escalation or miscalculation, to

-69-

contemplate major military involvement, such as commitment of ground forces or direct air support. Congressional and public backing for large-scale U.S. involvement would in any case probably not be forthcoming.*

Even limited U.S. military assistance to an invaded Yugoslavia would be prudent only under two conditions: (1) post-Tito Yugoslavia remained or at last became internally cohesive; (2) activating total national defense, Yugoslavia succeeded, utilizing its own forces, in transforming a massive Soviet armored and airborne assault into a protracted conflict. The USG should employ all its available resources to monitor continuously both the degree of internal cohesiveness and the effectiveness of resistance. The behavior of the territorial defense forces would be a primary indicator on both scores. If a civil war broke out (or continued) or if the Yugoslavs quickly capitulated, there would be no effective client for the United States to support. The USG might require up to a week to satisfy itself that these conditions were being met. In the likely absence of prior bilateral contingency planning, the USG would, in any case, require such an interval in order to patch together with individual NATO allies and with the Yugoslavs appropriate forms of assistance. Hence, any U.S. military support, as opposed to diplomatic and political backing, for the Yugoslav resistance not only need not but should not be rendered in the initial hours following a massive Soviet invasion. This posture would also have the advantage of depriving the USSR (or domestic U.S. critics) of ammunition for charges of prior U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia.

Non-military measures should attempt to exact the highest possible political and other non-military costs from the USSR for invading Yugoslavia. Parallel to corresponding NATO steps, U.S. declaratory policy

* According to a U.S. public opinion poll conducted in the spring of 1971, 7 percent of respondents would send American troops to assist Yugoslavia were it attacked by "Communist-backed forces"; 27 percent would send military supplies only; 51 percent would refuse to get involved at all; 15 percent were undecided. (Comparable figures for Turkey were 10, 36, 37, and 17 percent, respectively.) A. H. Cantril and C. W. Roll, *Hopes and Fears of the American People*, Universe Books, New York, 1971, p. 47.

-70-

might emphasize the USSR's gross violation of its bilateral agreements and communiques with Yugoslavia and its European renunciation-of-force pledges. A freeze on contacts with Moscow could be announced. Diplomatic contacts and economic decisions could stress the point. The USG could encourage non-NATO, no less than NATO member states, to interrupt all "détentist" contacts with the occupiers. It could take the initiative in making the Yugoslav cause a major issue in the UN. In the Third World, U.S. informational activities could play up the ominously expanded scope of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The USG could also attempt to coordinate a major diplomatic initiative with the PRC (which might encompass a parallel announcement of mutual strengthening of military forces in Western Europe and Western China, respectively).

U.S. military assistance to an invaded Yugoslavia might include any or all of the following measures:

1. Logistical support, to help the Yugoslavs overcome materiel bottlenecks.
2. Assistance with intelligence, reconnaissance, and communications. The USG could give the Yugoslav Supreme Command intelligence information on Warsaw Pact reinforcement activities. It could furnish high-altitude mapping services. Together with Italy and Greece, it could furnish communications facilities, for command-and-control, psy-war, and public information purposes.
3. Quarantine or blockade. Had the Soviet fleet not yet entered the Adriatic, the Strait of Otranto could be blockaded or, if feasible, mined to exclude it. The Sixth Fleet could stage a "show of force" in the Adriatic.
4. Diversionary pressure on the Central Front. A higher alert status and reinforcements from the CONUS might, in contrast to the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, limit Soviet readiness to deploy large numbers of troops in Southeastern Europe. The impact of such measures would be strengthened were the PRC to take corresponding measures in Asia.
5. Collateral, non-provocative strengthening of NATO's Southern Flank. Such measures, probably necessary in any case to reassure

-71-

Italy, Greece, and Turkey, might serve to restrain massive reinforcement of the initial Soviet invasion force.

Continuation of limited U.S. and allied military assistance to an invaded Yugoslavia should depend on prolongation of a united and effective Yugoslav resistance effort. In the optimal case, the Warsaw Pact invasion force would be bogged down, the morale of at least the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces would weaken, dissension in Eastern Europe would increase, and Soviet leaders would begin to question whether the enterprise was worth the costs. The Politburo might be unable to agree on further redeployments from the Central or Chinese fronts, it might seek a political settlement with the Yugoslavs, and most or all of the Soviet forces might be withdrawn. If the fighting continued for a number of weeks, the USG and its allies might, with due regard to the danger of a direct confrontation with Soviet forces, continue a limited support operation.

Even if the ultimate prospects of successful Yugoslav resistance seemed bleak, it would be in the U.S. interest--in terms of future Atlantic and Soviet-American relations--to maximize the costs incurred by the USSR in completing its occupation. Provided the Yugoslavs showed the will and some ability to defend themselves, the U.S. aim should be to prevent a Czechoslovak-like Soviet occupation of the country.

If in the end, however, the Yugoslav resistance effort crumbled, whether from inherent political or military weakness or because the Soviets had resolved to go all out to crush it, Western assistance should be terminated, not escalated. Assuming no gross change in the East-West power balance and no transformation of Soviet foreign policy in general into a fundamentally more militant one, the U.S. should not view a Soviet invasion of even a cohesive post-Tito Yugoslavia as necessarily signifying the first step toward direct Soviet military expansion into Western Europe requiring an all-or-nothing U.S. response. Declaratorily, the USG could state, in terminating assistance, that it had no alliance commitment to Yugoslavia and that limited Western aid had served its intended purpose of reinforcing Yugoslav self-defense so long as it held up, and of substantially increasing the cost of the Soviet takeover.

-72-

With Yugoslavia, therefore, it would be in the U.S. interest to lend limited support to protracted resistance *for its own sake*, even if the USSR were likely eventually to consolidate its control over the country.

Collateral Cases.

Romania. A Soviet-Romanian crisis is bound to involve Yugoslavia at least indirectly. It would thus present the United States with a painful dilemma. Threats or warnings intended to deter Soviet intervention in both Romania and Yugoslavia that did not differentiate between the two countries would have to be pitched to the lowest common denominator if overcommitment to Romania were to be avoided. The deterrent effect of such threats or warnings would necessarily be weaker than that of analogous measures undertaken on behalf of Yugoslavia alone. If, on the other hand, the Romanian and Yugoslav contingencies were explicitly differentiated, the deterrent impact of U.S. declaratory policy for Yugoslavia would be greater, but the Soviets might read it as a green light to move into Romania.

In formulating a concrete declaratory position in a Romanian-Soviet crisis, this tradeoff between support for Romanian autonomy and for Yugoslav independence should be understood. In adapting U.S. policy to the specific circumstances of the time, the following principles should be borne in mind:

1. Threats implying Western military measures in response to a Soviet invasion of Romania would be inherently incredible. Whatever credibility such threats might have with respect to Yugoslavia should not be compromised by linking Romania and Yugoslavia in this context.

2. Support for Romania should probably be limited to declaratory statements that emphasize the political and diplomatic costs the USSR would incur if it invaded. If the Yugoslavs agreed, such declaratory policy might include a stronger statement on U.S. interests in preserving Yugoslavia's independence.

3. Failure by the United States and its Western allies to impose some concrete political and diplomatic costs on the USSR in the event a Warsaw Pact intervention in Romania would weaken the deterrent effect

-73-

of declaratory policy in support of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, an overresponse in which all the political and diplomatic stops were pulled out could prove counterproductive. It might weaken Soviet inhibitions against intervention in Yugoslavia by encouraging Moscow to believe that it had already incurred the full costs in the West; having acquired the "onus" in Romania, it might as well pick up the Yugoslav "bonus."

Austria. A Soviet-Yugoslav crisis is likely to involve Austria indirectly. Unless Soviet European policy had undergone a qualitative change and become fundamentally more aggressive, however, the USSR would be likely to favor the perpetuation of Austrian neutrality even if it suppressed by force Romanian autonomy and Yugoslav independence.

"Spill-over" into Austria might nevertheless occur. If the Soviets invaded Yugoslavia, refugees might seek to enter Austria on a large scale. If Yugoslavia disintegrated, a Slovene secessionist attempt might win considerable support among Austrian Slovenes. Especially if the Soviets met with determined resistance in invading Yugoslavia, they might violate Austrian airspace on a much larger scale than during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. In attempting to subdue Maribor, they might even transit the southeastern corner of Austrian territory. In contrast to Romania, however, such violations of Austrian sovereignty would probably be incidental to the battle in Yugoslavia and not simply an excuse to alter Austria's political status.

In such an eventuality, U.S. declaratory policy should stand firmly on the State Treaty. The USG should indicate its continued support for Austrian territorial integrity, sovereignty, and neutrality. It should protest any violation of Austrian airspace or territory. It should not, however, weaken the remaining deterrent effect of its declaratory position on Yugoslavia by implying that the Soviet threats to Austrian and Yugoslav independence were of a similar magnitude.

Albania. A Soviet-Yugoslav crisis would almost certainly involve Albania as well. Even if Kosovo remained firmly anchored in Yugoslavia, an imminent threat of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia might result in Albanian appeals for Western support and assistance. In these circumstances, just as in the case of a Greater Albania discussed earlier,

-74-

the USG would have an interest in extending political support and perhaps even limited military assistance to Albania. In contrast to the case of Romania, such support to Albania would probably bolster, rather than detract from, U.S. support for Yugoslav independence.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESENT POLICY

Presence

The earlier discussion of the substance of U.S. policy toward post-Tito Yugoslavia highlights the current importance of carefully monitoring developments and a U.S. presence in all the Yugoslav republics and provinces. In addition to the embassy in Belgrade and the consulate in Zagreb, a limited presence--in the form of United States Information Agency reading rooms--is now projected for all the regional capitals except Titograd and Pristina. In anticipating the post-Tito period, it would be desirable to have the centers run by de facto American political officers and to cover the Kosovo capital as well. In addition, the consulate in Zagreb could usefully be balanced by a "Southern consulate" in Skopje. Alternatively, the reading rooms might be supplemented by "traveling consulates" and regularized embassy visits to all the republics and provinces. The VOA could devote more broadcast time to the non-Serbian languages and dialects. Such an augmented U.S. presence would permit increased reporting from the republican and provincial capitals, better coverage of the regional press, and more contacts with regional personalities. These informational and representational channels are likely to be prerequisites for effective U.S. policy toward post-Tito Yugoslavia.

Apart from augmenting the U.S. presence in Yugoslavia, some improved Western coverage of the republics and provinces might be achieved by better coordination of the activities of individual NATO members in Yugoslavia. The common concern with post-Tito developments might provide sufficient stimulus for such coordination; the regular NATO Political Advisors' discussions of Yugoslav developments might serve as the point of departure. Reporting of consulates and other local

-75-

representations might be more routinely exchanged.* Foreign broadcasts in the various Yugoslav national languages and dialects might be scheduled to better complement each other.†

Contingency Planning

The earlier policy discussion also suggests the desirability at present of detailed operational contingency planning keyed to possible developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia.

Military Assistance Planning. Such planning would have to be done unilaterally by the USG. Yugoslavia is not likely to be interested until too late, while any attempt to engage in such planning in NATO (excepting diversionary and collateral measures on the Central Front and Southern Flank) would probably prove not only futile but counter-productive.‡ Given the disparity of interests in Yugoslavia among alliance members, it is highly improbable that agreement could be reached on a meaningful plan. Northern Flank states, in particular, would probably argue that Yugoslavia is not a NATO problem at all. Failure to concert a meaningful position would probably leak, with embarrassing and perhaps dangerous consequences for Yugoslavia's security. Such a leak would signal NATO's impotence to the USSR, helping Soviet leaders to resolve optimistically their likely uncertainties about NATO's response to an invasion of Yugoslavia. The U.S. might wish to make discreet soundings of the potentially most interested NATO allies. But in view of the high possibility of leaks, it should present concrete plans to its allies only in a crisis.

Unilateral contingency planning for this eventuality is warranted. An invaded Yugoslavia would almost certainly request Western assistance

* In addition to the numerous Western consulates in Zagreb, Greece has a consulate in Skopje; France, in Kumanovo; Italy, in Koper; Great Britain, in Split; (and Austria, in Ljubljana). (1970 data.)

† E.g., VOA does not broadcast in Macedonian, but the FRG and France have inaugurated limited Macedonian broadcasts. In contrast--and symptomatic of the potential U.S. problem--the USSR has broadcast to Yugoslavia in Macedonian since 1945.

‡ "Post-Czechoslovakia" contingency planning in NATO related to Yugoslavia was not carried far and is devoid of operational significance.

-76-

and, under the conditions noted earlier, the United States might want to extend limited support. While a Soviet invasion may still be unlikely, it is the least unlikely violent "discontinuity" involving movement of Soviet forces into a non-Warsaw Pact country presently foreseeable in Europe.

