

# December 4, 1989 National Intelligence Daily for Monday, 4 December 1989

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# Summary:

The CIA's National Intelligence Daily for Monday, 4 December 1989 describes the latest developments in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, USSR, Bulgaria and Romania.


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
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
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#### EAST GERMANY:

#### Party Leadership Resigns

Yesterday's resignation of the entire Communist party leadership makes reformist Premier Modrow the country's de facto ruler and increases prospects for free democratic elections in the coming months.

Reacting to increasingly strident dissatisfaction from the Communist party's grassroots, the Politburo and Central Committee resigned yesterday. An interim 25-member working group dominated by reform proponents was selected to handle party affairs and preparations for the extraordinary congress on 15-17 December.

The outgoing Central Committee voted to expel former party boss Honecker and 11 other members from the party. Two former Politburo members—economic czar Mittag and trade union chief Tisch—as well as a district party chief were arrested on charges of abuse of public property. A leading foreign trade official who handled trade talks with West Germany and arms shipments to the Third World was also sacked from his party and government posts.

**Comment:** The latest developments almost certainly will accelerate East Germany's move toward democracy, further discredit its 40-year experiment with Communism, and spur public demands for democratic elections in the next few months. The party's decay seems irreversible; it probably will dissolve itself and adopt a new name and program at its congress in a vain effort to improve its dismal electoral prospects.

Modrow's power as head of government has been enhanced at least temporarily; with Krenz and the entire party leadership eliminated, he has no obvious rival as the country's ruler. To distance himself and his government further from the discredited party and to capitalize on his personal popularity, Modrow probably will increase his efforts to identify himself with reformist demands. He is likely to back legalizing opposition groups as political parties, early national elections, and economic measures to improve the consumer's lot in the next few months

The leader of a reconstituted party may well be a relative newcomer. Modrow apparently has already decided to seek his political fortunes in the government. He probably will back his ally Wolfgang Berghofer, the mayor of Dresden and a popular reformer. Other leading candidates include former spy chief Markus Wolf and former Politburo member Schabowski. Wolf, however, may be discredited in the eyes of the rank and file by his intelligence connections. Schabowski's chances probably have diminished in recent weeks because, as party spokesman, he is identified with the discredited Krenz leadership.

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1386 Fop Secret New Czechoslovak Government Premier Ladislav Adamec (Communist Party-CP) **First Deputy Premiers** Marian Calfa (CP) Bohumil Urban (CP) **Deputy Premiers** Josef Hromadka (nonparty) \* Pavel Hrivnak (CP) Frantisck Pitra (CP) Ladislav Vodrazka (CP) Jaromir Zak (CP) Ministers: Agriculture and Food Jaromir Algayer (CP) Antonin Krumnikl (CP) Energy Jan Stejskal (CP) Finance Jaromir Johanes (CP) Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade Andrej Barcak (CP) \* Frantisek Pinc (CP) \* Interior Labor and Social Affairs Alfred Sebek (CP) National Defense Col. Gen. Miroslav Vacek (CP) \* Scientific-Technical Development Frantisck Reichel (People's Party) \* and Environment Transportation and Frantisek Podlena (CP) Telecommunications Without Portfolio Viliam Roth (nonparty) \* Chairman, Federal Price Office Ladislav Dvorak (Socialist Party)\* Chairman, People's Control Kvetoslava Korinkova (nonparty)\* Committee \* Newcomers.

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#### **CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Opposition Rejects New Government**

Premier Adamec may have badly miscalculated in not giving non-Communists positions of real power in a new government; his actions almost certainly will provoke more mass demonstrations and could lead to his ouster.

The new government announced yesterday contains only five non-Communist ministers. It also retains a Communist military officer as Defense Minister and a Communist as Interior Minister in defiance of the Civic Forum's demands. The Civic Forum had pressed Adamec to name a civilian to oversee the Army and a non-Communist to control the security services. In rejecting the new government as an "outrage," the Civic Forum is calling for a mass demonstration in Prague today.

