

September 18, 1969

**Report about a Meeting with the General Director of
the Iraqi Directorate for Security, Lieutenant
General al-Ani**

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Summary:

Iraq's General Director of Security al-Ani seeks a solution to deal with the United States, West Germany, Israel, and other imperialist and reactionary states have launched active diversionary activities against the new Iraqi regime. The solution that he reaches is to contact the socialist countries for help, beginning with East Germany. Al-Ani meets with the East Germans and they are not opposed to cooperation between the two states.

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R e p o r t

about a Meeting with the General Director of the Iraqi Directorate for Security,
Lieutenant General al-Ani

The meeting was held on 15 September 1969 between 1400 and 1700 hours.

Present:

Lieutenant General al-Ani

Comrade Colonel Wagner (Jänicke)

the undersigned as interpreter [Strauss]

On the General Director's Mission

General Director for Security al-Ani informed that the new regime in Iraq tasked him in 1968 with issues of security. He took over the General Directorate for Security which exists for about 40 years. The Iraqi security apparatus is in no way up to the challenges and tasks of the new regime. So far the security apparatus was exclusively content with monitoring political parties in the country, like for instance the Baath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party. There was no department within the security directorate concerned with espionage and diversionary activities by imperialist countries against Iraq. Previously, leading officials of the Iraqi security apparatus collaborated with the CIA. Through clear evidence the former Iraqi Minister of Interior was now identified as a CIA agent. He has made a public confession in this regard.

The new regime in Iraq has commissioned the security organs with new tasks, in particular with regard to an offensive fight against diversionary activities conducted by imperialist states and reactionary neighboring countries (Iran, Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, Israel). Currently the security apparatus faces the completely new challenge to organize a counterintelligence. The United States, West Germany, Israel, and other imperialist and reactionary states have launched active diversionary activities against the new Iraqi regime. A large number of agents of Iraqi nationality was successfully arrested, but there exists a lack of experience, trained cadres and technological means to infiltrate imperialist centers.

Therefore the President, the Revolutionary Command Council and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior have decided to turn to the socialist countries for help. So far the Iraqi security organs have addressed only the GDR for support (with this visit by al-Ani to Berlin). It is possible that they will also turn to the USSR following an according decision by the Revolutionary Command Council. Al-Ani explained how a decision by his government to ask the Soviet Union for support is contingent on the result of his visit to the GDR. He also informed that the character of his mission is not known to his embassy in Berlin and other government agencies in Iraq (except for the President, the Revolutionary Command Council, and the Ministry of Interior).

The details of the General Director's request to the GDR for support are as follows:

a) Training of Iraqi security officers in the GDR:

□□ Training of officers (about 5) to run secret observations
□□ training of officers (about 5) in the field of operative means of communication
(secret ink and decoding of secret enemy communication; operation of mini
transmitters, bugging devices and other means of operative technology)
□□ training in the field of personal protection
□□

He also asked to provide them with instruction films, textbooks and course material to conduct training sessions in Iraq. He wished to see a beginning of training for Iraqi officers in the GDR as soon as possible. Duration of training is contingent on objective needs; he talked about 1-2 months.

b) Providing GDR support through operative technology and equipment

He mentioned those concrete requests:

Mini recorders, mini transmitters, control instruments to identify surveillance technology, phone wiretaps, microphones, letter opening equipment, mini and regular cameras, detectors to identify explosives in the transportation sector (airplanes, airports, trains, ports), opening devices for all kinds of locks, x-ray equipment to identify contents of containers, a lie detector to train its own employees, guns with sound absorbers, signal transmitters (which e.g. are attachable to vehicles to identify their location). They also need help in radio fix training, although they will start it only after one year due to its costliness. Furthermore, he asked for advice to create complex security systems and planning for ministries, important factories, and other essential objects. In addition, he requested the sharing of experiences and support for operative tasks, such as arrests of main agents abroad and their secret transfer to Iraqi territory (here he mentioned for instance a main CIA agent, an Iraqi lawyer who directs central activities against Iraq from Beirut, London, and Kuwait; the assistant of this agent was arrested).

Al-Ani asked for a positive and urgent review of these requests from the Iraqi security organs. He explained that imperialist intelligence services increase their hostile activities against the new regime in Iraq in order to achieve a breakthrough in the Middle East and thus against the socialist camp.

