

August 28, 1970

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan, Concerning US Military Reduction

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Summary:

Principal Secretary of UNCURK Zouheir Kuzbari informs Chef de Cabinet of the UN C.V. Narasimhan about the talks between Spiro Agnew and Park Chung Hee. The talks concerned the reduction of US troops and military assistance to the ROK. No final agreement was reached.

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c.c. Mr Kutakov

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CONFIDENTIAL

4 September 1970

My dear Kuzbari.

I acknowledge receipt of your report dated 28 August on the recent discussions between the U.S. Vice-President and the ROK President.

I have taken note of its contents.
With kind regards,

On the other was Yours sincerely,

C. V. Narasimhan Chef de Cabinet

Mr Zouheir Kuzberi Principal Secretary UNCURK Seoul Kores

UNITED NATIONS



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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA (UNCURK)

CONFIDENTIAL

Seoul, 28 August 1970

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

The extensive talks which were held this week between U.S. Vice-President, Spiro Agnew, and the ROK President, Park Chung Hee, on the question of U.S. troops reduction in South Korea and the U.S. military assistance to this country have apparently led to no final agreement.

Vice-President Agnew came ostensibly to assure the South Korean leaders that while the U.S. is determined to go ahead with its plans to reduce its ground forces here, nevertheless, it intends to provide the South Koreans with the necessary military equipment in order to modernize its army. As an indication of the U.S. willingness to do so, the Vice-President stated upon his arrival that the U.S. will transfer a wing of F-4 tactical fighter planes from Japan to Korea to bolster its air defence.

On the other hand, the ROK President insisted during those talks that there should be no further reduction of U.S. troops in Korea beyond the 20,000 troops already announced and that the U.S. should provide the ROK with 3 billion dollars over a period of 5 or 6 years in order to modernize its armed forces. In addition, the President was reported to have demanded a written pledge from the U.S. that it will come automatically to its help in case of an armed attack by North Korea. He also insisted that his government will not discuss the question of U.S. troops reduction without first agreeing on the extent of future U.S. military help to the ROK.

During those talks, it was also made known that the U.S. side did not share the ROK's apprehension of North Korea's military intentions, and the U.S. Vice-President pointed to President Park that according to his assessment the North Korean military posture is primarily of a defensive character and there are no evidences to support the ROK's view of an imminent attack by North Korea.

The U.S. position has been further clarified when Vice-President Agnew stated that there was no change in the 1971 deadline for the withdrawal of the 20,000 U.S. troops and that

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan Chef de Cabinet United Nations New York once the modernization programme of the ROK army is completed, the U.S. hopes to completely withdraw all its forces from Korea. The differences in views of both sides on these questions became apparent when contradictory statements were made by both sides at the conclusion of those talks. While Vice-President Agnew stated after his departure from Korea that he had reached a basic accord with President Park Chung Hee on the time table of withdrawing U.S. troops from Korea and future American military aid, the ROK Government denied that such an agreement was reached with the U.S. side.

At the conclusion of these talks, it was not made clear whether there will be further discussions between the two sides on the problem of U.S. troops reduction and the modernization of the ROK army or further clarifications are needed after Vice-President Agnew reports on the outcome of his discussions here to President Nixon.

The ROK Government's anxiety on these developments can be viewed in terms of its domestic issues and the fact that in 1971 there would be presidential elections in the country. President Park does not wish to appear that his position in the country has been weakened because of the new U.S. moves in Korea.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Santa Kole.

Zouheir Kuzbari Principal Secretary