The intelligence community should estimate the materiel bottlenecks which the Yugoslavs are likely to encounter if total national defense is effectively implemented. These bottlenecks are unlikely to coincide with standard U.S. logistical supply packages. Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) planners could address, inter alia, the following questions: Are the appropriate bottleneck items stockpiled in Italy, the FRG, or other suitable locations? Are there U.S. weapons that the Yugoslavs are not now obtaining but that might significantly enhance Yugoslav resistance? If some items are classified sophisticated systems, are draft Conte-Long Presidential waivers prepared? What are the alternative means of delivery and the relative escalatory potential of each (e.g., covert versus overt channels, air drops with or without fighter protection, supply by sea, supply by rail from Italy)? What is the degree of passive or active participation of individual NATO members required by each alternative?

Appropriate contingency planning for the other possible forms of limited military assistance discussed earlier could also be undertaken.

Political Planning. In the event that post-Tito Yugoslavia disintegrated, the USG might require a massive informational input capability. Such a capability would be essential, for example, to tell the Yugoslav population that the United States opposed a secessionist attempt or backed a new YPA-dominated federal regime. VOA is likely to serve as the primary vehicle for this purpose. VOA should formulate a contingency plan for strengthened, round-the-clock service to Yugoslavia in at least all the major Yugoslav languages.

Priority Deterrent Measures

The earlier discussion also suggests the particular utility of three near-term measures to strengthen deterrence of Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia in an environment of European détente, and to

-77-

restrain Soviet behavior toward Yugoslavia should détenteist inhibitions decline or evaporate.

1. The USG should, in discussions on or in preparations for CSCE, devote greater emphasis to impressing on Moscow that Soviet threats to Yugoslavia's independence and territorial integrity are incompatible with "normalization" of East-West relations and relaxation of tensions in Europe. This involves more than promoting bilateral relations with Yugoslavia by gratifying its desire to play a prominent role in the "European security" process. Yugoslavia's involvement in CSCE or related forums and collective Atlantic-European guarantees of the independence, territorial integrity, and nonaligned status of Yugoslavia and other neutral states on the continent might exercise a restraining influence on the USSR if a Yugoslav internal crisis offering opportunities for Soviet intervention were to arise while the USSR was still practicing détente diplomacy. Deterrence would be strengthened if Moscow had to treat Yugoslavia in this context as a full member of the "European neutral" grouping. Assuming it were desired by the respective states, the United States might promote involvement of Yugoslavia, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden as a group^{*} in selected aspects of CSCE discussions. Support for Yugoslavia on the part of the West European countries that have been objects of Soviet attention, the FRG and France especially, would be particularly useful in this respect.

Discussions on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) should not be limited to the Central Front but encompass Southeastern Europe as well, and the USG should emphasize proposals, such as inspections and limitations on deployments and weapons, which would make it physically more difficult for the Soviets to invade Yugoslavia without violating a force reduction agreement at the same time. Even if no agreements are reached, explicit international discussion of the matter itself could have some deterrent value.

^{*}Yugoslavia has yet to develop intensive *multilateral* ties with the neutral European states. But Yugoslav leaders have begun to speak of the grouping--including Yugoslavia in it--as a significant factor in European affairs (e.g., LCY Presidium member Belovski's reference to a "cordon of neutral and nonaligned states" between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, *Komunist*, March 2, 1972).

-78-

2. The United States and other NATO members should, under the umbrella of détente, continue to develop (with due regard for the possibility of entanglement in the future) regularized low-profile military relationships with Yugoslavia. More is at stake than promoting closer bilateral relations with Yugoslavia in all spheres. Especially given the neglect of military relations in the decade prior to 1968, such expanded ties could serve to strengthen the deterrent effect upon the USSR of uncertainty regarding the possibility of Western involvement in the event Soviet intervention were to result in a large-scale protracted conflict in Yugoslavia. Also, since credible Yugoslav organization for total national defense is perhaps the primary deterrent to Soviet intervention, the USG should be as responsive as possible to Yugoslav endeavors to strengthen their defensive capabilities by purchasing defensive weaponry in the United States.

3. In the event of a troubled post-Tito Yugoslavia, U.S. interests are likely to be served by better relations with Tirana. Albania's improved relations with numerous West European countries have been welcomed by the USG, as a contribution to stability in the Balkans.* In preparing for post-Tito Yugoslavia, the USG should consider fresh initiatives that would promote normalization of U.S.-Albanian relations as well.

* *United States Foreign Policy: 1971*, op. cit., p. 39.

UNCLASSIFIED

-79-

Appendix A

YUGOSLAVIA TODAYTHE MULTINATIONAL CONDITION

(U) Yugoslavia is a mosaic of national-ethnic groups, which fall into two categories: (1) "peoples" (*narodi*), South Slav national groups located predominately within Yugoslavia; and (2) "nationalities" (*narodnosti*, formerly called national minorities), whose co-nationals are predominately located outside Yugoslavia. The first category is comprised of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and--lately--Bosnian Muslims. The second category includes Hungarians, Kosovo Albanians, Turks, Slovaks, Romanians, and other smaller groups. Formerly quite distinct, the two categories have blurred in recent years. The percentage breakdown of the Yugoslav population into "peoples" and "nationalities" is indicated in Fig. 5.

(U) This multinational condition is not expressed in compact regional settlement of the various national groups but involves their intermingling without assimilation, like oil and water, throughout most of the constituent units of the Yugoslav federation, the six republics, and the two provinces into which part of the Serbian republic is subdivided. Slovenia is the only republic that is virtually homogeneous nationally; 96 percent of its population is Slovene.* The population of Croatia is 80-percent Croat and 15-percent Serb. The Serbs are neither dispersed evenly throughout Croatia nor concentrated in one section of the republic; most are located in Slavonia (eastern Croatia) and Lika (southwestern Croatia), where they are the majority element in 11 communes. Serbs are disproportionally represented in the Croatian Party, constituting almost 30 percent of the membership.


(U) Bosnia-Herzegovina was resurrected as a republic in 1945 to put an end to Serb-Croat conflict over the allegiance of its inhabitants. Its population is 43-percent Serb, 22-percent Croat, and over 30-percent

* (U) Data are from the 1961 census, since national data from the 1971 census are not yet available, except for those presented in Fig. 5.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-80-



SOURCE: 1971 census data

(U) Fig.5 — The national composition of Yugoslavia (in percentages)

Bosnian Muslim. The latter group, a product of the Ottoman Empire with few national traits in 1945, was originally the CPY's best candidate for developing a new Yugoslav national consciousness. Today the Bosnian Muslims are in the process of constituting themselves as the sixth people of Yugoslavia. The three national elements are intermingled throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

(U) Serbia is 75-percent Serb. Serbia proper (minus the provinces) is nearly as homogeneous nationally as Slovenia--93-percent Serb. Of the Serbs--the largest national group, which dominated interwar Yugoslavia--43 percent are located outside Serbia proper. Vojvodina, the traditional seat of Serbian culture, is thoroughly multinational, with a bare majority of 55-percent Serbs, along with 8-percent Croats, 24-percent Hungarians, and 13-percent smaller nationalities. These groups

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-81-

are intermingled throughout the province. Kosovo, containing the legendary last battlefield of the medieval Serbian state, has a majority Albanian population of 67 percent (constituting nearly 45 percent of all Albanians). Serbs account for 24 percent and are dispersed throughout most of the province.

(U) The population of Macedonia is 72-percent Macedonian--a people who first constituted themselves as a national group in postwar Yugoslavia--and 13-percent Albanian, concentrated in the northwest. Montenegro is 81-percent Montenegrin. While Montenegrins have traditionally considered themselves to be Serbs, many now regard themselves as a distinct national group. Montenegro has a 7-percent Muslim and 6-percent Albanian minority population.

(U) Tables 1 and 2 and Map 2 present the national composition of each republic and province, the distribution of national groups by republic and province, and an overview of the national intermingling.

(U) Table 1

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE REPUBLICS AND PROVINCES OF YUGOSLAVIA
(In percentages)

Slovenia	Croatia	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Vojvodina
95.6 Slovenes 4.4 Other ^a	80.3 Croats 15.0 Serbs 4.7 Other	42.9 Serbs 21.7 Croats 25.7 Bosnian Muslims 8.4 Unspecified Yugoslavs ^b	54.9 Serbs 23.9 Hungarians 7.8 Croats 13.4 Other
Serbia Proper	Montenegro	Kosovo	Macedonia
92.5 Serbs 7.5 Other	81.4 Montenegrins 6.5 Bosnian Muslims 5.5 Albanians 6.6 Other	67.0 Albanians 23.5 Serbs 9.5 Other	71.2 Macedonians 13.0 Albanians 9.4 Turks 6.4 Other

SOURCE: 1961 census data.

^aNational groups accounting for less than 5 percent of a republic's population are included together in this category.

^bMostly Bosnian Muslims.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-82-

(U) Table 2

DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR NATIONAL GROUPS AMONG THE REPUBLICS
AND PROVINCES OF YUGOSLAVIA
(In percentages, rounded)

Republic/ Province	Serbs	Croats	Slo- venes	Mace- donians	Monte- negrins	Bosnian Muslims	Alba- nians	Hungar- ians
Serbia proper	57	1	1	2	6	9	6	1
Vojvodina	13	3	--	1	7	--	--	88
Kosovo	3	--	--	--	7	1	71	--
Croatia	8	78	2	--	1	--	--	8
Slovenia	--	1	96	--	--	--	--	2
Bosnia- Herzegovina	18	17	--	--	2	87	--	--
Macedonia	1	--	--	96	1	--	20	--
Montenegro	--	--	--	--	75	3	3	--

SOURCE: 1961 census data.


SOCIOECONOMIC MODERNIZATION

(U) Yugoslavia has been involved since the summer of 1965 in an effort to take the final half-step of the systemic economic reform initiated in the early 1950s but blocked for essentially political reasons in 1961-1962. The command economic system erected after the war has evolved into a system of "market socialism" in which public enterprises, making their own decisions on production and (to a large extent) investment, produce for a market influenced indirectly by the state in a manner far more characteristic of Western than Communist countries. The goal of the latest stage of economic reform is to ensure continued economic and social development by further modernizing the Yugoslav economy, increasing its productivity and orienting it more toward world markets. This involves further rationalization and de-politicization of the banking and foreign exchange systems and greater participation in the international division of labor, including encouragement of the large-scale influx of foreign venture capital into Yugoslavia.

(U) In the perspective of the past twenty-five years, the non-Stalinist approach to modernization in Yugoslavia has achieved considerable success. An underdeveloped Balkan country has been transformed

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



-83-

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: G. W. Hoffman and F. W. Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962, p. 30, based on 1948 census data.

UNCLASSIFIED

-84-

into a semi-industrialized, semi-urbanized, more European country. Living standards have risen appreciably in the past few years in much of the country. Sixty-five percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade is now conducted with Western Europe and the United States, roughly 28 percent with Communist countries. A trade agreement was concluded with the European Communities, and venture capital has begun to enter the country.

(U) But modernization has also spawned a number of negative side-effects which, if to some extent inevitable, appeared to multiply after 1968. These include a number of short-term economic dislocations often viewed as the necessary price of any economic progress: inflation, which pushed up the cost of living by 16 percent in 1971; unemployment, amounting to nearly 10 percent in 1971, notwithstanding temporary emigration of 800,000 Yugoslav workers to Western Europe; and a balance of payments deficit of over \$300 million in 1971. Wage differentiation has increased sharply, accompanied by some flagrant corruption. Some of these economic dislocations were partially mitigated in early 1972. But their social consequences have clashed with the revolutionary-egalitarian residue of Yugoslav Communist ideology, leading the Party to mount a campaign against "unearned wealth" (and a small minority of Communists to question the basic premises of "market socialism").

(U) A second group of problems, similar to those many multinational states have encountered as a result of uneven economic development, has taken on distinctive contours in the Yugoslav political context. While absolute living standards throughout Yugoslavia have continuously risen, the gap between the richer and poorer republics has not decreased, as the Yugoslav Communists promised in 1945, but has widened. (See Table 3.) From a developmental point of view, there are two Yugoslavias, roughly separated by the Danube and Sava Rivers. "Northern" Yugoslavia, in this sense, includes Slovenia, Croatia-Slavonia, Vojvodina, and Belgrade and its Serbian environs. This Yugoslavia contains the country's breadbasket and the bulk of its industry, has easy access to Western European markets, and has a low net birth rate. (See Table 4.) Living standards are comparable to those of Austria and central Italy. "Southern" Yugoslavia, in a developmental sense, is made up of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia south of the Sava and Dalmatia, Serbia proper

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-85-

(U) Table 3

PER CAPITA INCOME, BY REPUBLIC AND PROVINCE

Republic/ Province	Income per Capita 1947	Income per Capita 1966
Slovenia	175.3	188.4
Vojvodina	108.8	107.4
Croatia	107.2	121.5
Yugoslavia	100.0	100.0
Serbia proper	95.6	98.4
Bosnia	82.8	70.5
Montenegro	70.8	74.2
Macedonia	62.0	64.3
Kosovo	52.6	37.6

SOURCE: *Ekonomist*, Zagreb, 1969, p. 150.

