

May 8, 1973
**Letters between Shail Upadhya and C.V.
Narasimhan**

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Summary:

Upadhya sends Narasimhan a report on his conversation with ROK Foreign Minister.

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cc - Mr. Shevchenko

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NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCKUR)CONFIDENTIAL

4 May 1973

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

CONFIDENTIAL

8 May 1973

Foreign Minister, Mr. Kim Yong Shik, at a recent party he gave for the diplomatic corps in Seoul. With reference to the Korean question at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly, he said it was a bit too early for his country to formulate any definite strategy in that regard but he expressed confidence that should the ROK decide once again to seek a deferment of the Korean debate, it would accomplish it with ease, and perhaps with a bigger margin than last year. He said that although deferment was one of the strategies being studied he was in the process of devising other strategies that were more positive in approach. He said one such strategy might be to make concessions on the procedural aspect of the question, such as deferment and the invitational aspect and concentrate on the substantial issues relating to the presence of UN forces and UNCURK. He believed the ROK could hardly defeat all moves for the withdrawal of UN forces and the dissolution of UNCURK.

I have received your confidential letter of 4 May regarding your meeting with the ROK Foreign Minister also insist on the implementation of the long-standing General Assembly resolution and the decision by the IPU to admit North Korea into the Union effective next October, and have taken careful accept.

note of your comments.

With kind regards, it had for years opposed it and had refused to accept the United Nations' competence to discuss the issue. He believed north Korea was insisting on a debate solely because the ROK now opposed it. He believed that a debate would be to north Korea's disadvantage, and that even China was **Yours sincerely,** it. He said China certainly did not wish to see the United Nations withdraw its forces from Korea and leave a vacuum which the Soviet Union might attempt to fill.

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C.V. Narasimhan

The decision by the International Chief of Cabinetry Union to admit north Korea into the Union effective next October is seen here as a bad omen for the ROK's efforts to block the DPRK's membership in the UN. Later this month. Prior to the IPU decision ROK officials had been openly stating that they were engaged in a battle with the DPRK — the IPU vote being the first, the UN vote being the second, and the UNCURK vote being the third. Now that the first battle in Seoul, Korea, session being the third. Now that the first battle

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chief of Cabinet
United Nations

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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL

4 May 1973

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

I had the occasion to have a brief talk with the ROK Foreign Minister, Mr. Kim Yong Shik, at a recent party he gave for the diplomatic corps in Seoul. With reference to the Korean question at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly, he said it was a bit too early for his country to formulate any definite strategy in that regard but he expressed confidence that should the ROK decide once again to seek a deferment of the Korean debate, it could accomplish it with ease, and perhaps with a bigger margin than last year. He said that although deferment was one of the strategies being studied he was in the process of devising other strategies that were more positive in approach. He said one such strategy might be to make concessions on the procedural issues of the question, such as deferment and the invitational aspect and to concentrate on the substantial issues relating to the presence of UN forces and UNCURK. He believed the ROK could handily defeat all moves for the withdrawal of UN Forces and the dissolution of UNCURK by arguing before the General Assembly that should it decide to withdraw the UN Forces and dissolve UNCURK it should also insist on the implementation of the long-standing General Assembly resolution calling for the reunification of Korea through fair elections conducted under UN supervision. This, he said, the North would never accept.

He said he could not understand why north Korea was now pressing so hard for a debate when it had for years opposed it and had refused to accept the United Nations' competence to discuss the issue. He believed north Korea was insisting on a debate solely because the ROK now opposed it. He believed that a debate would be to north Korea's disadvantage, and that even China was not too keen on it. He said China certainly did not wish to see the United Nations withdraw its Forces from Korea and leave a vacuum which the Soviet Union might attempt to fill.

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The decision by the International Parliamentary Union to admit north Korea into the Union effective next October is seen here as a bad omen for the ROK's efforts to block the DPRK's membership in the WHO later this month. Prior to the IPU decision ROK officials had been openly stating that they were engaged in a three-stage diplomatic battle with the DPRK — the IPU vote being the first battle, the impending WHO vote being the second, and the battle for deferment of the Korean question at the next United Nations General Assembly session being the third. Now that the first battle

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
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has been lost there is apprehension that the IPU decision might influence the WHO vote. Although ROK officials are still expressing confidence that their efforts in the WHO will succeed, they now see the ROK's victory in terms of a close margin and not by a 20-vote margin that they had been predicting.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Shail U. Upadhye

SHAIL UPADHYA

Acting Principal Secretary