

## **July 17, 1951**

### **Telegram, I. Stalin to Cde. Malenkov**

#### **Citation:**

"Telegram, I. Stalin to Cde. Malenkov", July 17, 1951, Wilson Center Digital Archive, RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 762, ll. 0043-0046. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg.  
<https://wilson-center.drivingcreative.com/document/209735>

#### **Summary:**

Stalin gives directions on how to react to the Egyptian atomic weapons ban. The Soviets are to support the Egyptian proposal and make all necessary concessions to get it passed in the UN. Vyshinsky should be informed of this position and made to understand how it encompasses a production ban.

#### **Credits:**

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)

#### **Original Language:**

Russian

#### **Contents:**

Translation - English

to Cde. MALENKOV

[Translator's note: another version of this message is entitled: "Additional instructions to Cde. Vyshinsky", but retaining "to Cde. Malenkov" above the title]

Nothing is said in your directive concerning the draft resolution of the Egyptians about the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and other forms of weapons of mass destruction. I think that this proposal is the most advisable in current UN conditions. If we manage to get only one proposal about an unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and other forms of weapons of mass destruction through at this UN session then this would be our most important victory at this UN session. [We] can make concessions on all other proposals, namely a reduction of armaments, etc., this is not important. The most important thing now is to achieve an absolute prohibition of atomic weapons in the resolution. That is why it is necessary to jump at this Egyptian resolution, to talk with the Egyptians, to encourage them, and to tell them that if their resolution about an unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons is adopted and the resolution sent to a commission then we can compromise on all the remaining questions. I suggest this thought be included in the directive to Vyshinsky and to explain its importance to him.

In the Egyptian resolution it talked about an unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons. We ourselves are demanding not only a prohibition on the use of atomic weapons but on their production, too. But this disagreement ought not perplex Vyshinsky since in the commission we will interpret this proposal, the Egyptian one, as an actual prohibition on the production of atomic weapons, since it goes without saying that it is clear that if atomic weapons are prohibited then there is no sense in producing them. Explain this in your directive to Vyshinsky.

I. STALIN

17 December 1951

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