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Documents

October 17, 1964

Cable from the Chinese Sports Committee, 'Request Clearance for a Letter of Congratulations to the South African Lawn Tennis Association'

Correspondence from the South African Lawn Tennis Association, which includes the competition schedule for the second national championship and the congratulatory letter from the Chinese General Secretary of PRC Sports Committee Zhang Lianhua.

October 17, 1964

Request for Clearance of a Draft Joint Communique of the People’s Republic of China Sports Committee and the Chair of the South African Colored People’s Sports Committee

The PRC Sports Committee requests instructions regarding the publication of a joint communique with a South African delegation. The document includes the minutes of the conversation between Zhang Lianhua and the South African representative.

September 1985

Memorandum, US National Intelligence Council, NIC M 85-10001, 'The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints'

The most recent CREST release included this analysis of “The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints.” The analyst sought to explain why “no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred” since the Chinese nuclear test, India had not weaponized while Israel and South Africa had not “taken any action to signal overt possession of nuclear weapons.”

September 25, 1954

Chinese Communist Party, Plan of Action for Welcoming Home the Chinese Internationals

A work plan on Chinese Communist Party strategies for engaging the Overseas Chinese in Burma, Indonesia, India, and South Africa, among other regions.

December 3, 1975

Memorandum of Conversation with Chinese Delegation led by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping

Chinese delegation visits the White House and discusses Angola. The Chinese emphasize that South Africa must exit the conflict if there is to be any chance of rallying other African states to oppose Neto.

July 1991

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5-91C, 'Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control'

With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.

January 20, 1983

Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13/32-83, 'Chinese Policy and Practices Regarding Sensitive Nuclear Transfers'

With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. These concerns did not go away during the Reagan administration. While nuclear proliferation was not a top priority, the administration was apprehensive about the implications of the spread of nuclear capabilities and that China may have been aiding and abetting some potential proliferators by selling unsafeguarded nuclear materials.

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

April 9, 1981

Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

Pagination