

October 22, 1944

Minutes of the PWP CC Meetings on 22 October 1944

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Summary:

Bierut describes the meeting between Mikolajczyk, Stalin, and Churchill, discussing how Stalin rejected Mikolajczyk's memorandum on the Polish situation. Bierut, Churchill, and Stalin discuss the rebuilding of Poland: Churchill thinks reforms should be postponed until after the war, Stalin and Bierut disagree. Beirut and Mikolajczyk discuss the Curzon line and the PKWN. In a final meeting, Churchill, Stalin, and Bierut discuss Poland's economy and infrastructure.

Original Language:

Polish

Contents:

Translation - English

Minutes of the PWP CC Meetings on 22 October 1944;
Bierut's Account of the Conference
with Stalin and Churchill Held on 13 October 1944,
and of a Conversation with Stalin on 18 October 1944

Minutes of a CC Meeting, Held on October 22, 1944

Present: Wiesław, Tomasz, Jakub, Franek, Zawadzki, Radkiewicz, Marek. In the latter part of the meeting took part comrades Ochab and Romkowski.

The agenda:

- 1) Information on a visit of the PKWN delegation in Moscow^[1]
- 2) Military matters
- 3) Questions relating to Puchała,^[2] Gabara^[3] and Stańczyk,^[4] or about the morale of party members in the state apparatus.

An account of point 1 is being given by com. Tomasz [pseudonym for Bolesław Bierut]: Contrary to what the international press was reporting the Polish question has been a secondary matter at the Moscow meetings and served Churchill merely as a supporting argument in Anglo-Soviet talks.^[5] The fact that there have been no official talks between the PKWN and Mikołajczyk's delegations testifies to this.^[6] The main purpose of Churchill's visit to Moscow was a Balkan question. Due to certain moves by Turkey at the border with Bulgaria (concentration of troops) and an escape of German troops to Bulgaria, which didn't intern them, the USSR declared war on Bulgaria^[7] without any consultations with Britain. The latter one had been frightened about Greece, the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, about a possible bolshevization of the Balkans and that is why he came to see Stalin.

Stalin ordered the arrival of the PKWN delegation on Churchill's request.

At the Stalin-Churchill-Mikołajczyk conference, with the participation of Eden, Molotov and a plethora of interpreters;^[8] whose objective was to get acquainted both England and the Soviets with the position of the Mikołajczyk government about the possibility of reaching an understanding with the PKWN with Stalin's and Churchill's assistance - Mikołajczyk, according to the accounts of com. Stalin, put forward a thesis that the basis for such an agreement should be a memorandum directed by him to the Soviet government shortly after his last meeting with Stalin.^[9]

Stalin responded to Mikołajczyk, that in that memorandum the PKWN had not been mentioned. Which means that mister Mikołajczyk tries to close his eyes to the reality. In talks with the Soviet Union this memorandum cannot be a subject for discussion. He suggested to Mikołajczyk to reach an understanding with the PKWN. However, the Soviet Union is interested mostly in Mr. Mikołajczyk's position regarding Poland's eastern borders.

On this question Mikołajczyk has taken a challenging position, dissenting to the Curzon line.

In that case Churchill intervened and told Mikołajczyk that the question of eastern borders had been agreed upon between England and the USSR, and thus, it could not be a subject for negotiations by Mikołajczyk.

After that statement by Churchill, Mikołajczyk came down a peg or two, put forward a proposal to leave with Poland Lwów and Borysław. Stalin rejected that proposal.

At the Stalin-Churchill conference, in the presence of Molotov, Eden, Kerr,

Harriman,^[11] and the whole plethora of interpreters and officials,^[12] Molotov^[10] introduced Bierut to Churchill. The latter one was dragging his feet in greeting him, but after a few second came up and shook Bierut's hand, saying he had heard a lot of good things about him and is delighted to have an opportunity to meet him.

Churchill took the floor at the opening of the meeting. He is appealing for mutual understanding among the Poles, which lies both in the interests of the Poles, as well as those of the alliance bloc. He is glorifying Poland and emphasizes great appreciation of England for Poland.

Bierut thanked for recognition for the Polish people. The Polish nation has heroically fought and is still fighting for a democratic Poland and doesn't want a return to the pre-war relations in Poland. The people reject the Constitution of 1935 and put it as one of the conditions for reaching an understanding with Mr. Mikołajczyk.

Churchill: Mikołajczyk is also for a democratic constitution, but first one needs to expel the Germans.

