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January 27, 1962

Entry from the journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, conversation with the Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, Bhupesh Gupta. Benediktov met with Gupta again on 27 January 1962 (as the Soviet envoy recorded in his diary four days later).

July 14, 1950

Letter from Kim Il Sung to Soviet Government

Kim Il Sung concurs with Stalin’s disapproval of the English appeal to remove the People's Army from the 38th parallel and considers the Korea question should be taken to UNSC.

October 10, 1962

Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with "Comrade E"

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with the charge d'affairs of the Chinese Embassy in India, Comrade E Cheng-Cheng, referred to as "Comrade E." in the document. In the conversation, the Chinese official gave Beijing's version of the building Sino-Indian border confrontation, blaming India for attacking Chinese posts along the border, and asserting that India had "gone too far" to resume normal relations with the PRC. Ten days later, China launched a broad attack on Indian positions along the disputed frontier.

August 31, 1950

Ciphered Telegram, Shtykov to Feng Xi [Stalin], transmitting letter from Kim Il Sung

Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin describing Kim Il Sung's positive reaction to Stalin's congratulatory telegram of August 29, 1950.

October 26, 1962

Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India," pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."

November 13, 1950

Telegram from Shtykov to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

Soviet advice to North Korea concerning the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly on the Korea issue.

November 2, 1962

Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai--with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier--opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."

July 3, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 21404, Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]

Kim Il Sung’s message to Mao Zedong communicates Kim’s requirements for a peace proposal.

August 13, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 22834, Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]

Telegram from Mao to Stalin relaying the assessment of Li Kenong of the state of the ongoing armistice talks. He states that the US is unwilling the accept the 38th parallel as the demaracation line and that given the state of North Korean forces, they should consider make concessions to American demands in this regard in the interests of ceasing hostilities.

August 28, 1951

CC Politburo decision with approved message from Stalin to Mao Zedong

Stalin agrees with Mao on the steps taken in response to the attacks, Stalin does not agree in inviting neutral countries to negotiations.

Pagination