

August 8, 1985

**Briefing Material for the Prime Minister: Problem of
the American Hostages in Lebanon (Dispatch of the
Prime Minister's Special Envoy)**

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Summary:

These briefing materials for the Prime Minister of Japan about Special Envoy Nakayama's recent trip to Iran and Syria include the Special Envoy's schedule and a response from Iran stating they will not use their influence to assist in the release of American hostages in Lebanon unless United States releases Lebanese hostages held in Israel.

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Japanese

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極 秘

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号

(総理ブリーフ用資料)

レバノンにおける米国人人質問題 (総理特使の派遣)

60. 8. 8

中近東第2課

1. 中山特使日程

8月6日-9日

テヘラン

10日-12日

ダマスカス

14日

東京着

2. 5日、本件特使派遣につき、在米大に米国への通報と指示。

松永大使よりマクファーレン大統領補佐官、及びシュルツ国務長

官に通報したところ、先方の反応は次のとおり。

(1) マクファーレン補佐官

日本政府の迅速な措置を高く評価し、感謝。大統領には直ちに報告する。

(2) シュルツ国務長官

JWA人質事件の際、日本政府の努力を高く評価

二極秘二

2.

今回の努力が成功することを希望。日本政府の努力が事態の解決に資することも確信。

3. イランにおける会談状況

特使よりの、米国人人質解放のための、イランの影響力行使を求

める要請に対する先方の反応は次とおり。(特使よりの

総理の内々の意向も伝達。

(1) アルデビリ外務次官(8月6日)

(イ) 日・イラン両国は、国際テロを否定するが、テロの定義が相

違。イランは、大国の第3国における大規模な違法行為をテロ視せず、個人、又は特定のグループの正当な権利回復の為の活動

をテロとして非難することはせず。ただし、右意見の相違も前提とした意見交換は有用。

(ロ) イランは米国人人質問題への如何なる形での関連も否定。イランは第3国において限定的な影響力しか有せ

—秘—

3

ず。TWA機事件の解決は特別な国際環境下で成立。イランは
決定的な影響力は行使し得ず。今次 TWA機事件と同様の

結果を期待されたとしてもそれが実現される保証なし。

(2) ラフサンジャニ議長 (8月7日)

レバノンにおける人質の問題はイランとしても非常に重要な問題と考えている。

TWA機事件が解決されれば、イスラエルにシリア派捕虜(300名)を解放さ
せる旨、レーガン大統領が、シリア大統領に約束したため、イラン・シリア

は事件解決に努力。しかるに米国は未だ約束も実行せず。米国
は、イスラエルをして、捕えられているレバノン人を解放させるべきであり、TWA

機事件における合意を守るべきである」というのが、中曽根総理に対する
メッセージ。

以上のことが実行されれば、その時はじめて
米が約束を守らない限り イランとしてはレバノン人に何も言えず。

イランはシリアと共同して人質解放のための何らかの行動をとり得るし、影響力
も行使し得る。

なお「ラ」議長よりは
(レバノンにおける米国の目的及び活動には、はきりしないところがあ
り、人質問題は、米国がレバノンにおける何らかの目的を達する為の
策略なのではないかという疑念も表明された)

(3)

Secret

(Briefing Material for the Prime Minister)

Problem of the American Hostages in Lebanon (Dispatch of the Prime Minister's Special Envoy)

August 8, 1985

Second Middle East Division

1. Special Envoy Nakayama's Schedule

August 6 - 9: Tehran

August 10 - 12: Damascus

August 14: Return to Tokyo

2. On the 5th, we instructed the Ambassador to the United States to inform the United States regarding the dispatch of the Special Envoy in this matter. Ambassador Matsunaga informed President's Assistant McFarlane and Secretary of State Shultz. The other side responded as follows:

(1) President's Assistant McFarlane

He expressed appreciation and thanks for the Government of Japan's prompt measure. He said that he would report it at once to the President.

(2) Secretary of State Shultz

He highly praised the Government of Japan's efforts at the time of the TWA hostage incident and expressed hope that its present efforts would be successful. He firmly believes that the Government of Japan's efforts will contribute to the resolution of this situation.

3. Situation of Meetings in Iran

The response of the other side to the Special Envoy's request that Iran exercise its influence for the release of the American hostages is as follows. (The Special Envoy [TN: portion blacked out] communicate the Prime Minister's private intentions. [TN: portion blacked out])

(1) Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili (August 6)

(a) Japan and Iran reject international terrorism but differ in defining terrorism. Iran does not see as terrorism the large-scale, illegal activities of a great power in a third country, nor does it criticize as terrorism the actions of individuals or certain groups for the just recovery of their rights. However, the exchange of views on the premise of this difference in views is useful.

(b) Iran rejects connection in any form to the problem of the American hostages. Iran has only limited influence in a third country. The resolution of the TWA Incident took place within a special international environment. Iran cannot exercise a decisive influence. Even if one hoped for a result this time similar to that of the TWA Incident, there is no guarantee for its realization.

(2) Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani (August 7)

Iran, too, considers the problem of the hostages in Lebanon to be a very important one. If the TWA Incident is resolved, Shia prisoners (300 persons) in Israel will be released. President Reagan promised this to the President of Syria, which is why Iran and Syria made efforts for the incident's resolution. However, the United States has not kept its promise. The message to Prime Minister Nakasone: "The United States should have Israel release the Lebanese held there and keep the agreement in the TWA Incident." So long as the United States does not keep its promise, Iran can say nothing to Lebanon. Only once what has been promised is carried out will Iran be able, together with Syria, to undertake some action and exercise some influence for the release of the hostages.

(In addition, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani expressed doubt, saying that there were unclear aspects to the goals and actions of the United States in Lebanon and that perhaps the hostage problem was a stratagem of the United States to achieve some goal in Lebanon. (End)