□□ Results of the Meeting

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Comrade Wagner first noted how the visit by the General Director took us very much by surprise. We did not receive any exact information and only a very much delayed pre-announcement. Thus it is impossible to provide him with a response in the next days already. Due to extensive commitments for the GDR security organs in the context of the 20th Anniversary of the GDR [7 October 1969], we can come up with a response in four to six weeks at the earliest. It was agreed to deliver, probably by the end of October, a response to the General Director in Baghdad after the Stasi leadership completed a review and arrived at a decision. The General Director asked for sending an authorized Stasi representative to Baghdad at this point in order to further discuss his proposals.

Furthermore, Comrade Wagner noted how it makes sense to hold some of the requested training sessions on site in Iraq (like e.g. surveillance, personal protection). Due to different environmental conditions you can only offer theoretical courses in the GDR. The General Director stated his willingness to welcome respective coaches

in Iraq.

As far as operative technology is concerned, the General Director was informed about the need for a review conducted by specialists (for instance whether equipment is tropicalized). It was noted how it would make more sense to discuss the question of operative technology with Soviet security organs.

Upon our request, al-Ani informed about his agreement with the GDR Ministry of Interior to delegate Iraqi police officers for training to the GDR and send GDR specialists from traffic and transportation police (railways) to Iraq.

At the end, Comrade Colonel Wagner summarized results of the meeting as follows: It is not possible to make a firm commitment right now. He referred to the need for an according decision by the GDR Minister for State Security. He promised to correctly forward to the Minister the requests and wishes expressed. The General Director will receive a response in about 4 to 6 weeks.

Al-Ani expressed his regret that the decision cannot be made earlier but overall he stated his agreement. He asked for setting a firm date for the transmission of a response so he can make sure to be in Baghdad at that date. Thus we agreed on delivering him a response during the last week of October.

Political Issues at the Meeting

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At the beginning, Comrade Colonel Wagner had the guest informed about the difficult tasks of GDR security organs. Those are due to especially strong subversive activities and ideological diversions directed against the socialist German state by imperialist intelligence services via West Germany and West Berlin.

The General Director stated the new regime in Iraq feels very close to the GDR. Both peoples fight against the same enemy of imperialism. He referred to the recent trials in Iraq and informed how about 50 agents of the United States and Israel were sentenced to death; about 50 additional sentences are to be expected over the coming weeks. Iraqi security organs had brought up clear evidence for agent activities by these people for the United States and Israel.

As far as the Kurdish problem is concerned, he stated: The new regime was ready to keep the armistice agreement with Kurdish leader Mustafa, in particular since the major part of the Iraqi army is deployed along the Jordan-Israeli border. Mustafa, however, has called for armed struggle. He represents the interests of Kurdish large landowners and collaborates with the U.S. and the reactionary regime in Iran (al-Ani referred to evidence of Persian arms and money shipments to the Kurdish leader). Mustafa is supported only by one Kurdish tribe, the majority of Kurds is against a continuation of armed struggle. The Democratic Kurdish Party has built an armed Kurdish militia fighting against Mustafa.

In this context al-Ani also explained that the Kurdish question figures as the main difference between the new regime and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). For the first time in Iraqi history the ICP has received all freedoms and can participate in government. However, the ICP views Mustafa as the representative of the entire Kurdish people, something the government cannot accept. The ICP proposes a peaceful solution of the Kurdish question. Yet this is impossible as long as Mustafa

continues with armed struggle.

About the person of al-Ani:

The General Director informed that he joined police college after graduation from school. So far he has served in the police forces for 22 years. He is heading the Directorate for Iraq's Security since 1968 in the rank of a Lieutenant General. During the meeting he left a solid impression. He acted modestly and reserved. He did not make any straight demands, but raised his wishes and requests in an acceptable manner. At the same time he also did not push for fulfillment of all his requests. Instead he asked for a review to what extent assistance from the GDR looks feasible.

Apparently al-Ani is a well-trained and experienced police officer. During the talks he was open and serious, he refrained from diplomatic phrases and making any dodges. Repeatedly he stressed the close friendship of his country with the GDR and made positive statements about political and social developments in the GDR.

It is necessary to check all available information on Lieutenant General al-Ani as an individual and do an exact assessment of his person. The facts we know about him (based on information from the Soviet fraternal organ) have to be reviewed again in order to arrive at a correct assessment.

[Signed] Jänicke
Colonel

[Signed] Strauss
Lieutenant [Interpreter]