Bierut: We also want to expel the Germans and part of Poland is already free. Thus, Poland needs to be built on the new foundations. The second condition is agricultural reform.

The Polish people have been waiting three hundred years for this moment, which has allowed them to possess the land on which they are toiling.

Churchill: If they have been waiting for three hundred years, then they can wait till the war is over. Now is not the time for reforms.

Stalin responded to this observation, saying he doesn't agree with Churchill on this issue. Some part of the landowners has escaped from Poland, part is sabotaging land cultivation, causing unrest and this has to be terminated so that the country will have bread and there will be peace in the back-up of the military front-line. The matter has already become ripe for consideration.

Churchill: Perhaps the military should order land cultivation, because once the peasants are given the land, it will be difficult to change owners.

Stalin: Nobody is going to take back the land from the peasants.

Bierut: The third condition is the question of a fratricidal warfare, initiated by a reactionary group, which wants to spread disorder in the country. He demands from Mikołajczyk to oppose this action. The fourth condition is the question of Poland's eastern borders. Mutual harmony with Poland's neighbors, particularly with the Soviet Union, as well as the interests of Poland demand the recognition of the Curzon line.

Churchill says that he will influence Mikołajczyk and hopes that he will succeed in persuading him to accept that border.

The second speaker was Osóbka-Morawski, who sums up Bierut's arguments and shows what the PKWN wants and what Mikołajczyk wants. At one point Churchill interrupts Osóbka-Morawski, arguing that he (Osóbka) also didn't behave as he should have. Osóbka asks not to be interrupted, as he will come up to those matters. Churchill demonstratively gets up and leaves the table to drink a glass of water. Drinking water he hesitates some time and then returns back to the table. Osóbka, who interrupted his speech, is resuming it, encouraged by Molotov. Churchill

interrupts it again when talk is about Bór [Komorowski] and states that the whole world considers Bór a hero. Osóbka-Morawski: and the Polish people consider him a traitor.

Stalin doesn't agree that Bór is a hero, as he caused huge, unnecessary losses to the Polish people by the Warsaw uprising.

Churchill retreats, saying that the Mikołajczyk government made thoughtless step in nominating Bór to the position of supreme commander.

Stalin, summing up the conferences' results, states that from the PKWN side there has been shown a willingness to reach an understanding with Mr. Mikołajczyk, therefore he suggests to hold a meeting of the PKWN delegation with that of Mikołajczyk's to reach an understanding, with the participation of Eden to exercise pressure on Mikołajczyk, and Molotov to exercise pressure on the PKWN, and Harriman as a mediator. This was agreed upon. The conference was then ended.

The next day the scheduled meeting didn't materialize, as Churchill allegedly was not feeling well. In the evening there was a festive performance in a theater, which was attended by Churchill with the British and American envoys, as well as Stalin with other members of the Soviet government, all sitting in special galleries. Our delegation took its place below.

Mikołajczyk didn't get a ticket. When the public at some point realized that Stalin was in the theater, it made him a huge ovation. Stalin left his lodge, leaving Churchill alone. The ovation continued and Molotov leaned out clapping hands, what even more intensified the ovation. Churchill was entranced, thinking that it was all for him. At the break, Bierut and Rola-Żymierski left the performance hall. When Żymierski spotted some French general and walked toward him, leaving Bierut alone, the journalists approached Bierut for an interview. Bierut refused, saying that it's not customary to give interviews before negotiations are concluded. Nevertheless, journalists were asking various questions. They forced him to agree to give to the press a statement that he is an "optimist", that "considering the fact that the matter of an agreement between the PKWN and Mr. Mikołajczyk have taken in their hands such people like Stalin and Mikołajczyk, one can be an optimist".

There were no results on Sunday and Monday.^[13] The scheduled meeting didn't take place. Apparently Mikołajczyk had been waiting for the news about the uprising in the country. On Tuesday Mikołajczyk's secretary came to Bierut's hotel with a proposal to hold a private meeting. A discussion aroused regarding the place of such a meeting. It was agreed that the meeting will be held at 5 p.m. in a cafe. Bierut and Mikołajczyk met in the hall and set down at the table. Mniszek,^[14] Mikołajczyk's secretary and a major, Bierut's adjutant,^[15] set down separately.

Conversation of Bierut with Mikołajczyk. Bierut: How to explain the delay of the meeting?

Mikołajczyk: By the fact that Stalin presented the question of borders in a way that he couldn't personally decide on it. He had to get in touch with London and only then continue the talks.