(U) Table 4

RATES OF INCREASE PER 1000 POPULATION,
BY REPUBLIC AND PROVINCE

Republic/ Province	Increase Index 1948 = 100			Index <u>1971</u> 1961	Average Annual Increase per 1000 Population		
	1953	1961	1971		<u>1948</u> 1953	<u>1953</u> 1961	<u>1961</u> 1971
Yugoslavia	107.3	116.9	129.4	110.8	13.9	11.0	10.0
Bosnia- Herzegovina	111.1	127.7	146.0	114.3	21.9	17.6	13.2
Croatia	104.1	109.7	117.0	106.6	8.0	6.9	6.1
Macedonia	113.1	121.8	142.9	117.2	24.5	9.4	15.8
Montenegro	111.3	125.0	140.6	112.5	21.2	14.6	11.7
Serbia proper	107.5	115.7	126.0	108.9	14.3	9.7	8.3
Vojvodina	103.6	112.8	118.9	105.3	7.0	10.9	5.0
Kosovo	111.0	132.4	171.0	129.2	20.7	20.8	25.4
Slovenia	104.5	110.0	119.8	108.9	8.7	7.0	8.1

SOURCE: *Yugoslav Survey*, No. 3, 1971, p. 4.**UNCLASSIFIED**

UNCLASSIFIED

-86-

(excluding the Belgrade region), Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo. This Yugoslavia has difficult access to the outside world. It is low in literacy and skills and has a high net birth rate. Living standards are comparable to those of Greece and southern Italy.*

(U) With the end of forced industrialization, gradual implementation of economic reform, and the "republicanization" of the LCY, "Northern" Yugoslavia has become increasingly unwilling to subsidize the industrialization of the "South."[†] Focusing less on its advantaged position in the country as a whole than on the economic gap still separating it from Central Europe, "Northern" Yugoslavia proposed and secured acceptance of new economic reform measures in order to hasten the modernization of its economy. It has agreed to continued subsidization of only the most underdeveloped areas of the "South," primarily Kosovo, and on a much reduced scale. "Southern" Yugoslavia, fearing that it faces a developmental challenge surpassing its own resources, has become increasingly aware of its own backwardness and bitter about forfeiting the subsidized industrialization it had believed was its "socialist" birthright. Rising material expectations fostered by all-Yugoslav and international communications; gross disparities in regional unemployment rates;[‡] and especially growing affirmation of its national groups have reinforced this perception.

THE "REPUBLICANIZATION" OF THE YUGOSLAV POLITY"Dinar Nationalism"

(U) Regional economic conflicts have mounted in Yugoslavia since the mid-1960s and have increasingly taken the form of disputes among

* (U) See R. V. Burks, *The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia*, The Rand Corporation, P-4761, October 1971, esp. pp. 52-59.

† (U) This is a "mass" and not an "elite" attitude. For example, in a Slovene public opinion poll of May 1969, economic conflicts were perceived as the most divisive issue between Slovenia and the rest of Yugoslavia (*Klasno i nacionalno u savremenom socijalizmu*, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 392).

‡ (U) This indicator is characteristic of the misleading nature of data pertaining to Yugoslavia as a whole. In mid-1970, the all-Yugoslav unemployment rate was 9 percent; in Slovenia, it was 3.5 percent, but in Macedonia and Kosovo, 19.5 and 26.7 percent, respectively.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-87-

various republics. In mid-1969, for example, the Slovene republican government demonstratively resigned (but later withdrew its resignation) to protest the exclusion of Slovenia from allocation of a loan from the World Bank for road-building. The Belgrade-Bar railroad, long promoted by Serbia and Montenegro to give "Southern" Yugoslavia its own international port, was long blocked by the opposition of Croatia and Slovenia. The latter republics opposed the federal government's longstanding refusal to raise rail freight tariffs as a measure which, de facto, subsidized less-efficient enterprises in the poorer republics. Croatian, Serbian, and Macedonian petrochemical and plastics combines, with the support of the respective republican officials, became embroiled in a dispute revolving around regional duplication of facilities. Croatian leaders lobbied in the past few years to limit control of Belgrade banks and re-export firms over the investment resources of Croatian enterprises. They sought to reduce the siphoning off of foreign exchange earned by Croatian export-oriented and tourist enterprises to the less-developed republics; the latter issue became the *cause célèbre* of Croatian nationalists in late 1971.

(U) These regional economic conflicts are but prominent examples of what has been called "dinar nationalism," the espousal by republican officials of economic causes promising special benefits for their own republics. The underlying cause of "dinar nationalism" is the regional disparity in economic development. The phenomenon first appeared in the late 1950s, as decentralization undermined the all-Yugoslav approach to economic development. Republican Party leaders in Slovenia and Croatia adopted the cause of economic reform in the interest of economic progress in their republics. The ensuing alliance between these republican Party leaders and reformers throughout Yugoslavia was primarily responsible for the federal government's reendorsement of economic reform in 1965 and the ouster a year later of Ranković and his followers, who still sought to block the reform. The price of regional Party support for the reformist economic cause has been its "republicanization"; disputes concerning implementation of the reform have become increasingly polarized along republican lines.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-88-

(U) In this context, economic and political issues have been inseparable. Successfully espousing regional economic causes, the republican LCY leaderships, those which had defended as well as those which had opposed greater economic centralism, acquired greater political power from the center--which whetted their appetites for still greater powers. This was a process driven "from below" and, as such, more far-reaching and less reversible than the initial measures of decentralization of the early 1950s related to worker self-management, which were decreed "from above." The major political developments in Yugoslavia since the mid-1960s have been due to this "republicanization" from below of the Yugoslav political system.

The National Question Reopened

(U) Devolution of political power in Yugoslavia from Belgrade to the republican level is the major factor responsible for the reactivation of the national question in Yugoslavia in the late 1960s, twenty years after the end of World War II and CPY's claim that it had been "solved." The revival of national tensions has, in turn, imparted increased momentum to the "republicanization" process.

(U) The significance--and ominous character--of this issue bears emphasizing. South Slav unity--the "Yugoslav idea" of the late nineteenth century--was the founding rationale of the Yugoslav state created in 1918. This ideal conflicted with the political reality of Serbian domination. The conflict made Yugoslavia virtually ungovernable in the interwar years and led to its self-disintegration when attacked by Nazi Germany in the spring of 1941. The CPY was the only Yugoslav political force in the 1930s that rose above national hatreds; its slogan "brotherhood and unity" was as instrumental as its skill in partisan warfare in bringing it to power in 1945. A formally federal constitution was promulgated in 1946 as a lightening rod for national discontent. Combining ethnic placement of cadres with revolutionary supranational Yugoslavism, the CPY firmly believed that forced socioeconomic modernization would end the disparity of economic development in different regions of the country, and in the process forge one Yugoslav nation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-89-

(U) As revolutionary totalitarianism evolved into decentralized and pluralistic authoritarianism, however, it became evident in the 1960s that the LCY had not "solved" the national question, but only anesthetized it. Republican Party organizations first developed links with "their" national groupings in espousing "dinar nationalism." In time, more direct links were forged as republican Party organizations took up the advocacy of the cultural/ethnic interests of "their" national groupings. The process began in the republics which had to subsidize uneven development of the "South" in the 1940s and 1950s (Croatia and Slovenia) and the republics with "unhistoric nations" affirming their national existence for the first time in Communist Yugoslavia (Macedonia and Bosnia). By 1970 all the republican Party organizations were promoting the national self-affirmation of "their" peoples and nationalities. Societal aspirations expressed in the form of national consciousness have triumphed over the original supranational vision of a once-revolutionary Communist Party.

(U) This development has promoted the linguistic and cultural national affirmation of *all* the constituent peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia. In the 1950s the secret police suppressed display of national emblems throughout the country; these emblems are now legitimate. Old national anthems have been revived, and new ones written, to complement the all-Yugoslav anthem. The 1971 census dropped the national category "Yugoslav," thus removing even implicit compulsion for, say, a Croat not so to declare himself. In the 1950s, the Party fostered Serbo-Croat--more precisely, the Belgrade dialect of Serbian written in the Croat Latin alphabet--as the official Yugoslav language, like the German *Amtssprache* of the Habsburg Monarchy. This was buttressed by the 1954 Novi Sad linguistic agreement on a "unitary Serbo-Croat" language, which favored de facto the dialect and literature of Serbia proper at the expense of Croat and Serb speakers elsewhere in the country. Today, Serbian, Croatian, Macedonian, and Slovenian have been supplemented by Albanian and Hungarian as official languages of the federation, any one of which may be used in its domestic and foreign communications. Simultaneous translation has been introduced in the Federal Assembly. The nationalities have been encouraged to establish

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-90-

their own cultural associations and to utilize their own languages in dealings with local officialdom. It is symptomatic that original television broadcasting is scheduled to begin in Vojvodina in 1974 in *five* languages.

(U) This process of national affirmation is having important international repercussions as well. Yugoslavia's nationalities have been encouraged to build bridges to their ethnic brothers in neighboring countries (e.g., Vojvodina Hungarians play a special role in Belgrade's cultivation of relations with Budapest). This is in sharp contrast to the interwar situation, when national minorities in Eastern Europe were almost universally treated as *irredenta* or security problems.

(U) Given the intermingling of Yugoslavia's many national groups and a history of ethnic conflicts, it was perhaps inevitable, on the crest of this process of national affirmation within a larger Yugoslav community, that defensive, exclusivist nationalism, sometimes with separatist overtones, also made its appearance.* The phenomenon first became evident in the mid-1960s in such multinational regions as Lika and Bosnia, where Serbian and Croatian nationalist speeches were delivered at local meetings and nationalist pamphlets were published. These nationalist utterances were generally suppressed by the local authorities. In 1966-1967, expressions of exclusivist nationalism appeared for the first time in a nationally homogeneous area, Slovenia, where Party leaders were confronted by a nationalist challenge with separatist and clerical overtones from a segment of the Slovene humanist intelligentsia. The Slovene Party proved able to suppress this challenge while continuing to promote economic reform and successfully maintaining its claim to be the "best defenders" of Slovene interests. Serbian and Montenegrin Party leaders have since been challenged by a less powerful (but more Church-influenced) Serbian nationalist current. Albanian nationalist demonstrations contributed to the "takeover" of the Kosovo Party apparatus by ethnic Albanians; while Albanian demonstrations have since largely ended, Serbs and Montenegrins in the province have begun to complain of national discrimination.

* (U) Insightfully analyzed by the Croat economist Branko Horvat, in *Gledišta*, Nos. 5-6, 1971, pp. 770-788.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-91-

(U) In 1971, a Croatian nationalist movement, much stronger than the one in Slovenia, rapidly gained momentum in Croatia. Occurring now in a multinational republic, it sought in effect to transform the Serbian population--part of the largest Yugoslav people--into a national minority. Tripalo, Dapčević-Kucar, and other top Croatian Party leaders tolerated and even encouraged this "national mass movement" in their effort to reap still greater economic benefits for Croatia. Nationalist incidents reminiscent of the Habsburg Empire occurred. Croats sought to replace Serb officials in a series of so-called local "cases," some in large factories. There was widespread public discussion of the economic "exploitation" of Croatia.* Local branches of the Croatian and Serbian cultural societies in Croatia multiplied,[†] and some organized rival nationalist parades. A drive was launched to purify the Croatian language of Serbian influences. Croatian nationalists assumed leadership of the republican student organization. A Croatian nationalist weekly expanded its circulation to 100,000 in a few months. The Croatian Supreme Court refused to ban a Croatian nationalist pamphlet previously suppressed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Extreme nationalists raised demands for membership of Croatia in the U.N., a Croatian national army, and even territorial revisions of the republican borders. Serbian nationalists in Croatia reacted with warnings of a threat to Serbs in the republic, while nationalists in Serbia itself began to claim a special responsibility for the protection of fellow Serbs in Croatia and other republics.

(U) While national affirmation elsewhere had also taken on exclusivist nationalist overtones, their strength and explicitly separatist implications, and thinly veiled anti-Communist character in Croatia, were the factors that caused Tito first to publicly denounce Croatian nationalism in April 1971 and--after eight months of indecision--to force the ouster of the top Croatian Party leadership in December 1971.

* (U) See the statement of the Croatian Pugwash Group (March 12, 1971) and the national holiday address of Zagreb University Rector Ivan Supek (April 28, 1971), both published in *Encyclopedia moderna*, No. 15, 1971.

[†] (U) *Matica Hrvatska* (the Croatian organization) expanded from 20 to 50 subcommittees and increased its membership from 1200 to 30,000 in the course of twelve months.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-92-

While an "anti-nationalist" campaign ensued, which has alienated a segment of the Croatian population, no attempt has been made to reverse the basic trend of the past decade toward national affirmation.* It is symptomatic that the ouster of the Croat Party leaders was followed by partial satisfaction of Croatian demands on the foreign exchange issue, greater recognition of the Croatian literary language in the revisions of the republican constitution, and the expulsion of a prominent Serb "conservative" from the Croatian Party Central Committee. In other regions, the Vojvodina Party leadership has renewed its campaign to correct the national structure of its cadres, while the Kosovo leaders have readvanced their moderate "Albanian" demands.

