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Documents

December 10, 1957

Letter, Nikolai Bulganin to Dwight D. Eisenhower

Bulganin proposes a halt on nuclear tests among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom beginning on January 1, 1958.

November 3, 1979

Memorandum by C.U.D., 'Observations on Our Differences with the West Europeans Over Non-Proliferation'

The memorandum describes a difference between President Carter and the West Europeans over their commitment to limiting reprocessing and plutonium supplies for R&D work on breeder reactors.

September 26, 1986

Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence, 'European Review [Redacted]'

Brief summaries of intelligence from Europe.

January 5, 1975

Telegram from the UK Embassy, Blantyre, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

May 25, 1955

Equipment for Radio Free Europe Studio in London

The Foreign Office writes to the Treasury to ask it to reverse its denial to RFE of customs duties exemption for import of technical equipment for a new London bureau. RFE “deserves the full support of her Majesty’s Government,” wrote the Foreign Office, adding that a London bureau will enable better cooperation between the U.K. and RFE and facilitate its interviewing of East European refugees. The Foreign Office notes that RFE is not a commercial organization and “is in fact supported by US Government money contributed covertly.. For political and other reasons the US Government are unable to admit this ….”

July 19, 1949

Cable from Moscow to the Foreign Office

The British ambassador to the Soviet Union and Stalin meet to discuss relations between their two countries. Conversation focused primarily on British intentions within NATO and reconstruction efforts.

November 9, 1944

Letter No. 402 from L.D. Wilgress, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, W.L. Mackenzie King

The Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, L.D. Wilgress, thoroughly reviews Soviet foreign policy in Europe, Asia, and in Latin America and its relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. Wilgress optimistically concludes that "the Soviet Government are desirous of co-operating fully with the other great powers."

March 3, 1967

Research Memorandum REU-14 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'How Major NATO Countries View the Prospect of an ABM Deployment'

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

July 15, 1965

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Attitudes of Selected Countries on Accession to a Soviet Co-sponsored Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

January 31, 1962

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

Pagination