Bierut: Thus, should we be waiting till he comes back from London?

Mikołajczyk: No, it may take place very soon.

Bierut: Even so, you couldn't have been surprised by the Curzon line.

Mikołajczyk: The Curzon line had two variants: A and B. Variant B had provided

leaving Lwów and Borysław with Poland. Since Churchill supported Stalin with variant B, so he is surprised and has to communicate with colleagues. He thinks that the situation for Poland is tragic, though one has to acknowledge it. One has to prepare the American Polonia for this and take into consideration its opinion. He shows his great influence among the Polonia.

Bierut: I propose to put the matter clearly: there are two trends in Europe: a democratic one and reactionary. Societies are divided likewise inside their countries. In Poland the mainstay of the reactionary camp is the London government, based on the Constitution of 1935. Everything that goes with that government, like it or not, has to be included into the reactionary camp. He, Mikołajczyk, is right now himself a banner for the Polish reaction, independent of what he himself thinks. He [Bierut] reminds him that at their first meeting [\[16\]](#) he essentially recognized the PKWN manifesto, but didn't draw from it any consequences. He suggests to him to cut off himself from the reaction, cut off from its camp and come over to the democratic camp, i.e. reach an understanding with the PKWN, independently of the position of other members of his government.

Mikołajczyk defends members of his government as democrats. All of them are honest, he even has in his desk a letter from Raczkiewicz, who is expressing willingness to depart any time. He has removed Sosnkowski.

Bierut: But you have nominated Bór.

Mikołajczyk: He is a military, honest man. He doesn't understand why we are still talking about the Warsaw Uprising. They had submitted plans for the uprising already several months before to the general staff of the alliance. And it was not their fault that the Soviet Union had not been notified about it. Besides, he asks who in his cabinet is a reactionist?

Bierut: How about Kukiel [\[17\]](#) and rev. Kaczyński. [\[18\]](#)

Mikołajczyk: Kukiel had this misfortune that he had let himself get involved in the Katyń affair. [\[19\]](#) Rev. Kaczyński is a red mason. Apart from that, there are strong intellects in his cabinet, while on our side, except for Bierut, Wasilewska and Jędrychowski [\[20\]](#) - these are people who do not qualify for the government. He has high praise for Komarnicki [\[21\]](#) as an outstanding intellectual, and also for Seyda [\[22\]](#) and others.

Bierut: You are also supported by Bielecki. [\[23\]](#)

Mikołajczyk - It's not true.

Bierut: The whole reactionary camp is marching under your banner to the fight against democracy.

Mikołajczyk: It's not my fault. He speaks of Kwapiński [\[24\]](#) as a fool. Anyway, he thinks that as far as people are concerned, we could reach an understanding. From among the peasant leaders he has such people as Domański, [\[25\]](#) Bien [\[26\]](#) and Mierzwa, [\[27\]](#) who arrived now from the homeland to London. He has also many good peasant leaders in the country. Regarding the Constitution of 1935: he is not supporting it. As

if to prove it, he is talking of a democratic electoral law, which they have just worked out in London. He promises to send it to Bierut. He supports agricultural reform similar to the one the PKWN supports, but he doesn't agree on the price of land, which, in his opinion is set too high by the PKWN.^[28] He is proposing a 30-year lease rate as a price of land.

Bierut is proving to him that it would be more expensive than what the PKWN has set. He asks him why doesn't he want to bring himself to such a political step which would cut him off from the reactionaries.

Mikołajczyk: Asks what should he do?

Bierut: Two months ago we proposed you to take over the position of prime minister of PKWN and to cut yourself off from the reactionaries.

Mikołajczyk: You are giving me only four ministerial portfolios. We are standing on the position of our memorandum.

Bierut: Thus, you do not recognize the PKWN.

Mikołajczyk: It's not true, it's wrong interpretation, we recognize all parties making up the PKWN.

Bierut: The memorandum cannot be a basis for negotiations, as PKWN exists, governs, and only on this basis--recognition of PKWN--can we talk.

Mikołajczyk: But you are giving us too few seats.

Bierut: And what do you want?

Mikołajczyk: Half of the seats.

Bierut: If you cut off from the reactionaries and come to the PKWN, then you can gain the whole party and have not just four mandates but a majority in PKWN. If you approve the total PKWN Manifesto, you will have the whole government behind you.

Mikołajczyk is squabbling about his influence in the country, thinking that he enjoys a majority and cannot agree to having just one-fifth of the ministerial seats.

Bierut: You cannot prove this now. Only in the country at party congresses one will be able to assess that. I am proposing you one-fourth of the seats in the government.

Mikołajczyk regrets that he won't be able to arrive in London with something more consoling for his colleagues.

Bierut: Till you stop traveling to London for authority it will be difficult to reach an agreement. Shall we thus be parting for good?

Mikołajczyk: I don't think so.

After this conversation Mikołajczyk had another talk with Stalin. He was complaining about the small number of ministerial seats that we had offered. On the question of borders he was conciliatory. He asked Stalin to allow Kwapiński to return to Poland.

Stalin referred him on this matter to the PKWN.

A communiqué has been agreed upon with Molotov.[\[29\]](#) It refers to the Mikołajczyk-Bierut conversation, as Mikołajczyk had not reserved himself the right to secrecy.

Besides there were two meetings of the delegation with Stalin. One was right after our arrival, the second one later. Stalin was asking if we want to talk with Mikołajczyk.

Bierut: We would like to reach an understanding, but we would prefer to have it later.

It was agreed with Stalin to give 1/3 of ministerial positions to the London people, with Mikołajczyk taking the position of prime minister. In addition create two deputies, i.e.

[Osóbka]-Morawski from the PPS and.... from the PPR. Stalin liked such idea of a presidium.

There was an extensive discussion about what other positions should be given to the Londoners. Since it was proposed that all important positions should be held in our hands, Molotov observed that also more important positions should be given to them.

It was agreed to give them: 1) premiership, 2) reconstruction of the country, 3) war compensations, 4) finance, 5) culture and arts, 6) social welfare.

Stalin thought that we should take into consideration that they might propose Żeligowski.[\[30\]](#) It might be acceptable, provided that Żymierski would be his deputy, situated in the country and a political chief, while Żeligowski would be staying for some time abroad. Besides, he is an old man and one can cope with him. It was agreed that if Mikołajczyk doesn't come up with such proposal, then our delegation will.

With regard to a president, Stalin suggests that Bierut should become a non-party man. At an attempt of protest Stalin said it was necessary to do so for the sake of the nation and it must be done. Stalin referred to a conversation that he had had with Churchill about Bierut. Churchill had asked Stalin if he knew Bierut well. Stalin responded that he had known him from meetings as chairman of the KRN. Churchill noticed that according to his information Bierut had been a political prisoner and as such had been deported to the Soviet Union.[\[31\]](#) Thus, he cannot be president of Poland, as he doesn't give a guarantee of objectivity, being in debt toward the Soviet Union. Stalin replied that he knew nothing about it, whereas he knows that as late as in 1939 Bierut parted with the Communist Party, as he didn't feel comfortable with it ideologically. Since that time Bierut had not been a party member. This being so, Stalin states to Bierut to notify his party that he is resigning, taking it on his conscience.

Stalin was somewhat irritated by the news of desertion of the 31st regiment.[\[32\]](#) He is reproaching us that we wanted to put aside the Red Army, that we are treating it as a foreign army, etc. He immediately gave an order by telephone to Rokossowski[\[33\]](#) and the NKVD in connection with the situation in Poland. At one point he said that we had misled ourselves and him in appraising the adversary's strength. Now we have to take the adversary by the head and not defend the AK, like once Gorki fell out with Lenin on the question of repression. Nevertheless, he was of the opinion, recalling Marx, that it also has good sides, as counter-revolution stimulates revolution. Without it revolution is losing action. We will also be stimulated by counter-revolution.

In connection with the news on preparations of the AK to actions, he agreed that Bulganin should go to Lublin. He didn't consent to Żymierski's trip.

Generally Stalin was trying to create a very friendly atmosphere, which was also true of the evening spent in wine drinking. At one moment Stalin corrects Beria's toast, [34] saying the toast should sound as follows: "Long live the Slavs, headed by a democratic Poland, that should unite them in a great Slav union".

Talking of the current personnel composition of the PKWN, Stalin suggests that now is the time to get rid of unreliable people and introduce a good element. Speaking of Witos he said it was good that we got rid of him. He knows very well that Witos is a reactionary agent.

Asked if the present talks would not weaken the inter-Atlantic alliance, he said no, on the contrary, they will strengthen the alliance.

Churchill was frightened by advances of Soviet forces in the Balkans. He reassured him by saying the Soviet Union had no intention to enter to Greece, or push through to the Adriatic. We don't need the Adriatic. We have a plan to strike at Germany from the South. We have a Hungarian delegation here, asking for peace. We will strike at Germany through the Moravian Gate. We will also strike at Prussia. In this way we will liberate Poland. There is a need for time, time to prepare such operation. He says Roosevelt is not happy about Churchill's trip to Moscow, he doesn't have time to come here personally, as he is afraid of elections and has to take care of it. [35] He would not like to see England influencing the course of events without him and therefore he is dissatisfied with the Churchill visit.

Regarding the question of reconstruction of industry in Poland, and particularly if there is a need for reconstruction of armaments industry, he said that armaments industry is the best school for cadres. It should be reconstructed with a view of educating cadres and independence of Poland.

To a question on the organization of a planned economy in Poland he said it is the most difficult task. Even in the Soviet Union the planned economy has made mistakes.

Kuropatkin [36] lost the war with Japan because he didn't have transportation. He asked the tsar to increase the number of trains on the Eastern Line from 4 to 7. The tsar could not do it. The Soviet Union built a new, second track, designed for 35 pairs of trains round the clock, but it turned out that the plan had been worked out so poorly that only 17 pairs can pass. Other chains of transportation connected with it had not been satisfactorily taken into account and therefore the works provided for in the plan had not been realized. That is how difficult it is to plan.

He was interested in our economy, what do we have for exports, etc. He was making plans for coal exports and strongly supported the idea of developing river shipping. He was asking about professional skills of intelligentsia. He recommended to take over all people from behind the front line, as they don't already have any significance there.

Stalin also suggested to include PKWN representatives to every Soviet mission going abroad to Soviet diplomatic missions, what should facilitate our work.

Discussion

Com. Berman informs that Wilanowski [37] communicates that a crisis among the emigres is growing. A new PPS is being formed. [38] There are also possibilities to form a Peasant Party, corresponding to the Peasant Party belonging to the PKWN.

Sommerstein^[39] said that there are 5 people in the PKWN who will go with Mikołajczyk.

Com. Tomasz: Janusz said to me that Kotek [-Agroszewski] demands his (Janusz's) resignation. Presidium of the Peasant Party (SL) demanded that Bertold and Janusz leave the PKWN. Janusz demanded a resolution in writing. Bertold is undecided. Kotek refused.

^[1] The delegation of KRN and PKWN (respectively National Domestic Council and the Polish Committee for National Liberation) was in Moscow from October 11-19, 1944. It was composed of: B. Bierut, E. Osóbka-Morawski and general M. Rola-Żymierski.

^[2] No information is available.

^[3] Bronisław Gabara (1891-1956) - at the time a prison chief in Lublin. Charged by the chief of Public Security Division of PKWN on October 3, 1944 with misuse of power, acts unworthy of a public security employee (drinking sprees, sex with volksdeutsch women prisoners), put before a military tribunal and then sent to a penalty company.

^[4] No definite data have been established.

^[5] Winston Churchill was in Moscow from 9 to 19 October 1944.

^[6] The delegation of the Polish Government in Exile, which stayed in Moscow from October 12-21, 1944, was composed, besides S. Mikołajczyk, of minister of foreign affairs Tadeusz Romer and chairman of the National Council Stanisław Grabski.

^[7] It took place on September 5, 1944.

^[8] That conference was held on October 13, 1944.

^[9] Reference is made to a memorandum of the Polish Government in Exile of August 29, 1944 on the conditions of resuming Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. The memorandum was handed over by S. Mikołajczyk to the USSR's Ambassador to the émigré governments in London, Victor Z. Lebedev on August 30, 1944, following Mikołajczyk's visit in Moscow on August 6-9, 1944. For the text see: *Sprawa polska w czasie II wojny światowej na arenie międzynarodowej*. Warszawa 1965, pp. 575-577.

^[10] Archibald Clark-Kerr (1882-1951), British Ambassador in Moscow.

^[11] William Averel Harriman (1891-1986) - U.S. Ambassador in Moscow. He participated in the Soviet-British talks as an observer.

^[12] That conference was held on October 13, 1944 towards the evening. W. Churchill in his account of that conference evaluated very critically the "Lublin Poles". See: W. Churchill: *The Second World War*. Vol. VI, London, 1954, p. 205.

^[13] It means the 15th, and 16th, of October 1944.

^[14] Aleksander Mniszek (born 1904) - a diplomat, was, among other, counselor of the Polish Embassy in the USSR in 1941-1943.

