1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
Western Europe
North America
1922- 2004
1926-
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1912- 2009
December 15, 1989
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Friday, 15 December 1989 describes the latest developments in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, USSR, East Germany, South Africa, Yugoslavia, Argentina and France.
June 19, 1990
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Tuesday, 19 December 1990 describes the latest developments in USSR, Germany, Poland, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, France and Africa.
May 22, 1964
Noting that the situation that gave rise to NSAM 41 had improved, Read informed Bundy that intelligence reporting would continue but he wanted permission to stop work responsive to the NSAM. There had been “no indication of any attempts by the French to enlist German or Italian cooperation in the Pierrrelatte project.”
July 5, 1963
In this memorandum, Secretary of State Rusk noted Minister Lenz’s denials of any German connection with Pierrelatte or any interest in supporting the French weapons program. He declared that the agencies would continue “reviewing allied attitudes toward the Pierrelatte project and possible measures for inhibiting bilateral cooperation.”
May 29, 1963
In this document, Assistant Secretary to European Affairs, William Tyler, discussed the State Department's request to the US Embassy to ask the West German government whether there was an arrangement in the French-German Friendship Treaty that included a secret annex on military and nuclear cooperation.
May 25, 1963
In this memorandum, Under Secretary Ball recommended making a greater effort to find more information about German or Italian interest in financial and other kinds of support for the Pierrelatte plant. Ball also suggested that Washington minimize German interest in acquiring nuclear fuel from non-US sources by making “assurances of a long-term supply of cheap nuclear fuel for peaceful uses."
May 21, 1963
This AEC report looked at the Pierrelatte plant’s prospective capabilities, possible West German motives for seeking an independent supply of enriched uranium (possibly in cooperation with the French), the “adverse” implications of a French-German project, and policy alternatives available to Washington. If the West Germans were determined to contribute to the French enrichment project, the AEC saw serious risks including the “the prospects of a Franco-German military alliance that could constitute a European third force capable of dominating Western Europe."
May 13, 1963
In this report, the CIA and the AEC found that because the French underestimated the cost of the Pierrelatte plant, they had a reason to consider West German financial aid.They conclude that the West Germans had relevant technical skill and the French may have regarded cooperation as a tactic to dodge Adenauer’s 1954 commitment and also as a “way for German industry to improve its position in the nuclear technological race.”
December 14, 1957
Conversation between John Foster Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer at a NATO meeting. Dulles learned from Adenauer that the French-West German project on nuclear weapons research would soon come to include Italy, to which Dulles expressed reservations and suggested a broader arrangement including the U.S. and the U.K.
February 21, 1990
The assessment by the Austrian Foreign Ministry of German Unity is broken into five subject areas. The first part concerns the responsibility of the Four Powers to a new unified Germany. Next, West Germany's commitment to German unity dating as far back as 1970. The third portion outlines the border and security concerns of East and West Germany, as well as the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and France. The next part is focused on economic recovery, specifically the lack of certain goods in East Germany (ie cars and houses). Finally, the report addresses the future developments of a unified Germany with an emphasis on the security of nearby states.