

November 24, 1978

**Stenographic transcript of the meeting of the
Consultative Political Committee of the CC of the
Romanian Communist Party**

Citation:

"Stenographic transcript of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee of the CC of the Romanian Communist Party", November 24, 1978, Wilson Center Digital Archive, ANIC, Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Chancellery, no.2611, 11.xii.1978. CWIHP Document Reader, vol.2.
<https://wilson-center.drivingcreative.com/document/112064>

Summary:

The meeting focuses on the relationship between Romania and the Warsaw pact and also the threat from NATO.

Original Language:

Romanian

Contents:

Translation - English

TRANSCRIPT of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party on 24 November 1978 □ Participants in the meeting : comrades Nicolae Ceausescu, Manea Manescu, Elena Ceausescu, Iosif Banc, Cornel Burtica, Virgil Cazacu, Gheorghe Cioara, Lina Ciobanu, Constantin Dascalescu, Ion Dinca, Emil Draganescu, Janos Fazekas, Ion Ionita, Petre Lupu, Paul Niculescu, Gheorghe Pana, Ion Patan, Dumitru Popescu, Gheorghe Radulescu, Leonte Rautu, Virgil Trofin, Iosif Uglar, Ilie Verdet, Stefan Voitec, Stefan Andrei, Ion Coman, Teodor Coman, Mihai Dalea, Miu Dobrescu, Ludovic Fazekas, Mihai Gere, Ion Iliescu, Stefan Mocuta, Vasile Patilinet, Mihai Telescu, Ioan Ursu, Richard Winter. □

Invited to the meeting : comrades Vasile Musat, Marin Vasile. □ The meeting began at 12.00 hrs and ended at 13.20 hrs. □ Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu □ Have you managed to see the materials? You have. Let us hear what you have to say. □ Cde. Manea Manescu : □ Esteemed comrades, I want to refer to the intervention – firm, principled, of special patriotic and revolutionary responsibility for the present and the future of our country, and, I would say, for the other socialist countries as well – which cde. Nicolae Ceausescu made at the Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty regarding the Report on the military situation, and the decision related to this report. □ As you have seen, after Marshal Kulikovsky presented the report, cde. Nicolae Ceausescu took the floor and criticized the working procedure, and the technique of drawing up materials of special significance which engage the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty in the crucial issues of peace and war, the arms race, disarmament, and international détente. □ Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out from the very beginning that the report and the decision did not result in a comradely collaboration of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, and that a decision can only be made on the basis of a common agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the acts and norms that direct the activity of the Consultative Political Committee. Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu also pointed out that the appreciations of the ratio of forces are made on the basis of erroneous, even false data, that the issues are raised as if the breaking out of a world war were imminent, which is in total contradiction with the first document and the debates that took place on it. □ In fact, cde. Nicolae Ceausescu drew very serious attention to the responsibility we have to analyze the present situation objectively, to make correct political appreciations, and not to fall prey to militarism, which would bring about incalculable consequences for the future of mankind (forcing the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty to make investments and incur exorbitant material and financial expenditures, which would constitute a heavy burden for the peoples, with negative consequences on the economic and social development, and the living standard of peoples). On the contrary, as cde. Nicolae Ceausescu showed in his first exposé, our countries have to take the initiative in taking measures to reduce military expenditures, measures independent of those taken by the NATO countries since this would have a highly positive influence on the peoples' fight for peace and détente in the world. □ Actually, the Report is a product of Soviet militarist circles, which pursue a policy of excessive arming by replacing the current weapons, and by involving the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty in the dangerous arms race, and the resultant expenditures deriving from this adventurous way of acting. The Report included such appreciations in order to justify the so-called emergency course, namely, in case of emergency, the command of the troops of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty should be transferred to the Soviet General Staff, with all the consequences deriving from this fact regarding the independence and sovereignty of our country and of other socialist countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty. This would give the Soviet Union the possibility of interfering in the internal affairs of our countries. □ I must tell you that cde. Nicolae Ceausescu was listened to with a lot of attention by all the participants in the conference. The other speakers who took the floor after cde. Nicolae Ceausescu only referred to the fact that the report and the decision had to be approved because cde. Nicolae Ceausescu's arguments were so strong that there was not even a slight attempt at formulating counter-arguments to what cde. Nicolae Ceausescu had shown when he raised for discussion the content of the report, which was obviously subjective and made for the purpose of justifying the arms race, the so-called need to allocate high investments, to change the armaments in all of the sectors as soon as possible, and to involving the economic potential of all the countries taking part in this arms race. □ I want to emphasize once more that cde. Nicolae Ceausescu's arguments were listened to by everybody, and nobody even tried to produce counter-arguments. It was clearly apparent that things had been

