

August 17, 1985

**Lunch Meeting of Vice Minister and Ambassador
Mansfield (Memo for the Vice Minister); Problem of
the American Hostages in Lebanon (Dispatch of the
Prime Minister's Special Envoy)**

Citation:

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Summary:

A memo summarizing a meeting between the Vice Minister and Ambassador Mansfield about Special Envoy Nakayama's visit to Iran and Syria to discuss the American hostages in Lebanon.

Original Language:

Japanese

Contents:

Original Scan

Translation - English

次官とマンسفールド大使の昼食会（次官用メモ）

レバノンにおける米国人人質問題（総理特使の派遣）

60.8.17

中近東第一課

中近東第二課

（発言要領）

総理特使として親書を携行した中山元駐仏大使が、6日から9日までテヘラン、10日から12日までダマスカスを訪問。同特使はラフサンジャニ議長、アサド大統領を含むイラン、シリアの首脳と会談し、米国人人質解放の為の両国の影響力行使を要請。（右会談の内容は、15日在米松永大使よりマクファールン補佐官に伝達済み。）

1. イランにおける会談状況

（1）特使より上記要請とあわせ、

との総理の内々の意向も伝達。

（2）先方の反応は次の通り

（イ）日・イラン両国は国際テロを否定するが、テロの定義が相違。イランは、大国の第三国における大規模な違法行為をテロ視せず、個人又は特定のグループの正当な権利回復の為の活動をテロとして非難することはせず。（アルデビリ外務次官）

（ロ）イランは米国人人質問題への如何なる形での関連も否定。イランは第三国において限定的な影響力しか有せず。TWA機事件の解決は特別な国際環境下で成立。イランは決定的な影響力は行使

し得ず。今次 T W A 機事件と同様の結果を期待されたとしてもそれが実現される保証なし。(アルデビリ外務次官)

(ハ) 米国は T W A 事件が解決されれば、イスラエルにシーク派捕虜 (300 名) を解放させる旨シリアに約束。米がこの約束を守らない限りイランとしてはレバノン人に何も言えず。(ラフサンジャニ議長)

(ニ) そもそもレバノンにおける米国人人質問題は、米が単に C L A I M しているだけのものであり、かかる問題が存在するかどうか不明確。仮にこの問題が事実としても、レバノンは多くのグループが個々に活動しておりこの種の問題の実体の把握は困難。(ベラヤティ外相)

2. なお、イラン側より骨子次の通りのラフサンジャニ議長発総理宛親書が接到。

(1) テロ問題の解決に向けての努力は重要。イランの全面的協力を信頼頂いて結構。

(2) 米がこの問題の解決を真に求めているかは疑問。T W A 事件後の米の動きは、テロ行為を挑発するものともとれるもの。米が人質の解放を真に求めているならば、以前の約束を覆行し、イスラエルの刑務所のレバノン人捕虜解放を実現すべき。

3. シリアにおける会談状況

(1) 中山特使からの要請に対する先方の反応次の通り。

(イ) 先般シリアを訪問された安倍大臣に対し、「シリアとしては現在レバノンで捕らえられている人々の解放の為にできる限りの努力をする」旨述べたが、かかる立場に変わりはない。レバノンに

いるシリア官憲はこれらの人質の居所及び誰がかれらを誘拐したかにつき情報を収集中。但し、現在のレバノンにおける無秩序の為、シリアの努力の成果には余り期待できず。（シャラ外相）

（ロ）米国は、TWA機人質が解放されればイスラエルが捕らえているシーア派レバノン人全員を釈放することに合意したが、この合意を完全に実施していない点で非難されるべき。但し、米国人人質解放と右シーア派レバノン人捕虜の釈放とは別問題である。

（アサド大統領、シャラ外相）

（ハ）シリアはイスラエル軍のレバノン侵略に直接関係のない市民を人質にとっても、イスラエルのレバノン侵略問題の解決には資さないということをレバノンの各グループに伝えている。レバノンの主要グループとの間ではこのような思想統一が明確にできている。しかし、レバノンには小さなグループが多数存在し、それらのグループは独自の考えに基づいて行動している。シリアとこれらのグループとの間には敵対関係はないが、その関係は相互理解あるいは友情といったものであり、確固たる基盤の上に立っているものではないので、シリアが影響を行使するといっても時間がかかる。TWA事件についてはシリアとして当初から事態を把握していたので解決に導き得たが、米国人7名についてはかれらがどこにいるのかも不明であり、だれの行為かも分かっていない個人的な行為。

（アサド大統領）

（ニ）米国政府はイスラエルは今月中にレバノン人捕虜を釈放することとなろう旨伝えてきた。この釈放の直後にも動き出してみたい。今後共本件については連絡する。（アサド大統領）

