

# **July 30, 1971**

## Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

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## **Summary:**

The ROK government is anxious about the Nixon-Zhou Enlai meeting. Their anxiety stems from the US military disengagement in the ROK, Zhou's four-point program, and the potential for communist China to sway UN votes on the Korean question.

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KORFA

Seoul, 30 July 1971

#### CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Narasimhan.

Concerned about recent reports that the Korean question is likely to be discussed between President Nixon and Premier Chou En Lai during their next meeting, the Government of the Republic of Korea made it known yesterday that the United States should, under no circumstances, make any concession harmful to the interests of the ROK. In a press conference hold on 29 July 1971, Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik spelled out the views of his Government regarding this issue by stating that the ROK is strongly opposed to any discussions between the two leaders without prior consultation with his Government.

The apprehension of the Government here stemmed primarily from the reported four-point programme attributed to Mr. Chou En Lai as a prerequisite for normalising relations between the United States and Communist China. Among these points is the question of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. In addition, there has recently been a growing feeling of "suspicion" among the ROK officials because of the recent subtle and indirect moves by the U.S. Government to disengage itself militarily and politically in the ROK. These moves include proposals made a month ago by the U.N. Command to bring the South Koreans into direct contacts with the North Koreans through converting the DEZ into an area for peaceful civil pursuits; the designation of a ROK senior member at the Military Armistice Commission; and the indirect endorsement for peaceful exchanges between the North and the South.

Although the attitude of the Government here with regard to the U.S.-China rapprochement appears on the surface to be a relaxed one, nevertheless, fear is being expressed in official circles that the admission of Communist China to the United Nations could also affect the voting pattern in the United Nations with regard to the Korean question.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Lanker Kylen Zouheir Kuzbari Principal Secretary

Mr. C.V. Narasimhan Chof de Cabinet United Nations Hew York