

December 12, 1970 Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

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Summary:

The Embassy of Hungary in North Korean reports on North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union and China as well as the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

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[...]

On November 21st of this year, the departing Bulgarian ambassador, Cde. Misho Nikolov [emphasis in the original], left for home for good. [...]

The utterances which the Korean leaders—in sequence: Kim Il Sung, general secretary of the KWP CC and chairman of the DPRK Council of Ministers; Pak Seong-cheol [Pak Song Chol], member of the KWP Politburo and second vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers; Kim Dong-gyu [Kim Tong Gyu], member of the KWP Politburo and CC secretary; and Heo Dam [Ho Tam], member of the KWP CC and foreign minister—made in the presence of the departing Bulgarian ambassador were particularly important, partly because these statements were made on November 18, 19, and 20, respectively, i.e., only a few days after the end of the 5th congress of the KWP, and they covered various important questions of internal and foreign politics which had been left unmentioned, or covered in a conspicuously brief way (and in a rather debatable perspective), at the Korean party congress [...].

On November 18th, Comrade Kim Il Sung [emphasis in the original] received Comrade Ambassador Nikolov for a farewell visit. [...] [Kim Il Sung:] "Comrade Ambassador, please tell Comrade [Bulgarian leader Todor] Zhivkov that when the relationship of these two allied [Communist] Great Powers was good, the Koreans were relaxed, but when their relationship deteriorated, the situation of the Korean people became very difficult. It is very difficult to regulate our relations with our two big allies without offending any of them in the process. We, Koreans, make great efforts not to offend any of our elder brothers. We, Koreans, on our part, intend to reinforce our contacts with both elder brothers on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and during this process we do not intend to please any of them to a greater extent than the other [emphasis in the original].

[...] Following the signing of the armistice, different and contradicting views and tendencies appeared in our party, but we overcame them. Due to similar circumstances, a few fraternal parties found themselves in a difficult situation in 1956. Here the situation did not degenerate to such an extent as in other countries, because the membership of our party remained united. Our experiences have proven that one should not weaken the education of the party membership and the youth, not even for a single moment, because otherwise both the party membership and the youth will fall victim to the enemy [emphasis in the original].

[...]

When the KWP and the government of the DPRK insist on solving the Korean question, they do not want to make the international situation more difficult. The KWP does not want a world war to break out because of Korea [emphasis in the original]. [...] The outbreak of a war between South Korea and the DPRK may indeed result in the involvement of their allies, which would mean the start of a new world war. We, Koreans, do our best to keep the solution of the Korean question within the confines of Korea, or rather that of South Korea. Comrade Ambassador, please tell Comrade Zhivkov: if we use sharper words now and then, this does not mean that we give up the idea of peaceful unification [emphasis in the original]. In our opinion, the most important element of our efforts for [achieving] a solution is [our effort to facilitate] the growth of the South Korean revolutionary forces and carry out the South Korean revolution. In our view, the essence of the solution is the following: the South Korean people should overthrow Park Chung Hee, seize power, and start negotiations with the DPRK about the peaceful unification of the motherland. We do not want to, and will not, negotiate with Park Chung Hee, because he is a national traitor, a servant of American imperialism. Up to now he invariably rebuffed every proposal of ours to establish contacts [between the two Koreas]. Park Chung Hee's latest proposal to establish certain contacts between South and North is nothing but a deceitful

electioneering trick used in the campaign preceding the South Korean presidential elections of 1971. If Kim Dae-jung, the presidential candidate of the oppositional New Democratic Party, wins next year's presidential elections, we will negotiate with him. Although Kim Dae-jung is also an anti-Communist, his public as well as unofficial plans are the following: creating a democratic power structure in South Korea, guaranteeing the democratic rights of the population, establishing contacts with the Soviet Union and China, initiating talks with the DPRK about peaceful unification, and pursuing a neutralist foreign policy. And if all this can be realized, it will be indeed unnecessary to wage war to solve the Korean question. [...]

