March 9, 1963

Memorandum from NEA [Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] Philips Talbot to G [Deputy Under State of State for Political Affairs Alexis] Johnson, 'FY 1964 MAP Levels as Basis General Wood's Discussions in Turkey'

Citation:

"Memorandum from NEA [Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] Philips Talbot to G [Deputy Under State of State for Political Affairs Alexis] Johnson, 'FY 1964 MAP Levels as Basis General Wood's Discussions in Turkey'", March 9, 1963, Wilson Center Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of the Turkish Affairs Desk, 1958-1963, Box 7, Jupiter. Contributed by Bill Burr and Leopoldo Nuti. https://wilson-center.drivingcreative.com/document/300445

Summary:

According to Talbot, an impasse in the impending talks between General Wood and the Turkish General Staff could have damaging implications for the removal of the Jupiters and for U.S.-Turkish relations. A key issue is the level of Military Assistance Program spending for the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces, with the Turks believing that they "need and deserve" a higher modernization rate than the U.S. had programmed. For the Turkish military, \$120 million would represent a "sudden and catastrophic decline." Citing the importance of keeping the military "in line," Talbot cites Ambassador Hare's argument that "it would be difficult to conceive a worse time for making a significant reduction in MAP" and urges Johnson to authorize Gen. Wood to start with a "base of least" \$150 million.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY)

Original Language:

English

Contents:

Original Scan

Wilson Center Digital Archive

Original Scan This document consists of _____ __pages No____ of ___ Copies, Series _A

Confirmation copy - JUBowling

MAR 9 1963

SECRET

TO: G - Mr. Johnson

THROUGH : S/S

FROM: NEA - Phillips Talbot

SUBJECT:

to be redon to indicate decession taken but to be sent up as "record". FY 1964 MAP Level as Basis General Wood's Discussions in Turkey.

General Wood is scheduled to proceed to Turkey tomorrow to discuss on behalf of Secretary MacNamara various questions which have been raised by the Turkish Ministry of Defense in connection with the replacement of Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Although agreement in principle has been reached, and NAC has been notified, an impasse in General Wood's discussions could have serious repercussions with regard to: (a) the physical removal of the Jupiters, in view of the Turkish military's capacity to stall either the Parliamentary ratification of our bilateral agreement to remove the Jupiters, or the technical-level agreements as to precise details of the physical dismantling of the missiles, and (b) the basic context of our future relationship with Turkey, in view of the essential internal element of military support for the democratic and development-oriented Inonu government, and in view of the widespread "crisis of confidence" and doubt as to the U.S. interest in Turkey engendered by the Jupiter replacement.

A key and critical element in the success of the Wood Mission in both these contexts is the nature of future U.S. MAP to Turkey as it affects the modernization of the Turkish armed forces. The Turkish military's concern that its capacity is degenerating in comparison with its hostile or potentially hostile neighbors has been increasing. For reassurance, the Turkish Government turns almost frantically toward the U.S., as was so clearly evidenced in the course of the Vice President's recent conversations with Turkish leaders.

The Turks badly want, and sincerely believe they need and deserve, a modernization rate much higher than anything we have in sight over the next few years. Should General Wood be forced to talk on the basis of a \$120 million FY 1964 MAP program, he can utilize only a modernization element worth about \$30 million. This will represent to the Turks a

sudden and

GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

SECRET

DEC	CLASSIFIED	
Authority_	95930	13

SECRET

- 2 -

sudden and catastrophic decline in U.S. military interest in Turkey. Despite General Wood's best efforts, we would be running an overwhelming risk of shattering the Turkish military's confidence in our continuing support of Turkey, as well as a concurrent risk that the Turks, out of stubbornness and near-despair, would indefinitely delay the Jupiter removal, either on the legal or technical levels. We must not forget that Inonu's control over the Turkish military is uncertain, though his basic dependence on them is total.

A rise in the program level for FY 1964 to be used as a basis for General Wood's discussion of items of modernization to \$150 million would roughly double the modernization reservoir on which he could talk, and would give him a reasonable rather than a near-hopeless opportunity for keeping the Turkish military in line. Even so, he will have to aim at convincing the Turks that a disappointing (to them) level of modernization does not represent a new strategic diplomatic attitude on the part of the U.S. which calls Turkey's basic foreign policy into question.

Ray Hare, who is a professional <u>par excellence</u>, and who has never been guilty of alarmist talk or of a parochial attitude toward the country to which he is accredited, said in Ankara's 1059 of March 8: "...would be difficult to conceive a worse time for making a significant reduction in MAP. This is in no sense an automatic reflex to the possibility of reduction, but is a very considered opinion." Hare also states: "(a \$120 million FY 1964 program) could not provide for both adequate force maintenance and appreciable modernization, and would severely complicate our problem not only as regards relationships with Turkish military and effectiveness Turkish forces but as regards Turkish-American relations generally."

I hope you can continue to do anything possible to ensure that General Wood can talk from a base of at least \$150 million FY 1964 MAP. Such a base will be necessary if General Wood is to have other than a bare outside chance of accomplishing his mission successfully.


NEA:GTI: JWBowling: bmh

DECLASSIFIED Authority 95 1393

SECRET

Wilson Center Digital Archive

confidential



NEA Mr. Talbot

Importance SA in Turkey.

Mr. Gaud has told Bowling this morning that provided Gen. Wood does not discuss Supporting Assistance with Turks, he Gaud will agree to its inclusion in congressional presentation. Problem is to confirm Bell will agree with Gaud.

Sa doubly important because of several aspects J removal apart from low map level covered in Bowling memo

Among items Turks are demanding is transfer of installation at Cigli base (Jupe location). Additional Under agreement Turkish Air Gen. Tansel and Jusmmat Gen. Lawrence, installations would revert to US. Air Force is insisting that they take ell and move one of elements from Adama there. This is collision, course. Slight possibility some softening Air Force position but not enough to satisfy Turks. In this light any indication cut off supporting assistance doubly disastrous.