Pluralization Through Quasi-Confederation

(U) The Party. Ever since its Sixth Congress of 1952, the LCY has sought to adapt itself to the post-totalitarian, decentralized Yugoslav political system without diluting entirely its Leninist core. The Ninth Congress of 1969 was another landmark in this process; the expanded powers and autonomy of the republican Party organizations were formalized. For the first time, republican Parties held their congresses prior to the all-Yugoslav congress; in contrast to Soviet practice, republican representatives at the Ninth Congress were bound by the decisions of the earlier republican congresses. New supreme Party bodies--the Presidium and its Executive Bureau--were set up on the basis of strict national parity, with representatives chosen by the republican Party bodies, not by the Party center. A new Party statute abolished the remaining centralized organs for cadre affairs, formalizing the prior devolution of *nomenklatura* (in its diluted Titoist form) to the republican Party secretariats and cadre commissions. In theory the Presidium and Executive Bureau enjoyed independent powers; in practice the supreme LCY organs themselves increasingly became instrumentalities of the republican Party organizations. They were often stalemated when

* (U) "There can never be sufficient [expression of] national characteristics . . . [but] even a small amount of nationalism is too much" (Croatian Party leader Jure Bilić, *Večernje Novosti*, February 23, 1972).

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-93-

the latter could not agree among themselves. The LCY began to look like an alliance of its eight component republican and provincial Party organizations (or nine suborganizations, if the Party organization in the People's Army is included).*

(U) Following the Croatian crisis of December 1971, the Second LCY Conference reduced the Executive Bureau from 15 to 8 members, gave them individual responsibility for "sectors" of public affairs, and established a Secretary, rotating yearly. The Conference stressed that the federal LCY organs must have independent powers. These changes may restrict, but they have not reversed the process of "republicanization" of the LCY. Indeed, the Action Program of the Conference affirmed the "increased independence" of the republican organizations and stressed that, while the LCY must not be permitted to degenerate into a federation of republican Parties, there could be no return to a suprarepublican organization.†

(U) "Seizure of power" from below by the republican Party organizations resulted in a rejuvenation of the Party's cadre. This process, too, was formally ratified at the Ninth Congress, at which the generally better-educated and reformist postwar Communist generation replaced the "old comrades" of the Partisan era--in the backward "South" as well as in the better-developed "North." At the federal level, only 12 of the 35 former Presidium-level representatives were elected to the new LCY Presidium. At the republican level, 69 percent of the republican Party Central Committees were on average newly elected; half of the new members had made their careers primarily outside Party channels. Most important, the Serbian Party organization, which had long allied itself with Ranković, passed into the hands of a new generation of moderate reformers. Parallel changes occurred in the LCY-dominated mass organization, the Socialist Alliance.

(U) Retirement in middle-age of the "old comrades" has unblocked the career logjam for the postwar generation. The cost has been the creation of a potential counter-elite of the dissatisfied--composed

* (U) Republican Party organizations transfer only one percent of their revenues to the federal LCY organization.

† (U) *Komunist*, January 29, 1972.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-94-

primarily of ex-Partisans of Serbian and Montenegrin origin (many of whom are no longer Party members, but still consider themselves Communists). After the Ninth Congress, members of this "underground," linking political conservatism with appeals to nationalist sentiments and economic grievances, gained control of local veterans' organizations and even some Party organizations. Vigorous efforts by the new Serbian Party leaders suppressed several blatant cases of such intra-Party opposition in Serbia. In 1971, Serb-dominated veterans' organizations in parts of Croatia opposed the Croatian national (and nationalist) revival.* Following the replacement of the top Croatian leaders in December, some of these organizations sought, unsuccessfully, to utilize the LCY's "anti-nationalist" campaign to reverse fundamentally the expansion of Croatian national autonomy and secure the adoption of more "conservative" policies in general. The new Croatian Party leadership headed by Milka Planinc has apparently contained this pressure. Still largely excluded from public life, this conservative, nationally distinct (but, on balance, not pro-Soviet), political "underground" remains.

(U) The State. A transformation of the governmental structure has occurred parallel to that of the Party. In 1967 and 1968, amendments to the 1963 Constitution increased the weight of the Chamber of Nations--where republics and provinces are represented on a parity basis--in the Federal Assembly. New legislation required application of a national "key"--i.e., proportional national representation--to the federal bureaucracy, including the diplomatic corps.

(U) Frequent stalemates in the top LCY bodies furthered the process (which had begun much earlier, independently of "republicanization") of transferring decisionmaking and policy formulation from the Party to the governmental machinery. Assembly delegates were still bound by Party-defined decisions, but these were the decisions of their respective republican Party organizations, and much interrepublican bargaining occurred in the Assembly committees themselves, with the Federal

* (U) An illuminating description of the "Communist-dogmatist" ("a potential supporter of a 'firm hand' [policy] and possibly even a pawn of eventual foreign aggression") was formulated by Stipe Suvar, sociologist and rising Croatian Party leader, in *Praxis*, No. 5, 1971, pp. 693-694.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-95-

Executive Council (FEC) attempting to play a mediating role. The Constitutional Court, established by the 1963 Constitution on the American model, began to assert itself. This accelerated democratization of the political system. The political process in Yugoslavia became depersonalized; multifaceted institutionalized channels of decisionmaking were established; and constitutionalism began to exert an influence.

(U) Yet appearance has been somewhat misleading. Institutionalization of the political system has not gone as far as some scholars have asserted. In many cases, presumptive manifestations of institutionalization have in fact been the consequence of direct political conflicts among still centralized republican Party organizations. By 1970, the republican Party organizations had won de facto recognition of the "imperative mandate" of republican representatives in the federal government.* Consequently, the federal government was frequently paralyzed by the same inability to reach a consensus that stalemated the supreme LCY organs. Essential all-Yugoslav decisions were put off. This paralysis proved crippling in late 1970, when the FEC proved incapable of carrying through urgently required belt-tightening measures and devaluation of the dinar.

(U) The vacuum of effective policymaking at the center was perhaps the direct motivation for Tito's September 1970 initiative on a collective Presidency. Since Tito himself had become the linchpin in a system of de facto bargaining among republican Party organizations, his explicit discussion of his succession called into question the fundamental premises of that system. The upshot was the promulgation in mid-1971, after much hard inter-republican bargaining, of 21 additional amendments to the 1963 Constitution. These amendments in effect partially dismantled the federal bodies and formally reconstituted them as instrumentalities of the republics, composed of their own representatives on a *parity* basis. The 21 amendments formalized powers previously

* (U) This was the significance of the "Zanko affair" of early 1970; Zanko was recalled as delegate in the Federal Assembly for refusing to accept guidance from the Croatian Party organization.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-96-

exercised de facto by the republics, including responsibility for the execution of much federal law and even an independent role in the conduct of foreign policy. They defined new republican competences, the most important of which is a formal voice in and veto power over decisions of the FEC, itself now reconstituted on the basis of strict republican parity. This competence is institutionalized in several inter-republican commissions, which must, independently of the Federal Assembly, unanimously agree on proposed legislation before it is endorsed by the FEC. The republics also gained control of over half of federal revenues, the right of parity representation on the Constitutional Court, control over the operation of the Federal Bank, and a partial claim on foreign exchange earnings of enterprises within their boundaries. The status of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which had earlier achieved much of the substance of republicanism, was further elevated.*

(U) The constitutional amendments of 1971 also sought to provide for more efficient functioning of the much-reduced federal apparatus and to prevent its paralysis in an emergency. Although the new constitutional structure generally precludes "outvoting" of any of the republics, the FEC is empowered to reach decisions by a two-thirds majority on certain critical economic issues. If the FEC is stalemated, important policy issues can be referred to the Presidency. Although elected by the republican assemblies, the Presidency, acting in this situation as on many issues by qualified majority vote, can call for the election of a new Government. The Presidency enjoys considerable powers of policy innovation and consultation. It can act unilaterally in the event of war or its imminent threat. These crisis and emergency provisions have yet to be tested; politically, given the considerable devolution of political power to the republican level, they will be very difficult to invoke short of severe internal strife or invasion.

* (U) Indicative of the provincial powers, Serbia proper has become concerned about its special interests being neglected in the Serbian republican assembly, where the two provinces are fully represented. See *Politika*, October 12, 1971.

UNCLASSIFIED

-97-

(U) On balance, the constitutional amendments of 1971 make the federal government more, rather than less, a creature of the republics and provinces. This development will be carried a step further later in 1972 in a second round of constitutional amendments. These will, inter alia, adapt the assembly system to the new executive structure, further increasing the weight of the Chamber of Nations (which will be renamed the Chamber of Republics and Provinces) and formalizing the "imperative mandate" of its republican delegations. The elevated status and powers of the republics and provinces are being anchored in parallel revisions of their respective constitutions. While conclusive judgments would be premature, the new governmental institutions have apparently begun to function more effectively than the old ones. The inter-republican committees, in particular, have had some success in harmonizing divergent republican positions.*

(U) The Security Police and the Army. "Republicanization" has also affected the State Secretariat for Internal Affairs and the Yugoslav People's Army. Following the purge of Ranković, the security service was deprived of its powers over routine political and economic affairs and reduced in size. The Federal Assembly began to monitor its activities. Responsibility for pretrial investigation was transferred to the courts. Ranković supporters at all levels were purged and largely replaced by individuals from outside the service, in the process reducing its Serb-Montenegrin coloration.† State security was in part removed from the domain of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Since 1966, the republican authorities have gained increased control over the service. The issue of federal versus republican control exploded into a major political crisis in early 1971 when the security service circulated spurious or misleading reports about communications between Croatian Party leaders and Croatian emigres. The incident was

* (U) See the analysis (based on extensive interviews with assembly delegates and members of the committees) in *NIN*, March 5 and 20, 1972. The most contentious issues have been referred to yet another body (not provided for in the Constitutional Amendments), the Federal Executive Council Coordinating Commission, composed of federal and republican governmental representatives.

† (U) Yet Serbs still constituted 62 percent of the federal apparatus in 1970 (*NIN*, May 2, 1971).

-98-

smoothed over by Tito, but without resolving the fundamental issue. Its sensitivity was reemphasized in the fall of 1971, when the position of Federal Minister of the Interior remained vacant for several months before it was filled by a Croat and Tito appointed General Ivan Mišković, the Croat head of YPA counterintelligence (who had monitored Ranković's activities in 1966) as his personal advisor on state security affairs and also as Secretary of the Presidency's Council for State Security.

(U) Restriction of the central powers of the security service left the YPA as the sole, highly centralized federal institution. The CPY came to power in 1945 as a Partisan-Party, nearly all the top leaders of which were generals, but in the 1950s the army became an exclusivist, supranational institution, almost hermetically sealed off from the rest of Yugoslav society. Since 1966, Party leaders have introduced reforms intended to correct this situation. Military men have been encouraged to participate in the affairs of the communities in which they are stationed and have been permitted to travel privately abroad. Military affairs, once a taboo, have been discussed in the media. The Federal Assembly has begun to debate, not just rubber-stamp, the defense budget. The Party organization in the YPA has been reorganized to permit greater participation by the rank and file and to encourage horizontal contacts with territorial Party organizations. Contact between YPA personnel and other Yugoslavs increased greatly with the establishment of territorial defense forces in 1969.

"Opening to society," the YPA, too, has been affected by "republicanization" and the forces of national affirmation. Pressured by republican Party organizations, the YPA--with a thoroughly multinational senior command, but dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins at the NCO level--has formally adopted the goal of fully proportional national representation in its ranks. Croatian, Slovene, and Macedonian republican authorities, in particular, have sought to enroll more of their youth in the military academies. The YPA accepted in principle in 1966 the stationing of at least 25 percent of the conscripts on the territory of their own republics (although, to date, the average is only 15 percent). The military districts were redrawn in 1969 to

-99-

coincide (with the exceptions of the Dalmatian coast south of Split and Montenegro) with republican boundaries. Commanders of large units must be of a major national group of the region in which the units are stationed.

(U) Opportunities for cultural and linguistic national expression within the YPA have also been enhanced. In some non-Serbo-Croat areas, notably Macedonia, the YPA itself has begun to foster the use of the respective national language in the community at large. Belgrade Serbian is no longer constitutionally sanctioned as the unitary language of command. While in practice Serbian is still used in most YPA units, in units composed entirely of one national group (e.g., Alpine Brigades in Slovenia), the appropriate national language may now be utilized for command. The new constitutional amendments have provided for a multiple post-Tito Supreme Command; the Presidency's Military Committee, to which command responsibilities are delegated, is currently composed of representatives of the three major peoples--a Serb, Croat, and Slovene--and its expansion to include six or eight republican/provincial representatives has been discussed. Potentially most significant, the YPA has been complemented by territorial defense forces under republican control, which are constitutionally coequal with the YPA. These developments occurred in the context of public demands by nationalists in Slovenia and Croatia for the radical reorganization of the YPA into single-nation units with national languages of command. While republican Party leaders never endorsed these demands, the Croatian leaders apparently did seek the replacement of General Djoko Jovanić (a Serb from Croatia) as head of the Zagreb military district by his Chief-of-Staff, General Janko Bobetko (a Croat).

