



January 19, 1963

**Joint Chiefs of Staff Message to U.S. CINCEUR
[Commander in Chief European Command],
'Rationale of the JUPITER Decision'**

Citation:

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Summary:

That the Commander of U.S. European Command (CINCEUR), Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, was a critic of the Jupiter removals may have informed a Joint Chiefs of Staff decision to send him a background paper explaining U.S. decisions that could also be used for discussions within NATO. The backgrounder provided information comparing the reliability, vulnerability, and survivability, among other features, of the Jupiter and Polaris missiles. While the withdrawal of Thor and Jupiter missiles reduced Western "nuclear potential," those reductions would be offset by an increase from 350 to about 800 U.S. strategic ballistic missiles, "some of which will be assigned to NATO targets." Further, it "may be assumed that there will be no reduction in the present expectation of timely damage to the ACE [Allied Command Europe] targets presently covered by the Jupiters."

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MESSAGE

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FROM: JCS

TO: USCINCEUR *JK*

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This is an advance copy of SM-100-63 (PART I), together with its Appendix (PART II), approved by the JCS on 18 January 1963.

PART I: SM-100-63

"Subject: Rationale of the JUPITER Decision (S)

"1. Reference is made to:

"a. USCINCEUR message, ALO 35, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 11 January 1963.

"b. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, message, JCS 8205 to USNMR, dated 12 January 1963.

"2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that it is important that there be a common understanding of the reasons for the JUPITER decision. Accordingly, the appended rationale behind the decision to remove the JUPITER missiles from Italy and Turkey is provided for

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the Turkish and Italian authorities and in the North Atlantic Council.

"3. A detailed analysis of the targeting implications incident to the withdrawal of the JUPITER missiles is being conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A copy of this report will be forwarded to you. While a great deal of the information contained therein is highly sensitive, it may prove useful to you."

PART II: Appendix to SM-100-63

"RATIONALE BEHIND THE JUPITER DECISION (S)

"1. In the light of recent decisions, the process of revitalizing and modernizing the nuclear defense capability of the NATO Alliance has begun. The United States envisages a staged evolution toward an effective, multilateral NATO force, integrating nuclear forces assigned to SACEUR with eventual control and manning arrangements in which Turkey and Italy, as well as other NATO powers, would participate. The precise form and timing of this evolution are not yet certain, but it is a major objective of the train of events started at Nassau.

"2. While many basic steps toward improvement of the NATO nuclear posture will require time for technical arrangements, there are certain steps which can be taken

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in the near future to implement the program. One such
in the near future to implement the program. One such
step is the substitution of more modern weapon systems
for the existing JUPITERS now stationed in Turkey and
Italy.

"3. The liquid-fueled JUPITER missile is a soft con-
figured, relatively vulnerable, first generation missile
which is being succeeded by more effective missiles cur-
rently in the US inventory, one of which is now available
for assignment to SACEUR to meet NATO requirements.*
This is the solid-fueled POLARIS, a system which would
meet the NATO requirements now covered by the JUPITERS
and which was committed to Alliance purposes by the US
Secretary of Defense at Athens in May of last year.
While it is recognized that the JUPITERS in Italy and
Turkey have performed a critical role in deterring
aggression against the Alliance, they, like all other
weapons, eventually reach obsolescence. The United States
feels that the JUPITER system should be replaced before
it is outmoded.

* JUPITER		POLARIS A-2
Operational System Reliability	.55	.70
CEP	2. NM	1.5 NM
Yield	1.45 MT	.5 MT
Survivability (No Warning/Warning)	.05/.5	1.0/1.0

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"4. In 1957 when the NATO decision was made to install these missiles they, along with the THORs, were the only suitable ballistic missiles the Alliance had ready for operation. Although they helped greatly to build up our early ballistic missile strength in light of rapid advances in technology and the accelerating growth of missile forces, they are no longer a major part of the total missile strength available to the Alliance. The relative vulnerability of the JUPITER missile makes it a high priority target for an enemy first strike in a period of tension.

"5. In contrast, the POLARIS missile system is far less vulnerable. The replacement of the JUPITERS by the POLARIS missile system will provide the NATO Alliance with a more secure, more effective, nuclear force with a significant growth potential.

"6. The United States recognizes that the replacement of JUPITER missiles by POLARIS submarines in the Mediterranean coupled with the phase-out of the THOR missiles will reduce by 102 the over-all nuclear potential otherwise available to the West. As it affects NATO, some reduction will be offset by the increase during this year from 350 to approximately 800 US operational strategic ballistic missiles, some of which will be assigned to NATO targets. Thus, despite the JUPITER and

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THOR phaseout, there will be a sharp increase in the

THOR phase-out, there will be a sharp increase in the total number of nuclear missiles available to the Alliance during this calendar year.

"7. Since the specifics of the withdrawal of the JUPITER missiles have not been agreed among the nations, it is premature to present the precise nature of the targeting measures required to compensate for the withdrawal. However, it may be assumed that there will be no reduction in the present expectation of timely damage to the ACE targets presently covered by the JUPITERS."

COMMENT: In forwarding this rationale to SECDEF the JCS have suggested addition of political and economic factors in order to develop a broad based government position. If accepted, this recommendation will result in changes and additions which will be forwarded to you. Gp-3.

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PAGE 5

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