

August 2, 1972

**Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to C.V. Narasimhan,
"Ramifications of the New Korean Item"**

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Summary:

Ozbudun sends a letter to Narasimhan regarding the ramification of the new Korean item, the so-called "Algerian item."

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cc. Mr. L. Kutakov

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL No. 156

28 July 1972

2 August 1972

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

REAFFIRMATIONS OF THE NEW KOREAN ITEM

The impact of the fourth item on Korea, inscribed in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly, appears to have shaken the heretofore predominant confidence among ROK officials regarding the deferment of the Korean issue at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. Behind the facade of a "stiff upper lip",

Dear Ahmet, genuine concern regarding the prospects of the "all-eggs-in-one-basket" ROK policy and endeavour for postponement.

I have received your confidential letter No. 150 of

28 July and taken note of its contents.

With kind regards, I have no need for contingency planning and consultation with its allies on alternative diplomatic circles in Seoul are apprehensive that it might be too late now to plan secondary lines of defence behind the deferment policy on such vital matters as the issue of UN participation in a Korean debate and tactics regarding the substantive aspects of the Korean question.

Yours sincerely,

Item 96 of the provisional agenda and the somewhat predictable draft resolution that may emerge from the inscription, are deemed to be most imaginative and therefore capable adversely to erode the UN posture towards extinction. Fully cognizant of this potential danger, ranking ROK officials seem to be banking on a gradually emerging argument that a Korean debate at the UNGA would be a dialogue on the Peninsula, both at the Red Cross and Communist levels. These officials appear to stress that any participation of the UN in the dialogue would most definitely wipe out all progress heretofore achieved in the dialogue.

C.V. Narasimhan
Chef de CabinetMr. A. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary
UNCURK
Seoul, Korea

The further development of such argumentation, diplomatic observers believe, may be capable of offsetting the thrust of the "Algerian" enterprise and thus pave the way toward another postponement. These students of Korean affairs also seem to hold that the

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA
(UNCURK)CONFIDENTIAL No. 150

28 July 1972

Dear Mr. Narasimhan,

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NEW KOREAN ITEM

The impact of the fourth item on Korea, inscribed in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly, appears to have shaken the heretofore predominant confidence among ROK officials regarding the deferment of the Korean issue at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. Behind the facade of a "stiff upper lip", there is genuine concern regarding the prospects of the "all-eggs-in-one-basket" ROK policy and endeavour for postponement.

Prior to the advent of the so-called "Algerian item", the Korean Government was so very confident of the success of its deferment policy, that it saw no need for contingency planning and consultation with its allies on alternative strategies. Diplomatic circles in Seoul are apprehensive that it might be too late now to plan secondary lines of defence behind the deferment policy on such vital matters as the issue of DPRK participation in a Korean debate and tactics regarding the substantive aspects of the Korean question.

Item 96 of the provisional agenda and the somewhat predictable draft resolution that may emerge from the request for its inscription, are deemed to be most imaginative and therefore capable adversely to erode the UN posture towards extinction. Fully cognizant of this potential danger, ranking ROK officials seem to be banking on a gradually emerging argument that a Korean debate at the UNGA would sabotage the dialogue on the Peninsula, both at the Red Cross and the South-North Joint Communiqué levels. These officials appear to be also inclined to stress that any participation of the DPRK in a Korean debate would most definitely wipe out all progress heretofore recorded in the dialogue.

The further development of such argumentation, diplomatic observers believe, may be capable of offsetting the thrust of the "Algerian" enterprise and thus pave the way toward another postponement. These students of Korean affairs also seem to hold that the

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan
Chef de Cabinet
United Nations
New York

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chances for deferment would be enhanced through the apparent Sino-Soviet schism on the Korean question. Moreover, they attach significance to the lingering loyalty of at least some of the proponents to the "more radical" Korean items in the provisional agenda, namely the withdrawal of troops and the dissolution of UNCURK.

The aforesaid experts are also impressed by the argument advanced in various quarters that if indeed the "mere" commencement of Red Cross talks were capable to effect postponement last year, then the more "earth-shaking" North-South contacts, in addition to the Red Cross negotiations, should certainly enhance the prospects of another deferment this year.

Both government and diplomatic circles appear to be most sincere in their conviction that Korean deliberations at the UN at this time, particularly if they witnessed direct North-South "confrontation", may indeed "wreck" the embryonic bilateral dialogue on the Peninsula by way of "poisoning" its atmosphere.

Furthermore, they fear intensely that prospective deliberations -- as could lead to the weakening or removal of the UN political and military presence in Korea without any credible substitution -- would thereby cancel this vital security umbrella which strongly encouraged the North-South dialogue in the first place.

OTHER MATTERS


Except for the foregoing and certain internal developments, such as the resignations of the Speaker (rejected by the National Assembly), and the Chairman of the ruling Party (accepted by Mr. Park Chung Hee in his capacity as DRP President), this week has been rather quiet. It may suffice at this point to say that the aforesaid events will have future repercussions, rekindling political strife and factional feuds within and between the executive and legislative branches of the Government.

Because of disagreement on relatively minor procedural issues, the Red Cross talks have again been "demoted" from the preliminary to the working committee level. Substantial and accelerated accord is needed to abide by the scheduled commencement of the formal or full-dress talks on 5 August. Yesterday's committee session was reported to have ended in deadlock.

Progress on the drafting of UNCURK's report is rather slow, despite frequent meetings. There is as yet no definitive target set for its finalization. The signing may, however, take place around mid-August.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,


Ahmet H. Ozbudun
Principal Secretary