1973 agreement between the Stasi and the KGB outlining their cooperative efforts to fight "ideological subversion" and uncover "the hostile plans of the enemy." Both secret services would also exchange information gathered by their espionage activities and provide mutual support in infiltrating agents. Of particular mutual interest was espionage against the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. To this end, the KGB was permitted to recruit East German citizens, and the MfS would secure their ongoing contacts.

A cable from the West German Embassy in Washington, D.C. discussing the threat to American security posed by an "offensive" Soviet base in Cuba, insights provided by recent intelligence, the purpose and the impact of the American blockade of Cuba, negotiations that have taken place at the United Nations, Soviet intentions during the Cuban crisis and, finally, a comparison of Cuba to the situation in Berlin.

DPRK Ambassador Pak Yeong-chan discusses Hungary's decision to recognize the South Korean government, East German-North Korean relations, and procedures for North Korean citizens traveling to West Berlin.

The DPRK Embassy in East Germany seeks to establish procedures and permissions for Korean citizens traveling to West Berlin.

This memorandum of conversation between the Head of the Far East Department in the East German Foreign Ministry Liebermann and Chinese Ambassador Peng Guangwei refers to China's intention to establish diplomatic relations with West Berlin. The East German side stresses the fact that countries such as Hungary and Bulgaria also established diplomatic relations with West Berlin taking into considerations the conditions posed by the international law and that China should do the same.

This is a memorandum of a conversation between the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in East Berlin, Rodin, and the director of the West Berlin Press Office, Günter Struve, with regard to China's intention to establish a trade representation in West Berlin. Apart from stressing that by initiating diplomatic relations with West Berlin, China is not implicitly acknowledging the existing international agreements, Rodin makes clear that East Germany will not rescind the rules on obligatory currency exchange for citizens of Western states.

This is a memorandum on a conversation reflecting the differences of opinion between the head of the China Desk in the East German Foreign Ministry and the First Secretary of the Chinese Embassy Qi Huaiyuan with regard to the intended establishment of a Chinese trade representation in West Berlin. East Berlin is clearly concerned such a step might favor West Germany's alleged goal of winning sovereignty over West Berlin, in violation of the Four Power Agreement. Qi states that he does not understand the East German position, and that the activities of Chinese diplomats in West Berlin are in accordance with international law. He rejects the notion that these relations might conceivably harm the interests of East Germany.

Documents related to East Germany's protest against the intended establishment of a Chinese trade representation in West Berlin. The East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses that West Berlin cannot be regarded as part of West Germany. Therefore, by initiating diplomatic relations with West Berlin without considering the existence of the internationally acknowledged Four Power Agreement on Berlin between the US, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, China is deliberately acting against the interests of East Germany.

An analysis written by the GDR's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the respective positions of European socialist states, socialist states in general, and NATO and other capitalist European states, on the organization of a European security conference, as well as guidance for carrying out the CSCE negotiations based upon an analysis of each side's perceived strengths and weaknesses

East German ambassador to Moscow, Johannes Koenig summarized information he gleaned from various Soviet Foreign Ministry officials about the process leading up to Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s speech of 10 November 1958 and notes of 27 November 1958, which launched the Berlin Crisis.