Findley proposes a system of mutual inspection of nuclear facilities between Argentina and Brazil. According to the agreement he proposed, Brazil and Argentina would renounce the intention to develop a nuclear device and would accept mutual inspections of their respective nuclear facilities.

Cyrus Vance - apparently unintentionally - left behind this document while meeting with Brazilian President Geisel. It lays out US negotiations with Argentina to ratify the Treaty of Tlateloco, to accept full scope safeguards and to delay the construction of a reprocessing facility in exchange for US nuclear assistance and Brazil’s acceptance of a moratorium on the construction of a reprocessing facility.

This is a CIA assessment of Brazilian nuclear politics a few weeks before President Sarney's visit to the U.S.

This SNIE analyzes Brazilian nuclear politics in the light of the return of civilian rule in the country after 21 years of military rule. It demonstrates a profound knowledge of the military's involvement in the nuclear program.

This estimate updates the 1974 predictions, and analyzes the “earliest dates of the technical feasibility of possession of a nuclear device” of the Republic of China, Pakistan, South Africa, The Republic of Korea, Argentina and Brazil, among others.

This letter sent by President Fernando Collor to President George H. W. Bush describes the importance of the first Brazilian made satellite to the country and communicates that the French-American consortium Orbital Sciences Corporation will probably be the enterprise chosen to put the Brazilian satellite in orbit. President Collor expected that this partnership paved the way for further cooperation in the space field and informed President Bush of his decision to create the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB), under civilian control.

Brazilian journalists Mariudim and Mme. Dotere speak with Mao about the prospects of stemming imperialism in Latin America, and countering Western influence. The reestablishment of diplomatic relations between China and Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, was also discussed.

With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.

A Directorate of Intelligence analysis, prepared in 1986, provides an interesting contrast with excisions in the NIEs on the indigenous program; it includes details on the major Navy, Air Force, and Army components of the indigenous program, including the nuclear submarine objective. As with the NIEs, the authors of this report saw no “political decision” on nuclear weapons and further noted President Sarney’s public statements against a weapons program. But a piece of political intelligence initially excised from this report suggested, rightly or wrongly, that Sarney may have been personally ambivalent.

The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to US or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities. According to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.”