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Documents

October 25, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 61

In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

March 12, 1962

Alexei Adzhubei's Account of His Visit to Washington to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law and the editor-in-chief of Izvestia, reports on his meetings with US journalists and officials in Washington, DC. Especially significant was his 30 January meeting with President John F. Kennedy in which Kennedy compared the communist revolution in Cuba with the 1956 Hungarian Revolution suppressed by the Soviet Union. Adzhubei also described Kennedy's comments on German reunification.

November 2, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'The Problem of How to Express a Position on the Cuban-Soviet Relationship'

A request from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba to the Foreign Ministry office, asking advice on the position they should take in regards to the complex Soivet-Cuban relationship. The embassy suggests China support the speech made by Castro on 1 November 1962, but that otherwise discussions of Soviet-Cuban relations should not be discussed at Chinese initiative.

November 2, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'The Soviet Union Continued a Reconciliatory Approach to the Cuban Problem'

A report from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union about Soviet-Cuban relations in the build-up of US-Cuban tensions. According to this Chinese document, the Soviet's involvement is one of hopeful reconciliation in the Cuban problem.

October 1964

The Polyansky Report on Khrushchev’s Mistakes in Foreign Policy, October 1964

Excerpt from a report prepared by Politiburo member Dmitry Polyansky on Khrushchev's foreign policy mistakes, presented at 14 October 1964 CPSU Central Committee plenum. Polyansky included a scathing denunciation of Khrushchev’s “adventurism” in sending the missiles to Cuba, causing the “deepest of crises [that] brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war.” Ridiculing Khrushchev’s claims of having achieved a successful “penetration” of Latin America, Polyansky dismissed his contention that the crisis had in fact ended with a Soviet victory.

November 6, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Instruction on How to Express Positions Regarding the Cuba-Soviet Relationship'

Instructions from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Cuba instructing them to indicate their support for Fidel Castro's November 1st speech, but advising "with respect to the Cuban-Soviet relationship, [you] should not speak but listen [zhiting bushuo]."

November 16, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, Havana, 16 November 1962

The conversation takes place soon after the IL-28 crisis, which gives Mikoyan a chance to patch up the relationship with trade agreements and promises of future aid and industrial cooperation. Near the end of the conversation, Guevara and Mikoyan discuss the theory of revolutionary struggle. Guevara shares his vision that “further development of the revolutions in Latin America must follow the line of simultaneous explosions in all countries.” Mikoyan cautions him, pointing to the Soviet experience and using the metaphor of the rebellion on the battleship “Potemkin.” Hinting at further disagreement ahead, he gently registers his disagreement with the Cuban leader’s drive to ignite revolution in the hemisphere.

November 13, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana

The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.

November 11, 1962

Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

December 3, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

Pagination