

**October 18, 1951**

**Cable No. 25025, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin]**

**Citation:**

"Cable No. 25025, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin]", October 18, 1951, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense (TsAMO). Obtained by Andrei Mefodievich Ledovskii.

<https://wilson-center.drivingcreative.com/document/117408>

**Summary:**

Mao writes to Stalin regarding an upcoming conference to discuss strategy for an armistice ending the Korean War.

**Credits:**

This document was made possible with support from Leon Levy Foundation

**Original Language:**

Russian

**Contents:**

Translation - English

## SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CABLE № 25025

Copies to Cde. Stalin  
to Cde. Stalin  
to Cde. Molotov  
to Cde. Beria  
to Cde. Kaganovich  
to Cde. Bulganin

from [BEIJING] received at 1135 19 October 1951  
Copy № 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN  
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC  
757  
Incoming № 254/3612/shs 19 October 1951]

Series G.  
T

to Cde. FILIPPOV

Cde. FILIPPOV!

I am sending you the text of my telegram to Cde. Li Kenong of 0530 18 October 1951 for [your] information.

"Cde. Le Kenong, copy to Cdes. Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai. I have received your telegram of 0115 18 October.

At the present time at the meeting of liaison officers our side should keep to an approach which promotes the rapid resumption of the work of the conference. We should both not be in a hurry and not waste time.

We should at our initiative and at an opportune moment propose means with which both sides could agree in order to solve some secondary issues.

As regards measures or secondary issues which we intend to change we should not make changes right away; at the same time we should not reveal at the first meetings or in the press that our point of view is absolutely inflexible. On the contrary, we should prepare the ground for a subsequent change so that at the moment the change is made it does not appear sudden, as if we are making a big concession.

Therefore your intention of giving instructions to correspondents to place a report in the press that the proposal our side has offered about the reduction of the Kaesong-Bunsan neutral zone and the neutral strip along the road between these points is a great concession is extremely inadvisable.

The proposal we have offered is not any serious concession.

In the event that the enemy does not agree we intend to reduce the neutral zone still further. Will this be a still greater concession after the great concession that was made? It is politically disadvantageous to make such a statement in the press this way.

In reality, in the opinion of the enemy the move of the conference to [Hamonten], the responsibility of both sides for security, and the expansion of the neutral zone to Bunsan has not given them anything good.

On the contrary, in this event enemy aircraft cannot fly over Bunsan, which is not in the enemy's interests. Therefore, since 7 October all the enemy press and public opinion has not considered this a concession by us, but on the contrary they note that there will be more trouble at [Hamonten] than at Kaesong.

As regards the enemy, as before he is interested in using the meeting of liaison officers in order to stall for time and conduct intelligence.

We should also act cautiously in order not to reveal our plans, which is to our advantage during the subsequent struggle at the conference.

However, of the four alternatives proposed by the enemy it is apparent that the enemy is increasingly disinclined to reject the resumption of the work of the conference.

Please be guided by my instructions.

MAO ZEDONG 0530 18 October"

Nº 5205

19 October

MAO ZEDONG

-----  
Deciphered by Fedyaev 1205 19 October  
Printed by Korniyushina 1250 19 October Nº 3007  
Eight copies printed

Verified: Section Chief Colonel  
[signature] (Makarov)