

**November 10, 1986**

**Cable No. 3026, Foreign Minister to Ambassador Nakae, 'The Prime Minister's Visit to China (The Meeting with Chairman Deng - on World Affairs)'**

**Citation:**

"Cable No. 3026, Foreign Minister to Ambassador Nakae, 'The Prime Minister's Visit to China (The Meeting with Chairman Deng - on World Affairs)'" , November 10, 1986, Wilson Center Digital Archive, 2017-0638, Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs, published online by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 12, 2017. Transcribed and translated by Yamaguchi Shinji.  
<https://wilson-center.drivingcreative.com/document/220105>

**Summary:**

The Japanese Prime Minister and Chairman Deng discuss U.S.-Soviet relations, specifically the recent U.S.-Soviet Summit.

**Original Language:**

Japanese

**Contents:**

Original Scan  
Transcript - Japanese  
Translation - English

(7)

※総第 [redacted] 号007公館宛

※昭和 61年 11月 10日 10時 44分 秒受付

略 暗

YYYYYY

暗秘

(回覧番号) 電 信 案

260 電信課長  
260 事務次官  
代 官一房一長

大 臣 秘書官 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官一房一長	主管 アシア局長 エ号 中川謙良	※発電係 1/2 起案 昭和61年11月8日 起案者 植田 電話番号
---	---------------------------	---

(※印欄内は電信課記入)

協議先  
北東一長 ソ連謙良  
北東謙良 ア東一長

在 中国 大 伊 総領事 あて 外務大臣 発

件名 総理訪中 (鄧小平主席の会見 - 世界情勢)

主管・文書記号 ア中	※電番 第3026号	大至急 至急 普通 (優先処理)	パターン・コード [redacted]
---------------	---------------	---------------------	------------------------

転電・転送・転報 在 米ソ、外、上海、杭州、香港 大使 総領事あて	※転電番号 合第17026号	大至急 至急 普通 (優先処理)
--------------------------------------	-------------------	---------------------

(八〇字)

宛先 3023号新電3

(昭和六〇・十一・一改正)

※ [redacted] 優先 TYUUGOKU 等007 漢

GB-1

外務省 (注意) 1枚目は、機械で処理しますので、折り曲げない様願います。

9

(110011)

● 総論的、米ソ首脳会談がソ連の外交政策についての見ている本質的側面を対立の文化は決定的な要因ではない。

同会談は、対話には賛成する。対~~立~~<sup>抗</sup>は賛成しない。米ソ首脳会談自体はよいことであり、<sup>現在は</sup>米ソの交渉の場、同会談の意義を低くはみてはいない。彼らから引き続き対話を促すの賛成だ。緊張は緩和される。

ソ連の外交政策については、米~~ソ~~<sup>ソ連</sup>の交渉は二一の面を言っている。ソ連の歩みは大きくない。~~歩み~~。中~~門~~<sup>と</sup>ソ連~~の~~<sup>の</sup>関係は同様に限られている。ソ連の言っている中では中~~門~~<sup>と</sup>の歩みが多い。三大障~~害~~<sup>害</sup>を排除することは原則的に同意しているから、実際には何も出ていない。

アッガニスタンでもせいぜい5%の軍隊を撤

8

(11004)

