Roijen, Jan Herman van 1905- 1991

Van Roijen relates the current situation in Washington and the American view on the crisis. The removal of the missiles was a non-negotiable issue for the Americans, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared their removal was absolutely essential. In the mind of American statesmen, the missiles in Cuba was directly connected to the 1961 Berlin crisis, as it was a new Soviet technique. The hurried construction of the bases was reported to go on, meaning time is of the utmost essence. The Americans were not above considering force to resolve the crisis, although this was relegated to a worst-case scenario.

Van Roijen relates in this cable the details of a meeting with the US State Department's Bureau of Western European Affairs. With regards to Cuba, the Soviets assured the United States that they would not supply Cuba with offensive military weapons and even detailed the ranges of the missiles shipped. The construction of the bases was done in such haste that no attempt to conceal them was made, indicating the construction was on a time limit. These along with several other factors (the 1961 Berlin crisis, internal pressure within the Soviet Union) had convinced the administration that the Soviets had the fixed determination to confront the US.

Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

Van Roijen writes again about the current situation in Washington just as the Cuban Missile Crisis is drawing to a close. The White House issued a statement regarding a proposal by Khrushchev. The statement's tough stance is attributed to Khrushchev's morning message which was completely different in content and tone to the personal message sent to Kennedy. The personal message amounted to admitting humiliating defeat by the Soviets with no mention of withdrawal of the U.S. missiles in Turkey. Van Roijen concludes that Kennedy made the right response to the previously offered Soviet deal, and kept the door open for consultation. The Cuban threat is almost "disappeared."

This cable comes from Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen, regarding the subject of Cuba and the discovered Soviet missiles. Van Roijen reports on the current status of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, noting that the Soviets are willing to dismantle the missiles in Cuba if the Americans would do for "obscolescent bases near Soviet territory." The State Department fervently denied that any such tradeoff would happen or was even being considered.