(U) Dilution of the YPA's supranational and exclusivist character notwithstanding, the army remains the most reliable all-Yugoslav political instrument. When Tito first took a public stand against the rising wave of nationalism in Croatia in the spring of 1971, he held a series of consultations with senior military figures, which served as a psychological buttress to his antinationalist remarks. He followed an exceptional constitutional procedure in reappointing General Ljubicić, a highly trusted confidant, State Secretary for National Defense for a

-100-

third term. In December 1971, Tito openly threatened to use the army, should it prove necessary, to put down a nationalist or other domestic challenge to the territorial integrity of the state and LCY rule. The Croatian crisis has given the YPA ample ammunition to ward off any renewed radical demands for its reorganization into republican national armies.

(U) Other Groups. Like the YPA, the trade union organization has retained a stronger all-Yugoslav focus than most federal institutions. It was symptomatic that Tito utilized the trade union organization as a platform in December 1971 in taking a stand against nationalism. Although overshadowed by "republicanization," channels of functional interest representation not strictly polarized along republican lines do exist. Examples are the syndical economic chambers in the assemblies above the local level and a variety of professional and technical organizations, which have exerted some influence on all-Yugoslav policymaking.

(U) In addition to the retired Partisan functionaries and prosecuted nationalists, other dissident elements have arisen. Although today of minor political importance, these elements could play a greater role in the future. They include alienated student and intellectual groups of various persuasions (e.g., the Belgrade student "New Left" active in the 1968 unrest, the radical humanist Marxists grouped around *Praxis*) and the activist anti-Communist foreign nationalist emigres, who have organized a number of terrorist incidents in the country and abroad in recent years.

(U) In summary, the "republicanization" of the Yugoslav polity has been far-reaching. Promulgated and pending constitutional amendments, although seeking to equip the federal authorities with explicit crisis and emergency powers, legitimize the transformation of the original centralist federalism into "cooperative federalism"* or "manipulative federalism"† with many interrepublican, quasiconfederal attributes. While the full consequences of the December 1971 Croatian crisis

* (U) Jovan Djordjević, *Federalizam, nacija, socijalizam*, Belgrade, 1971, p. 72.

† (U) Paul Shoup, "The Impact of the National Question on the Political Systems of Eastern Europe," unpublished paper, 1971, p. 66.

UNCLASSIFIED

-101-

have yet to be demonstrated, it has not resulted in any real reversal of this development. The LCY has called for revitalization of its "political center" as the locus of all-Yugoslav policymaking. Nevertheless, it has foresworn any reversion to centralized or "strong arm"* rule and recognized the continued powers of its constituent republican organizations.

POTENTIAL SOVIET CONSTITUENCIES

(U) The only actual Soviet constituency in Yugoslavia is the handful of literal "Cominformists." While this grouping would welcome Yugoslavia's reincorporation in the Soviet bloc, its members are totally without political influence, personally under surveillance, and easily isolated in a crisis.

(U) Other elements of Yugoslav society, however, while staunchly anti-Soviet today, might in *exceptional* circumstances be inclined to turn toward the USSR and even accept its intervention in Yugoslavia as the lesser evil. This *potential* Soviet constituency may comprise a segment of the YPA and security police, purged "old comrades," certain economic managers, and perhaps even other members of particular national groups.

(U) The security police and the army have remained reliable defenders of Yugoslav sovereignty ever since 1948. Tito has always been especially attentive to the loyalty of both, and there is no reason to believe that either institution harbors significant pro-Soviet forces. Senior YPA officers comprise that stratum of the Party elite that has been most consistently concerned with the Soviet threat. At the same time, because of their professional preoccupations, there probably has

* (U) Tito cautioned against a "witch hunt" at the conclusion of the Second Conference. Leading Croatian nationalists are under investigative detention and may be tried. Yet the Federal Assembly refused to approve a tough press law to prevent expression of nationalism by means of censorship. Tito and other Yugoslav leaders did make the ominous charge that "counterrevolution" had threatened in Croatia. Yet the term has been authoritatively interpreted (Stane Dolanc, Speech to the 32nd LCY Presidium, *Borba*, May 12, 1972) to include neo-Stalinism, and the Party leadership has again resolutely rejected any alliance with neo-Stalinist forces against nationalism and political trials of the deposed Croat leaders.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-102-

been significant concern among senior officers over the security implications of excessive decentralization and lack of discipline in Yugoslav society.* This may incline an element of the officer corps toward more "conservative" domestic policies. (In Yugoslav Communist terms, this means neo-Rankovićism, not a pro-Soviet outlook or neo-Stalinism.)

(U) Some of the retired "old comrades," no longer subordinated to institutionalized Party guidance, clearly have a more "conservative" political outlook. Managers of marginal economic enterprises, located mainly in the "South," producing goods primarily for the Soviet market have a vested interest in more conservative economic policies and in good Soviet-Yugoslav relations. In historical perspective, Montenegro has had long historical ties with Russia, while Serbs have often exhibited greater political conservatism and more concern with the integrity of the Yugoslavia they dominated than Croats and Slovenes, especially.†

(U) The hard question for the future is whether an extreme threat to the internal values of these segments of Yugoslav society in the post-Tito period might incline them toward reliance on the Soviet Union if this appeared to be the only alternative to the breakup of Yugoslavia, the collapse of "socialism," or domestic chaos.

TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE‡

(U) The shock of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia led Yugoslavia's leaders to conclude that their existing defense capabilities were inadequate to counter the Soviet threat. A renewed conventional military buildup like that of the early 1950s was out of the question

* (U) This concern was openly voiced by Gen. Jovanić, addressing the Zagreb Garrison (Tanjug, February 8, 1972).

† (U) Serbian intellectual circles exhibited considerable opposition to the 1971 Constitutional amendments as signifying the disintegration of Yugoslavia (for example, the discussion at the Law Faculty of Belgrade University, in April 1971, reported in *Student*, April 30 (banned), May 18 and 27, 1971).

‡ This section is based on one author's ARPA-supported study of Yugoslav military developments. A summary analysis is contained in A. Ross Johnson, *Total National Defense in Yugoslavia*, The Rand Corporation, P-4746, December 1971.

UNCLASSIFIED

-103-

for both economic and domestic political reasons. Large-scale foreign military assistance such as the United States had supplied in the 1950s was neither desired nor available. Instead, Yugoslavia has turned to the doctrine of total national defense. At the heart of the doctrine is the peacetime organization of large-scale territorial defense forces (TDF)--territorial armies of citizen-soldiers--organized and, to a considerable extent, controlled by republican political authorities.

(U) The doctrine and corresponding organizational measures were affirmed in a new National Defense Law of 1969, which repeated the constitutional prohibition on capitulation or surrender of territory under any circumstances.

(U) Should Bulgaria or another neighbor attempt an incursion into Yugoslavia, it would be resisted by the YPA itself. In the more likely event of a massive blitz attack led by the USSR, the YPA, employing frontal tactics but seeking to avoid large losses, would attempt to delay enemy penetration long enough for the country to carry out total mobilization. Thereafter, YPA units, withdrawing from border regions, would wage active mobile defense in depth alongside the now-mobilized TDF throughout the country, utilizing combined and partisan tactics. Yugoslav military planners assert that this doctrine and organization could tie down a Soviet invasion force of up to two million.

(U) Since 1969, the TDF has been expanded into a force of one million, with a force goal of three million (15 percent of the population). The emphasis in organizing the TDF has been on company-size units at the local (communal) level, supplemented by defense units in factories and other institutions. Some battalion-sized, highly mobile TDF units have also been formed at the republican level. Local TDF units are subordinated to a local defense command, with the local commander responsible both to the local political authorities and to the republican defense command. The latter is in turn subordinated directly to the federal Supreme Command, not through the chain-of-command of the YPA/State Secretariat for National Defense. TDF units fall under YPA tactical command only when engaged in joint operations; if the enemy should overrun an entire republic, the republican defense command would assume control of all units--YPA as well as TDF--on its territory. The

-104-

TDF is armed primarily with light anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons of indigenous manufacture, supplemented by heavier mobile anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons for battalion-size units.

(U) The YPA, while no longer *the* Yugoslav military institution, is still intended to play a key military role. While additional manpower cuts are projected, the YPA will be further modernized; the primary goal is a modern mobile infantry, well armed with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, primarily of indigenous manufacture. The YPA reserve has been deemphasized; currently, 80 percent of YPA conscripts are subsequently assigned to the TDF. Military maneuvers now involve joint defense by YPA and TDF units against large-scale armored invasion and airborne assault. Some support functions have been transferred from the YPA to the TDF or the civilian sector. Total national defense was simulated on a mass scale for the first time in October 1971 in the "Freedom-71" maneuvers.*

(U) Yugoslav defense doctrine and organization seek to deter Soviet military invasion or political pressure by demonstrating that a Czechoslovak-like road march through Yugoslavia by the Warsaw Pact will not be possible and that an occupation effort would be bloody, prolonged, and very costly in manpower and materiel. Two underlying assumptions of the doctrine--made quite explicit in professional discussions, if, understandably, not in public statements--are of special relevance to this study: (1) the major restraint on Soviet deployment of very large forces in southeastern Europe, and the use of such forces to conquer Yugoslavia, is the Central European NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance; (2) while Yugoslavia would be able, with its own forces, to transform a massive blitz Soviet invasion into a protracted conflict, it would subsequently encounter materiel shortages and would seek military assistance from the United States and Western Europe.

The maneuvers were highly rated by Western Defense Attachés, who pointed to obsolescent equipment as the most serious failing.

-105-

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(U) Yugoslav foreign policy since 1968 has been conducted under the lodestar of two events: the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the crisis of the nonaligned movement.

In the early 1960s, while remaining nonaligned, Yugoslavia enjoyed better relations with the USSR than at any time since 1948. It supported Soviet positions on many international issues and became again dependent on the USSR for heavy weaponry. This Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement fell victim to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslavs conceded that their analysis of "progressive" evolution in the USSR had been ill-founded and perceived a greatly increased threat to their own independence. They have since become convinced that Moscow still finds Yugoslavia's independence unacceptable, for ideological, Soviet-bloc-related, and now increasingly for geostrategic, Mediterranean-related, reasons. By the fall of 1969, public Soviet-Yugoslav polemics were reduced and bilateral relations were outwardly normalized with Gromyko's visit to Belgrade, followed by the return visits of Premier Ribičić and Foreign Minister Tepavac to Moscow in 1970 and 1971. But Yugoslav apprehensions about Soviet intentions continued to be fueled by a number of Soviet actions. Moscow attempted (without success) to use the expiration of a long-term arms agreement to exert pressure on Belgrade, while demanding expanded overflight and staging rights and naval facilities (which it failed to get), ostensibly to strengthen the Soviet arms supply bridge to Egypt. Publicly and privately, Moscow has objected to the doctrine of total national defense. The Soviets have engaged in large-scale propaganda activities in Yugoslavia. They have proposed special economic relations with enterprises in backward regions of the country. Old Cominformists in the Soviet bloc have been activated. More ominously, Moscow has attempted to play on national tensions and separatist forces, attempting to cultivate supporters in Yugoslavia and reportedly even extending limited covert support to Croatian neofascist emigres.

(U) In welcoming Brezhnev to Belgrade in September 1971, and visiting Moscow in mid-1972, Tito has sought to induce the USSR to abandon or limit these subversive activities and thus to defuse, at least temporarily, some of the tension again mounting between the two countries.

-106-

The Yugoslavs have chalked up some minor successes. Bulgaria's anti-Macedonian propaganda has again been muted. Belgrade has gained partial satisfaction of its demand for reciprocity with the USSR in its informational programs.

(U) Belgrade's economic difficulties have led it to expand some forms of economic relations with the USSR. Its long-standing clearing account surplus with Moscow has been replaced by a deficit of some \$20 million. Several new bilateral trade protocols have been concluded since Brezhnev's visit. One provides for processing Soviet raw materials in Yugoslavia, with the finished products to be returned to the USSR. Moscow has agreed to extend credits on generous terms to help Yugoslavia develop raw materials in short supply in the USSR (following the long-standing Yugoslav refusal to meet Soviet requests for investment in Soviet resource development).