<sup>32</sup>退<sup>り</sup>は<sup>2</sup>在<sup>り</sup>て、<sup>3</sup>それ<sup>は</sup>防<sup>空</sup>部<sup>隊</sup>也。毛<sup>コ</sup>ソ<sup>ソ</sup>  
 駐<sup>留</sup>軍<sup>の</sup>撤<sup>退</sup>の<sup>つ</sup>ら<sup>い</sup>中<sup>味</sup>は<sup>な</sup>い。~~事~~<sup>た</sup>ら<sup>し</sup>  
~~と~~自<sup>分</sup>は<sup>ソ</sup>連<sup>が</sup>カ<sup>ン</sup>フ<sup>ク</sup>ア<sup>の</sup>障<sup>碍</sup>を<sup>取</sup>り  
 除<sup>く</sup>は<sup>ら</sup>ば、コ<sup>ソ</sup>連<sup>の</sup>合<sup>意</sup>を<sup>得</sup>る<sup>の</sup>は<sup>お</sup>し<sup>や</sup>  
 ら<sup>な</sup>い。<sup>カ</sup>、内<sup>閣</sup>は<sup>最</sup>も<sup>実</sup>地<sup>的</sup>な<sup>問</sup>題<sup>で</sup>あ<sup>る</sup>  
 子。<sup>三</sup>大<sup>障</sup>碍<sup>を</sup>取<sup>り</sup>除<sup>く</sup>こ<sup>の</sup>た<sup>り</sup>は、  
 最<sup>も</sup>中<sup>味</sup>の<sup>な</sup>い<sup>カ</sup>、内<sup>閣</sup>に<sup>あ</sup>り、<sup>ソ</sup>連<sup>の</sup>  
 意<sup>を</sup>知<sup>ら</sup>ず<sup>い</sup>る。<sup>中</sup>ソ<sup>間</sup>の<sup>ホ</sup>ット<sup>ポ</sup>イント<sup>は</sup>  
<sup>カ</sup>、に<sup>あ</sup>り、<sup>ソ</sup>連<sup>の</sup>誠<sup>意</sup>が<sup>あ</sup>る<sup>の</sup>を<sup>知</sup>る<sup>カ</sup>、<sup>と</sup>  
 みる<sup>こ</sup>と<sup>に</sup>な<sup>ら</sup>ず<sup>わ</sup>か<sup>ら</sup>ず。<sup>カ</sup>、<sup>か</sup>解決<sup>す</sup>べ<sup>し</sup>  
<sup>中</sup>ソ<sup>は</sup>正<sup>常</sup>比<sup>で</sup>す。  
 (総<sup>理</sup>相、<sup>それ</sup>は<sup>三</sup>大<sup>障</sup>碍<sup>は</sup>実<sup>は</sup>一<sup>大</sup>  
<sup>障</sup>碍<sup>に</sup>な<sup>ら</sup>ぬ<sup>か</sup>、<sup>と</sup>否<sup>の</sup>問<sup>題</sup>)  
<sup>そ</sup>う<sup>と</sup>の<sup>い</sup>ふ<sup>子</sup>。<sup>カ</sup>、<sup>依</sup>然<sup>と</sup>して<sup>三</sup>大<sup>障</sup>  
<sup>碍</sup>と<sup>い</sup>う<sup>の</sup>は、<sup>中</sup>ソ<sup>間</sup>境<sup>に</sup>、<sup>在</sup>る<sup>軍</sup>が

GB-3

9

(1110011)

撤退（この50数個師団を残し、ソ連の3分の1  
 のミサイルをおおわす。二重の中隊を  
 是處の南心の友の句題であり、東門のつら  
 南心の友の句題である。

（総理別更へ、東軍艦の青島寄港が行な  
 われる。東中軍事提携はど：東：ソ連、北  
 北と：3）

東門は東門遠くまでゆく：北は北、  
 中国も同じだ。中国の外交政策は独立自主で  
 あり、他人の事と自分とを併りつけようとする  
 北は（北）

米、ソ、外、上海、廣州、香港に電報した。

~~177~~

(3)

GB-3



Received at 12:46:44, November 10, 1986

Drafted on November 8, 1986

Primary: Director General of Asian Bureau approved  
[illegible]  
Director of China Division approved

From: Foreign Minister  
To: Ambassador to China

Title: The Prime Minister's Visit to China: Meeting with Chairman Deng: on World Affairs

Cable No. 3026

Secret, Urgent

[...]

The Prime Minister [Nakasone] asked the Chairman what he thought of the U.S.-Soviet Summit and the Soviet Union's foreign policy, and Mr. Deng said:

I'm always in favor of dialogue. I do not agree with the confrontation. The U.S.-Soviet summit is a good thing in itself, and neither side now views the significance of the meeting in a lesser light. I'm in favor of them continuing to engage in dialogue. Relaxation is better than tension.

□

As for Soviet foreign policy, as I said in response to a U.S. television interview, the Soviet Union has not made great strides. As far as the relationship between China and the Soviet Union is concerned, there is much that the Soviet Union says that has no substance. They agree in principle to remove the three major obstacles, but nothing comes out of it in practice. Even in Afghanistan, at best, only five-percent of the troops are being withdrawn, and that's an air defense force. There is also nothing about the withdrawal of troops stationed in Mongolia. So I said that I could go and see Gorbachev if the Soviets would remove the Kampuchea obstacle. The "power" issue is the most substantive issue. If we are to truly remove the three major obstacles, the most contentious one is the "power" problem, and the Soviet Union knows this. The hot point between China and the Soviet Union is "power," and you can tell whether the Soviet Union is sincere or not by looking at "power." Once the "power" is resolved, China and the Soviet Union will be normalized.

(The Prime Minister asked if the three major obstacles had actually become one major obstacle.) That could be said. But I [Deng] still keep saying the three major obstacles. Some 50 divisions remain on the Sino-Soviet border even if the forces in Mongolia are withdrawn, and one-third of the Soviet Union's missiles are located there. This is an issue of common interest to both Japan and China, and it is of interest to the United States as well.

(When the Prime Minister further asked about how far would the military cooperation between US and China go in the light of in the wake of the U.S. warship's port call to Qingdao) The US won't go very far, and neither will China. China's foreign policy is independent and self-reliant, and it doesn't try to stake itself on other people's affairs.

[Cable] relayed to the [Japanese diplomatic missions in] the U.S., Soviet Union, Thailand, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong.