

**August 22, 1973**

**Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to C.V. Narasimhan,  
"'Suspension' of Activities of UNCURK?"**

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**Summary:**

Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a letter on "suspension" of activities of UNCURK.

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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF KOREA  
UNCUK cc: Mr. ShevchenkoCONFIDENTIAL

10 August 1973

"SUSPENSION" OF ACTIVITIES OF UNCURE

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

22 August 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Ahmet, My General and you may have reliable information on recent New-York date-lined reports that the ROK Foreign Minister and UN representatives of four "friendly" countries have agreed inter alia to suspend My dear Ahmet, "temporary suspension" of UNCURE's activities at the forthcoming UNCUK. Ministry sources here are unable either to deny or to confirm this. I have received your confidential letter of 10 August on the subject of "Suspension" of Activities of UNCURE, and by cable now.

I have taken note of its contents.

If the reports are unfounded, the chances, at this stage, seem in favour of earlier indications that Yours sincerely, actually sought is the dissolution (rather than the "suspension") of UNCURE.

If, however, the reports on "temporary suspension" are correct, the ramifications would include the following:

(a) Re-thinking on the part of the ROK and consultations among friendly countries have established "temporary suspension" to be infinitely preferable to abrupt dissolution. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

(b) A suspended UNCURE would still remain as the repository or custodian of the UN principles on Korean unification. Moreover, the political vacuum created as a result of suspension would be relative and not absolute as that resulting from outright dissolution. (However, suspension may, in the final analysis, be a transitory bridge toward dissolution).

Mr. Ahmet H. Ozbudun  
Principal Secretary  
UNCURE  
Seoul, Korea  
resolution proposing "temporary suspension" should indeed be accepted carefully. In the absence of this, Member States may be tempted to bind themselves to their individual, and probably conflicting, interpretations in their explanations before or after the vote. Serious questions and undue controversy as would arise may include (i) the matter of duration of the suspension; and/or (ii) the issue as to how UNCURE would be re-activated, if any, and by whose decision.

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet  
United Nations

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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA  
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL

10 August 1973

"SUSPENSION" OF ACTIVITIES OF UNCURK --7--

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

The Secretary-General and you may have reliable information on recent New-York date-lined reports that the ROK Foreign Minister and UN representatives of four "friendly" countries have agreed inter alia to propose the "temporary suspension" of UNCURK's activities at the forthcoming UNGA. Ministry sources here are unable either to deny or to confirm this, and state that Mr. Kim Yong Shik may prefer to report on the matter verbally upon his return around 17 August rather than by cable now.

If the reports are unfounded, the chances, at this stage, seem in favour of earlier indications that what might be actually sought is the dissolution (rather than the "suspension") of UNCURK.

If, however, the reports on "temporary suspension" are correct, the ramifications would include the following:

(a) Re-thinking on the part of the ROK and consultations among friendly countries have established "temporary suspension" to be infinitely preferable to abrupt dissolution. This is all the more so since the option of dissolution will remain operational in the future.

(b) A suspended UNCURK would still remain as the repository or custodian of the UN principles on Korean unification. Moreover, the political vacuum created as a result of suspension would be relative and not absolute as that resulting from outright dissolution. (However, suspension may, in the final analysis, be a transitory bridge toward dissolution).

(c) The draft resolution proposing "temporary suspension" should indeed define this concept carefully. In the absence of this, Member States may have no alternative but to bind themselves to their individual, and probably most conflicting, interpretations in their explanations before or after the vote. Serious questions and undue controversy as would arise may include (i) the matter of duration of the suspension; and/or (ii) the issue as to how UNCURK would be re-activated, if any, and by whose decision.

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet  
United Nations



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It would be one thing to set a definitive date for the resumption of the Commission's activities and entirely another thing to leave the decision for resumption either (i) to UNCURK members; or (ii) to a call by the ROK; or (iii) the advent of an emergency (who would decide?); or (iv) to a vote by the GA. (In the latter case, an affirmative Assembly vote on the matter may be as hard to obtain as the formation of a successor political presence to UNCURK).

(d) Another difficult matter connected to the foregoing is the very definition of "suspension", and what would happen to UNCURK physically during the period of suspension.

Seemingly subsidiary but vital questions include the following: (i) Would the Commission be totally or partially inactive? (ii) Would its membership remain in the ROK or would it be "temporarily" transferred elsewhere (New York)? (iii) What would happen in the event of serious developments concerning Korea or the Korean question, whether internal or external? (iv) What would happen to the Commission's budget, its assets and its present Headquarters building (rent free and obtained with untold difficulty)? (v) What would happen to its members and its Secretariat (international and local staff) -- would the Secretariat be kept, reduced or cut off? In reference to (ii), (iv) and (v) above, it is suggested that the status quo be maintained since what is a political question now might adversely and perhaps hopelessly be treated as a financial and administrative matter or be hence "settled" on these and not on pertinent political grounds.

The foregoing naturally remains academic until the confirmation, if any, of the said contingency of "temporary suspension" (on the reported initiative of the ROK and the four "friendly" powers) remains. However, some of the arguments herewith are applicable to the so-called "Algerian item" in the agenda of the twenty-eighth UNGA.

I continue resolutely to believe in the indispensability of a political and military presence of the UN in the form of the UNC, UNCURK, or a substitute political presence for the latter, so long as this Korean Peninsula is practically the only fertile ground on earth now for the inadvertent or premeditated concoction of a third world war. Moreover, I would venture to retain my conviction that a live rather than a suspended UN presence in Korea is imperative. However, if the issue is bound to be between "suspended animation" and "no political presence at all", I would infinitely prefer the former, for it may literally "buy time" for an operational and realistic quid pro quo for the status quo. This thinking is resolutely shared by an increasing number of observers at this end.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,  
*A. H. Ozudun*  
AHMET H. OZUDUN  
Principal Secretary