Cuban Missile Crisis

Foreign Minister Raúl Roa said to the Yugoslavian official that Fidel’s last declaration (his 5 point statement on 28 October) was directed more at Khrushchev than to Kennedy.

Prato and Pinto discuss Brazilian efforts to pursuade Cuba to accept inspectors as well as what a potential U.S. attack would mean for diplomatic relations in the region.

Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.

Fidel Castro discusses the conditions of the Cuban economy and militia and expresses his belief that Cuba-United States relations are heading in a positive direction.

Alekseev gives the details of a meeting with U Thant, a meeting that took place as a result of Cuban refusal to allow U Thant and his advisers to view the dismantling of military sites.