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Documents

February 13, 1976

Information regarding the meeting of the fraternal intelligence services held in Prague on the 13th and the 14th of February 1976

Summary of main points from the meeting of the fraternal intelligence services held in Prague on the 13th and the 14th of February 1976.

February 6, 1945

Letter from President Roosevelt to Stalin on an Acceptable Compromise Regarding the Composition of the Postwar Polish Government, 6 February 1945

Letter from President Roosevelt to Stalin on an Acceptable Compromise Regarding the Composition of the Postwar Polish Government; discussing Soviet actions and the Polish government.

November 25, 1980

Activities of Opposition Elements at the Gdansk Shipyard - On the Conditions of the New Social-Political Situation

Report on the situation in the Gdansk Shipyard. Also discusses the opposition's methods, and individual members of the opposition.

August 20, 1968

Report No. 10 from Generals Pavlovsky and Kovalov to Brigadier General Florian Siwicki

General Pavlovsky writes to the Commander of the Polish Second Army, Brigadier General Florian Siwicki. He lists preliminary steps in Operation Danube where the troops enter from Poland into Czechoslovakia.

September 7, 1968

Report from the Political Department of Polish Second Army on the emotional-political condition of the soldiers taking part in Operation ‘Danube’

Report states the morale of soldiers taking part in Operation Danube is still good. But there is still no change in the unfriendly relations between Czech people and Warsaw Pact soldiers. The report describes how the Czech people are under the influence of revisionist and reactionary propaganda. It also details the conflict between Czech soldiers and Polish soldiers. It also gives an update of propaganda being broadcast through Czech radio stations.

April 14, 1988

Lecture by Sergei Akhromeyev, 'The Current State of Soviet Military Doctrine'

This is a transcript of a lecture delivered by Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the Polish General Staff about Soviet military doctrine in early 1988. The document defines what the Soviets meant by military doctrine, differentiating between the doctrine of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by stressing the former’s wider range objectives, especially concerning the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, it identifies contemporary issues facing Soviet doctrine and analyzes topics such as nuclear non-proliferation, reduction of nuclear stockpiles and refutes the idea that nuclear weapons should be used in a counter-offensive operation. It stresses the importance of defense, negating offensive military preparedness in lieu of purely defensive Warsaw Pact capabilities (albeit altogether sufficient to successfully deter a NATO attack from the West). It also discusses the results of the March 2-3 1988 NATO talks and concludes that the West is not willing to stop the arms race and is increasing its offensive capabilities. The Warsaw Pact’s response should include increased military research, better vigilance to capture signals of a possible attack and more tactical and technical training for the military command. It asserts that even though a war is less likely than in the past, quoting Gorbachev, “the nature of capitalism itself can be the cause of war.”

February 15, 1977

Plan for Collaboration between Bulgarian and Polish Ministries of the Interior for 1977

June 2007

The KGB vs. Vatican City. Folder 29. The Chekist Anthology.

In this entry Mitrokhin describes the history of chilly diplomatic relations between the KGB and Vatican City from the 1960s through the mid 1980s.

August 3, 1981

Transcript of the Meeting Between Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and Comrade E. Honecker at the Crimea on 3 August 1981 (excerpt)

Brezhnev and Honecker discuss issues related to Poland, including the need for stabilization of the Polish crisis and the composition of the new Politburo.

August 28, 1980

Special Dossier on the Polish Crisis of 1980

Memorandum to the CPSU Politburo from the Suslov Commission regarding a request by the Soviet Ministry of Defense to bring up to full readiness 3 divisions of the Soviet Armed Forces. The memorandum cautions the Soviet leadership that, in case the Polish Armed Forces switch allegiance to the counter-revolutionary forces, another 5-7 divisions might be necessary.

Pagination