

June 24, 1975

**Memorandum for General Scowcroft from W.R.
Smyser, "Defense of the Northwest UNC-Controlled
Islands in Korea"**

Citation:

"Memorandum for General Scowcroft from W.R. Smyser, "Defense of the Northwest UNC-Controlled Islands in Korea"", June 24, 1975, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security Adviser Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (7). Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.
<https://wilson-center.drivingcreative.com/document/114037>

Summary:

Richard Smyser writes to General Brent Scowcroft about the defense of the five islands off the northwest coast of Korea and whether or not the defense of these islands is bound to the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty.

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English

Contents:

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Transcript - English

MEMORANDUM

4333

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET GDSACTION

June 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

W. R. SMYER

SUBJECT:

Defense of the Northwest UNC-Controlled
Islands in Korea

Heightened concern about North Korea's intentions in the wake of the Indochina collapse has underscored the vulnerability of the five islands off the northwest coast of Korea. President Park, in a letter of May 12 to ROK Defense Minister Suh, instructed the Minister to work out jointly with General Stilwell a coordinated plan for the defense of the islands in case of large-scale surprise attack by the enemy. Minister Suh, in a subsequent letter to General Stilwell of May 13 requested that a clear-cut policy on the defense of the islands be established as soon as possible. Minister Suh specifically requested that the plans provide for the contingency employment of U.S. air and naval forces in the defense of the islands (see Tab B).

The issue is whether or not we should affirm that the islands indeed fall under the MDT and thus whether or not to engage in joint planning. (A year ago when the ROK unilaterally reinforced the island garrison

If we assume that joint planning is now appropriate and necessary,

Ambassador Sneider and General Stilwell have both recommended that we engage in joint planning regarding the islands

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MRB 10-130, #10

state ltr 9/17/10; OSD ltr 9/25/10

By dal NARA, Date 12/8/10


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State/Defense Position

A joint State/Defense message attached at Tab A reaffirms that the islands fit the definition of territory under ROK administrative control and therefore come under the MDT. The message authorizes CINCUNC to discuss planning for the defense of the islands with a view toward reaching understanding that (a) the ROK will not act precipitously and unilaterally and CINCUNC will exercise opcon of ROK forces; and (b) in the event of an attack on the islands, CINCUNC will immediately commit ROK forces but these commitments must not jeopardize the capability to defend the ROK as a whole.

Our ViewSECRET

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[REDACTED]

Except for this addition, we recommend approval of the joint State/ Defense message. Joint planning will remove the element of ambiguity regarding our commitment, will reassure the ROK, and once Pyongyang hears of it may constrain DPRK adventures. By asserting CINCUNC opcon, we will also be better able to control ROK response and to head off any precipitous ROK effort [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the joint Defense/State cable at Tab A with our recommended addition.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Approve without our addition _____

*Review guidance
in cable in wake
of Dec. 1950
trip (and outcome
his talks) per
prBS.*

SECRET

MEMORANDUM 4333

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET GDS ACTION

June 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: W.R. SMYER

SUBJECT: Defense of the Northwest UNC-Controlled
Islands in Korea

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Our View

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Recommendation

That you approve the joint Defense/State cable at Tab A with our recommended addition.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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Approve without our addition _____