Journal entry from D.A. Zhukov, the Soviet ambassador to Indonesia, on a March 14, 1955 visit from Huang Zhen, the PRC's ambassador to Indonesia. Zhen relayed to Zhukov that he had been visited by the Egyptian ambassador to Indonesia, Ali Fahmi Al-Amroussi, and that the Egyptians were upset that the PRC was reportedly considering trade with Israel. Zhen sought Zhukov's advice on whether or not to meet with the Egyptians.

Tugarinov wrote this overview of reactions to the events in Hungary and Suez by third world nations. Tugarinov reports that the events in Hungary and the Near East increased the prestige of the United States.

Information on the results of an analysis of the activities of the KGB residency in Cairo, Egypt from 1972-1976, conducted by KGB Service R. Starting in January 1973, the KGB leadership prohibited the residency from using Egyptian citizens as agents; however the resident in Cairo initiated restrictions on penetration operations earlier, in 1967 and 1968. As a result, by 1977, the residency had no agents in the majority of its intelligence objectives.

In May 1971, after the defeat of the anti-Sadat opposition group “left Nasserists,” the KGB’s leadership role in the organization came to light. In response, President Sadat took steps to curtail the activities of Soviet intelligence in Egypt. The KGB resident in Cairo was forced to strengthen his efforts to obtain information on the intentions of the Egyptian leadership, while improving security for clandestine operations. In 1967, the Centre decided not to task the Cairo residency with collecting information on the United States or China, because its limited resources permitted it to focus only on Egypt’s internal politics, and its relations with the USSR, the United States, Israel, and other Arab states. The prohibition against using Egyptian citizens as agents meant that the residency often had to rely on operational-technical means of collection; however by June 1977, the KGB’s leaders instructed the Cairo resident to select and recruit a well-known Soviet-Arab for use in gathering political information, and active measures.

In a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Solod, President Nasser discusses Egypt's lack of sufficient arms to fight the British and discusses attempts to negotiate for the sale of arms from other European countries.

President Nasser discusses with Soviet Ambassador Solod possible relations with communist China and his fear of conflict with Israel. Nasser then turns to the economic and political relations between the USSR and Egypt

President Nasser discusses Western interference in the Arab world and describes Egypt as an island surrounded by imperialist waves. Despite this, he claims Egypt will remain independent and neutral.

President Nasser criticizes the Israeli attack at the Gaza strip which involves Egyptian soldiers. He requests immediate military aid from the Soviet Union in case of future incidents by Israeli or British forces.

President Nasser discusses a Soviet-Egyptian arms deal and claims he is pleased with the agreement. However, he worries that Britain will no longer supply arms to Egypt as a result of this agreement.

This 25 April 1974 directive from the Centre is attributed to an author identified as “Sviridov.” It was sent to KGB Line A residencies in Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Aden, Samaa, and others, and contains instructions for planning “active measures.”

“Sviridov” identified a variety of channels through which the KGB could influence Middle Eastern governments, militaries, and political groups, while suppressing anti-Soviet groups. Additionally, the residencies were instructed to plan active measures in advance to prepare for future contingencies.

In an explanatory note, Mitrokhin explains that “Sviridov” is a pseudonym for then KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, and that Line A is the arm of the KGB concerned with active measures intended to influence foreign countries.

Soviet Military Intelligence assess the equipment provided to Afghan counterrevolutionaries by the US, Britian, Egypt, and Pakistan.