The Czechoslovakia Executive Committee discusses the anti-Soviet protests of March 28-29 following the defeat of the Soviets by the Czechoslovak national team at the hockey world championships in Stockholm. Segments dealing with procedural or organizational matters and parts where the discussion repeats itself or digresses to other, unrelated issues have been omitted.

Report describing the polarized public response in Czechoslovakia to the Soviet-Czech hockey match during the World Championships in Vienna. The match (which Czechoslovakia lost 2-4) involved multiple fights and when the Soviet anthem played during the final ceremony it was accompanied by deafening boos and catcalls from the audience.

The objectives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia are outlined, as a result of the nationwide party congress on 28 November in Prague.

This transcript shows the Czech party elites choosing against violent repression of the mass protests in Wenceslas Square. More clearly than in almost any other Party document, the reasons for nonviolence are spelled out: such a solution would only temporarily "return calm," it would radicalize the youth, "the international support of the socialist countries can no longer be counted on," and "the capitalist states" might react with a "political and economic boycott."

Calderio's visit to Prague in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis served to solidify the ties between Cuba and Czechoslovakia, relations that would persist until the end of the Cold War. Among the activities of Calderio's visit included attendance of 12th Party Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, meeting with Cuban ambassadors to China, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a promise to attend the meeting of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

The report to Novotny details the happenings of the Cuban Missile Crisis at that time. Great Britain feels out of the loop and hurt by not being consulted by the United States before it took action, while Kennedy is not backing down on the blockade until the missiles are removed. According to the message, it is unclear whether there are nuclear missiles in Cuba at all; an American army colonel admits to the UN that no traces have been found, despite hundreds of photographs taken. In Czechoslovakia, the situation is unchanged; troops are still on alert and awaiting combat orders, with morale running high. There are even some volunteers willing to go to Cuba and aid their Latin comrades.

This concerns the status of Czechoslovak domestic organizations at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Included in the report are the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, Central Council of Labor Unions, Czechoslovak Union of Youth, and the National Front.

This report to Antonin Novotny details the European military situation at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Most NATO troops were on combat alert, but no increased activity or suspicious movements were reported. The Czechoslovak Armed Forces were at combat ready status to repel any attack by NATO.

The record and attached resolution concerns the final decision by the Politburo of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to send arms and "special technology" to Cuba. Among the arms shipped are 2 mobile artillery batteries, 50 million 7.92 mm bullets, and military specialists to aid the Cuban military in the construction of anti-aircraft defenses on Cuban territory. This would prove to be fruitful for the Cubans in the coming Bay of Pigs Invasion.

The report concerns requests from Cuba for shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia, along with providing advisors to the Cuban military. Among the arms being transferred are Czechoslovak fighter planes, automatic rifles and ammunition, mobile artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. Clearly the Cuban desires for arms were fueled by fears of American attack, which would come to fruition in the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion.