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Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

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Netherlands. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

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Boissevain, Gideon W.

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Netherlands. Embassy (Cuba)

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Luns, Joseph

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Interchurch Peace Council (Netherlands)

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Nuclear Proliferation

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November 2, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 2 November 1962 Boissevain writes a cable detailing a meeting between Fidel Castro and UN Secretary General U Thant. Cuba refused any inspection of missile silos, if the Americans did not uphold their pledge to not threaten Cuba with invasion. The Five Points were mentioned as preconditions for peace and Castro pledged Cuba was ready and willing to work towards peace. It appears Castro was aware of Soviet considerations for "global politics" as the reason behind the Soviet withdrawal of missiles.
November 1, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1962 Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.
October 31, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 31 October 1962 Boissevain writes about a conversation between Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto. The conversation revolves around Castro's Five Points, and Roa claims they are not aimed at the United States but rather the Soviet Union whose concession to remove the missiles greatly disturbed Castro. The Brazilian Ambassador though the Cubans asked too much, while Roa said these points are negotiable.
October 29, 1962	Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 29 October 1962 Boissevain speaks on the domestic situation in Cuba immediately after the end of the Missile Crisis. There are many counterrevolutionary groups who worry that current UN supervision of dismantling of the Soviet missile sites will preclude a U.S.-led invasion of Cuba, and perhaps might be the prelude to a normalizing of relations between Cuba and the United States. Raul Castro gives a speech saying the dismantling of the Soviet missile sites is a run-up to new Cuban demands, especially toward the evacuation of the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo. Raul goes on to address his brother Fidel, with assurances unity from the people, and obedience to any orders he issues. This raises the fear of what future demands Fidel may raise in the aftermath of this crisis.
October 29, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 29 October 1962 Boissevain writes after the conclusion of the crisis the Cuban response to the Tripartite Agreement. Fidel Castro proclaimed that no guarantee would be sufficient until all of the following had ceased: the naval and economic blockade, American aid to anti government forces and espionage, piracy from the United States and Puerto Rico, American military flights over Cuba, and dismantling the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay.
October 27, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 27 October 1962 Van Roijen writes again about the current situation in Washington just as the Cuban Missile Crisis is drawing to a close. The White House issued a statement regarding a proposal by Khrushchev. The statement's tough stance is attributed to Khrushchev's morning message which was completely different in content and tone to the personal message sent to Kennedy. The personal message amounted to admitting humiliating defeat by the Soviets with no mention of withdrawal of the U.S. missiles in Turkey. Van Roijen concludes that Kennedy made the right response to the previously offered Soviet deal, and kept the door open for consultation. The Cuban threat is almost "disappeared."
October 27, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 27 October 1962 Van Roijen relates that the U.S. State Department has great interest in learning about the mood in Cuba, particularly Havana. Van Roijen asks the Minister of Foreign Affairs to forward all of Boissevain's correspondences including his personal letters to him.
October 26, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 26 October 1962 Van Roijen relates the current situation in Washington and the American view on the crisis. The removal of the missiles was a non-negotiable issue for the Americans, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared their removal was absolutely essential. In the mind of American statesmen, the missiles in Cuba was directly connected to the 1961 Berlin crisis, as it was a new Soviet technique. The hurried construction of the bases was reported to go on, meaning time is of the utmost essence. The Americans were not above considering force to resolve the crisis, although this was relegated to a worst-case scenario.
October 26, 1962	Cable from Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, The Hague, to Dutch Embassy, London, 26 October 1962 This cable from Foreign Minister Luns refers to a personal letter received from British Foreign Minister Lord Home, regarding the stance of the United Kingdom in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The letter is one encouraging support to the United States at the UN Security Council, and that such a crisis would have repurcussions not only for the Caribbean but for Europe as well. Luns later sent a reply of thanks, indicating continuing solidarity with the Western World and promises to keep in closer touch with the British.
October 25, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 25 October 1962 Van Roijen relates in this cable the details of a meeting with the US State Department's Bureau of Western European Affairs. With regards to Cuba, the Soviets assured the United States that they would not supply Cuba with offensive military weapons and even detailed the ranges of the missiles shipped. The construction of the bases was done in such haste that no attempt to conceal them was made, indicating the construction was on a time limit. These along with several other factors (the 1961 Berlin crisis, internal pressure within the Soviet Union) had convinced the administration that the Soviets had the fixed determination to confront the US.