agreed upon in the sense that the report was good and a decision had to be taken. I must tell you that also this time cde. Nicolae Ceausescu intervened firmly, with determination, regarding the observance of the new principles in the relationships between the socialist countries, non-interference in internal affairs, respect, and mutual esteem. We must thank cde. Nicolae Ceausescu from the bottom of our hearts for the way he defended the rights of the Romanian people to freedom and independence on this occasion as well. I think that the materials containing the two exposés of cde. Nicolae Ceau-sescu's must be known by our whole party, by our whole people, because it is from them that we must draw all of our conclusions about the way we must firmly militate for the defense of the holy rights of our people to independence and national sovereignty, to the independence of our party's actions. As to the issues connected with disarmament, I would not like to retain your attention too much. I would like, however, to remark that cde. Nicolae Ceau-sescu's intervention was listened to very attentively by the participants, and was – in the context of the other exposés – the most substantial, the most supported by arguments, and the one that showed – as clearly and as justly as possible – the actual ways and means we are to employ to really ensure an international climate now and in the future on the way of disarming and defending the rights of the peoples to shape their destinies freely, to ensure their economic and social development, to raise the living standard of the peoples and to ensure peace in the world. I have to tell you that, from discussions with other participants, I found that cde. Nicolae Ceausescu's [first] exposé enjoyed a quite large audience. In fact, the second did, too, but things were of such a nature that nobody could take a critical stand but, conversely, from the way they presented [their position] it was apparent that what cde. Nicolae Ceausescu showed in relation to the Report and the decision were just things which needed thinking over for one to be able to exemplify the way we are to take part in the solution of the major problems of international life, which can only be solved by way of understanding, coexistence, disarmament, and peace. Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu : Especially Lenin's Peace Decree Cde. Manea Manescu It was listened to attentively. Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu When he spoke about “a peace without annexations, and without occupa-tion of foreign territories.” Lenin said so. Of course, first of all we should see if the Consultative Political Committee agrees with the adopted position, and afterwards to see how we are to act. (all of the comrades agree). Cde. Leonte Rautu We highly appreciate this stance Cde. Paul Niculescu : These issues are so clear that no other stance could exist. It is very good that cde. Ceausescu spoke about all of these issues. It is very good for both our party and the general cause. Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu Then I understand that you agree. (all of the comrades totally agree). How are we to proceed now? First of all, I think it would be good to issue a communiqué of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee, in which it is pointed out that they listened to the information and how they appreciate the activity of the delegation, obviously, emphasizing these issues. In addition, the position adopted by them on the issues of collaboration development and on the military issues, without mentioning what we think should be done in that respect. It goes without saying that we understand the necessity of dealing with the issues of defense strengthening, but rationally, without panicking and taking excessive measures. Cde. Leonte Rautu It is very clear Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu In the decision it was stated that the expenditures should be increased, and the investments should be increased. It is not stated that measures are to be taken, only that expenditures should be increased substantially. And, in comparison with the current five-year period, it stipulates that the investments should be increased. Cde. Paul Niculescu : And in the Declaration it is stated that we clearly declare ourselves against the armament policy. How can this be explained? Cde. Leonte Rautu It is a decision to stimulate the arms race, and to stimulate NATO to do the same thing. Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu : The difference lies in the fact that NATO's decision is public, and ours is secret. Cde. Manea Manescu It is a bellicose decision Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu : We said that we agreed to provide the measures to be taken, we did not reject any measures. We said that we agreed for a Statute to be drawn up, but we were not in a position now to establish how this Statute would look like based on what a general or a marshal said since we did not even discuss this issue. In addition, Article 6 is inadmissible. Cde. Paul Niculescu During the [Second] World War there was an anti-Hitler coalition also comprising capitalist states, but they did not choose this