Adamec received the endorsement of the Communist-controlled National Front for the new government. Meanwhile, hardline Communists staged a rally against the Civic Forum in Ostrava last week and demanded that the regime suspend negotiations with the opposition. The Civic Forum has issued warnings to its regional organizations to beware of Communist attempts to disrupt their activities by infiltrating their groups with party members.

Comment: Adamec, who almost certainly knew the new government would be unacceptable to the Civic Forum, may be counting on the National Front's support to defy the threat posed by the Civic Forum to remove him from power if he does not accept its demands. It is doubtful whether the compromised leadership of the National Front can guarantee him the support of rank-and-file members of the various groups included in the Front. It is equally doubtful that local party leaders can muster any serious public opposition to the Civic Forum.

A government crisis is likely; the Civic Forum almost certainly will not back down from its challenge and probably will use the rally today to issue a call for the government's resignation. The opposition may press this time for a premier of its own choice—possibly highly respected economist Valtr Komarek, a rising political star.

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#### USSR:

#### **Caucasus Situation Worsens**

Both Azeris and Armenians, led by their nationalist front organizations, are challenging Moscow's authority and placing themselves on a collision course toward higher levels of economic and intercommunal violence.

In yet another direct challenge to Moscow, the head of the Azeri Supreme Soviet said over the weekend that the USSR Supreme Soviet's decision on Nagorno-Karabakh, which includes a Moscow oversight committee, infringes on the republic's sovereignty and would be suspended by the Azeri legislature, according to Western press reports. Following that statement, Azeri Front leaders claimed they would halt the strike and resulting blockade for a week in order to allow the legislature to follow through. Azeri Communist Party officials continue their unsuccessful campaign to convince the populace that the central government's decision is just, but some 500,000 Azeris protested Moscow's decision over the weekend.

Press reports claim that soldiers—probably Ministry of Internal Affairs troops who are in the area—are being readied to move into Baku and restore order there after Armenians and Georgians reportedly attacked Azeris. Meanwhile, the Armenian press is painting President Gorbachev as a key villain in this matter, and Armenian nationalists have told foreign journalists that many of their deputies will boycott the USSR Congress of People's Deputies when it reconvenes on 12 December.

**Comment:** If the Azeri Supreme Soviet suspends the central government's decision, Moscow will have two constitutional challenges to fight in the Caucasus—Armenia's earlier vote to unify with Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri nullification. The Supreme Soviet will almost certainly reject both positions, and Moscow may be obliged to send in more troops to impose order. Even an enhanced troop presence is unlikely to be able to force striking laborers to work or those legislators boycotting Moscow's ruling to submit to it.

The contradictory Armenian and Azeri stances clearly position the two republics to negotiate a compromise—the outcome Moscow hopes for, probably in vain—or to escalate their differences. Given the level of tension and the numbers of weapons reportedly in the region, a sharp escalation of intercommunal clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh, along the Armenian border, and in Baku and Yerevan is likely.

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USSR:

#### Communist Party's Leading Role To Be Challenged

General Secretary Gorbachev probably will take steps to protect the Communist Party's monopoly on power in the debate on the issue in the Congress of People's Deputies session opening next week, but he may already realize that the party will be unable to stave off pressures for independent parties for long.

Gorbachev said in *Pravda* on 26 November that it is "expedient" for the party to maintain its monopoly rule to carry out the difficult work of restructuring the country's economy and political life. He noted. however, that the party risks losing its "vanguard role" if it does not reform itself soon.

The Interregional Deputies group, whose leaders include Andrey Sakharov and the controversial Boris Yel'tsin, has announced that at the Congress of People's Deputies opening on 12 December it plans to seek debate on that portion of the Constitution, Article 6, used to justify the party's dominant role. A prominent Leningrad deputy said recently that he is confident a majority of the Congress would support the repeal of Article 6. Sakharov and others hope a brief general strike can be staged a week from today to buttress the campaign against Article 6 and put Gorbachev on the spot.

