1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
South Asia
North America
East Asia
1931- 2022
1909- 1989
1906- 1982
1914- 1984
-
1929- 1979
August 30, 1981
The General Consul is asked to approve an ultimatum which would allow Soviet forces to psychologically influence the rebels, and secondly, provide a way to warn the civilian population.
September 25, 1981
This document consists of diary entries covering the events within the Afghan and Soviet militaries which ultimately led to the defection of the 913th Afghan Border Battalion.
October 11, 1981
This document reveals the difficulty in distinguishing between rebels from the local population. The often coercive tactics of the Afghan military, which drew in individuals who would not join on their own, shows the difficulty in differentiating between rebels and local people.
July 4, 1981
This document reveals much disagreement between Soviet policy makers. Cheremnykh, Chief Military Adviser Mayorov, and N. A. Nur, Karmal’s deputy disagree over the responsbility to the armed forces.
May 10, 1981
This document reveals reluctance on the part of the Soviets to maintain military involvement in Afghanistan, and difficulty in shaping a newly forming Afghan government. The PDPA's efforts to establish a democratic government, Soviets analysts revealed, were hampered by tribalism and strong ethnic disagreements regarding the scope and shape of their government.
January 1, 1989
A decision authorizing military aid, totaling 6 million Soviet rubles.
March 18, 1979
This conversation reveals the difficulty that the Afghan political leadership faced in establishing a government--despite substantial military aid and advice from the Soviet Union.
December 27, 1979
'Outside Interference' in Afghan affairs lead Soviet officials to provide limited military aid and supplies in order to stabilize Afghanistan. Soviets, in pointing to a time-table for their involvement, stated that they would leave Afghanistan as soon as the foreign interference no longer exists.
This document reveals the struggles facing Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Local individuals reacted negatively to outside Soviet involvement, which threatened to overturn the results of the April Revolution. Also, Soviets believed that the CIA, and Beijing’s leadership, were attempting to de-stabilize Afghanistan.
This document provides a statement to the UN Security Council, explaining the Soviet position on Afghanistan. The Soviets justify involvement in Afghan affairs--citing UN Article 51, which, in the context of this document, legalizes national defense efforts in response to the presence of outside forces.