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Documents

June 4, 1982

Note for [name excised] from [name excised], 'State/INR Request for Update of Pak SNIE, and Assessment of Argentine Nuclear Program'

A planned update of the Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-32/81 concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear program was continuing and new evidence suggested a “significant” Chinese role in the design of the weapons. Despite this new evidence, CIA estimates suggest that the required amount of fissile material for weapons production would not be available as early as had been predicted, and that a Pakistani nuclear test was not imminent.

June 25, 1981

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'India-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential Repercussions'

A U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research report offers an overview of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, and speculates how the development of a weapon in one country could strain relations with Washington and lead to a regional nuclear arms race. India is less likely to take preventive action against Pakistan because of the risk of “antagonizing China,” the report suggests.

April 9, 1981

Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

February 13, 1989

Ciphered Telegram No. 41, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Short report on a recent Pakistani missile test based on information from an Indian official. India does not believe Benazir Bhutto's statement that Pakistan's nuclear program is peaceful. Includes speculation on China's involvement in the program. Pakistan has also approached contacts in Hungary about obtaining nuclear technology.

November 28, 1989

Ciphered Telegram No. 219, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Short report on India's response to Pakistan's purchase of a nuclear reactor from China.

December 12, 1989

Ciphered Telegram No. 227, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Short report on talks with the chairman of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission. Pakistan wants to purchase a nuclear power plant control system from Hungary.

April 30, 1980

Ciphered Telegram No. 68, Embassy of Hungary in Pakistan to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Short analysis of Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq's upcoming visits to China and North Korea, with discussion of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan's nuclear program.

January 19, 1982

Report, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on Indian-Pakistani relations

Report based on information from a Soviet ambassador on India's strategy for dealing with Pakistan. India is concerned about the military support Pakistan is receiving from the United States and China, as well as Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. India is receiving military support from the Soviet Union, modernizing its forces, and seems to be preparing for war with Pakistan.

January 26, 1982

Report, Permanent Mission of Hungary to the International Organizations in Vienna to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Report on a conversation with Indian Ambassador Dalal. Topics discussed include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India and Pakistan's nuclear programs, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the upcoming election of a new Executive Director.

November 18, 1978

'Pakistan Proliferation Problem,' Department of State Cable 292469 to US Embassy United Kingdom

Discussion of a British list of countries that were actual or potential manufacturers of inverters. The U.S. does not want to approach any "nuclear threshold states" yet because some might not cooperate or might inform Pakistan. Also discusses strategies for approaching the Soviet Union and China in the future.

Pagination