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Documents

April 12, 1968	Memorandum, Permanent Mission of Hungary to the U.N. to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry Memorandum of conversations between Hungarian delegate to the UN with Soviet, Yugoslav and Romanian counterparts on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
August 21, 1968	Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry Report on the results of Indian President Zakir Hussain's visit to Moscow, including discussion of Soviet-Indian relations broadly and India's relations with Pakistan, as well as on Soviet efforts to pressure India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
November 18, 1978	'Pakistan Proliferation Problem,' Department of State Cable 292469 to US Embassy United Kingdom Discussion of a British list of countries that were actual or potential manufacturers of inverters. The U.S. does not want to approach any "nuclear threshold states" yet because some might not cooperate or might inform Pakistan. Also discusses strategies for approaching the Soviet Union and China in the future.
November 24, 1978	'Pakistan Proliferation Problem,' US Embassy United Kingdom Cable 19322 to Department of State Britain agrees with U.S. thinking on the matter of State Department cable 292469, except on its approach to the Soviet Union. Britain decided not to approach the Soviets because they were unsure whether Moscow’s “commitment to nonproliferation outweighs their special political interests vis-à-vis Pakistan.”
July 2, 1960	Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry Károly Práth reports on North Korea's Seven-Year Plan, the difference in ideological views between the Chinese and Soviets, and Korea's relations with those two countries.
June 2007	Disarming 'Osot' ideologically, 1963-73. Folder 12. The Chekist Anthology. Vasiliy Mitrokhin provides a detailed account of the KGB active measures in the case of Vladimir Dremluga, codenamed “Osot.” In 1963, at the age of 23, Dremluga was put on probation for his repeated attempts to leave the country. In 1964, Dremluga enrolled in the Leningrad University where he met Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, the leading members of the samizdat journal Chronicle of Current Affairs. A year later, Dremluga was dismissed from the University for indecent behavior. In 1968, he was sentenced to three years in jail for acting inimically to the country. While in prison, Dremluga did not disavow his anti-Soviet beliefs. Upon his release in 1971 he was sentenced again. During his second imprisonment in Yakutia, the KGB decided to proceed with active measures against Dremluga. Dremluga's second prison term had no impact on his overt anti-Soviet statements. However, he became reclusive, exercising more caution and deliberation in making new acquaintances. The next step for the KGB was to introduce him to agent “Mayskiy” (May). Agent Mayskiy reported that Dremluga's lengthy imprisonment had restricted his communication with friends in Moscow who shared his beliefs. He actively sought ways to reconnect with them. The KGB's plan was to initiate a “postal chain” for Dremluga to supposedly reestablish his channels of communication. Agent Mayskiy offered Dremluga to correspond with his peers in Moscow through Svetlana, Mayskiy's friend in Yakutsk who had an acquaintance in Moscow. Svetlana was to be reached through “Maslova,” allegedly a teacher at the prisoner's night school. In fact, all correspondence went directly to the KGB. By means of such “postal chain,” the KGB was able to work out Yakir and Krasin and, consequently, press criminal charges against them. In his written conversations, Dremluga continued to express anti-Soviet opinions. But his convictions were soon undermined by the Yakir and Krasin's trial and letters he received from the operatives in Moscow, depicting a tragic defeat of the democratic movement. Dremluga became uncertain and wavering. Having isolated Dremluga from his like-minded friends, the KGB then insisted that he repent and publicly condemn his own anti-Soviet actions. For fear of reprisal, Dremluga eventually renounced his views and condemned his activity.
June 2007	Pseudonym. Folder 11. The Chekist Anthology. Mitrokhin states that discipline was the main reason for assigning a pseudonym to a KGB agent. Some agents refused to choose a pseudonym, considering it to be humiliating. But as Mitrokhin points out, a refusal to use a pseudonym could diminish the psychological and operational effect of the recruitment process. The KGB Order No. 00430 stipulated that all recruits had to sign a non-disclosure agreement regarding their collaboration with the agency. The KGB Order No. 00235 specified that the most valuable agents had to be indexed solely by their respective pseudonyms. As a recruitment tactic, Mitrokhin notes, the use of a pseudonym enhanced agent’s awareness of the secretive nature of one’s work and accentuated the conspiratorial function of the KGB.