(U) The somewhat surprising Yugoslav willingness to participate in a more intensive development of Party-level ties since the Brezhnev visit may be attributable in part to the Yugoslavs' desire to defuse a tense situation; it may also be a consequence, notwithstanding, of Tito's residual ideological affinities with the USSR--which since 1948 have never led him to endanger Yugoslav sovereignty (and his personal power base), but have inclined him to seek close relations with Moscow on his own terms. If that is the case, this ideological residue is not shared by the postwar generation of Yugoslav Communist leaders. The latter may still believe that the "Yugoslav road" can influence the future of Communism in Eastern Europe, but they evidently believe that--barring fundamental changes in the Soviet political system and leadership--the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia is long-term and fundamentally unbridgeable.*

(S) One Yugoslav approach to countering this threat has been intensive cultivation of relations with other Communist states at odds

* (U) This attitude--evident to many Westerners (including one of the authors) in personal contacts with Yugoslav leaders and foreign affairs advisors--is clearly expressed by academician Radovan Vukadinović (then a member of the LCY Presidium's Commission for International Relations) in his major study of the Soviet bloc, *Odnosi medju evropskim socijalističkim državama*, Zagreb, 1970, pp. 291-299 and by Macedonian leader Slavko Milosavljević, in his book *Socijalizam i suverenost*, Belgrade, 1971, pp. 46-76.

-107-

with Moscow. Ties with Romania have developed to such a point that, the disparity in internal systems apart, a de facto Romanian-Yugoslav alliance has been established which even involves limited cooperation in the military sphere.* Belgrade's relations with the People's Republic of China have improved markedly in all spheres as the two countries found themselves facing a common Soviet threat. Relations with Albania--incorrigibly hostile to Yugoslavia since 1948--have also improved, with special ties developing between Kosovo and Albania. A tacit Balkan Communist grouping--Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia--is thus taking shape that fears the USSR and enjoys a measure of Chinese backing. This Chinese political support has been warmly welcomed in Belgrade, but both sides recognize its limits; in Chou En-lai's words, "a fire cannot be extinguished with water from a distant well."

(U) Yugoslavia has continued to cultivate its ties with non-aligned countries. Nonalignment, however, no longer enjoys the international prominence of ten years ago. Moreover, widespread passivity in the Third World to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia brought home to any Yugoslav leaders with illusions on this score the impotence of the nonaligned movement to assist should Yugoslavia's sovereignty be seriously threatened.

Yugoslavia's primary response to the post-1968 international situation has been a "return to Europe," an intensive effort to recultivate ties promoted with Western European countries in the early 1950s but subsequently neglected. Since the mid-1960s, the Yugoslav economy has reoriented itself toward the West European market. A trade agreement was concluded with the European Economic Community (EEC); an international banking consortium was established to promote inflow of venture capital; debt relief and other economic assistance have been obtained. Eight hundred thousand Yugoslavs have taken up work in Western Europe, 500,000 in the FRG. Since 1969, these economic ties have been complemented by political and military measures. Tito has visited the major West European countries. Yugoslavia has taken an active interest in

*

Exchange of top-level military delegations has been regularized. The two countries are reportedly cooperating in developing a new jet trainer or fighter.

-108-

discussions on CSCE and MBFR. Military delegations have been exchanged with both neutrals and NATO members (with especially strong soundings in Italy), while an effort has been made to diversify Yugoslavia's foreign arms purchases.

In the context of this "return to Europe," Yugoslavia has begun to cultivate better relations with Washington. The highlights of the improving bilateral relationship have been President Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia in September 1970, Tito's first full-dress official visit to the United States in October-November 1971, the extension of Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) guarantees to Yugoslavia in early 1972, and resumed exchanges of military delegations. While determined to remain fundamentally nonaligned, Yugoslavia has signaled its interest in the establishment of a stable long-term American presence in Yugoslavia with implicit security overtones.

UNCLASSIFIED

-109-

Appendix B

THE HISTORICAL U.S. STAKE IN YUGOSLAVIA^{*}

(U) This appendix selectively reviews U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia between 1948 and 1968. It recapitulates major arguments of American proponents and critics of closer official relations between the two countries, the major substance of which was, until the early 1960s, substantial United States aid. The validity of the respective arguments and, relatedly, the efficacy of the instruments of U.S. policy are then evaluated.

ALLIANCE AGAINST STALIN

(U) By 1947, United States-Yugoslav relations were perhaps worse than Washington's relations with any other East European state. During World War II, Tito's Partisans had benefited from considerable U.K. and U.S. military assistance, while achieving much popularity among American public opinion. At the end of the war, however, relations quickly deteriorated as the CPY consolidated a revolutionary totalitarianism at home and pursued both a territorially aggrandizing (alternatively, nationally unifying) and "leftist" revolutionary foreign policy. U.S. public opinion was particularly disturbed by the Tito regime's execution of Chetnik leader Dražha Mihailović and persecution of the Croatian Catholic Church. Internationally, the Tito regime demanded incorporation of all of Trieste and part of Austrian Carinthia in Yugoslavia, while supporting the Greek Communist insurrection and taking a strong anti-Western position in the U.N. When the Yugoslavs shot down two U.S. military transport planes which overflew Yugoslavia in the fall of 1946, relations between the two countries reached their lowest point.

(U) In the U.S. foreign policy community at the time, no less than among the public at large, conventional wisdom held that in pursuing these militantly anti-Western policies, Yugoslavia was acting in

^{*}(U) This appendix is based on a paper by A. Ross Johnson, "The United States Stake in Yugoslavia, 1948-1968," issued by the *Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar*, 1971.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-110-

the interest of the USSR and at Stalin's command. In fact, however, Stalin found the Yugoslav Communists' international radicalism in the initial post-war years somewhat embarrassing. Their reckless activities in the southwest outpost of the Soviet camp were a major source of Soviet-Yugoslav friction. That friction increased dramatically in early 1948, resulting in the open break between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in June. Expelled from the Cominform and anathematized by Moscow, Tito refused to capitulate, staunchly maintaining that Yugoslavia's Communist purity was not in question and that the CPY would hold firmly to its course of socialist transformation at home and militant anti-imperialism abroad. Words were matched by deeds on both policies in late 1948 and 1949.*

(U) While the public rupture between Stalin and Tito came as a bombshell to most of the world, the American Embassy in Belgrade, headed by Ambassador Cannon, had become aware in the spring of 1948 of mounting Soviet-Yugoslav frictions and was able to appraise the open break of June as real and significant--the breakaway of an important component of the Soviet European empire.†

(U) Well before the CPY had begun to attenuate its international or domestic radicalism, the U.S. Government took the first step toward supporting Yugoslavia as an independent, anti-Soviet Communist state. In the fall of 1948, in return for a settlement of small nationalization and other claims, Washington released the Royalist Yugoslav gold holdings of \$47 million. In early 1949, in a unilateral action, it eased restrictions on exports to Yugoslavia, treating it more leniently than other Communist countries. By mid-1949, the Yugoslav leadership began to reciprocate this U.S. interest in a new relationship, for its stance of "defending internationalism" against East and West promised no solution to the increasingly effective Cominform economic embargo of Yugoslavia and a mounting Soviet-backed East European military threat.

* (U) See A. Ross Johnson, *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945-1953*, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1972.

† (U) John C. Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road; America and Yugoslavia in World Politics*, Harper and Row, New York, 1967, p. 15.

UNCLASSIFIED

-111-

In July, Tito ended Yugoslav support of the Greek Communist uprising by closing the Yugoslav-Greek frontier. In September, in response to a Yugoslav request, the Export-Import Bank granted Yugoslavia the first U.S. loan of \$20 million; in October, in the face of Soviet opposition, Yugoslavia sought and won, with U.S. support, a seat in the U.N. Security Council; in December, George Allen, the new U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade, publicly affirmed the U.S. interest in "the retention of Yugoslavia's sovereignty," and Belgrade welcomed this declaration.

(U) In early 1950 Yugoslavia sought and was granted a second loan of \$20 million from the Export-Import Bank. The severe drought in mid-1950, and the resulting threat of famine in view of the Cominform embargo, then led the Yugoslav government to request economic assistance on a much broader scale. Up to this point, President Truman and the Executive Branch had acted independently, improvising on the basis of existing legislation. Now, in view of the magnitude, perspective duration, and controversial nature of the U.S. aid program which seemed advisable, Truman requested appropriate legislation. Congress responded with the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Act, passed in the Senate by a vote of 60-21 and in the House by a vote of 225-142, granting food relief in the amount of \$50 million. In 1950, the United States joined with the United Kingdom and France to extend tripartite balance of payments support to Yugoslavia. The same year, President Truman certified the independence of Yugoslavia as essential for the defense of Western Europe and "important" to U.S. national security, qualifying the country for Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) and Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) grants. By mid-1955, the United States had extended grants of \$356 million to Yugoslavia from MDAP and ECA funds, which, together with other economic grants and loans, raised total U.S. economic aid during the 6-year period to nearly \$600 million.

The first soundings on the possibility of U.S. military assistance to Yugoslavia came from the Yugoslav side in late 1950 when, in the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War, Belgrade felt a substantially increased Soviet bloc military threat. Following certification under MDAP legislation, Ambassador Allen negotiated MDAP and ECA agreements with Yugoslavia (which, owing to Yugoslav sensitivities about national

-112-

independence, departed from standard agreements concluded with other countries). A small (30 men) Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in Belgrade. General Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, visited the country and became a staunch advocate of U.S. military assistance. By mid-1955, the military assistance program alone had amounted to nearly an additional \$600 million, most of it heavy equipment to modernize infantry divisions in the Zagreb military district so that (in the U.S. view) they might mount a conventional defense against Soviet attack in the region of the Ljubljana Gap. Yugoslav officers underwent training in the United States. Yugoslavia supplied ammunition and other Offshore Procurement items for the U.S. military.

This substantial assistance program was a source of continuing bilateral friction, for the Yugoslavs--concerned about their national independence and oversensitized by their experiences with Soviet military "advisors"--refused to accept the usual obligations of U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) recipients. They insisted that the MAAG deal only with a Yugoslav "counterpart staff" and generally refused it direct access to the Yugoslav People's Army. Initially, they also refused to permit observation of or provide data on end-use of U.S.-supplied weaponry. (During 1955-1957 they were more forthcoming on the latter score, but never to U.S. satisfaction.)

Beginning in 1952, the USG sought to coordinate military planning with Yugoslavia at the Chief-of-Staff level. NATO-Yugoslav consultations were originally contemplated, but the USG shifted to promoting Tripartite (U.S., U.K., French)-Yugoslav talks when it became evident that it would be difficult for NATO to coordinate an agreed position and that Yugoslavia was unwilling to deal directly with NATO representatives. Although General Collins met with General Koca Popović in Washington in 1953, the Four Power talks made little headway. As a precondition, Yugoslavia originally sought a firm U.S. security commitment to assist it in the event of Soviet attack. When such a commitment was not forthcoming from Washington, Tito feared that Yugoslavia might be left on its own were it to be invaded in isolation, apart from a European-wide conflict. Nevertheless, provided that reciprocity of information were observed, Belgrade accepted a U.S. proposal to conduct Four Power

-113-

military contingency discussions under the assumption that a U.S. political decision to assist an invaded Yugoslavia would be forthcoming. Yugoslav military planners conducted extensive contingency discussions with their Greek and Turkish counterparts on this basis, a process formalized in the Balkan Pact of August 1954. In the Four Power talks, in contrast, the Yugoslav representatives felt that they were being asked to reveal unilaterally their military plans. In the face of these difficulties, Yugoslav interest in military discussions of any kind rapidly waned following Stalin's death and the subsequent easing of Soviet pressure.

(U) Improved relations with and acceptance of massive aid from Washington were but one facet of a major shift in Yugoslav foreign policy after 1949. Belgrade established good relations with all its Western neighbors (although the Trieste dispute continued to burden relations with Rome). Yugoslavia's revised attitude toward the USSR and its satellites had much in common with that of the United States. Yugoslav statements on the aggressive and hegemonic nature of Soviet foreign policy were as sharp and bitter as those of the most fanatical Western anti-Communists of the day; at the same time, the Yugoslav ideologues sought to demonstrate by quotations from Marx and Lenin that the Soviet Union was no longer a socialist country. They began to lay the theoretical underpinnings for the domestic, political and economic reforms of the early 1950s, which--undertaken in the name of socialism and not calling into question the perpetuation of Communist Party rule--liberalized the political system and improved the lot of the Yugoslav citizen.

(U) From the U.S. viewpoint, this pattern of relations--the major substance of which was large-scale economic and military assistance--was intended to assist a Tito-led, Communist-ruled Yugoslavia to maintain its independence in the face of strong Soviet pressure to replace the Tito regime with a loyalist, pro-Moscow Communist leadership that would return the country to the Soviet fold. In early 1949, as it was better appreciated in Washington that the Tito-Stalin break was neither illusory nor transitory, a policy of U.S. support to "keep Tito afloat" won ground. The policy rested on the assumption that Yugoslavia could

-114-

not remove itself from the Soviet sphere of influence and simultaneously be "liberated" of Communist rule. The rationale (developed fully in the early 1950s) for U.S. support of a Tito-led, independent Communist Yugoslavia was primarily three-fold.*

1. *Strategic Benefits.* A truly independent Yugoslavia meant rolling back the military power of the Soviet bloc, subtracting Tito's 33 divisions from its military strength and, in certain circumstances, adding them to the capacity of Western Europe to resist Soviet attack. With Yugoslavia's cooperation, Italy could be defended at its natural line of defense, the Ljubljana Gap, instead of on the Venetian Plain; Greece might be defended in the upper Vardar Valley instead of at Salonika. Yugoslavia was hence the missing link in the southeastern flank of West European defense.