solution. The General Staffs of the respective states collaborated. □Cde. Leonte Rautu : □Particularly as now we are not in wartime□Cde. Manea Manescu□It is not possible for their General Staff to draw up such materials, and align all the others.□Cde. Ilie Verdet :□We expressed our wish to find a solution to this issue several times, but they did not agree.□Cde. Manea Manescu□Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu proposed a break during which a discussion could be held, but they did not accept.□Cde. Ion Coman□I would like to show the Consultative Political Committee how these materials were brought to Bucharest. On Saturday, at 13.00, Marshal Kulikov called us up and told us he wanted to come to Bucharest with the report's theses and the decision. I told him to send us the materials in advance so that we could translate them with a view to discussing them. He said he would not send them but bring them along. When he came with the materials, I told him at least to wait until we translated them but neither did he accept this. This is the way the materials for the meeting of the general secretaries were prepared.□Cde. Ceausescu, this morning a few of our generals asked me about the issues [raised] at the Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty. I told them that I only knew the decision that had been published. Some of them asked to be received by you so that they can be informed by you about the military issues. If you can spare the time, you might meet part of the generals of our armed forces tomorrow or on Monday at the latest. □Cde. Paul Niculescu□This is the most brutal expression of the subordination policy. □Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu□Today I have received a telephone call [informing me] that the miners intend to send a delegation to Bucharest.□Cde. Virgil Cazacu :□The Writers' Union and the Plastic Artists' Union intend to send a delegation to you in order to be informed [about the situation].□Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu :□In fact, this decision was made by the army and it is known. In this case the principle is valid that if two people know something, everybody knows it.□Cde. Janos Fazekas :□Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu, in my opinion you very honorably fulfilled the mandate you had, supporting the stance of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party on these important issues.□It goes without saying that, taking into consideration the way things turned out, a total lack of receptivity and democratic sense in listening to another opinion than the outlined ones is clearly apparent. What you said was so strong, so serious, that any man in his right mind could see the wish of our delegation to find a compromise solution. The total united front of all those who were not able to do anything to reach a compromise solution is clearly visible. We did it without impairing the independence and sovereignty of any country, without meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. □I also thought about the following thing. Taking into consideration the exposé you made, the positions adopted, along with the fact that the decision under point 2 is in total contradiction with point 1, and with what you said – namely that we make a commitment to fulfill our obligations within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty as long as NATO exists since NATO clearly is a military organization against socialism and not only against socialism, but also where there is no socialism, where there are capitalist countries, especially in the developing countries which have just gained their independence and are weak from an economic point of view, and where a great many unsolved issues from the colonialist period still remained. We agree with the rational modernization of the armed forces, with their adequate equipping. We agree with the drawing up of the envisaged Statute, but in the conditions of democratic working norms to be established.□In view of the fact that under point 2 there are very serious infringements of a number of procedures and norms, I do not know if it would not be better that after our positive appreciation of the way in which you acted at this Conference was published, that after this Communiqué, to have the Consultative Political Committee of our party send a letter to all of the parties that signed, also using what was said under point 1, to help them ponder more on these issues. I feel that this could create a certain possibility of discussion within these parties, of enabling them to see that the decision adopted by their leaderships is wrong. Afterwards, we could see what their reaction to this letter is.□I wholly agree with the stance taken by our delegation, headed by cde. Ceausescu, and the way it acted. □Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu□Of course, it is clearly pointed out in the Treaty that the decisions are to be adopted by common agreement. In the Committee of the Ministers of Defence as well, the decisions regarding the recommendations and the proposals made in relation to the main military issues are made by common agreement and afterwards they are

