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March 4, 1963

From the Diary of M. A. Popov, Record of a Conversation with the Chairman of Hungarian Radio and Television, Cde. Istvan Tempe, 28 February 1963

A member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Istvan Tempe, describes his impressions of Cuba upon his visit for the fourth anniversary of the Cuban revolution. He notes that while the Cuban population has positive opinion of the Soviet Union, their Communist leadership is generally insufficient.

March 4, 1980

CPSU CC Directive to Soviet Ambassadors in Communist Countries, Instructions 'About the China Question'

Instructions to Soviet ambassadors on dealing with China's outreach to socialist countries in the eastern bloc, outlining a series of steps for Soviet ambassadors to follow which would
foster skepticism about China’s intentions and thwart efforts by Chinese representatives to make wide-ranging contacts in these states. The directive notes China’s hostility to Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia and contrasts this with its development of extensive relations with Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea.

May 24, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 32 (continued)

The Presidium decides to adopt Protocol 32.

April 10, 1968

Comment by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Gretchko to CPSU CC, 10 April 1968

A comment by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Gretchko to the CPSU CC on 10 April 1968 regarding the Soviet Union's relations with Cuba. He says, "We provide all-sided aid to Cuba, including considerable military aid. Thousands of Soviet military specialists, i.e., officers, sergeants, and soldiers, are stationed in Cuba, protecting its security, training its forces. However, all of this does not meet with appropriate recognition on the part of the Cuban leaders."

April 9, 1968

Secret Speech by Leonid I. Brezhnev CPSU CC Plenum, 'About Current Problems of the International Situation and the Struggle of the CPSU for the Cohesion of the World Communist Movement'

An excerpt on Cuba from Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev's secret speech, “About Current Problems of the International Situation and the Struggle of the CPSU for the Cohesion of the World Communist Movement,” to the CPSU CC Plenum on 9 April 1968.

November 19, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation between Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka and British Journalist David Astor, 19 November 1962 (excerpt)

Polish leader Władysław Gomułka and British journalist David Astor discuss the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

October 25, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 61

In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

December 3, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

November 16, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66

Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

October 28, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63

According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.

Pagination