（2）なお、中山特使はシリア側に対し会談の席上、従来よりの経済・文化等の分野における関係の一層の強化のため尽力したいとの

中曽根総理の意向を伝達したところ、シャラ外相はアサド大統領からの指示に基づくとして同特使と急遽行った第二回目の会談においてシリアとしては利己的な動機や偏見のない日本からの一層の経済援助を得たい旨単刀直入に述べるところがあった。この結果、中山特使とシャラ外相との間で、

(イ) シリア側はなるべく早く人質を解放することを約束する。

(ロ)



Lunch Meeting of Vice Minister and Ambassador Mansfield (Memo for the Vice Minister)

Problem of the American Hostages in Lebanon (Dispatch of the Prime Minister's Special Envoy)

August 17, 1985

First Middle East Division
Second Middle East Division

(Main Points of Remarks)

[Yoshihiro] Nakayama, former ambassador to France, serving as special envoy of the Prime Minister and carrying a letter from him, visited Tehran from the 6th to the 9th and Damascus from the 10th to the 12th. The Special Envoy met with leaders of Iran and Syria, including Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani and President Assad, and requested that they exercise their influence for the release of the American hostages. (The contents of these meetings were conveyed on the 15th by Ambassador Matsunaga to Presidential Assistant McFarlane.)

1. Talks in Iran

(1) In line with the aforementioned request on the part of the Special Envoy, [TN: section blacked out] conveyed the Prime Minister's confidential intention.

(2) The other side's response was as follows.

(a) Japan and Iran both reject international terrorism but differ in their definitions of terrorism. Iran does not see a great power's large-scale illegal activities in a third country as terrorism. Nor does Iran criticize as terrorism the just activities of individuals or certain groups for the recovery of their rights. (Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili)

(b) Iran denies any form of connection to the problem of the American hostages. Iran has only a limited influence in the third country. The resolution of the TWA Incident occurred in a particular international environment. Iran cannot exercise a decisive influence. Even if one wished this time for an outcome similar to that of the TWA Incident, there would be no guarantee that it could be realized. (Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili)

(c) The United States promised Syria that, if the TWA Incident were resolved, they would then release the Shiite prisoners (300 persons) in Israel. So long as the United States does not keep this promise, Iran can say nothing to the Lebanese. (Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani)

(d) First of all, the problem of American hostages in Lebanon is one where the United States is simply making claims. It is unclear whether or not this problem exists. Even if this problem is real, in Lebanon there are many groups acting on their own; it is difficult to grasp the true state of this type of problem. (Foreign Minister Velayati)

2. In addition, we received from the Iranian side a letter from Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, the main points of which are as follows:

(1) Efforts are necessary for the resolution of the terrorism problem. You may trust in Iran's complete cooperation.

(2) We doubt whether the United States is truly seeking a resolution of this problem. The actions of the United States since the TWA Incident can be taken as provocations to terrorist activities. If the United States is truly seeking the release of the hostages, they should carry out their previous promise and realize the release of the Lebanese imprisoned in Israel.

3. Talks in Syria

(1) The response of the other side to the request from Special Envoy Nakayama is as follows.

(a) Syria told Minister Abe on his recent visit to Syria that, "Syria will do all that it can for the release of those now held in Lebanon." There has been no change in this position. The Syrian authorities in Lebanon are gathering information on the whereabouts of the hostages and on who abducted them. However, due to the disorder in Lebanon at present, one cannot have much hope in the outcome of Syria's efforts. (Foreign Minister Shara)

(b) The United States agreed to the release of the Lebanese Shiites held in Israel, and they should be criticized for not completely implementing this agreement. However, the release of the American hostages and the release of those Lebanese Shiite prisoners are different problems. (President Assad, Foreign Minister Shara)

(c) Syria has communicated to each group in Lebanon that taking civilian hostages not directly connected to the Israeli military's invasion of Lebanon does not contribute to the resolution of the problem of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. The major groups in Lebanon all clearly think this way. However, there exist in Lebanon many small groups, and those groups act on the basis of their own thinking. Relations between Syria and these groups are not hostile, but those relations are those of mutual understanding or friendship. They are not based on a solid foundation. Therefore, even speaking of Syria exercising influence, it will take time. In regard to the TWA Incident, Syria from the start had a grasp of the circumstances and so was able to bring it to a resolution. As for the seven Americans, it is unclear even where they are. It is an individual act, and we do not even know who did it. (President Assad)

(d) The US Government informed us that Israel would release the Lebanese prisoners this month. I would like to take action right after their release. I will contact you henceforth regarding both matters. (President Assad)

(2) In addition, Special Envoy Nakayama in his meeting with the Syrian side conveyed Prime Minister Nakasone's desire to to strengthen further the relationship to date in the economic and cultural fields. Foreign Minister Shara, in the second meeting with the Special Envoy, hurriedly arranged at the direction of President Assad, frankly said that Syria would like to obtain more economic aid from Japan, which is without ulterior motives or prejudice. As a result, between Special Envoy Nakayama and Foreign minister Shara:

(a) The Syrian side promises the release of the hostages as quickly as possible.

(b) [TN: section blacked out]

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