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Documents

November 26, 1979

International Technology Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory, ITO-79-155, '22 September 1979 Event Report Draft'

This Los Alamos study is another in the series of report and studies of the Vela event performed by US intelligence agencies, the national labs, and contractors.

June 1978

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Projects Division, 'Proliferation Group Quarterly Report, January – March 1978'

This issue includes an extract from a recent study on Pakistan and two highly technical articles relating to on-going research to identify the signatures of high explosives used for the implosion method of nuclear detonation. It also includes a report that utilized open literature and classified intelligence, including two satellite photographs, the purpose of the article is to illuminate how the South African Government intended to use the site, down to the depth and thickness of the bore holes.

July 1978

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, 'South Africa’s Nuclear Options and Decisionmaking Structure'

Memo reports that during the period the Carter administration was putting pressure on South Africa to avoid the nuclear weapons route, but the analysts suggested that even if the South Africans signed the NPT and accepted IEAE safeguards they would continue to pursue a “covert program.”

September 1977

Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Projects Division, 'South Africa: Motivations and Capabilities for Nuclear Proliferation'

This report for the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) pointed to downsides of US and international pressures against pariah or otherwise beleaguered states such as South Africa and Israel and against would-be nuclear proliferants. They might cooperate to advance their goals.

September 2, 1949

Memorandum of Conversation Regarding Eximbank Loan to South Africa

Assistant Secretary of State Thorp, Arneson, and Wendel discuss a potential Eximbank loan to South Africa, noting that though the loan application should be considered separate from US uranium purchases, South Africa was due to become the main source of uranium in the US after the Congo's supply was depleted.

March 28, 1949

House of Assembly Debates, Union of South Africa, on Atomic Energy Bill, First Session, Tenth Parliament

House debate on the Atomic Energy Bill, which proposed controlling South Africa's nuclear energy by placing the state in charge of mining and ownership of uranium, thorium, and other radioactive materials.

October 18, 1948

Memorandum from A.M. Rosenson to Wendel Regarding Draft Economic Policy Statement

Memo from Alexander M. Rosenson, chief of the monetary affairs staff at the Dept. of State, to Wendel with the economic section of the US policy agenda towards South Africa attached.

May 26, 1948

Memorandum from J.K Gustafson to C.L. Wilson Regarding Gustafson's Conversation with Anton Gray

Memo from J. K. Gustafson to Carroll L. Wilson, both of the US Atomic Energy Commission, regarding a conversation Anton Gray had with General Smuts, the fourth prime minister of South Africa, about South Africa's uranium development and its effect on relations with the US and the UK.

May 17, 1948

Memorandum from Edmund A. Gullion to J.K. Gustafson Regarding US Policy towards South Africa

Memo from Edmund Gullion, Special Assistant to the Undersecretary, to J. K. Gustafson of the Atomic Energy Commission summarizing the most important unresolved policy issues between the U.S. and South Africa.

October 5, 1984

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 73/5-84, 'Trends in South Africa’s Nuclear Security Policies and Programs'

Seeking “constructive engagement” with the apartheid regime, the Reagan administration wanted the South Africans to keep a lid on their nuclear weapons program. The NIE’s top-secret status was compatible with one of the elements of the 1984 estimate: that any revelations that broke the regime’s “calculated ambiguity” about its nuclear status would put Washington in an “awkward position” by “fir[ing] the drive” for the sanctions and disinvestment campaigns which the administration was trying to avoid. Analyzing the motives for the nuclear program, the CIA found it “irrelevant” to any threat that the regime was likely to face.A key issue was whether South Africa had a nuclear arsenal. On that problem, the NIE dovetailed with the view taken by NIE-4-82: South Africa “probably has the capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.” That was accurate, but U.S. intelligence may not have known that the regime’s leaders had already decided to build a stockpile of 7 weapons, with six weapons assembled during the 1980s.

Pagination