

**September 28, 1973**

**Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to Ismat Kittani, "Timing  
of UNGA's Korean Deliberations"**

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**Summary:**

Ozbudun sends Kittani a letter on the issue of timing of UNGA's Korean deliberations and abduction of the former presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung.

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA  
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL : No. 221Recd 1 Oct.  
28 September 1973

Dear Mr. Kittani,

TIMING OF UNGA'S KOREAN DELIBERATIONS

New York continues to be the center of gravity for vital Korean issues and there is relatively little reporting in the ROK Press on UN developments as compared to recent years. Hence, while it is redundant to dwell on the Korean question at this end at this time, two seemingly interrelated points may merit attention.

First, most observers here had expected earlier UNGA deliberations on the question than at least the past decade-and-a-half. They were surprised by the news report that the Korean items might not come up until around mid-November. This is attributed offhand to one or more of the following factors:

(i) advocacy by the ROK which feels itself much weaker than it expected regarding its chances to attain a sizeable majority for the pro-Seoul draft resolution (it hopes that delay in UNGA consideration might improve favourable prospects);

(ii) DPRK willingness to have a later (than earlier) debate in order to acquaint itself with the UN atmosphere and to have more time for lobbying purposes;

(iii) anxiety of the pro-Pyongyang side concerning the imminence of a Sino-Soviet confrontation on the Korean question as well which it believes might somehow be precluded by intensive behind-the-scenes efforts;

(iv) hopes entertained by a growing number of states which are said to be most desirous to have the major powers attain some compromise understanding, through quiet diplomacy, towards an amicable Korean settlement;

(v) strengthened conviction among a sizeable number of states that full Korean deliberations at this very point would not only be void of any purpose, not only worsen relations between the two Koreas and their respective supporters, but also provide the worst possible keynote to deliberations on other agenda items; and

Mr. Ismat Kittani  
Executive Assistant  
to the Secretary-General  
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- 2 -

(vi) parallel conviction on the part of most of these states that deliberations could lead to too revolutionary a departure from the status quo, especially in the absence of a workable alternative arrangement. [Some of the aforesaid observers seem also to give "perhaps exaggerated credence" to reports that all this might possibly lead to yet another UNGA deferment of substantive Korean deliberations.]

The second point seemingly interrelated to the foregoing is the conviction among some observers that the "abduction" case of former Presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung has exerted (as it is still exerting) a major role on the Korean question as such. Some observers feel that the "real" reason behind ROK efforts to postpone the debate until mid-November is the hope that the impact of the "scandal" might "somehow" wither, rather than gain further momentum, through a possible settlement. Others hold that weakened chances for a sizeable pro-Seoul majority are attributable to the Kim affair which they say has swayed many Member States from voting in favour of the pro-ROK draft resolution. Yet another group of observers are of the opinion that the longer the postponement of deliberations at the present UNGA the more the adverse reaction to the Seoul Government would grow.

In view of some relevant key points regarding the Kim case raised in my letter of 15 August 1973, I am taking the liberty of sending you a duplicate of this letter. [Also, since that letter was one of five or six communications pouched that week, I had inserted typographical corrections by hand having had no time for re-typing. I would therefore appreciate if the duplicate could replace the earlier letter in your files.]\*

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

*AHMET H. OZBUDUN*  
Ahmet H.H. Ozbudun  
Principal Secretary

\* With one exception, this series of five letters was practically the only one for which I received an acknowledgement. Would you kindly have it checked whether the letters drafted between 15 and 17 August under an introductory communication entitled "General" have been received. The reason for my anxiety is because the aforesaid exception was somehow not received.

11  
Sms