^[15] Quite possibly, reference is made to major Ignacy Wrzos, who in October 1944 was named chief of the Military Cabinet of chairman of the KRN (National Domestic Council).

^[16] S. Mikołajczyk met with the PKWN representatives in Moscow on 6 and 7 August 1944.

^[17] Marian Kukiel (1885-1971) - a historian, brigadier general, at that time minister of national defense in the Polish Government in Exile.

^[18] Rev. Zygmunt Kaczyński (1894-1953) - a leading figure in the Labor Party, at that time minister for religious affairs and public education in the Polish Government in Exile.

^[19] M. Kukiel as minister of national defense issued a communiqué regarding the missing Polish soldiers in the USSR. See "Dziennik Polski" of April 16, 1943, No. 851, p. I.

^[20] Stefan Jędrychowski (born 1910) - then a PPR activist, chief of the Information and Propaganda Division of PKWN, and at the same time representative of PKWN in

Moscow.

[21] Wacław Komarnicki (1891-1954) - a leading figure in the National Party (SN), then a minister of justice in the Polish Government in Exile.

[22] Marian Seyda (1879-1967) - an activist of SN, at the time minister for parliamentary affairs in the Government in Exile.

[23] Tomasz Bielecki (1901-1982) - the chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Camp.

[24] Jan Kwapiński (1885-1966) - then chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of PPS (Polish Socialist Party), vice premier and minister of industry, trade and shipping in the Government in Exile.

[25] Jan Domański (1898-1978) - a member of the Central Leadership of the Peasant Movement. On May 30, 1944 sent to the West as a political emissary of the peasant movement by a British plane which landed near Tam6w. Returned to Poland in the summer of 1945.

[26] Adam Bien (born 1899) - then member of the Central Leadership of the Peasant Movement and of the National Council of Ministers.

[27] Then member of the Central Leadership of the Peasant Movement and the Council of National Unity.

Both Bien and Mierzwa remained in Poland during World War II. Apparently the transcript of Mikołajczyk's description was not precise.

[28] A decree by PKWN from September 6, 1944 provided the price for the land granted equivalent to the value of one year's crop from that land. It was assumed that on the lands of category III this will be 15 quintals of rye (=6000 zł.).

[29] For the communiqué see "Rzeczpospolita" of October 21, 1944, No. 79, p. 1.

[30] Lucjan Żeligowski (1865-1947) - Lieutenant-General, then member of the National Council of the Republic of Poland in London.

[31] Bolesław Bierut, served time several times for his communist activity, arrested last time in 1933 was not covered by an exchange of political prisoners between Poland and the USSR in the years 1921-1932.

[32] A massive desertion of soldiers of the 31st regiment of infantry took place on October 12, 1944, at a time when the PKWN delegation was in Moscow. Already on October 16th commander-in-chief of the Polish Army issued order to dismantle the regiment. On October 24 an order was issued on behalf of the commander-in-chief (signed by general Karol Świerczewski) in connection with a verdict of the Military Court of the 2nd Army against the officers of that regiment (6 death sentences, but ultimately not executed). That order recommender to use in the future severe punishment for desertion and to upgrade political education ("to use all necessary measures to protect a sound soul of the Polish soldier from influences of the hitlerite-AK agentura"). See also I. Blum: Sprawa 31 Pułku Piechoty. "Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny", 1965, No. 3, pp. 40-73.

[33] Soviet marshal Konstanty Rokossowski (1896-1968) at that time was in command of the I Belorussian Front of the Red Army.

[34] Lavrenti P. Baria (1899- 1953) - at the time associate member of Politburo of the VKP(b), deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, member of the Committee of State Defense of the USSR.

[35] Reference is here to the U.S. elections set for November 7, 1944. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected then for the fourth time.

[36] Alexei N. Kuropatkin (1848-1925) - adjunct-general, commander of the Manchurian Army, later commander-in-chief of the Russian Army in the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905.

[37] Stefan Wilanowski (1900-1978) - an attorney, activist of the peasant movement, at that time president of the Polish Slavic Committee in London, representative of PKWN in London from October 7, 1944.

[\[38\]](#) Reference is made to a group headed by Tadeusz Ćwik, Julian Hochfeld and Bogusław Kożusznik.

[\[39\]](#) Emil Sommerstein (1883-1957) - a Zionist activist, at that time head of the War Reparations Department of PKWN, chairman of the Central Committee of Jews in Poland.