submitted to the governments and the Consultative Political Committee for consideration and approval. Consequently, even the proposals and recommendations of the Committee of the Ministers of Defense are mandatorily subject to common agreement. They cannot be adopted on a majority basis. □Cde. Paul Niculescu□A decision adopted on a majority basis is not valid. □Cde. Leonte Rautu□In other words, we do not recognize this to be a decision of the Consultative Political Committee since it is in contradiction with the basic documents. □Cde. Manea Manescu□It is null and void. □Cde. Leonte Rautu□Nor was the invasion of Czechoslovakia an act of the Warsaw Treaty. □Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu□Of course, let us however convene a plenary session of the Central Committee, independently from the common session, because nevertheless within the framework of the common session we cannot make these decisions as they are looked upon as being secret, and in the plenary session we can make them. We can hold the plenary session on Wednesday so that we do not have to convene people twice. At the common session we will also have to adopt a common proclamation, where these very issues should be underlined. In fact, this common session could serve as a substitute for a session dealing with international issues. It will be a common one: the Central Committee, the Socialist Unity Front, and the Great National Assembly; it includes them all. □Let us think, the Consultative Political Committee or the Central Committee should address a letter in that respect to the Central Committees of the other parties. I think that in this letter we should insist on the necessity of abiding by the treaties and decisions stipulating that the decisions can only be made in common, otherwise they cannot commit the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, and represent an infringement of these norms. Naturally, if – over the years – more democratic practices took root in the political domain, in the military field no such thing has been noticed. □We must draw attention to the fact that collaboration presupposes democratic relationships in the military field as well, that such relationships cannot be conceived of as relationships from a subordinate to his superior. Even within the framework of an army, the principles of democracy and conscience [must prevail], but especially when independent national armies are concerned, the decisions can only be made by common accord. It is also in the interest of collaboration, of brotherhood in arms, to completely renounce such soldierly practices. I was tempted to say Stalinist or dictatorial, but it is so. But let us call them soldierly and stress the fact that we must introduce in practice relationships that really are socialist. Only thus can the collaboration relationships be strengthened, and the friendship and brotherhood in arms be consolidated between our armies as representatives of the peoples, which must be subordinated to the parties and execute the line of the parties, and not try to counterpoise it. Let us see the formulation. □Cde. Manea Manescu□Or that we must not take them outside the prerogatives of parties and states. □Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu□The fact must be understood that the army is responsible to the people, and it is subordinated to the parties and the states. That between the armies of the socialist countries there must clearly exist such relationships, which cannot be removed from the attributions of parties and peoples. That it is in the very interest of the development of collaboration and of the strengthening of cooperation and brotherhood to reconsider this decision that infringes the Warsaw Treaty and the decisions we already have, and to act accordingly. We are doing this starting from our decision to fulfill our obligations, to cooperate and so on. That is approximately the way we are to proceed to take this matter further.(all the comrades agree). □

□Cde. Ilie Verdet□And to say that we do not think this is a decision of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty. □Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu □We have already said so□Cde. Elena Ceausescu□At least the Warsaw Treaty should be observed. □Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu□Indeed, improvements are necessary, but they should contribute towards deepening the collaboration, the brotherhood so that a new model of cooperation between the socialist countries can be offered. □Then on Wednesday we will hold the plenary session. By then, we must get both the letter and the decision ready. □As to the military, I will see if I shall receive them, especially as they know the draft decision. □Cde. Leonte Rautu□It is a justified request. □Cde. Ion Coman□I propose that they be received eventually. □Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu □Let us think about it some more□Cde. Petre Lupu□Directly after the plenary session of the Central Committee and the session of the Great National

