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United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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"The Bundeshaus (Federal Building) in Bonn, West Germany, May 1961. "

Western Europe

West Germany

George H.W. Bush and Lech Walesa

CIA Reports on the Collapse of Communism in Europe

The Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik) in Berlin

Eastern Europe

East Germany

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich

1931- 2022

Photograph of Helmut Kohl, 1982.

Kohl, Helmut

1930- 2017

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Western Europe

Germany

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Indian Nuclear History

Nuclear Proliferation

Israeli Nuclear History

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Yeltsin, Boris

1931- 2007

Truman with Attlee and Stalin at Potsdam

Cold War Origins

Brazilian Nuclear History

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

Erich Honecker, 1976.

Honecker, Erich Ernst Paul

1912- 1994

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September 8, 1986	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'President Sarney and Brazil’s Nuclear Policy' A Directorate of Intelligence analysis, prepared in 1986, provides an interesting contrast with excisions in the NIEs on the indigenous program; it includes details on the major Navy, Air Force, and Army components of the indigenous program, including the nuclear submarine objective. As with the NIEs, the authors of this report saw no “political decision” on nuclear weapons and further noted President Sarney’s public statements against a weapons program. But a piece of political intelligence initially excised from this report suggested, rightly or wrongly, that Sarney may have been personally ambivalent.
December 1985	Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints' The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to US or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities. According to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.”
October 21, 1983	Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 93-83, 'Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints' Brazilian nationalism has often posed a challenge to US official precepts on the way the world should work and these estimates convey the deep Brasilia-Washington gap over nuclear policy during the 1980s. The SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to U.S. or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities.
January 20, 1966	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation' This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.
December 10, 1948	Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum for the President on the Situation in Berlin CIA Memorandum for President Truman on US position on Soviet actions in Berlin.
September 28, 1948	Central Intelligence Agency Report, "Consequences of a Breakdown in Four-Power Negotiations on Germany" Summarizes Soviet objectives and strategies in entering into Four-Power discussions about Berlin and Germany.
October 21, 1964	National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, 'Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade' This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”
June 23, 1963	National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-63, 'Likelihood and Consequences of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems' This NIE comes to the general conclusions that “there will not be a widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons over the next 10 years” and discusses programs in various countries (Israel, China, Sweden, India, West Germany, Japan, etc.) This copy includes newly declassified references to the Israeli nuclear weapons program, including the conclusion that “the Israelis, unless deterred by outside pressure, will attempt to produce a nuclear weapon some time in the next several years.”