Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

India English Clear All

Related Resources

The Taj Mahal Shrine in Agra, India.

South Asia

India

Indian Nuclear History

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Potala Palace

South Asia

Tibet

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

China and South Asia

Nuclear Proliferation

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

South Asia

Pakistan

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Department of State

-

Indira Gandhi, 1982

Gandhi, Indira

1917- 1984

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

-

Sino-Indian Border War, 1962

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Bhabha, Homi Jehangir

1909- 1966

Jawaharlal Nehru, 1949

Nehru, Jawaharlal

1889- 1964

South Korean Diplomacy in Asia, 1955-1957

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Embassy (India)

-

Results:

321 - 330 of 369

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

October 21, 1964	National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, 'Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade' This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”
April 23, 1964	Letter from Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone Noting new intelligence information on the Indian and Israeli nuclear programs, as well as the possibility of developments concerning Sweden, Hughes requested McCone to initiate a new estimate of nuclear proliferation trends, which would eventually become part of a October 1964 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Hughes enclosed draft “terms of reference,” that included questions about the possibility of “clandestine” weapons programs and new technological developments that could make weapons development “easier” (perhaps a reference to gas centrifuge technology that the 1964 NIE would discuss).
May 23, 1974	National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 202 on Nuclear Proliferation Following India’s nuclear weapon test, the US must reassess its nuclear non-proliferation policy and how best to deal with India in the future. The author of the memo determines that nuclear non-proliferation is still necessary and can be “effectively pursued.” The memo is followed by a series of documents outlining courses of action to help deter further proliferation.
August 13, 1963	Memorandum from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report on the request of the Indian Red Cross to collect and cremate the bodies of their soldiers in accordance with Indian customs. The Chinese Red Cross agreed to carry out the cremation.
October 3, 1953	Aide Memoire from the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs India agrees in principle to withdraw their Military Escorts in Tibet and proposed conversation between the two governments at the earliest opportunity
February 17, 1984	Hugh Montgomery, director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, to Ambassador Ronald Spiers, Enclosing 'India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation,' Report 778-AR A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.
1983	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,' Report 83-AR A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.
September 21, 1981	John N. McMahon, Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, to Ambassador Richard T. Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management, 'Special National Intelligence Estimate on Indian Reactions to Nuclear Developments in Pakistan,' 31-32/81 Special National Security Estimate 31-32/81 outlines possible Indian preventative action that could be taken against Pakistan’s nuclear program, and possible responses should Pakistan develop a weapon.
June 25, 1981	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'India-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential Repercussions' A U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research report offers an overview of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, and speculates how the development of a weapon in one country could strain relations with Washington and lead to a regional nuclear arms race. India is less likely to take preventive action against Pakistan because of the risk of “antagonizing China,” the report suggests.
April 9, 1981	Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation' Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.