Assembly we should hold meetings with the party active in the counties, in which members of the Consultative Political Committee take part. Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu : After the plenary session, we will inform the party active. We must clearly reaffirm our position, namely that we deem the Declaration acceptable. In this sense it was discussed that the press should also reflect the general approval, emphasizing the issues of essence – disarmament, and détente. Everybody took the floor, even Brezhnev, saying that we must do everything for peace. In general, everybody was for peace, for détente. The Chinese were criticized for not being for détente. I did not notice that they were very much concerned with this decision. But, obviously, we will see. It goes without saying that the issue of the development of collaboration within COMECON is one thing, and these issues are quite another thing. Let us debate [these issues] seriously, calmly within our party, pointing out what our position is. It is normal for people to wonder what has happened since these issues cannot be kept secret: are we for subordination or not? We must tell people clearly that if we accepted such a policy, it would be impossible for us to continue either the achievement of the Program of the 11th Congress of economic and social development of our country or the achievement of the program of raising the living standard because such a thing is hard to achieve. Stalin himself said, in 1948, that one cannot carry on, at once, a policy of armament and a policy of raising the living standard. Irrespective of what he was at the time, he could still reason. The armament policy has a negative impact on the growth of economy even in the developed countries, which have an altogether different national income. It is obvious, however, that for the socialist countries, for example Romania and the Soviet Union, this negative impact is much stronger. In fact, most of the metal raw materials go to the military sector. That is, if you want to keep improving things in this field at all costs. How much is a MIG-25 [fighter] plane Cde. Ion Coman It costs six million roubles. Cde. Ion Ionita It will amount to somewhere about 50-55 million Lei. Cde. Cornel Burtica A missile costs 25 million Lei. Cde. Ion Coman The T-72 missile is one million roubles. Cde. Ion Ionita Cde. Ceausescu, since I totally agree with your position, the position of our delegation which was in Moscow, there is a question that keeps tormenting me: At this level of the Consultative Political Committee no decision was ever made with a majority of votes. Of course, at other levels this was the rule, which – in fact – we accepted via our separate points of view on very big issues. I only want to give an example: the unification of fleets. The fleets of the socialist countries are unified, are under a common command. Maybe in this sense an attempt was made at the level of the Consultative Political Committee. Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu These are not common decisions. They can do anything amongst themselves, and we cannot prevent them from doing so, but within neither the framework of the Consultative Political Committee nor the framework of the Committee of Defense Ministers can such decisions be made. We cannot accept that such decisions be taken, and recognize them as being decisions of the Warsaw Treaty. For example, the Command of the Black Sea Fleet does not function, although they insist on that. Obviously, they act together with the Bulgarians. [The Command] does not function, and is not an organism approved and recognized by the Warsaw Treaty. Of course, I cannot prevent them from doing what they want, but as states. Cde. Virgil Trofin I would like to say also before the Consultative Political Committee that I wholly agree with the position presented within the framework of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, as well as with the stance adopted regarding the proposals made by Marshal Kulikov. The firm and clear positions expressed by cde. Nicolae Ceausescu in regard to the contemplated proposals and measures were not in fact discussed within the framework of the Consultative Political Committee since, if I take into consideration the positions adopted there by the other delegations, it is apparent that they asserted their support for the relevant draft [document], but have no argument to oppose what cde. Nicolae Ceausescu raised as issues of essence and procedure. I do not attribute this only to the fact that they had agreed beforehand on these issues. I would attribute it also to the fact that they did not know that our powerful arguments would be put forward there, and did not dare to think otherwise. I think that the idea of sending the Central Committees of the respective parties a letter in which to put forward clearly the point of view of our party on the relationships between the armies of the socialist countries, and on the way the statute of this organization is to be

observed is of great importance. The letter will give the leaderships of these parties the chance to reflect on the issues, to trigger discussions, and to find solutions, to the extent of their accepting what the letter contains. In point of fact, the functioning principles of this body were infringed. The most they could have done would have been to postpone this discussion so that in the meantime solutions could be found. Actually, the Statute of the Warsaw Treaty is not heeded any longer. It goes without saying that nobody can stop them from doing what they want to do in the relationships in the military field, but as long as we participate in this Military Pact it is normal that everything that is to be done should be agreed upon [with us]. You remember that we were not consulted in regard to Czechoslovakia; we were only sent a letter announcing us that they would enter Czechoslovakia that night. Otherwise, this Pact cannot have any validity whatever. If the general issues may still be discussed, in the military field very dangerous unilateral actions can also be undertaken. That is why in the letter we are going to send we will have to explain the importance of carrying out the activity of this body on the basis of the principles on which we agreed, and of observing these principles to the letter. I also take the view that it is very good to hold a plenary session of the Central Committee. I think that it would be good to hold, within the framework of the plenary session, a wider debate about our party's position on these issues. In addition, I also agree that in the solemn assembly these issues be debated as well. Debates should be held about the issues of creating the Romanian national unitary state, but the main debate should focus on what we have established. Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu said from the very beginning that we must underline what we have to do, and not from a historical point of view. It is clear that we evoke the moment, the significance, but we must emphasize what we have to do. We will have to ponder in the future as well about the agenda of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty. This report should not come from the Commander-in-Chief, but from the Committee of the Ministers of Defense. Actually, the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Defense will take place in the beginning of December. They probably will come with issues there, too. Cde. Stefan Andrei As I said yesterday, as one who took part in the delegation that was in Moscow, I express my full approval of and adhesion to the position of our delegation, of cde. Nicolae Ceausescu, at the Conference at Moscow. It is my firm conviction that the stance adopted by cde. Nicolae Ceausescu there was a reaffirmation of the independence policy of our party. It was apparent from the way things unfolded there that the Statute of the Warsaw Treaty had become uncomfortable for the Soviets. Even during the discussions here they said they would come with a series of issues outside the Warsaw Treaty. In fact, they also told me that the 1965 formulation was not adequate, and that with the other socialist countries they actually act like that. This is one issue. This is uncomfortable for them because, in fact, in their relationships with the other socialist countries they attained a degree of integration and domination that conflicted with the principles in 1955. The second issue. It is a fact that we must expect that they will try these actions of domination in other respects as well. In foreign policy, and on both party line and state line, the socialist countries are trained how to coordinate themselves, what to do even in Ghana, and also in Angola. It all boils down to what Brezhnev said as far back as 1974, namely they want to force the so-called "getting-closer" of the socialist countries in accordance with the prototype of the relationships existing between the republics of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev said it clearly in 1974. In connection with the way they received our objections yesterday. They were expecting it. What shocked me was this position of force of the military in the sense that they do not want to change anything. I had the conviction that they knew that Romania would not agree, and the stance of the military was not to change anything. On the other side, we can expect a number of difficulties on the economic line, too, going on the line of armament. They already have an increase of 4.6% in group A, and in group B - an increase of 4.2%; if the armament plan is added, difficulties will really appear in the development of economic relationships as well. That is why we must adopt the line of diversifying our economic and political relationships. From here also stems the need for us to develop our relationships with the developing countries. With this end in view, I will do my best to fulfill the tasks we have proposed ourselves in this field. Cde. Ion Dinca : I express my full accord with the activity carried out by our delegation, by comrade general secretary in person, at this session of the Consultative Political

Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty. I am convinced that our whole people and party will approve from the bottom of their hearts the activity carried out by you, cde. Ceausescu, and by our delegation. This will bring about the strengthening of the party's and people's ranks around their leadership, first of all around you, cde. Ceausescu. □As far back as March, 1962, when the COMECON issues were being discussed (I was working in the army at the time), it was proposed to us to create a series of bodies which were to function under the direct command of the Soviet army. The need was felt to exist at the time of a propaganda section of the Warsaw Treaty. All these were nothing else than attempts to take the military organs from under the leadership of the respective parties and subordinate them to the Soviet army. It is now apparent that they did not give up all these aims. In 1968 it was not easier either. Then, too, you carried out a prodigious activity. The decision of the Great National Assembly is still valid today. The way you acted this time as well proves to us to be a model of the manner in which we all are to militate further on this line. □I agree with the proposals made □Cde. Ceausescu, three big enterprises in our capital – 23 August, Grivita Rosie, and Vulcan – asked us to tell them what had been discussed at the Conference of the Consultative Political Committee. Consequently, this issue preoccupies people. I do not know what will be initiated, but working people wish to know these issues in more detail. I think that it is good for these issues to be discussed at the plenary session of the Central Committee, at the plenary session of the Socialist Unity Front, and in the Great National Assembly, but – in my opinion – it is also good to discuss them with working people. □Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu : □Of course, comrades, the issues of integration are not new from economic, political, and military points of view. Undoubtedly, such attempts are made on both the propaganda line and the press one, and their scope will become even greater. In fact, [Todor] Jivkov has already said that they no longer correspond to the current forms of economic collaboration, that they have been overtaken by realities, and that new ones have to be created. From this point of view, the activity will be intensified. To a number of questions we gave answers in due time, and we have decided that we will only participate in those actions in which we take an interest. This in regard to the issues of economic collaboration within the framework of COMECON. Naturally, the wish to integrate militarily, to set up a common DSPA, a common brass band and so on, including a common large-size cooking-pot will not disappear. □Cde. Ion Coman □The proposal was made to introduce a common type of uniform for all of the armies of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty. □Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu : □It seems that these issues are not new. It seems that we are now in a period, where the so-called complicated international situation is used, also taking advantage of the lack of a clear political leadership in the Soviet Union due to Brezhnev's illness, and everybody tries to demonstrate that they can do more. We must keep the policy established by the party's congresses, the Central Committee, and the Great National Assembly, a position that is wholly just and valid and we must apply it with all firmness. We must, however, act calmly but with all firmness, without closing our eyes, and answering firmly where necessary; we must not keep silent, but adopt a firm stance. Calmness is one thing, and firmness is quite another, they are two different things. You know that I have a rather bellicose nature where these issues are concerned, but in Moscow I presented our position regarding the debated issues very calmly. In fact, Brezhnev himself only said a few words. □Then let us proceed as we have established. Do you agree? (all the comrades agree). □This meeting is adjourned. 24.11.1978