June 2007	Directorate K Memorandum No. 153/838, 21 January 1976. Folder 13. The Chekist Anthology The Memorandum No. 153/838 considered problems associated with the dissident movement of the Peoples Workers’ Union (Narodno-trudovoy soyuz, NTS). Vasili Mitrokhin writes that among the primary concerns mentioned in the Memorandum was the execution of complex active measures to aggravate contradictions between the leadership of various NTS groups. The Memorandum instructed operatives to observe relations of the NTS with the publishers of the journal “Continent.” In order to fuel up tensions between the NTS groups, operatives needed to, among other things, find out whether members of the “Continent” received higher payments than members of the NTS. In general, Mitrokhin suggests that the foremost purpose of the Memorandum was to gather disreputable information and undermine activities of the NTS.
June 2007	Tracking down writers of anonymous letters and leaflets, 1957-74. Folder 14. The Chekist Anthology. Vasili Mitrokhin describes investigative methods used during anti-Soviet incidents in Sverdlovsk and Serov. On November 7, 1969 anti-Soviet leaflets were distributed in the city of Sverdlovsk. The KGB collected 60 copies. It was determined that the leaflets were made on a portable typewriter of a foreign make using a standard-format paper. It was also estimated based on the content of the leaflets that the author was approximately 17-20 years old. On April 26, 1970 the anonymous leaflets appeared in the city for the second time. They were printed on the same typewriter, but differed in content. The KGB operatives collected 14 copies. Similarly to the first group of leaflets, they feature a signature of the “Executive body of the party ‘Free Russia’.” On May 1, 1970 identical leaflets were disseminated in the city of Serov. The KGB operatives narrowed down the circle of suspects to 176 students. From local testimonies, they discovered that Uzlov, a student at the Ural Institute of Engineers, had been a member of a youth organization called “Revolutionary Workers’ Party,” which was later renamed to “Free Russia.” Nikolay Shaburov (born 1945) and Victor Pestov (born 1946) were leaders of the “Free Russia.” They designed the text of the leaflets and recruited followers to help distribute the copies. Members of the “Free Russia” were arrested and convicted.
June 2007	The 'MRAKOBES' [Obscurantist] Case, 1960-61. Folder 15. The Chekist Anthology. This report from Vasili Mitrokhin presents evidence of an anonymous writer—“Mrakobes”— who between 1960 and 1961 delivered anti-Soviet letters and caricatures of government and party leaders to foreign embassies and Soviet institutions in Moscow. The letters were written by hand and contained Church Slavic fonts and constructions. They were put in a letter box at different times of the day, in different parts of Moscow. Each set of letters was put in a different letter box. Examination of text, envelopes, and paper demonstrated that the anonymous author was familiar with rare literature, had a good command of musical and church lexicon, and made good use of figures of speech. The author was also estimated to be a middle-age male with education in humanities. From some letters intercepted by the KGB, operatives obtained his fingerprints. They also observed that one letter box was frequented by the anonymous writer more than others. The KGB laid an ambush. The hideout for the operatives was camouflaged as a storage room and a light signal was set up. Several weeks later, on February 5, 1961 “Mrakobes” delivered four letters. A surveillance team identified him as S.F. Petrakov (born 1924). To verify it was the right person, the team wanted to check his fingerprints against the earlier obtained fingerprint. Petrakov was invited to a medical inspection, during which an operative posing as a doctor fingerprinted him with a magnifying glass. Petrakov’s identity was confirmed. He confessed to having produced around 100 anti-Soviet documents that had been mailed by post at various times.