

June 9, 1962

Soviet Report by Cuban Involvement in Assisting Partisans in Other Latin American Countries

Citation:

"Soviet Report by Cuban Involvement in Assisting Partisans in Other Latin American Countries", June 9, 1962, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Archive of the Federal Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, File 88631, vol 4. https://wilson-center.drivingcreative.com/document/114518

Summary:

Report on a conversation between Fidel Castro and Soviet representatives. Castro believed that revolutionary situation has developed in all Central American countries (except Mexico) and a few South American countries. In his opinion, a slight push in the form of armed actions by partisans would rally the peasant masses and bring about regime change. The report also discussed Havana's low opinion of many Latin American Communist Parties. Cuba's bypassing these parties in interfering in the respective countries' affairs worsened the relations between them and Havana.

Credits:

This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation

Original Language:

Russian

Contents:

Original Scan
Translation - English

после чего они в своих странах спокойно придут к власти и займутс распределением портфелей."

-- тиях-в Чили, Уругвае, Сальвадоре и Парагвае.

Составлена (отпечатана) в...____.экз., учтена в журнале

_и подшета в дело № (DOMESTER)

COBEPAL: 5:11. 686 - 333358eeca

СПРАВКА

с входящей (исходящей) шифртелеграммы № 16743/467

от 9 мбня _____1962 г. /продолжение/


Кастро заявил, что поскольку компартии ряда стран не понимая обстановки и догиатически применяя марксистско-ленинскую теорир о вооруженной борьбе трудящихся масс, проявляют нерешительность в организации партизанской борьбы, они вынуждены контактироваться в этом деле и оказывать помощь другим более активным политическим организациям, таким, как крестьянская дига в Бразилии, МИР в Венецуэл перонистское движение в Аргентине, студенческие иранские организаци в Колумбии, "13 ноября" в Гватемале и т.п. Кастро выразил надежду, что руководство КПСС и советское правительство правильно поймут в оценят политическую линию ОРО на Латинскую Америку и окажут помощь и содействие в проведении этой линии, которая направлена на прорыв самого слабого звена американского империализма, которым в настояще время является Летинская Америка. Кастро намеревается обсудить этот вопрос с советскими руководителями во время его пребывания в СССР осенью этого года.

Необходимо отметить, что политическая и тактическая диния кубинских друзей в странах Латинской Америки вызывает недовольств руководства компартий Аргентины, Бразилии, Венесуэлы, Эквадора и Гватемалы, которые, в частности не согласны с механическим перенесением кубинского опыта партиванской борьбы, послешностью, а также считают неправильным, когда кубинцы устанавливают контакты с другими политическими организациями в обход компартий, поддерживают их материально и проводят свою работу через них. Фортуни, представитель гватемальской партии труда, рассказал руководителям резидентуры, что кубинцы засылают подготовленные партизанские группы в Гватемалу, не консультируясь с гватемальцами. В частности онк подготовили партизанскую группу "13 ноября" на территории Мексики, которой было вручено IO тысяч доливров/при переходе мексиканскогватемальской границы эта группа была полностью арестована/. Аналогичные жалобы высказывали представители компартий Эквадора /продолжение на следующем лиете, печатана) в....... эк , учтена в журнале 22 14

Исполнитель

 ω . И повинта в дело N_0

(фамилия)



TOP SECRET (when filled)

REPORT

from incoming (outgoing) ciphered telegram# 16743/467 from 9 June 1962

Comr. [7 chars. blacked out, probably Alexeev- transl.] from Havana reported that F. Castro, in a conversation with our representatives, mentioned two questions concerning the situation in Latin American countries and the decision made by the Cuban government and the ORO [Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas] leadership.

During the meeting Castro declared that the Cuban government and the leadership of the ORO had carefully studied the economic situation, the arrangement of political power, and the possibility of overthrowing the existing regimes in Latin American countries, prior to determining the political and strategic line regarding these countries. It is Castro's firm conviction that a revolutionary situation has developed in all Central American countries (except Mexico) as well as [7 chars. blacked out] in a number of South American countries (Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, Paraguay), and only a slight push is needed in order to raise the people to armed rebellion.

In Castro's opinion, such a push could come in the form of armed actions by well organized, mobile partisan groups in the provinces of any of these countries, which could later attract to their cause the peasant masses which, in Castro's opinion, are the primary resource [sila] in the struggle against the current Latin American regimes.

Evaluating the activities of Latin American Communist parties, Castro said that the overwhelming majority of the communist parties in these countries are not the true vanguard of the working masses, are cluttered with petite bourgeoisie elements, infected with sectarianism, are out of touch with the masses and represent a very weak political force. Moreover, he noted ironically that the 'leadership of these parties is not undertaking any activism, but waiting until the USSR drops atom bombs on the USA, after which they will quietly come to power in their countries and occupy themselves with distribution of portfoglios."

Castro spoke more or less positively only of the communist parties in Chile, Uruguay, Salvador and Paraguay.

Castro declared that since the communist parties of a number of countries do not understand the situation nor the dogmatic adoption of Marxist-Leninist theory in the armed struggle of the working masses and demonstrate indecisiveness in the organization of the partisan struggle, they [the Cubans] are forced to establish contacts themselves and give assistance to other, more active political organizations such as the Peasant League in Brazil, MIR in Venezuela, the Peronist movement in Argentina, student Iran [iranskiie] organizations in Colombia, "13 November" in Guatemala, etc. Castro expressed hope that the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet government will correctly interpret and evaluate the political line of the ORO toward Latin America and will give assistance and help carry out this line, which is directed at breaking the weakest link of American imperialism, which is currently Latin America. Castro intends to discuss this question with the Soviet leadership during his visit to the USSR in the autumn of this year. One must note that the political and tactical line of the Cuban friends in Latin American countries provokes dissatisfaction in the communist party leadership of Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador and Guatemala, which disagrees in particular with the general haste and the mechanical transfer of the Cuban experience in partisan warfare, and also believes that it is wrong for the Cubans to establish contacts with other political organizations, bypassing the communist parties, to support these organizations and carry out their work through them. Fortuni, representative of the Guatemalan Labor Party explained to the chiefs of stations [rezidentura] that the Cubans send over trained partisan groups into Guatemala without consulting with the Guatemalans. In particular, they trained the partisan group "13 November" on Mexican territory, which received [from them] 10 thousand dollars (when crossing the Mexican-Guatemalan border this entire group was arrested). Analogous complaints were expressed by representatives of the communist parties of Ecuador and Salvador. The Cubans established contact with the leaders of the peasant league of Juliao and give him economic assistance; this was a reason for a significant deterioration in relations between the leadership of the Communist party of Brazil and the Cuban leaders.

RESOLUTIONS: [1 0 chars. blacked out] Please, come for a talk. - SAKHAROVSKII

11.6.62

[20 chars. blacked out] 11.6.62

REPORT: [7 chars. blacked out] reported on the contents of the c[iphered] t[elegram] to comr.

KHRUSHCHEV orally.

1 copy (typed), referenced in ntbk. as [10 chars. blacked out], included in file [1 0 chars. blacked out]

[..] June 1962 Executed by [blacked out]

TK4951