

**July 16, 1952**

**Ciphered Telegram No. 502597, Razuvaev to Cdes.  
Vasilevsky and Vyshinsky, transmitting message  
from Kim Il Sung to I.V. Stalin**

**Citation:**

"Ciphered Telegram No. 502597, Razuvaev to Cdes. Vasilevsky and Vyshinsky, transmitting message from Kim Il Sung to I.V. Stalin", July 16, 1952, Wilson Center Digital Archive, APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Listy 65-68; AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 40-43; and RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 348, ll. 0065-0068.  
<https://wilson-center.drivingcreative.com/document/113640>

**Summary:**

Telegram from Kim Il Sung to Stalin stating the current situation of the armistice talks and the pressure which is being exerted upon North Korea by uninhibited American air power. He makes a request for additional anti-aircraft support from the Soviet Union and China, which he believes will lead to a more advantageous bargaining position at the negotiating table.

**Original Language:**

Russian

**Contents:**

Translation - English

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 502597/sh

From Correspondent 20 Sent 17.7.52

18:45 Received 17.7 20:50

Sent to 8th Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army 17.7 21:10

Extremely Urgent

To Comrade A. Vasilevsky

To Comrade A.Ia. Vyshinsky

I report the letter from KIM IL SUNG to Comrade STALIN I.V. of 16.7.52.

RAZUVAEV

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky.

No. 2250

17.7.52

"Respected comrade ambassador, I ask you to bring to the attention of Comrade STALIN I.V. the contents of the following telegram:

"Dear Comrade STALIN I.V.

I consider it necessary to report to you, Josef Visarrionovich, about the following: proceeding from a general analysis of the situation in Korea the possibility is not excluded that the negotiations for an armistice can be drawn out for an indefinite period of time.

Over the past year of negotiations we have virtually curtailed military operations and moved to a passive defense.

Such a position has led to the fact that the enemy almost without suffering any kind of losses constantly inflicts on us huge losses in manpower and material values.

Thus, for example, just recently the enemy put out of operation all the electrical stations of Korea and because of the active operations of VVS [air force] does not allow the possibility to restore them, which has caused and continues to cause huge losses to the entire national economy of the DPRK.

In only one 24 hour period of barbaric bombing, of only one city of Pyongyang (on July 11 and the night of July 12) more than 6,000 peaceful inhabitants were killed and wounded.

The enemy, making use of this situation, makes demands in the negotiations that are unacceptable to us.

Naturally, the Chinese friends refuse to accept these conditions. We share the opinion of Comrade MAO ZEDONG on this question.

However, in order to spare the DPRK and its people suffering and unjustified, needless losses, it is necessary for us hopefully to provide cover for the most important sites and to go over to active operations.

For this it would be desirable:

1. To strengthen antiaircraft defense. By our accounting, for this it is necessary to receive additional arms for ten antiaircraft regiments (including three middle caliber regiments and seven small caliber regiments).

It is desirable in connection with this that the Chinese comrades put out half and that the KPA receive arms for five antiartillery regiments directly from you.

2. To activate the night operations of the VVS [Air Force] of the KPA [Korean People's Army] and CPV [Chinese People's Volunteers]. It is necessary to cover North Korea in the daytime with fighter aviation, if only up to the line of Pyongyang.

VVS of the KPA is prepared at any time to begin active military operations. Along with this, in the near future 40 crews of KPA TU-2 pilots will finish their training in the Soviet Union. We would like for these pilots to come to the DPRK together with TU-2 airplanes so that they could immediately take part in active military operations and bring influence to bear on important enemy sites.

3. To carry out a number of ground operations, appreciable to the enemy, so as to divert the operations of the enemy VVS from our rear and to influence the course of the negotiations in Kaeseong.

Aside from all of this, to raise the battle capability of the KPA it is extremely necessary for us to receive from you in the nearest future technical goods and materials according to our note of January 10, 1952 and July 9, 1952 and application for 1952 in the note of October 6, 1951, within the limits of your possibilities.

4. In Kaeseong we need simultaneously to move decisively toward the soonest conclusion of an armistice, a ceasefire and transfer of all prisoners of war on the basis of the Geneva convention. These demands are supported by all peace loving peoples and will lead us out of a passive position in Kaeseong.

The change in the character of military operations on the ground and in the air will have a corresponding, desirable influence on the enemy.

A telegram of analogous content was sent to comrade MAO ZEDONG.

The Korean people are boundlessly grateful to you for the enormous selfless assistance being rendered to the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

We await your orders and advice on the aforementioned questions.

We wish you good health and long years of life for the well-being and happiness of progressive humanity.

With deep respect and esteem

Your Kim Il Sung

Pyongyang 16.7.52.”