**Comment:** Gorbachev holds that preserving the party's monopoly rule is critical to his control of the pace of the reform process and to his control of regional leaders increasingly disturbed by the party's loss of authority. He is likely to take steps to stave off any immediate challenge to the party's dominance. Gorbachev probably will first try to postpone debate on Article 6 but, if the Congress forces the issue, will try to broker compromise language that protects the party's real power. he recognizes his

reforms are making the party's defense of its monopoly rule increasingly untenable.

If the Congress repeals Article 6, paving the way for the development of opposition parties, Gorbachev almost certainly will try to cast this step in a positive light to minimize the damage to party authority. He could characterize Article 6—included in the Constitution only in 1977—as a product of the discredited Brezhnev era and parade the party's acceptance of its repeal as evidence of its commitment to democracy.

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## USSR: Miners' Strike at Vorkuta Settled

Moscow skillfully used political pressure and the new strike law to bring the miners' strike in Arctic Russia to a close. Miners at the final mine on strike—the largest in the region and the first to walk out more than a month ago—returned to work on Saturday after laborers in the other mining regions refused to engage in sympathy strikes. Other Arctic mines resumed operations more than a week ago, after receiving assurances from Premier Ryzhkov that the government is moving ahead with meeting the terms of last summer's strike settlement.

**Comment:** Moscow isolated the Arctic miners by portraying them as extremists recklessly jeopardizing the region's winter energy resources and pushing political demands that even other miners would find questionable. The regime also may have warned the final miners on strike that its offer of clemency from fines and prosecution would soon end. Vorkuta's capitulation advances the regime's strategy of exploiting the provincialism that has arisen in the four major mining regions to avoid creating an independent national miners' union. A new government commission for monitoring implementation of last summer's strike settlement will thus operate largely on a regional basis.

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# 1-1-1-1 Top Secret **BULGARIA: Resurgence of Opposition Party** The old-line leaders of Bulgaria's Agrarian Party, long subservient to the Communist Party, resigned at a party meeting Saturday, clearing the way for the resurgence of a genuine opposition to the ruling Communists. Speakers at the Saturday session demanded that the party act as an opponent equal to the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the new leader, Angel Dimitrov, is himself a longtime member of the Agrarian leadership. Comment: The Agrarian Party-which ruled Bulgaria in the 1920s-

**Comment:** The Agrarian Party—which ruled Bulgaria in the 1920s poses a potentially serious challenge to the Communist Party's power. The extent of the challenge may depend on the ability of the new leaders to remain in power. Many members probably will perceive the leadership changes as cosmetic and could agitate for younger, more militant leaders undaunted by links to the Zhivkov regime. Even Dimitrov and his allies, however, probably will press recently installed General Secretary Mladenov to address the issues of pluralism and free elections sooner than he had planned. Mladenov for his part almost certainly will seek to avoid actual power sharing, probably citing the Agrarian Party's resurgence as evidence of his support for pluralism.

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## **ROMANIA-USSR: Rift Growing**


President Ceausescu, increasingly concerned about the popularity of Gorbachev-style reforms in Romania, has intensified his polemics against Moscow

At the recent party congress, Ceausescu implicitly called for the return of Romanian territories Moscow annexed as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact concluded in 1939. And he has told the Soviets he will not attend their Malta summit debriefing in Moscow today unless he is granted a bilateral meeting with Gorbachev

Comment: Ceausescu clearly is feeling more vulnerable to Soviet pressure now that Eastern Europe's other Stalinist regimes are crumbling; his broadsides are intended to assert his independence and to embarrass Moscow. He would use a meeting with Gorbachev to reiterate his commitment to orthodoxy and to insist on new Soviet guarantees of noninterference in Romanian affairs. Ceausescu might threaten to counter any perceived Soviet move against him by hitting back on such controversial issues as the postwar borders.

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