Certain people may disapprove and fail to understand our triple slogan, 'independence, self-reliance, and self-defense' [emphasis in the original]. Certain people happen to think that the DPRK does not need support and assistance, or they think that by using this slogan, we want to keep the foreign assistance from our people. But this slogan is not directed against the fraternal countries [emphasis in the original]. When we announced this slogan, we had the South Korean situation in mind, because the South Korean people does not know proletarian internationalism. By using this slogan, we want to detach the South Korean people from the USA and Japan. This slogan already has many supporters in South Korea. Recently it was the South Korean students who raised this slogan, making a declaration in which they demanded that the USA should cease interfering in the internal affairs of South Korea. We consider the revolutionizing of the South Korean masses an important task." [...]

[Pak Seong-cheol:] "It appears to us that a few foreign comrades do not sufficiently understand us [emphasis in the original]. They give us the following advice: we, Koreans, should practice greater self-restraint. Certain people are of the opinion that, for instance, we should not have sunk the South Korean patrol boat No. 56, we should not have captured the Pueblo, we should not have shot down the American EC-121 spy plane, and so on. But this is demagoguery, which is based entirely on misinformation and illusions about the USA. We do have to react to the provocative steps taken by the enemy, we must firmly defend our achievements."

On November 20th, Foreign Minister Heo Dam [emphasis in the original] gave a farewell dinner in honor of the departing Ambassador Nikolov and his wife. [...]

[Heo Dam:] "A few foreign comrades misinterpret our struggle against revisionism, of which our leader spoke at our 5th party congress [emphasis in the original]. Some of them already asked whom Comrade Kim II Sung meant by speaking about revisionists. It is clear that Comrade Kim II Sung meant, and spoke about, the revisionists of our country. This is also revealed by the fact that this subject was covered in the chapter on party work, rather than in the chapter on international activity." [...] (Heo Dam did not tell that to the Bulgarian ambassador, but Kim Yun-seon [Kim Yun Son], the deputy head of the International Liaisons Office of the [Korean Workers' Party] CC, told the Soviet ambassador, whom he informed about the results of the congress, that the revisionist elements criticized at the congress were, above all, Pak Geum-cheol [Pak Kum Chol], Ri Hyo-sun [Ri Hyo Sun], Kim Do-man [Kim To Man], and Pak Yong-guk [Pak Yong Guk], who had been replaced before or in the wake of the party conference held in 1966. At the time of their dismissal, the first was a Politburo member and CC secretary, the second a Politburo member and the head of the South Korean department of the CC, the third the deputy head of the CC department for agitation and propaganda, and the fourth the head of the International Liaisons Office of the CC.) "Some of them even asked whether Comrade Kim II Sung had had the Soviet Union in mind when he spoke about the struggle against revisionism," Heo Dam continued. "We replied that this was not the case! After all, in the report [of the congress] there was no such term as 'modern revisionism,' the term that the Chinese habitually use when they castigate the Soviet Union.

The recent development of Korean-Chinese relations has raised doubts in some

foreign comrades, [inspiring them to ask] whether we want to worsen our relations with the Soviet Union [emphasis in the original]. I can say," Heo Dam emphasized, "that this will never happen! [emphasis in the original] We strive to improve our relations both with China and the Soviet Union." [...]

Jenő Sebestyén (Ambassador) [...] 00 110 210, 000 000 000 00, 00 0000[Misho Nikolov] [00 00 00] 000 00 000. [...] [...] [...] [...] 110 200 000 00 [00 00 00]0 0000 00 00000 00 0000 0000 0 000 0000 000. [...] [aa:] aa aa aaa aa 5a aaaaa aa aaaa aaa aaaa [revisionism]a aa aaa aa aaa aa. [aa aa aa]. a [--- and and an an anno anno anno, ann (annon) anno an ann ann ann ann ann an' (an an an) ann "c □□ □□□□□(Jenő Sebestyén) $(\Box\Box)$