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August 3, 1972

Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 31-72, 'Indian Nuclear Developments and their Likely Implications'

Prepared as part of the NSSM 156 policy review, this Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) concluded that the chances of India making a decision to test were “roughly even,” but the post-mortem analysis [see "Why now?," 18 May 1974] argued that based on its own findings, the conclusion ought to have been 60-40 in favor of a decision to test. In its analysis of the pros and cons of testing, the SNIE found that the “strongest factors impelling India to set off a test are: the belief that it would build up [its] international prestige; demonstrate India's importance as an Asian power; overawe its immediate South Asian neighbors; and bring enhanced popularity and public support to the regime which achieved it.” The drafters further noted that a test would be “extremely popular at home, where national pride is riding high” and that supporters of a test believed that it would make the world see India as “one of the world’s principal powers.” The arguments against a test included adverse reactions from foreign governments that provided economic assistance, but the estimate noted that foreign reactions were “becoming less important” to India.

July 26, 1972

US Embassy India Cable 9293 to State Department, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

The Embassy acknowledged that India had the “technical know-how and possibly materials to develop [a] simple nuclear device within period of months after GOI decision to do so.” Nevertheless, it saw no evidence that a decision had been made to test a device. Moreover, capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons were limited, with no plans in sight to “develop [a] missile launch system.”

July 4, 1972

Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Proposed NSSM on the Implications of an Indian Nuclear Test,' with cover memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy

National security assistant Henry Kissinger asks President Nixon to approve a proposal for a national security study memorandum [NSSM] on the implications of an Indian nuclear test for U.S. interests.

June 27, 1972

US Embassy Tokyo Cable 67912 to State Department, 'Japanese View Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans'

Cable on a discussion with Japanese Disarmament Division Chief Tanaka, who was uncertain whether India would conduct the nuclear test or not.

June 26, 1972

US Mission Geneva Cable 2755 to State Department, 'Japanese-Pakistani Conversations Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans'

Report on conversations between Japanese officials and a Pakistani source who indicated the location of the upcoming Indian nuclear test. The cable expressed doubts about the information, suggesting that the "stir" "may have been created largely on personal basis" by the Pakistani source.

June 23, 1972

State Department Cable 113523 to US Embassy India, 'Japanese Views Regarding Indian Nuclear Plans'

In response to a request from the State Department, Ryohei Murata, an official at the Japanese embassy, reported that the Japanese government believed that for prestige reasons and as a “warning” to others, the “Indians have decided to go ahead with a nuclear test” which could occur at “any time.” The Thar Desert in Rajasthan would be the test site.

April 22, 1972

State Department Cable 69551 to US Embassy United Kingdom, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

The Canadian embassy had asked the State Department for information on the intelligence reports from earlier in the year that an Indian nuclear test was “imminent.” The State Department denied the request, but informed the Canadians that the reports were so numerous and their “congruity, apparent reliability, and seeming credibility” so striking that it had become necessary to update official thinking about Indian intentions.

April 7, 1972

State Department cable 59655 to US Embassy United Kingdom, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

The British Government took the same view as the Canadians, seeing no evidence that the Indians had made a decision to do a nuclear test, although they had the “capability.”

March 24, 1972

State Department Cable 50634 to US Embassy Canada, 'Indian Nuclear Intentions'

Further discussions with the Canadian embassy counselor disclosed Ottawa’s view that it had no evidence of Indian intentions to test a nuclear weapon or a PNE. The Indians were “leaving their options open.” If they decided to test, however, it would be “impossible” for them to move forward “without revealing some indication of their intentions.”

March 14, 1972

US Embassy Canada Cable 430 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions on South Asia Situation'

Elaborating on his earlier cable and responding to the general issues raised by the Department’s 9 March message, science attaché Hudson questioned Lauren Gray’s evaluation of Sethna, suggesting that by combining “guile” and “technical proficiency,” the latter could easily have “easily misled” the Canadian. Based on consultations with a variety of Canadian insiders with knowledge of and experience with the Indian nuclear program, the Embassy saw no technical or fiscal barriers to an Indian test. Moreover, any pressure on India not to test would increase the “likelihood” of that happening.

Pagination