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June 1, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Ninth Restricted Session

Zhou reports on his conversation with Molotov and on the ninth restricted session on Indochina. Molotov describes his earlier meeting with Eden. Later, at the ninth session, Zhou insists to his opponents that the NNSC on Korea should serve as a model for NNSC on Indochina.

June 3, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Tenth Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the tenth restricted session on Indochina. Bidault spoke of the five functions of the NNSC for Indochina. Bidault opposes Poland's and Czechoslovakia's participation in the NNSC because he believes communist nations cannot be neutral.

June 4, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Eleventh Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the eleventh restricted session on Indochina. During the session, Zhou opposes using the UN as a supervisory body, and asserts that the joint commission should take major responsibility in implementing the armistice, and that the NNSC's function is to supervise the joint commission's work and the Indochina borders.

June 5, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twelfth Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the twelfth restricted session on Indochina. Participants consider Zhou's proposal that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva Conference participants. Molotov gives his counterarguments to Smith's and Bidault's statements.

June 7, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Concerning Consultations among the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese Delegations

Zhou informs the CCP that he is sending the twelve terms on the Indochina armistice issue to be discussed on the 8th.

June 22, 1954

Cable from Zhou Enlai, 'Premier’s Intentions and Plans to Visit India'

Zhou Enlai informed the Chinese government that his purposes of visiting India were to prepare the signing of an Asian peace and to build peace in the Indochina area. He also stated his plans regarding the negotiations of several treaties. The Chinese government agreed with his plans.

June 28, 1954

Record of the First Meeting between Premier Zhou and Prime Minister U Nu

Zhou Enlai and U Nu first talked about the decision made on the Geneva Conference regarding the armistice in the Korean Peninsula and the role of the US in it. Then they talked about the elements that complicated the Sino-Burmese relations and the need for building mutual trust and signing a non-political agreement. They also discussed the principles they would have in a joint statement before the signing of this potential agreement.

June 21, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Sixteenth Restricted Session

Zhou reports on his meeting with the four partner delegations to bid farewell to Comrade Nam Il and to discuss the proposals of Laos and Cambodia. Also, Zhou discusses the three points of agreement both sides made during the sixteenth restricted session on Indochina.

June 23, 1954

Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Pierre Mendès-France

Mendes-France and Zhou discuss the Indochina issue during their first meeting together. Both men feel they are in agreement with each other regarding several points (establishing a cease-fire before discussing political issues, that no US military bases should be established in Indochina, elections in Cambodia and Laos, cooperation between France and Vietnam and between the two sides in Vietnam). They end on a positive note, both certain that their few differences of opinion will be worked out.

March 2, 1954

'Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference,' Prepared by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (drafted by PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai) [Excerpt]

Zhou discusses the need to make agreements at the Geneva conference in order to open a path for discussion and negotiation with the west. Zhou notes that because the US, France and Britain are not united in their opinions, the CCP must hold fast to their positions on the peaceful unification of Korea, and of peace in Indochina. Finally, Zhou suggests that the CCP prepare to discuss issues of trade, relaxing international tensions, and breaking the US embargo, although these issues are not on the agenda.

Pagination