Ulbricht writes to Khrushchev regarding the closing of the border between east and west Berlin.

Ulbricht speaks at the Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.

Ambassador Pervukhin sends the views of the Soviet embassy in East Germany regarding the negotiation of a peace treaty between East Germany and the Soviet Union. It notes that "the most difficult issues which will arise after signing a peace treaty are the practical exercise by [the] GDR organs of effective control over the links between West Berlin and the FRG and the establishment of a regime over the movement of the population between West and Democratic Berlin."

Ambassador Pervukhin reports to Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko on the position of the East German government regarding the possibility of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany and a resolution to the ambiguous status of Berlin. The report also discusses the possibility of enforcing better border controls between east and west Berlin in order to "close 'the door to the West.'"

CIA Memorandum for President Truman on US position on Soviet actions in Berlin.

Summarizes Soviet objectives and strategies in entering into Four-Power discussions about Berlin and Germany.

1973 agreement between the Stasi and the KGB outlining their cooperative efforts to fight "ideological subversion" and uncover "the hostile plans of the enemy." Both secret services would also exchange information gathered by their espionage activities and provide mutual support in infiltrating agents. Of particular mutual interest was espionage against the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. To this end, the KGB was permitted to recruit East German citizens, and the MfS would secure their ongoing contacts.

A cable from the West German Embassy in Washington, D.C. discussing the threat to American security posed by an "offensive" Soviet base in Cuba, insights provided by recent intelligence, the purpose and the impact of the American blockade of Cuba, negotiations that have taken place at the United Nations, Soviet intentions during the Cuban crisis and, finally, a comparison of Cuba to the situation in Berlin.

Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.

Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.