2. *International Political Benefits.* A truly independent Yugoslavia also meant a political subtraction from the sphere of Soviet hegemony, achieved not by Western action but by the resolve of the government of the country in question. An independent Yugoslavia, it was also assumed, would pursue less militant policies toward its neighbors than would a Stalinist-dominated Yugoslavia.

3. *Disruptive Effects on the Communist World.* "National Communism," defending the principle of the sovereignty of socialist states and equality in relations among Communist Parties, would encourage anti-Stalinist Communists elsewhere in the Communist world and thus weaken Soviet hegemony.

* (U) The primary source for this analysis is *ibid.*, pp. 18-22. See also Steven C. Markovitch, "The Influence of American Foreign Aid on Yugoslav Policies, 1948-1966," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1968, pp. 1-9; Harry Michael Chase, Jr., "American-Yugoslav Relations 1945-1956; A Study in the Motivations of U.S. Foreign Policy," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1957; Milorad Drachkovitch; *United States Aid to Yugoslavia and Poland: Analysis of a Controversy*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1963.

UNCLASSIFIED

-115-

(U) A fourth consideration of U.S. policy, although not fundamental, was the hope that, while Tito could not be pressured from outside into making specific internal reforms,^{*} increased political, economic, and cultural relations with the West would inevitably encourage domestic political liberalization as well.

(U) These arguments were not, of course, convincing to all segments of American opinion; the Congressional vote on the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Act of 1950 indicated that significant opposition existed to the Truman Administration's policy. During this period, however, opponents of U.S. policy generally ignored, rather than confronted, the Administration's primary rationales for supporting Tito. As articulated in Congress, the opposition was concerned, instead, with the principle of "give-away programs" per se and with moral reservations concerning U.S. support of any kind to a Communist "tyrant." Some members of Congress could support the Administration's policy without accepting the legitimacy of national Communism; as one put it, the United States should "keep the Communist backfire burning in Yugoslavia."[†] Others could not accept this reasoning, insisting that, as a Communist, Tito remained part of the world Communist conspiracy and emphasizing that he ruled over a repressive dictatorship, as manifested by the absence of political, religious, ethnic, and personal freedoms in Yugoslavia.

SUPPORT FOR COMMUNIST NONALIGNMENT

(U) After Stalin's death, the USSR slowly adopted a less hostile attitude toward Yugoslavia. In 1955, overcoming internal opposition headed by Molotov, Khrushchev embarked on a course of normalizing bilateral relations. In a Canossa-like trip to Belgrade that year, the Soviet leader apologized in part for the past and acknowledged Yugoslavia's right to pursue its "own road" to socialism. Many of the Yugoslav leadership's remaining reservations about Soviet policy were

^{*}(U) This constraint did not spare the USG from periodic Yugoslav complaints--some quite heated--that this was precisely an American purpose.

[†](U) John Connally, quoted in Chase, op. cit., p. 137.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-116-

overcome by Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress and its endorsement of a plurality of socialist forms and "peaceful coexistence." Tito and his colleagues now concluded that their refusal to buckle under to Stalin had been vindicated, that the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia's independence had been removed, and that Khrushchev had resolved to reconstruct inter-Communist relations on the basis of equality and to carry through far-reaching liberalizing reforms in the USSR itself. With Tito's triumphant visit to Moscow in mid-1956 and the signing of the Moscow Declaration, the Yugoslavs concluded that the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute had ended--on their terms.

(U) In the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia learned to its sorrow that this assessment had been much too optimistic; Khrushchev was not a Soviet Tito, and the Khrushchevian and Titoist concepts of a Communist grouping of nations remained basically incompatible. The warmth of Soviet-Yugoslav relations subsequently fluctuated, depending in large measure on the degree of stability in Soviet Eastern Europe and the state of Sino-Soviet relations at any given time. But, although Soviet-Yugoslav relations were again strained during several years after 1956, Yugoslavia did not believe until 1968 that Moscow was seriously threatening its national independence as had been the case prior to 1955. Consequently, even in the periods when Soviet-Yugoslav relations again became most strained--in early 1957, in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution, and in 1958-1961, the initial years of the Sino-Soviet conflict--Yugoslavia's outlook on Soviet foreign and domestic policies manifested little of the harmony with U.S. positions of the period between 1950 and 1955.

(U) Between 1962 and 1968, as the Sino-Soviet conflict worsened, another Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement occurred. While not calling into question its national independence, Yugoslavia resumed military purchases from the Soviet Union and increasingly took positions on international developments that approached the Soviet stand.

(U) Khrushchev's policy of normalizing relations with Yugoslavia was hence responsible for a shift in Yugoslavia's international posture from one of anti-Sovietism to nonalignment; the Soviet leader could take credit for the disruption of the U.S.-Yugoslav informal anti-Soviet

UNCLASSIFIED

-117-

alliance of the early 1950s. After May 1955, Yugoslavia made it quite clear that, having begun to normalize relations with the USSR, it envisaged placing its relations with the United States on a new basis. Washington slowly adapted existing policies to this changed situation. It undertook several policy reviews in 1955-1957--during each of which it suspended deliveries of aid--which concluded that existing policy should be continued. As Ambassador Riddleberger put it, after the first policy review, "Nothing is really changed in the relationship of Yugoslavia with the West." But much had in fact changed following Stalin's death, and *volens volens*, U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia was soon substantially modified. Feeling that the Soviet military threat had ended, and irritated by suspension of delivery of American aircraft in early 1957 during a policy review in Washington, in the fall of that year Tito requested the termination of the U.S. Military Assistance Program. (Yugoslavia did continue to buy spare parts and other military equipment, such as obsolete jet fighters, on a cash basis.) Earlier, the Yugoslav Government had indicated that it regarded the Balkan Pact as a dead letter--although it never took the next step of formally abrogating its membership. At the same time, Belgrade still wished to benefit from American economic assistance--particularly to cover its chronic balance of payments deficit. The United States responded positively, extending roughly an additional \$630 million worth of aid (mostly surplus food) to Yugoslavia between 1955 and 1960.

(U) Yugoslavia's economic progress, its renunciation of defense assistance, and the world-wide U.S. reappraisal of foreign aid programs were the factors responsible for the termination by the end of 1960 of U.S. economic assistance to Yugoslavia (except for surplus agricultural products). American domestic factors then swung the pendulum of U.S. policy ever further away from the massive aid program of the early 1950s. Mounting anti-Communist sentiment in the Congress, combined with general disillusionment in the utility of foreign aid, the influence of Yugoslav emigre groups, and demonstrative pro-Soviet gestures on Tito's part (notably, his failure at the Belgrade nonaligned conference of 1961 to denounce the USSR for resuming atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons), led the Congress to overrule the Administration and enact legislation

-118-

that actively discriminated against Yugoslavia in the economic sphere. The President was denied discretionary power to supply even surplus foodstuffs to Yugoslavia (deliveries were forbidden to any "Communist or Marxist government"), and for a year (1962) Congress sought to deny Yugoslavia most favored nation status in trade relations with the United States.* The Food for Peace Act of 1966 went a step further and (in view of token Yugoslav aid to North Vietnam) precluded dollar credits to Yugoslavia for purchases of surplus foods.

(U) These developments meant that bilateral Yugoslav-United States relations in the early and mid-1960s were more correct than warm. In 1963 President Kennedy received Tito in the White House--but it was hardly the triumphant public visit Tito had become accustomed to in numerous world capitals. Political disagreements notwithstanding, a high level of cultural and educational exchange nevertheless continued between the two countries through the decade. After 1965, as it initiated a new stage of domestic economic reform, Yugoslavia further re-orientated its economy away from the Soviet bloc and toward Western Europe.

(U) As it became apparent after 1955 that Soviet-Yugoslav relations had changed significantly, it was concluded in Washington that an independent Yugoslavia occupying a middle position between the USSR and the United States, while less desirable than the previous anti-Soviet relationship, was still in the U.S. interest and was thus still deserving of U.S. support. For John Foster Dulles, Communism and neutralism might be separately immoral, but a neutral Communist state was to be preferred over a pro-Soviet one; Dulles made this explicit during a brief visit to Yugoslavia in late 1955.

(U) The primary rationales of U.S. policy of the early 1950s were believed to justify--albeit with some modifications--the policy of the latter 1950s.[†] In strategic terms, although there was now little chance that the Yugoslav army would act in defense of NATO, it could still be

* Military sales to Yugoslavia were interrupted between 1962 and 1964.

[†](U) See the sources cited on p. 114.

UNCLASSIFIED

-119-

counted on not to join a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe and to defend Yugoslavia itself in the event of attack from the East. Politically, the continued separation of Yugoslavia from the Soviet empire was felt to be of advantage to the West. Yugoslavia was still believed to exert a liberalizing influence elsewhere in Eastern Europe; the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary were cited as a demonstration of this effect. Domestically, Yugoslavia was felt to be progressing along a course which, with ups and downs, continued to be a fundamentally liberalizing and reformist one and thus, in the long run, promised to increase the country's self-identification with the West and not with the East.

(U) Additional rationales for U.S. support of Communist nonalignment were also articulated. First, given Yugoslavia's increased influence in the Third World after the mid-1950s, it was felt that from the U.S. point of view Yugoslavia played a basically positive role in the region. If Belgrade stood for the spread of "socialism," its ideological interpretation of the concept and the consequences of its political influence in fact worked against the spread of Soviet (later, also Chinese) influence in the Third World. Second, U.S. support for Yugoslavia was held to have a value for its demonstration effect alone, showing autonomy-minded elements in the Communist world that the United States would extend at least limited support to them were they to exert themselves vis à vis the USSR. Third, policy toward Yugoslavia at times became entwined with the larger issue of Presidential power in foreign affairs; in the battles with Congress over aid legislation and commercial relations with Yugoslavia in the early 1960s, the Administration often devoted more energy to defending the President's discretionary powers than to the merits of specific policies toward Yugoslavia.* Throughout the period, when the Administration defended the substance of policy, its self-confidence seemed to be in direct relationship to atmospheric oscillations in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

(U) The above arguments put forth to justify U.S. support for a nonaligned Communist state were now countered by opponents of such

* (U) For example, the letter from Mc George Bundy to Senator Mansfield urging rejection of the ban on aid to Yugoslavia, *The New York Times*, June 7, 1962.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-120-

support, instead of being simply ignored as previously. While the strategic issue was usually still sidestepped, critics maintained that Yugoslavia was slipping back toward the USSR, thus reducing its separation from the Soviet bloc, limiting its disruptive impact on Eastern Europe, and calling into question its very independence. The critics stressed cases in which Yugoslavia supported Soviet positions in the U.N., downplaying instances (such as the Troika reorganization proposal) in which Belgrade opposed Moscow. Critics of U.S. policy interpreted the economic slowdown and the proclamation of firmer control by the Party in the early 1960s as signifying that, domestically too, Yugoslavia was converging with the Soviet Union rather than with the West.

(U) Moral objections against aid of any kind to a Communist dictatorship were still voiced; Senator Dodd claimed that U.S. assistance had in fact contributed to a regressive development in Yugoslavia in the early 1960s, since it had allowed the regime to reverse limited concessions to popular feelings it had formerly been compelled to grant.* The critics judged Yugoslavia's role vis à vis United States interests in the Third World to be fundamentally negative. In this view, Yugoslavia was even diverting a part of the economic assistance it received from the West "to undermine Western power and influence" in the Third World.† On occasion, too, members of Congress also criticized U.S. support for Yugoslavia less on the merits of the case than in terms of excessive discretionary authority of the President in foreign affairs.

TWENTY YEARS ON

(U) An evaluation of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia between 1948 and 1968 must encompass an appraisal of both the soundness of the aims of the policy and the appropriateness of the instruments employed in their pursuit.

(U) Prior to 1955, there can be no question of the reality of the direct Soviet threat to Yugoslavia and the success of Tito's

* (U) Quoted in Markovitch, op. cit., p. 8.

