

May 1, 1979
Notes on a Meeting held during the
Secretary-General's Visit to Peking, 1 May 1979

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Summary:

Deng Xiaoping criticizes Vietnam as a regional hegemon in his a meeting with Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

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Present: The Secretary-General

H.E. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China

H.E. Vice Foreign Minister Chang Wen Ching of the People's Republic of China

Two officials of the Foreign Ministry

Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed

Mr. Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Grünbühel

Mr. François Giuliani

Referring to the Secretary-General's next stop on this trip, namely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Vice Premier Deng said that this country was not well understood abroad. People said that there was tension on the Korean Peninsula but this was not at all the case. Equally, the rumours that the Soviet Union has established military bases in the DPRK was not true.

The Secretary-General then enquired about the Vice Premier's views on the situation in Indochina. Mr. Deng said that the Chinese position had already been explained to the Secretary-General by Foreign Minister Huang Hua and Prime Minister Hua Guofeng and that this was really only a courtesy visit. But he went on to say that he had known the Viet Nameese leaders for many years and he had experienced that one should never believe what they said. During Viet Nam's struggle against the United States, it had totally relied on China for arms, food and clothing. The hostile position which Viet Nam later took towards China could only be called perfidious. Negotiations between the two countries would certainly be

marathon in length. Viet Nam's aim was the creation of the impression that there was a relaxation of tension in the north so that it could concentrate on Kampuchea. They did not want to negotiate seriously. When the Secretary-General interjected that the Viet Nameese leaders must know that it could not win a war against China, the Vice Premier said that they had gotten "swollen heads" and thought themselves invincible. But he also, admittedly, did not understand the Viet Nameese attitude.

When the Secretary-General mentioned the apprehension of the ASEAN countries with regard to Viet Nam, the Vice Premier said that the Chinese operation had a specific and limited objective. In the first place it was designed to create more restraint on the side of Viet Nam.

Asked by the Secretary-General about the theory of an Indochinese federation, Mr. Deng said that Viet Nam executed the Soviet plans for the establishment of an Asian collective security system. This was an old scheme which, however, had been shelved because none of the countries had responded to this idea. Now, after its successes in Afghanistan and Viet Nam, the Soviet Union "pulled it out again". In the wider scope of this scheme, there was a plan to include at least some of the ASEAN countries - Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore as well as Burma. Once Viet Nam had established complete control in Laos and Kampuchea, it would concentrate on Thailand, etc. This would not necessarily be done by force but also through

threats and by creating trouble and unrest in these countries. Mr. Deng furthermore expanded the Chinese theory of the Soviet advancement in Africa and Asia - which would be linked up in the Molucca Straits. He added that he had advised the United States under no circumstances to normalize relations with Viet Nam at this particular time.