

## **January 1968**

### **Polish-Soviet Talks in Lansk**

#### **Citation:**

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#### **Summary:**

Excerpts related to China from the Polish-Soviet talks of January 1968. Gomulka and Brezhnev agree that the "China issue will be the most difficult one during the consultative meeting in Budapest."

#### **Original Language:**

Polish

#### **Contents:**

Translation - English

Polish-Soviet Talks in Lansk  
January 12-14, 1968

Secret  
[Excerpts regarding China]

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Gomulka: As far as the issue of the [communist parties'] conference, we are in agreement on this. The China issue will be the most difficult one during the consultative meeting in Budapest. How shall we put it during the meeting? We still don't have an idea as how to tactically, and in a beneficial manner, to broach this issue so we get the support from the international communist movement. We cannot avoid the issue, but we should present it in a calm manner in that so we can influence the Chinese communists by stating that, sure, there's a group which departed from Marxism, but there are also those communists whom we have to be fighting for. However, we still don't have any clear idea [on how to approach this issue].

The pronouncements will be published. There will be differences of opinion and we won't be able to say anything that won't leak to the outside. This is why it is better to have the statements printed out ahead of time and to be aware when one is preparing one's own statements. I think that we should get to know our own statements ahead of time.

The most important thing to say is that the resolutions from the Moscow meetings in 1957 and 1960 are enforced in principle and to show what has changed since then. There is a proposal to adopt three documents. If not all will vote in favor of all of the three documents, then it won't be a big deal. The most important thing is for the CPSU to deeply think about the content of its pronouncement because this statement will be of particular significance.

We should assume that the Romanians, as well as Castro and others, can come out with something prior to the meeting. We should not, however, add oil to the fire as far as the internal struggle, but it will be difficult to just keep silent if that happens. This is a complicated issue. The representatives of the six parties have agreed upon some issues, but will the others react, for example, the Italians? They will also underscore their independence even in that they will point out things that they don't agree with.

Brezhnev: Yes, the Chinese problem at the consultative meeting will not be easy. At the Politburo meeting, we have examined the materials on China worked out by the international departments [NOTE: reference here to the Interkit Meeting in Moscow in December 1967], but they are not suitable for the [consultative] meeting. There will be difficulties, because as the meeting approaches and during its proceedings, the Chinese will surely not cease their propaganda in which they use unceremoniously insults, invectives, etc. Perhaps we should not give up our counter-propaganda, at least not for the next half a year before the meeting. However, the problem lies in that that [North] Korea, Cuba, or Vietnam won't be participating in the meeting. The Vietnamese continue to think that we should only receive, but they are not willing to take sides [in the Sino-Soviet split].

The Romanians said that they would come to the consultative meeting. They did not say, however, for what. Perhaps to cause trouble? They have already made it clear that the big conference has to be postponed.

Gomulka: The Yugoslavs are offended that they have not been invited. There is a the issue of the Chinese convening their own separate meeting, but we doubt that this will happen at this point.