† (U) Milorad M. Drachkovitch, "The Emerging Pattern of Yugoslav-Soviet Relations," *Orbis*, Winter 1962, p. 451.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-121-

efforts to maintain Yugoslavia's independence. In considering the arguments adduced at the time in favor of U.S. support for the Tito regime, the strategic benefits were considerable--particularly when the felt military threat to all of Western Europe following the outbreak of the Korean War and the miniscule West European defense capabilities in 1950 are kept in mind. The subtraction of Yugoslavia's divisions from the Soviet military potential and their preparedness to defend Yugoslavia were unqualified gains from the U.S. point of view. It may be questioned, however, how well Yugoslavia would have served as the "missing link" in the defense of Italy and Greece in the sense intended at the time by NATO military planners. (This issue will be amplified later.) The political subtraction of Yugoslavia from the Soviet orbit was also an unqualified gain for the West, although the benefits in terms of less militant foreign policies toward Yugoslavia's neighbors were not quite as great as assumed at the time.* The disruptive potential in the Soviet bloc of a "national Communist" Yugoslavia was overestimated in the short run; while Yugoslavia did serve as a convenient stalking horse for Stalin's endeavor to purge the East European Communist Parties, the "anti-Titoist" trials notwithstanding, the number of genuine Titoists (such as Wolfgang Leonhard) was very few. On the other hand, it does seem justified to have assumed that, while U.S. aid could not induce specific changes in the internal Yugoslav system, it could initiate a process of closer association of Yugoslavia with the West, which would over time ameliorate the repressive character of the political system.†

(U) In appraising the post-1955 period, it bears repeating that, although Yugoslavia shifted its foreign political orientation from

* (U) Mistakenly viewing Yugoslav foreign policy prior to 1949 as an emanation of Soviet policy, most observers of the day failed to realize that Tito's pre-1949 foreign policy was more expansionist and revolutionary than Stalin's.

† (U) Instantaneous "liberalization" would have been counterproductive for the United States. While it is generally recognized that Tito's monolithic control of the CPY in 1948 was a precondition for successful resistance of Stalin, such control was probably equally a prerequisite of Yugoslavia's major foreign policy realignment between 1948 and 1951. As it happened, one anti-Stalinist CPY Politburo member (Blagoje Nesković) was ousted for opposing the reconciliation with the West.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-122-

anti-Sovietism to nonalignment, at no time was the preservation of its national independence called into question. At the height of the rapprochement with the USSR in the mid-1960s, when Yugoslav nonalignment appeared to take on a pro-Soviet coloration, the Yugoslav Communists maintained their organizational independence and distinctive ideological outlook on foreign and domestic affairs. At worst, from the U.S. perspective, one may speak of a near identity of Soviet and Yugoslav policies on certain international questions during these years. Developments since 1968 have demonstrated, further, that this limited Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement rested on stability in Soviet Eastern Europe and the hostility of a common Communist enemy in Peking--factors unlikely to recur for any extended period.

(U) In the post-1955 period, too, the benefits felt to accrue to the United States from a nonaligned Communist Yugoslavia would appear on balance to have been appraised realistically. It remained a strategic plus for the United States that the Yugoslav army remained outside the Warsaw Pact and was prepared to defend Yugoslavia against attack (although it must be noted that in 1967 and early 1968, especially, the army was apparently not very well prepared to do so). Yugoslavia's continued freedom from the discipline of the Soviet bloc also remained a plus--one qualified somewhat by the closeness of Yugoslav and Soviet positions on topical international issues. The Yugoslav presence in the Third World conflicted with, more than it reinforced, Soviet (or Chinese) goals in the area.* In the post-Stalin era, Yugoslavia's disruptive impact on Soviet Eastern Europe was enhanced, as evidenced at least indirectly in Poland and Hungary in 1956, in Romania in the early 1960s, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. On the other hand, the "demonstration" value elsewhere in the Communist world of U.S. support for Yugoslavia would appear to have been exaggerated (it played no apparent role, for example, in Romania's successful effort in the early 1960s to free itself from some forms of Soviet hegemony).

(U) Throughout this period, too, Yugoslavia's expanded ties with the West continued to exert a liberalizing influence on the domestic

* (U) See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1970.

UNCLASSIFIED

-123-

political system, ups and downs (such as that of 1962-1963) notwithstanding. The latest stage of economic reform, initiated in 1965, and accompanying political reforms that followed the ouster of Aleksandar Ranković in 1966 would be inconceivable outside the context of closer economic, technical, informational, and cultural ties with Western Europe and the United States in the early 1960s--just the period when Yugoslavia's nonalignment was modified somewhat to emphasize better political and military relations with the USSR. The Yugoslav case supports the "ooze theory" of convergence.

(U) From today's perspective, then, on balance the reasons adduced by the proponents and defenders of U.S. support for Yugoslavia after 1948 were sensible ones, the intended consequences of which have been largely borne out by the course of subsequent events. Several reservations concerning specific rationales utilized to justify U.S. policy have been noted; most serious, perhaps, was the lag in adapting the pre-1955 outlook to the post-1955 reality of the Soviet-Yugoslav-American triangular relationship. The objections of the critics of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia after 1948 have not passed the test of time. The conclusion of this analysis is therefore quite non-"revisionist": a sound policy was pursued for essentially sound reasons.

(U) Finally, the instruments of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia will be reassessed. The economic assistance program--begun on a pragmatic basis to "keep Tito afloat"--was clearly essential to Yugoslavia's economic health in the early 1950s.* The aid program served U.S. interests since it reinforced a determined Yugoslav effort to create economic

* (U) The most convincing evidence for this judgment is a Yugoslav study which concludes that, while Yugoslavia's annual rate of economic growth between 1951-1960 averaged 7.5 percent, without U.S. assistance it would have been 4.5 to 6.5 percent (and the economy would have foundered in 1951-1952). (Slobodan Branković ["Impact of Foreign Aid on the Postwar Development of Yugoslavia"], Unpublished study, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 1961, as cited and interpreted in Markovitch, op. cit., pp. 157-158.) But no attempt can be made here to analyze the utility of the overall amount or specific forms of the aid program. Doubtless a certain percentage was "wasted." In the initial years of the program, the Yugoslav government inflated its requests (and distorted its official statistics) in an attempt to continue its grandiose industrialization program while importing food-stuffs. (Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče; memoari*, Vol. II, Belgrade, 1971.)

-124-

prerequisites of national independence from the USSR. At the same time, economic assistance served as a bridgehead for the establishment of a broad Western presence in Yugoslavia in the early 1950s.

(U) In the post-1955 period, on the other hand, U.S. aid had a much more marginal economic and political impact. It continued to serve as a linkage which helped to keep Yugoslavia looking to the West. Perhaps it limited the risk that the country might fall into an excessively pro-Soviet international orientation. On the other hand, Yugoslavia's participation in international financial and economic organizations and its commercial relations with Western Europe probably had more of an impact than direct U.S. economic assistance in reinforcing the primarily domestic determinants of "socialist marketization" and Westward reorientation of the Yugoslav economy in the 1960s. Moreover, while the economic cost of the assistance program in its later phase was reduced, this lower cost must be weighed against the "domestic backlash" in the United States (one indication that the case for support of Communist nonalignment had not been made very effectively in the country at large). On balance, some of the aid programs were probably continued after their political utility to the United States had ceased. Over the period as a whole, while economic assistance was not an effective instrument with which to induce short-term policy changes, it did serve to reinforce desired economic and political evolution.

The second major instrumentality of U.S. policy was the Military Assistance Program. It strengthened considerably the Yugoslav armed forces in the post-Korean years. But U.S. assistance was primarily devoted to modernizing units in northern Yugoslavia assigned to defense of the Ljubljana Gap. It may be asked whether the intended mission of direct Yugoslav participation in the defense of Italy and Greece was not misconstrued; U.S. interests might have been better served even in the early 1950s by a program emphasizing reinforcement of Yugoslavia's capability to defend itself by protracted, partisan-type resistance in the mountains. Also, had the USG been able to be more responsive to Yugoslav sensitivities in the military sphere, it might have mitigated the country's reorientation toward the Warsaw Pact for arms supplies between 1958 and 1968.

UNCLASSIFIED

-125-

(U) Finally, for the reasons enumerated previously, technical, cultural, and other informational exchange programs with Yugoslavia proved to be quite effective in the promotion of long-term U.S. interests in Yugoslavia.

UNCLASSIFIED

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

- Antic, Zdenko, "1971--Ein dramatisches Jahr in der jugoslawischen Politik," *Osteuropäisches Rundschau*, No. 3, Munich, March 1972, pp. 6-11.
- Bombelles, J. T., *Economic Development of Communist Yugoslavia*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1968.
- Brzezinski, Z. K., *The Soviet Bloc; Unity and Conflict*, rev. ed., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967.
- Campbell, J. C., *Tito's Separate Road*, Harper & Row, New York, 1967.
- Chase, H. M., Jr., "American-Yugoslav Relations, 1945-1956; A Study in the Motivations of U.S. Foreign Policy," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, 1957.
- Crawford, J. T., "Yugoslavia's New Economic Strategy: A Progress Report," in Congress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1970, pp. 608-633.
- Cviic, Chris, "Another Way; A Survey of Yugoslavia," *The Economist*, London, August 21, 1971.
- Dedijer, Vladimir, *Tito*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1953.
- Deveti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, Belgrade, 1969.
- Djordjević, Jovan, *Federalizam, nacija, socijalizam*, Belgrade, 1971.
- Fisher, J. C., *Yugoslavia--A Multinational State*, Chandler, San Francisco, 1966.
- Fisk, W. M., "The Constitutionalism Movement in Yugoslavia; A Preliminary Survey," *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXX, No. 2, Seattle, June 1971, pp. 277-297.
- Hamilton, F. E. Ian, *Yugoslavia; Patterns of Economic Activity*, G. Bell, London, 1968.
- Hartl, Hans, *Nationalismus in Rot*, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart, 1968.
- Hoffman, G. W., and F. W. Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962.

UNCLASSIFIED

-129-

- Hondius, F. W., *The Yugoslav Community of Nations*, Mouton, The Hague, 1968.
- Klasno i nacionalno u savremenom socijalizmu*, 2 Vols., Zagreb, 1970.
- Klein, George, "Yugoslavia--The Process of Decentralization," in P. A. Toma (ed.), *The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1970, pp. 217-241.
- Lendvai, Paul, *Eagles in Cobwebs*, Doubleday, Garden City, New Jersey, 1969.
- Markovitch, S. C., "The Influence of American Foreign Aid on Yugoslav Policies, 1948-1966," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1968.
- Mates, Leo, "Dyason Memorial Lectures. 1. East-West Relations in Europe: A Yugoslav Perspective. 2. The Impact on World Politics of the Newly Independent States," *Australian Outlook*, East Melbourne, Vol. 24, No. 3, December 1970, pp. 227-249.
- Meier, V. E., *Neuer Nationalismus in Südosteuropa*, Leske Verlag, Opladen, 1968.
- Milenkovitch, D. D., *Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1971.
- Palmer, S. E., Jr., and R. R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question*, Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut, 1971.
- Reissmüller, J. G., "Jugoslawien in Bewegung," *Europa Archiv*, No. 19, Bonn, October 19, 1971, pp. 684-692.
- Reorganizacija federacije i razvoj političkog sistema*, Zagreb, 1970.
- Rubinstein, A. Z., *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970.
- Shoup, Paul, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1968.
- Shoup, Paul, "The Impact of the National Question on the Political Systems of Eastern Europe," Unpublished paper, 1971.
- Shoup, Paul, "The National Question in Yugoslavia," *Problems of Communism*, Washington, January-February 1972, pp. 18-29.
- Verfürth, Heinz, "Jugoslawiens Absicherung in Europa," *Aussenpolitik*, Stuttgart, February 1971, pp. 92-104.
- Vucinich, W. S. (ed.), *Contemporary Yugoslavia*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1969.
- Vukadinović, Radovan, *Odnosi medju evropskim socijalističkim državama*, Zagreb, 1970.
- Zaninovich, M. G., *The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1968.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-130-

JOURNALS AND NEWSPAPERS

Borba (Belgrade, daily).

Fieldstaff Reports (American Universities Field Staff, Hanover, New Hampshire). (Occasional papers by Dennison I. Rusinow.)

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt, daily). (Dispatches by Andreas Razumovsky.)

Gledišta (Belgrade, monthly).

Jugoslovenski pregled (Belgrade, monthly).

Komunist (Belgrade, weekly).

Le Monde (Paris, daily). (Dispatches by Paul Yankovitch.)

Narodna armija (Belgrade, weekly).

Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zürich, daily).

Politika (Belgrade, daily).

Praxis (Zagreb, bimonthly).

Pregled (Sarajevo, monthly).

Radio Free Europe Research (Munich). (Occasional papers by Zdenko Antic, Slobodan Stankovic, and Louis Zanga.)

Review of International Affairs (Belgrade, bimonthly).

Socialist Thought and Practice (Belgrade, quarterly).

Socijalizam (Belgrade, monthly).

The New York Times (New York, daily).

Vjesnik and *Vjesnik u Srijedu* (Zagreb, daily).

Vojno delo (Belgrade, bimonthly).

Washington Post (Washington, D.C., daily). (Dispatches by Dan Morgan.)

UNCLASSIFIED