

# August 7, 1970 TelCon between Secretary Rogers and Mr. Kissinger

#### Citation:

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## **Summary:**

A conversation between Rogers and Kissinger, in which they discuss the meeting Kissinger previously had with Israeli Ambassador Rabin, and Kissinger's overall involvement in negotiations with Israel.

## **Original Language:**

**English** 

### **Contents:**

Original Scan

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BY KK NAHA, Date S 13 04

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Telecon Secretary Rogers 8/7/70 12:00

R: I just read the memcon of your meeting with Rabin last night. I think it was a mistake for him to do that.

K: It went immediately to Sisco.

R: But for you to meet. He thinks that way he can get two shots. It's so screwed up at the moment. How did you leave it?

K: That he would be hearing from Sisco. Every time I made a move I checked it with Sisco and reported bact to him afterwards.

R: I think we should do it one way.

K: My understand is that I have followed exactly what Sisco told me. He said he had a personal message for the President from Mrs. Meir.

P: I think we're going to have to be pretty tough with them. The Israeli Ambassador went to Jarring and said that the of their acceptance and then handed them this piece of paper which restates it. They can't possible back away from that, or say 'we accept it but we have rewritten it.' Jarring is prepared to go ahead. I don't know how we can avoid that. I will talk to Rabin and explain it.

K: I am out of it—the only thing Sisco thought helpful was to make it clear to them that there was no split. I hadn't been clued in on all the detalis during the day so I didn't know what he was talking about.

R: Jarring is prepared to go ahead now.

K: The President thought we should have Ziegler just release the message you phoned over and have you do any backgrounding you want.

R: Let's wait and see, because I think it's bettwe to have it done here. It's just easier if we go ahead and give the statement and fill in because Ziegler doesn't understand it very well. And if it falls through then the President isn't involved. If that's what you want to do Okay, but I think it's a mistake. He shouldn't be involved in these operational details.

K: The President understood that you didn't care where it was announced.

R: No, but this may not even hold. We are doing it because we want to make it hold and we are trying to force them. I don't think he should be involved.

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By KKU NARA, Date 5/19/04

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Telecon Secretary Rogers 8/7/70 12:30 p.m.

R: I have had McCloskey go in and he won't refer to this.

K: We can't do anything about it now anyway. What the President wants is to give the announcement here and give the backgrounding to you.

R: What is the announcement? I understand "Godspeed" is in there.

K: We got the lines from you.

R: But if the thing falls through, which it might, and they had the statement from the President he'd have egg on his face. I am willing to take some risks, but I'm not sure the President should.

K: When should it be done?

R: Well, we said 12:00. It's now 12:30. But if you announce it you are going to get a million questions that can't be answered.

K: The UAR hasn't agreed to it yet.

R: We were going to say that there are rules, but we're not releasing them now. We may now have ruined the thing.

K: Not me because you haven't been talking to me.

R: These things are operational and I think I should take the lead. This meeting last night screwed it up so badly . . .

K: Don't be ridiculous.

\* R: I'm not being ridiculous.

K: Your are being absurd. The thing was totally screwed up and everything I did was checked with Sisco. He said Mrs. Meir was about to resign. . .

R: You either have somebody running the operation or you don't.

K: If you have a complaint, talk to the President. I am sick and tired of this. If he has a message for the President he isn't going to give it to you. I was at a dinner last night. I had an urgent call. I ame back to my office. As soon as I came in I called Sisco and Atherton for instructions.

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By KK NAHA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon Secretary Rogers 8/7/70 12:30 p.m. page 2

R: He didn't have a message for the President; he wanted to talk with you. When you have an audience with him they think they have two ways to play it. I don't think it's a good procedure. I am not saying you shouldn't be involved...

K: I don't want to be involved. I said I noted what he said and they would hear their answer from Sisco.

R: Well, you and I don't see alike on these things. They need to have the idea that when we are acting we act persuant to the President. If they have a feeling that there are two channels to the President they will use them differently.

K: I didn't take it to the President. He doesn't even know about it yet.

R: But they think you did. It would be helpful to me if, when all it is is sarrying out orders, you would not take part in the discussions. When they hade a message that's different, but when they have a complaint about something they did with us, you should refer them to me or Sisco. I don't think when you have such a critical matter they should have a feeling that they have got two ways to play it. They should think when we speak that we speak for the President.

K: There is no separate channel. Every conversation I have had I have sent you a memcon and I have checked every comment with Sisco and I have been told the fact that I backed Sisco has helped.

R: Why do you think they go to you?

K: To try to end run and get the President to overrule you

R: That's right.

K: But that has never heppened.

R: But why give them the impression that it might.

K: I thought they were going to tell me that they had attacked the SAM sites across the Canal.

R: I'm not making any headway. I think this is operational--I don't think you should see these people. Anyway, let me know what the President wants. When is Ron going to do it?

K: When we get word from you that we can.

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By KX NARA, Dalo S 17 00

Telecon Secretary Rogers 8/7/70 12:52 p.m.

R: I have just talked to Bergus. Nasser has not approved making this public yet. He's going to TV in an hour and 15 minutes to announce it and I think we should coordinate it so the President can make it at the same time.

K: The President is not going to make it.

R: Well, the White House.

K: Okay, and if you have any change in the text let us know. I will have what we have phoned over to you.

R: Okay, also Nasser doesn't want the ground rules made public. Then we don't really have any background to give out.

8/7/70 1:00 p.m.

K: In looking over what we have here and thinking over all the loose ends, that have to be tied together, I think the announcement ought to be made at State. The point you made that if anything goes wrong, the President shouldn't be in it is right.

R: Okay. I just talked to Bergus: Nasser wants to make it and Mrs. Meir wants to announce it and I don't want to get the President into that kind of thing.

K: Okay. You will make the statement that was dictated over the phone. The President is in a meeting so he doesn't know about this yet, but I will take the responsibility for it.

R: Okay, now timing is a question. We will probably do it in the next your. We will try to coordinate it with Israel and Egypt.

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BY KKY NARA, Date 5/13/04

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TELCON Rogers/Kissinger 3:13 pm 8/7/70

R: We just had Rabin in here. In trying to solve this problem we have been in touch with U Thant and Jarring and we have a statement we are going to release. We have just worked it out. It's not going to please them. We will read it to you and send you a copy. A U Thant statement. "I have been informed by the U.S. that their peace proposal has been accepted by Israel, Jordan and the UAR. Subsequently, my????? has been giver confirmation by these 3 governments." That's confirmation by letter. That protects them. "In accordance with that proposal and acceptance given by?????? the letter." The letter has our initiative. They object to the????? but if you don't agree, there's nothing left, "(finished quote)" Rabin is satisfied but he can't show it because his Government will be upset, We ddn't give them much notice.

K: I think he is closer to us than his instructions.

R: I asked what was in the language he doesn't like. He thinks there should have been more. I said that's in your acceptance.

K: If it had been included????? They will be better off that way.

R: It may be a problem ex for her. In the first place no one will notice because people think you have already done this. Secondly, if you come out and say you don't accept the language of our draft on the initiative, you will have to state what you don't accept and the fact you accepted it at all.

K: I went through this last night. I couldn't get him to put on paper what is wrong.

R: I said what the you object to? You agreed to 242, indirect negotiations, withdrawal, and you have \_\_\_\_\_ a cease fire. You might mention it to the President,

K: I will. You had not choice and that's a subtle way of dealing with it,