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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

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Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

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Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

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Drozniak, Edward

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Photograph of John F. Kennedy in 1963

Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald)

1917- 1963

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Milnikiel, Eugeniusz

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Krajewski, Aleksander

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President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

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Nikita Khrushchev Collection

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October 25, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 61 Protocol 61 indicates Khrushchev was already taking steps away from the crisis unfolding. Khrushchev decided that the ships carrying the IRBM missiles (the R-14s) on the high seas should turn around and come home.
October 23, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 60 Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.
July 6, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 40 Malin provides notes from Issa Pliev, who would be named commander of Soviet forces in Cuba. They make reference to Kennedy's Independence Day speech, and draft a response, to the remarks made therein.
July 1, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 39 Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.
November 2, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.
October 27, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."
October 23, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.
December 14, 1962	Mongolian Embassy in Moscow, Record of Conversation between the Mongolian Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade Alberto Mora Becerra Mongolian Ambassador in Moscow Luvsan and the visiting Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade Alberto Mora make plans for future trade negotiations between Mongolia and Cuba. They also discuss the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the effect of the US embargo on Cuba's trade relations with Latin American countries and the sale of its sugar harvest.
November 28, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana, Conversation with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodrigue Summary of comments made by Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Rodriguez criticizes the Soviet Union's decision to withdraw its missiles, questioning the Soviet commitment to the defense of Cuba.
November 10, 1962	Soviet Report on the Cuban Missile Crisis Based on Intelligence Materials Summary of intelligence sources reporting that the US had been preparing for an invasion of Cuba and Kennedy only used the installation of missiles as a pretext to carry out aggressive actions. The US carried out the blockade also to warn the Soviet Union against signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR and to strengthen the position of the Democratic Party before the election. According to the report, other capitalist countries agreed that it was only the flexible policy of the USSR that prevented the outbreak of war.